1. Better Infrastructure Institutions
A discussion paper
September 2013
by
Dr Chris Hale
with
Associate Professor Colin Duffield
Mr Bernardus Djonoputro
Mr Leith Doody

2. This paper reviews leading international practice and trends in the institutions and institutional arrangements that support effective policy, planning and
delivery for contemporary infrastructure. We adopt an internationalist perspective, but centre findings and exemplars around applicability to the
Indonesian context.
In this paper, ‘infrastructure’ covers both urban and regional contexts. It covers core economic and social infrastructure - with an assumption of
contemporary standards in sustainability and energy efficiency. We assume that high quality outcomes in infrastructure require robust capabilities across
fields such as: urban and regional planning; civil engineering (including environmental engineering and water); urban design and architecture; housing
and social infrastructure; ports and shipping; intermodal freight; airports; mass transit networks; project finance; governance and policy. It is suggested
that middle-income status for a country like Indonesia implies and demands new standards in performance across these fields and comprehensive
working inter-relationships among them.
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1
The paper hopefully acts to stimulate thinking and discussion around the potential to establish a new multi-partner Indonesian Institute of Infrastructure.
The writing of this paper has been supported with a project grant from INDII (Indonesian Infrastructure Initiative) but the views contained herein reflect
only the current thinking of the authors - and are not related to official INDII positions.

3. Table of Contents
2. Background – infrastructure and the 21st century society
Pg 4
3. Excellence in Planning and Delivery – international exemplar cities and regions
Pg 5
4. Research Hubs and Units
Pg 7
5. Professional Institutes
Pg 9
6. Industry Associations & Lobby Groups
Pg 10
7. NGOs & Not-for-profits
Pg 12
8. Infrastructure in Government
Pg 13
9. Seamless Delivery – a new paradigm of policy and projects
Pg 15
10. Key Themes in Indonesian Infrastructure
Pg 16
11. Workable Options
Pg 18
12. Recommendations – a new institute that suits Indonesian circumstances
Pg 23
13. Bibliography
Pg 25
2
Pg 3
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1. Executive Summary

4. To arrive at this contention, the authors have initially reviewed
international trends in infrastructure thinking, policy and investment –
and suggest that infrastructure is now much more than a self-referential
sector based on hard-edged engineering and construction outcomes. The
authors contend that the ‘soft’ elements of policy, pricing, skills,
planning, design, assessment and finance are evolving rapidly, and new
support is needed to allow the infrastructure sector in any given country
to keep up with the pace of international change.
We then review the state of play among various institutional exemplars
internationally. We break this analysis down according to the ownership
or membership of such institutes – running across professional
institutes, research units, business associations, NGOs and government
units. The activities of the government units are offered for contextual
purposes, to demonstrate the manner in which government postures
toward infrastructure policy and delivery are changing rapidly. The
other organisations are listed with a view to identifying salient attributes
and activities that are either worthy of strong consideration for a
potential new Indonesian infrastructure institute, or worth avoiding in
some instances. The sense arises from the civil society exemplars that an
institute focused on infrastructure-specific research, knowledgeexchange, intra-sector dialogue and trust-building is worthy of pursuit.
Some of the advanced institutional exemplars distinguish themselves by
focusing their infrastructure discussions under a ‘public interest’ rubric.
In part 10, we review and group various technical themes and topics in
infrastructure and policy. We suggest that the creation of topic-coherent
‘special interest groups’ may form an effective way to structure a new
infrastructure institute in a manner that improves the relevance and
personalised experience for institute members. The special interest
groups could function as key units for proposing and initiating research
and knowledge-exchange activities of a future institute. We then sketchout a potential institute structure, alongside a presumed resource base to
deliver a critical threshold of industry-relevant activity. As with each
part of the discussion paper, this sketch of resourcing and potential
structure is mobilised as a hypothesis - and we hope that industry
stakeholders will respond to suggestions with their own ideas, either
confirming or disagreeing with the sketched concept as they see fit.
In concluding, the paper touches on some advanced intellectual
parameters for a potential institute, including the need to focus firstly on
supporting broad-based economic development progress. We suggest an
‘independent but close’ relationship to government for the institute, and
canvas various issues in resourcing, membership, focus, and policy
direction with an encouragement for stakeholders to submit their own
views in response.
3
This document puts forward a hypothesis – that a new multi-partner
infrastructure institute would be valuable and beneficial to Indonesia’s
infrastructure sector and hence to overall economic and social
development objectives and outcomes.
We then summarises an emerging concept of ‘seamless infrastructure
delivery’, which draws on best practice approaches from policy
development, through initiation of project concept planning, into
assessment, detailed design, technical refinement, and then delivery.
This open and transparent ‘process-based’ approach to infrastructure
projects is currently seen as a key factor in better projects and more
effective delivery. But the demands of a more advanced process
presumably frame the knowledge needs of the infrastructure sector in
developing countries – hence these demands frame the potential role and
activities of a new infrastructure institute.
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1. Executive Summary

5. Infrastructure can be taken in a narrow sense, to mean hard
infrastructure such as ports, roads, buildings, electricity supply and
water treatment systems. But these ‘hard’ elements and systems exist
within a complex economic and social context. Therefore, more up-todate thinking recognises the role of ‘soft infrastructure’ such as policy,
pricing, project assessment methods, governance, and capabilities for
delivery. These soft infrastructures can exist in an ad-hoc and
opportunist state at one end of a spectrum – or alternatively they can be
‘institutionalised’ in some fashion or other. We should recognise
excessively inflexible institutionalisation of infrastructure outcomes and
mechanisms as a problem in its own right. So - infrastructure
institutions, settings and ‘soft’ or policy-related elements ultimately
need to be positioned at some workable and practical space between
excessive informality and opportunism on the one hand, versus
excessive rigidity and stasis at the other end of our spectrum. Changed
and changing economic, social and technological circumstances require
Infrastructure work is, by definition, group work. Even the smallest
infrastructure project requires a cast of hundreds from conception,
through design and planning, into approval and endorsement, and then
delivery. Risks are many, but so are rewards when well-conceived
economic or social infrastructure is delivered effectively. Trust is a key
element in successful infrastructure projects, while hard-edged elements
of governance are required to guard against and manage the most
difficult of project risks. Differing individual perspectives,
organisational needs and professional capabilities demand opportunities
for open discussion and trust-building. Research and evidence-based
analysis plays an increasingly important role in informing policy
choices and actual practice. Structured skills-development lies at the
core of enhanced personal, institutional and sectoral capacity.
A quality infrastructure program is inherently based on effective interrelationships between demographic and social need and chosen
infrastructure solutions. This implies that transport infrastructure should
be integrated with housing, recreational, work and shopping
opportunities. Industrial land must be connected with freight-movement
mechanisms. Metropolitan-scale growth needs to be balanced by
regional-scale provision and protection of parkland, open space,
agricultural, and forestry lands. Water resources are finite and crucial.
Systems of movement should enhance and nurture city environments
and streets rather than overwhelming them. And the very dynamism of
cities means that opportunities abound for innovative financing of
much-needed urban transport, electricity, water and other infrastructure.
The society that grasps these elements and works with them effectively
creates its own, much better future.
4
Great diversity is evident among contemporary societies the world over,
but also much commonality in themes and influences. We can talk at a
philosophical level of the elements that make up any given society.
These include; inherited but evolving non-material culture such as
language, ritual, and social norms; material culture and consumerism;
the arts; systems of government; science and education; human
settlements and dwellings – both traditional and contemporary; and
trade, business and production. But increasingly, across all these
elements of human society and many more – we recognise the role of
infrastructure in sustaining, supporting, connecting and improving the
social and material condition.
institutions and arrangements that are flexible, responsive, socially and
environmentally responsible, and economically progressive.
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2. Infrastructure and the Contemporary
Society

6. 3. Excellence in Planning & Delivery –
international exemplar cities & regions
benchmarking of infrastructure and planning approach against that
achieved or targeted in other developing countries.
Jakarta, as the Indonesian mega-city and powerhouse of the Indonesian
economy, faces a difficult choice in terms of infrastructure and planning
reference-points. Likewise, medium-scale cities such as Surabaya are
presented with two essentially very different pathways and reference
cases for economic development. The two ‘options’ in question involve
a choice between an agenda for a high-quality medium to higher-income
urban growth trajectory, versus a planning and infrastructure approach
that entrenches low-to-medium income status into the future.
By contrast, some cities in the developing world are captive to a
dynamic of lower expectations and benchmarks. This is very
understandable, given resource and delivery constraints – but carries its
own specific implications, parameters and risks. Certain Latin American
cities have charted a path toward rapid expansion of BRT infrastructure
(for example). And a mega-city like Bogota now grapples with the
5
Conversely, medium-scale Indonesian cities can orient themselves
around recognised planning and infrastructure reference exemplars like
Washington DC, Melbourne, Munich, or any number of advanced
European cities. Neighbouring Kuala Lumpur is another interesting
reference case, in which the ambition seems to be about matching-up
against the standards delivered in Singapore (for example), rather than a
Picture: Yamanote Line, Tokyo. Tokyo is acknowledged as a world leader in mega-city
infrastructure and economic power. But few pause to reflect on Tokyo’s past as a poor city, or
the investment and development pathway that sustained its economic transition over time.
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The ‘high quality’ reference points for Jakarta include locations like;
Tokyo, Osaka, Hong Kong, Seoul, London and perhaps the San
Francisco Bay Area. Chinese mega-cities such as Shanghai and
Guangzhou have also set an interesting direction, by aspiring to and
developing first-world standard infrastructure, during a growth phase
from low to middle income status (and ultimately beyond).
Additionally, we recognise the important role that a location like
Singapore has played, albeit at a lower population benchmark, in setting
an agenda for long-term transition out of developing world status,
through middle-income, and ultimately into higher-income living
standards, infrastructure, and city conditions.

7. reality that ‘quick and reasonably low-cost’ roll-out of BRT systems has
been achieved, but next phases of mass transit infrastructure
development demand higher capacity and quality-of-service. South
American cities clearly don’t have the same resources as many cities in
the developed world. But those same South American locations
increasingly recognise that a ‘limitation on expectations and standards’
across urban design, planning and infrastructure makes them a captive
in future to those same lower standards.
involves innovative and flexible approaches to project financing and
implementation.
India presents another intriguing paradigm. In locations like Delhi, rapid
expansion of Metro transit is being achieved - but a choice to make
marginal cost savings by limiting design and infrastructure quality of
stations (particularly) seemingly entrenches another generation of
developing-world status. This at the very time that economic growth
would suggest emergence into middle-income standard urban
environments is possible.
Picture: BRT - Bogota, Colombia. Bogota achieved transformation of urban people-movement
with bus rapid transit, but the system appears to be at-capacity just a handful of years after
opening. The balance between cost and capacity is a common debate for developing cities.
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While Indonesian cities and infrastructure developers should be mindful
of the needs of lower-income citizens – those citizens are seemingly
best served by a rapid and sustained transition to middle and higher
income status through a high-quality approach to urban infrastructure.
This implies an emphasis on productive institutions, high professional
standards and reference points, as well as effective planning processes,
inter-organisational communication and co-operation, and independent
assessment of competing projects and investment priorities. It also
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We recommend deep consideration of the high-standard infrastructure,
planning, and city design approaches that have successfully supported
the transition to middle and higher income status among cities like
Singapore, Hong Kong, Seoul, Nagoya, Tokyo, Osaka and more
recently Shanghai or other large Chinese cities.

8. A research and learning facility such as UC Berkeley’s ‘City and
Regional Planning’ unit has attained pre-eminent status within its areas
of operation - through lengthy track record, a large faculty, and depth of
resourcing. Berkeley CRP offers quality interaction between
knowledge-creation (through research), and teaching/learning or
publication activities (‘knowledge transfer’). Although there is
anecdotally a significant and meaningful interaction between Berkeley
CRP and industry or government – those links are not always overtly or
clearly formalised, and tend perhaps toward the activities of individual
academics. Berkeley’s main mechanism for overcoming the
planning/engineering divide is through the activities of key staff
members who have formal credentials in both of these inter-dependent
fields. Berkeley CRP does not currently offer a high profile in
infrastructure finance - which could render a perception of limitation
into ‘traditional’ concepts and approaches of planning.
Melbourne University’s architecture, building and planning department
founded the GAMUT unit several years ago (‘Governance and
Management of Urban Transport’). While GAMUT is thematically
coherent, it has only a small permanent staff and has struggled
somewhat to attain high levels of published output in recent times,
especially after the departure of a particularly prominent individual lead
The University of Wollongong founded the SMART infrastructure unit
relatively recently. SMART’s launch was attended with high levels of
publicity and the overt promise of something ‘new and comprehensive’
in infrastructure research. SMART has attained some level of
relationships to industry and government – although these appear to be
at the level of individuals more than formal institution-to-institution
arrangements. SMART could be perceived to have a low research
output (or impact) relative to its resource base – and it is not clear that
the staffing of SMART is entirely in-line with ambitions to be a
specialist infrastructure research organisation (rather than a group of
diverse researchers turning their attention to infrastructure). SMART’s
regional location could be perceived as something of a hindrance in the
realm of urban infrastructure – but the unit does not seem to orient itself
explicitly around the regional infrastructure context in which it could
conceivably gain a clear competitive advantage.
ARRB Group (originally the ‘Australian Roads Research Board’) has a
50 year history as a major not-for-profit research unit, after starting with
a variety of Australian state and national government departments as
foundation funding members. ARRB explains that the rationale for its
creation was to collectively carry out road transport research exercises
that could otherwise not be justified or resourced individually. ARRB’s
core membership and funding currently comprises federal, state and
local transport organisations – but has diversified significantly to
encompass a wide variety of strategic, opportunistic, and purely
commercial funding sources. ARRB’s activities have also now
significantly diversified – and include; knowledge exchange and
‘information services’, road infrastructure and design expertise,
transport strategy, road safety, and advanced technical equipment
7
Internationally, a number of infrastructure-related research ‘hubs’,
‘units’ or ‘institutes’ have emerged whose progress and agenda is worth
tracking and discussing. Broadly, it is observed that these units can
either follow ‘organic’ growth and development trajectories, or they can
adopt a ‘big-bang’ approach based around heavy publicity and
aspiration.
researcher. GAMUT’s relationships with government and industry could
be perceived as somewhat limited.
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4. Research Hubs and Units

9. The Australian “CRC” (co-operative research centre) concept was
inaugurated around1990 – with the intention of integrating industry
interests with the research competencies of universities, under a hybrid
multi-partner funding model. CRCs have been widely successful in
delivering meaningful industry-university connections, and are
recognised to have delivered valuable research and knowledge advances
across a range of scientific and industry fields. On the other hand, CRCs
are often criticised (by academics particularly) for having a top-heavy,
highly managerial approach that is disproportionate to research budgets,
and which can marginalise individual researchers of high standing into
‘research staff’ roles (while simultaneously being entirely dependent on
their output for credibility). CRCs also receive criticism for their
‘equity’ stance across universities – and it is sometimes contended that
We would suggest that a new multi-partner Indonesian institute of
infrastructure needs a multi-university research capability at its core. It
could conceivably become a high-profile research unit in its own right
by commissioning research output from a handful of pre-committed
Indonesian and international member university research teams.
8
Stuttgart University’s Centre for Transportation Research is
noteworthy because it combines the transport-related research interests
of a diverse variety of units and individual university researchers under
one umbrella. In this manner, a range of competencies such as rail
engineering, transport planning, geomatics, IT, and business (to mention
but a few) are integrated around common or inter-related transport
topics. Under the Centre, specific stand-alone units such as the Institute
of Railway and Transportation Planning and Engineering offer
important exemplars, through their longstanding profile and
acknowledged competency across both technical, engineering-driven
concerns alongside the broader social and economic contexts of rail
transport infrastructure.
lower-status regional universities are effectively learning from the larger
or more established universities in the CRC, rather than contributing
original research outputs in their own right. The strength of the CRC
model lies in its flexibility – with different CRCs being variously
housed in a particular university, existing as a stand-alone office (with
input from a range of university researchers), or even existing in the
‘virtual’ sphere in some instances (rather than having a bricks-andmortar home). They span a long list of partner universities and have
involvement from a wide variety of Australian jurisdictions, companies,
and government departments. CRCs have become one of the key
mechanisms for industry-university research connections in the
Australian context. The CRC for Water Sensitive Cities is a
recognised leading exemplar – whose activities seemingly hold
resonance for the concept of an Indonesian institute of infrastructure.
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(including design thereof). ARRB offers a useful exemplar because of
its rich history, diverse but coherent activities, up-to-date attitudes to
funding and resourcing, leading-edge technical expertise, public interest
agenda, and a universally high regard and standing in the national and
international transport research community.

10. Engineers Australia offers ‘registered practicing engineer’ status to
professionals across the civil and other engineering disciplines in
Australia. Engineers Australia is to all intents and purposes a monopoly
institute in this role – a phenomenon mirrored by similar institutes
stemming culturally from the UK’s Institution of Civil Engineers.
These institutes straddle mundane activities such as intra-industry
networking with the quite different demands of a quasi-regulatory role.
As an example – engineering programs at even the most prestigious of
Australia’s universities require regular accreditation from Engineers
Australia for those programs and degrees to be acceptable as a
credential for establishing ‘practicing engineer’ status for the holder.
Clearly this is a somewhat self-referential and circular dynamic -
Similarly, the Planning Institute of Australia (PIA) provides
‘registered practicing planner’ status to holders of three year
undergraduate degrees with threshold levels of workplace experience
(tellingly, this experience must be completed under the supervision of
another PIA member). A registered planner is, in the final analysis,
credentialed mainly for the processing of development applications or
various project approvals under pre-existing planning schemes (ie preparation, submission, or assessment). This role definition is very
similar to that played in the United States by the American Planning
Association (APA). Although we recognise the important current role
of organisations like PIA or APA, there are broader questions as to
whether their accreditation or ‘continuing professional development’
thresholds are appropriate for the demands faced in creating
metropolitan-scale strategic plans, or in project development and
implementation work for major infrastructure projects. Indeed, these
organisations themselves face regular internal discussion around the
standards expected of higher-level practitioners and experts – although
no definitive solution has yet been tabled. As with organisations like
Engineers Australia – many advanced practitioners or experts may
transition into a career trajectory for which APA or PIA membership
becomes less relevant or crucial over time.
9
Professional institutes offer a fulcrum for networking and exchange
within a particular profession, alongside representation of that
profession to key external stakeholders. The point-of-difference between
professional institutes and the other organisations discussed in this
document lies in their accreditation role, and hence they often also
feature greater depth of membership (within a particular profession).
The role of professional institutes is evolving – but a coherent critique
of these institutes could revolve around their focus on minimum
standards and entry into professional status. It could be suggested that
these institutes don’t sufficiently distinguish between the credentials and
standards applicable for early-career, entry-level professionals, versus
those operating at higher levels of seniority, technical complexity,
project scale, or social impact. There is seemingly no professional
institute in the world that focuses explicitly on ‘major infrastructure’ or
its planning, finance and delivery, But there is nothing to suggest at this
stage that such an institute would not be useful in Indonesia – possibly
even featuring some form of accreditation role in future.
although at this stage the role of Engineers Australia faces no serious
challenge in the regulatory sphere. The greatest question for such
institutes perhaps lies in their relevance and applicability for advanced
practitioners and experts – whose own individual credentials may lend
them unassailable in roles outside the narrow confines of ‘signing off’
for plans or on-paper technical designs. Advanced practitioners may no
longer see value in membership of an institute focused on lower-level
credentials for specific technical roles and activities.
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5. Professional Institutes

11. In summary it is mainly this ‘agenda-setting’ dynamic which renders the
industry bodies worthy of review and consideration. While an
Indonesian institute of infrastructure would need to be prominent, and
have a clear role in public discussion or agenda-setting, we might hope
it would be continuously mindful of public and taxpayer interests, and
evidence-based in its approach to agendas and policy issues.
Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (IPA) is a group with diverse
membership but focused almost exclusively on the issue of PPPs. IPA is
actually very small by staff numbers, and tends to operate mainly in the
space of public and media debate, and through consistent involvement
in government-sponsored ‘studies’ and ‘working groups’. Without being
overly critical, it seems at times remarkable that IPA has been
Urban Taskforce is another small (3 staff) Australian group which has
arisen out of the perceived need for the real estate development industry
(particularly) to intensify its communication on infrastructure-related
issues. Urban Taskforce is, again, focused on media impact and profile
(and internal member discussion to some degree) – rather than having a
robust and coherent research, knowledge-development, policy
formulation, or capability-building role. Its focus on themes of ‘private
development profits supported by public funding for infrastructure’
could be perceived as counter-productive for any larger, broader and
more co-operative sectoral discussion around better infrastructure
outcomes (or collaborations). Urban Taskforce was part of a successful
lobbying effort to overturn a widely-accepted ‘user pays’ infrastructure
funding regime across Australia in recent years, in favour of a return to
state and local government infrastructure subsidies for privatelydeveloped housing estates.
Property Council of Australia self-describes mainly as a ‘champion of
the interests of members’ and a ‘business ally’ of members, rather than
specifically being an organisation based on professional standards,
knowledge development, or knowledge transfer (although it lays
contestable claims to such activities). Certainly, the Property Council
10
Industry bodies are a particularly pervasive phenomenon in a market
like Australia – where small but well-resourced groups can be
physically and philosophically prominent-enough to be relevant and
active sounding-boards for both industry and government actors. It is
not clear whether this dynamic of a very large number of small and
diverse industry representative groups could be relevant in a market like
Indonesia - where population is an order of magnitude greater. In any
case, the role of these industry bodies is worth reviewing and
canvassing. While they could be perceived as relatively weak on
research and knowledge-transfer, their achievement in setting an agenda
for public discourse and policy decisions is successful out of all
proportion (and hence an interesting phenomenon in its own right). As a
first point of contrast, it is clear that industry bodies are substantially
less prominent in a larger, more diverse marketplace like the United
States (the reputation for industry lobbying in Washington DC
notwithstanding).
successful in retaining government membership - as an organisation
devoted mainly to furthering the interests of its private sector ‘big
corporate’ stakeholders. IPA could be perceived as largely not relevant
to harder-edged issues and developments in evidence-based
infrastructure policy, governance, and financing. IPA tends to focus on
re-iterating a set of clear and consistent messages around the desirability
of private involvement in public infrastructure delivery where
government resources are limited – and accordingly is invariably
prominent in any corporate or private sector-led discussion around these
topics.
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6. Industry Associations

12. Urban Land Institute (ULI) is a prominent US organisation that seems
to effectively balance a ‘big corporate’ membership base with a
publically-spirited and responsible role in policy advocacy and policy
development, plus the dissemination of progressive planning and real
estate ideas. Urban Land Institute has around 80 years track record –
and currently focuses on concepts of ‘smart growth’, and important
contemporary housing and infrastructure issues with a social and
environmental dimension, while retaining a mainstream membership
base in the real estate and development sectors. ULI’s apparently
substantive resource base seems to allow it the opportunity to engage
In summary, the networking, events-management, and public advocacy
roles of all these industry associations are worth noting. It is suggested
that the US-based ULI exemplar provides better overall guidance, due to
their inherent acknowledgement of the public interest in policy
discussion. Correspondingly, ULI also appears to have a strong and
proactive research capability at its core – which presumably forms an
important component for any emergent Indonesian infrastructure
institute.
11
highly-credentialed researchers to deliver its policy papers or analysis.
ULI also offers a ‘panel’ formation role (essentially a clearing-house for
technical input) and ‘technical assistance’ more broadly. As with many
US-based NGOs, these roles tend to straddle into consulting – and there
would clearly be a debate as to whether such roles are suitable in the
context of a new Indonesian institute of infrastructure. We might
comment that overall, ULI represents a similar sectoral membership
base to an equivalent Australian organisation in the Property Council,
but the tenor of its core ideas on planning and infrastructure are
recognisably more up-to-date, progressive, evidence-based, and socially
responsible. One can only assume that being up-to-date is a benefit to
members, rather than a hindrance.
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holds no professional accreditation role. Overall, the Property Council is
quite successful at walking a perceptual line between being an ‘industry
group’ and being an outright lobbyist for industry interests – a role that
it does indeed carry-out reasonably robustly. Property Council’s
relevance to the Indonesian institutional context probably lies in its
sustained success at attracting membership and resources, and its broad
involvement in the property industry across all major cities of Australia.
Property Council seems to have a lively and active membership, a
regular agenda of events, and a high public profile – but articulates a
reasonably narrow view on complex issues such as planning, urban
design, infrastructure, infrastructure finance, or the appropriate role of
public interests (broadly defined) when industry engages with
government on policy questions.

13. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy is a US not-for-profit that focuses
primarily on research, public and industry communication and policy
advocacy. To carry out these functions, Lincoln relies on an endowment
funded model – which in the classic American tradition renders it
largely independent of industry or sectoral fashions. As with ULI,
Lincoln provides a progressive, up-to-date, evidence-based view on
metropolitan planning, sustainable infrastructure (such as mass transit)
and land or housing policy. Lincoln has distinguished itself particularly
through the popularising role of some of its staff – as noted writers and
communicators for mainstream audiences. Lincoln also offers
scholarships at PhD level for research into key policy or technical
questions. These latter two roles may not be immediately obvious – but
are worthy of initial consideration for a new Indonesian institute.
Embarq is a not-for-profit focused on bus rapid transit (BRT) in
developing cities. Embarq’s activities are oriented mainly to pro-BRT
public relations and promotion, but also span research (loosely defined)
and provision of technical support and expertise on a project basis.
Embarq appears to be extremely well-resourced - with a large
professional and technical staff base. Embarq’s exclusive emphasis on
BRT can be seen as curious, in a world where public transport
traditionally spans a diverse range of modes and options, and where
This dynamic perhaps alerts us of the need for institutions that are
broad-based, diverse, multi-party, independent, and which effectively
balance specific technical options against a sense of policy choices.
Enabling institutions need to prioritise ‘what is best for the taxpayer’
and demonstrate a strong orientation to the public interest.
Presumably a new, multi-partner Indonesian institute of infrastructure
fits into the ‘NGO’ mould in some manner or other. With relatively few
infrastructure-focused NGOs around to provide a template, it falls to
potential members and major stakeholders to proactively chart a course
forward that is largely original, unique, and responsive to circumstance.
12
Beyond government and the commercial sector, the ‘institutional’
landscape of infrastructure sees strong representation from NGOs and
not-for profit organisations. NGOs and not-for-profits are increasingly
focused and professional in their approach -hence their impacts are
growing. Undoubtedly, a new Indonesian institute of infrastructure will
take on some of the roles, outlooks or activities represented among the
organisations here below.
‘mode neutrality’ is valued. A review of Embarq’s membership and
sponsors suggests a strong emphasis on heavy industry, bus and roadrelated interests, and representation from several of the world’s largest
petroleum suppliers. Without being overly critical about Embarq’s wellintentioned work, there could be concerns around the promotion of
particular options and technologies in-line with donor interests.
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7. NGOs & not-for-profits

14. Infrastructure Australia (IA), when formed around 2008, had a
defined role as an assessor and funder of nationally significant
infrastructure projects, drawing on a ‘pool of funds’ as its resource base.
More recently, the ‘pool’ has diminished and IA increasingly focuses on
project assessment, and on working with government partners on a caseby-case basis to fund agreed projects. IA is interesting particularly
because of this assessment and appraisal role. While IA is notionally
‘independent and expert‘, it has struggled to consistently maintain both
of those challenging attributes. But the role and concept of “independent
assessment” is worthy of consideration for any new Indonesian institute.
Presumably a new institute might assist and support a move toward
open, independent assessment. But it may also conceivably have a role
in executing such assessments itself (if that capability were of interest to
stakeholders). IA also maintains a ‘list’ of major projects – although is
running into problems around transparency and the level of information
provided to justify and clarify that list of projects. At present, IA merely
suggests that various projects are more or less ‘preferred’ than others,
without providing substantive justification behind that ranking (although
The trend toward Government-Owned Corporations (GOCs) and
quasi-private provision of infrastructure is worth tracking as an
influential phenomenon in its own right. This trend seems to be
occurring in Indonesia as quickly as anywhere else in the world. Hence
the trend toward GOCs becomes a framing reality around which a new
Infrastructure institute presumably arranges itself in Indonesia. GOCs,
new and old, would also presumably become core members of a new
institute. Some better practice among GOCs is identifiable in a leading
exemplar like:
Hong Kong MTR Corporation successfully straddles the worlds of
government and commercial activity, and shapes Hong Kong as a city
through real estate development, and the infrastructure needed to move
large numbers of people daily. MTR is a profitable, stock market listed
company with HK Government still retaining a large shareholding. In
many respects, MTR is similar to the diversified business model of
private and public railway companies present throughout Asia,
including in Japan. The sheer success of MTR and similar firms in
transport and commercial terms provides a pointer to the level of
sophistication and policy nuance required to deliver world-beating
infrastructure in a developing mega-city like Jakarta over time. The key
finding here is that any new infrastructure institute would need to be
capable of supporting and explaining far-reaching transitions in the role
and capabilities of key infrastructure organisations (and indeed GOCs)
toward advanced practice standards.
13
Government itself seeks to innovate and adapt its approach to
infrastructure through its organisational units and structures. While it is
difficult to position any given example as genuinely ‘best practice’,
there are some roles, functions and trends worth considering in the
context of a potential new Indonesian institute of infrastructure. A new
multi-partner Indonesian institute would not replicate or deliver the
same mainstream public sector activities represented below, but it might
have a significant role in supporting progressive change and adoption of
new approaches. It would lay the research, analytical, skillsdevelopment, and informational foundations to assist and explain
substantive changes and innovations as required.
claiming to perform such analysis out of the public eye). The idea of an
infrastructure ‘list’ and a ranking of projects according to merit is
probably also worthy of consideration among the potential roles of an
Indonesian institute – with the institute supporting and sustaining a
move in that direction at the very least, if asked to do so.
Page
8. Infrastructure in Government

15. The Transbay Joint Powers Authority (TJPA) is a special purpose
vehicle for a massive downtown renewal and station redevelopment
project in San Francisco. A diverse array of state and local government
arms and organisations combine themselves into the TJPA to create a
commercially-focused delivery organisation built on equity
contributions. The key issue here, again, is the rapid evolution and
sophistication of new-era best practice infrastructure delivery
arrangements. An Indonesian institute would presumably need to play a
key role in researching and explaining these new and emerging delivery
models to government, industry and even the general public.
The Partnerships Victoria policy created a specialist PPP unit within
the Department of Treasury and Finance, of the State Government of
Victoria. The unit provides policy leadership and practice guidance in
support of various agencies involved in project delivery. This team
develops policy and project guidelines, provides advisory support to
project teams, convenes training, and assists project teams in their
interface with Victorian State Government. The model is generally
considered to have been successful in raising the standard of projects and has provided the basis for similar arrangements in British Columbia
(Canada), and at the national PPP unit in South Africa.
Within the specific sub-topic of PPPs, there are a number of different
government-owned or managed ‘centres of excellence’ around the
world. The centres typically fall into two categories: a) government
units that encourage and define best practice and provide guidance
material, and b) specialist delivery units with high-end project
management and finance skills. Examples of these groups include:
Infrastructure Ontario (Canada) is a specialist delivery agency that
implements PPP policy across Provincial Government. IO manages a
diverse range of interests such as: integrating between the value of
public infrastructure and real estate; managing government facilities;
and financing the renewal of the province’s public infrastructure. The
focus of the unit has primarily been around lending, project delivery and
real estate management. The strength of this model is consistency, but
questions remain around the depth of understanding provided for
specific sector businesses, projects and activities. It has been suggested
that lack of sectoral specialisation could hinder opportunities for project
optimization.
14
Infrastructure UK is a specialist unit that concentrates on policy
process and arranging finance for projects, but does not deliver projects
directly. Prior to the GFC, this approach had generated a solid pipeline
of projects. The Infrastructure Investments Unit within Scotland
government is somewhat similar.
Page
Public-Private Partnership Center in the Philippines was established
in its current form in 2010 with a charter to support the implementation
of PPPs by facilitating, co-ordinating and monitoring PPP programs and
projects. This is done via the provision of technical assistance and
advisory services, capacity development, and policy formulation and
evaluation. By itself this ‘professional service’ approach initially proved
insufficient to stimulate the hoped-for level of in-country PPP activity.
The Centre was then boosted and complemented by a multi-agency
program to develop, package, competitively tender, and implement new
PPP projects. This additional support facilitated new enabling
capabilities, policy platforms, legal and regulatory reforms and supports,
and institutional frameworks for PPP. Through these measures, the
Centre is seen now to have effectively supported the creation of a
workable pipeline of PPP projects.

16. Rapid changes in technology, society and economy in the early 21
century place ever-greater demands on government and industry to
deliver an infrastructure outcome and city environment that is
acceptable to residents, and which actively fosters better living and
business conditions. At the same time, the profound economic impacts
of decent, well-planned infrastructure mean that opportunities abound
for projects that are either partially ‘self-sustaining’ at the very least, or
fully ‘self-funding’ at best. But this effortless provision of quality
infrastructure through a practical delivery and financing package
depends absolutely on the support and efforts of a broad team of wellrehearsed infrastructure specialists. These specialists will invariably be
working in concert across institutions and jurisdictions.
Some may go so far as to say that great cities, with the best
infrastructure, have become that way through application of high levels
of skill and co-operation in infrastructure conception and delivery
(more than though accident, happenstance, the actions of a single
leadership figure - or through any other specific factor). Great societies
and better cities demand exemplary infrastructure capabilities.
st
In the 21 century the process of effective delivery begins with
advanced analysis and interpretation of existing conditions, the drivers
and sources of change, and the current and future needs of the populace
and businesses. Good planning demands brilliant analysis. Through
good planning, we can identify agreeable policy parameters, and a shortlist of potential infrastructure initiatives and projects. These should then
be assessed at arms-length, and the most compelling prioritised because
of the social, economic, environmental and functional benefits they
If we presume that we are selecting and working with the best project
proposals, offering the greatest array of economic benefits – then project
implementation and financing become radically more straight-forward
and attainable. Conversely, selecting projects for reasons other than a
clear and positive economic contribution implies great difficulty in
financing and even in attaining multi-stakeholder agreement and
commitment. With a compelling financial package and clear triple
bottom-line rationale, the range of beneficiaries is invariably greater.
This smooths the way for an array of institutions, levels-of-government
and industry players to get involved, support, contribute and deliver
from within their respective areas of influence and competency.
But each and every element of this delivery process is entirely reliant
on; individual technical skills, organisational capabilities, trust, open
discussion, and the sharing of advanced knowledge. For these reasons,
infrastructure specialists have often looked at the question of overall
‘institutional and sectoral capabilities’ and identified these as a preexisting requirement that precedes, but ultimately supports the creation
of better infrastructure and better cities.
We believe that for these reasons, the time has come to create the
settings for sustained advancement of skills and capabilities in the
infrastructure sector in Indonesia. Whatever is ventured into an
initiative for developing the analytical, policy, finance and project
capabilities of sectoral stakeholders is likely to be repaid many times
over in the form of more effective, efficient project planning and
delivery. Indonesia’s competitiveness and social dynamism depends on
a major step-forward in the infrastructure sector.
15
st
offer. The best projects will invariably match-up well against pre-agreed
policy guidelines and directions.
Page
9. Seamless Delivery – a new paradigm
of policy and projects

17. SIG – Policy & Investment
This SIG connects with Government of Indonesia objectives to
accelerate delivery of needed infrastructure. A full variety of policy and
financing innovations should be engaged and discussed, including but
not limited to PPPs. Assume that accelerated, more effective project
delivery demands increasingly effective governance and sectoral
performance. This SIG then becomes a key hub for discussion, debate
and research of policy change and investment innovation.
Picture: Transport and urban planning conference in Colombia, 2013. Special interest groups
could frame and initiate topic-specific discussions and events.
SIG – Commercial Transport Infrastructure
This SIG covers the movement of freight and commercial traffic at a
regional scale. This SIG should be positioned at the interface between
international, intra-national (and island-to-island), and localised
16
In this section, we canvas the idea that a new Infrastructure Institute
could find strength in diversity – by providing a number of ‘special
interest groups’ that link with key themes, fields of business activity,
and the topical interests of organisations, government units, and
professionals. Special Interest Groups (SIGs) may allow members to
arrange their input into the institute in a more practical and meaningful
manner, and allow a more personalised experience of membership. The
SIGs may stand coherently as largely self-managing and self-actualising
units within the overall institute, drawing on the leadership of
champions and discipline experts. They could become the key interface
for project-level research funding decisions. The following discussion is
representative, but not exhaustive of the themes and topics that might
form themselves into special interest groups. We envisage the institute
will initially comprise those SIGs with greatest up-front support and
momentum, but the inauguration of new or pre-nominated SIGs should
be pursued as circumstances allow over time.
SIG – Integrated Metropolitan Infrastructure
This SIG covers distinct but inter-related fields such as metropolitan
planning policy, housing and social infrastructure decisions, urban
design, transport strategy, and mass transit networks. This SIG engages
across the infrastructure required to support; quality of life, housing
options that meet contemporary needs, livable attractive cities and
neighbourhoods, and convenient 21st century urban people-movement.
Page
10. Key Themes in Indonesian
Infrastructure

18. movement of commercial vehicles and goods. It comprises a concern for
ports, rail freight corridors, trunk roads, and distribution networks.
SIG – Infrastructure Challenges in Informal Settlements
This SIG addresses the unique and special challenges of providing better
infrastructure and living conditions to informal settlements, and indeed
the future planning and evolution of such locations.
SIG – Airports
This SIG addresses policy, planning, supportive infrastructure and
business models for major and regional airports.
SIG – Infrastructure for Major Regional Cities
This SIG could cluster around urban infrastructure initiatives outside of
Jakarta, particularly in the larger Indonesian cities. It recognises that
medium and larger non-capital cities face their own demands and
conditions. It is also conceivable that this SIG could see much of its
member and group activity taking place outside of Jakarta.
SIG – Communications
This SIG addresses an interest in 21st century telecommunications
infrastructure and uptake of advanced ICT services.
SIG – Water & Sanitation
This SIG clusters around water supply and sanitation infrastructure - and
its planning, engineering, financing, pricing, governance and delivery.
SIG – Energy Supply
This SIG clusters around electricity and gas supply infrastructure - its
planning, engineering, financing, governance and delivery.
Picture: Jakarta’s varied pattern of urban development suggests a broad range of infrastructurerelated interests and topics need to be covered.
Page
SIG – Better Infrastructure for Women
This SIG could provide a forum for driving research and exchanging
information around infrastructure initiatives that enable better outcomes
in women’s health and economic progress. It could also comprise a key
form for women working in the infrastructure sector to meet and
exchange knowledge and support.
17
SIG – Rural Infrastructure and Agriculture
This SIG connects with the substantial population base in rural and
regional Indonesia, and their infrastructure-related needs. It should
cover agriculture, irrigation, social needs, rural supply chains, and
settlement-based planning and infrastructure delivery solutions.

19. “To become known nationally and internationally for its high quality
and independent evidence-based policy advice on infrastructure and the
PPP approach to Indonesian governments at the national, provincial
and local levels, and to Indonesian and international investors and
businesses, and for its capacity building in the public and
private infrastructure sector of Indonesia.”
This mission statement could be rephrased to suggest the institute
should be:
a) independent, but collaborative and multi-themed – with a broad and
diverse membership and support base
b) marshalling highest-level expertise in technical and policy-based
aspects of infrastructure – and in a position to regularly exercise this
expertise through evidence-based research and advice
c) a sustained driver of enhanced capabilities for infrastructure policy,
planning, evaluation, finance, and delivery
On the governance and direction of a new institution
The University of Melbourne accepts most of the governance and
organisational advice offered by Parikesit et al (2012, part 3) regarding
the establishment of a new institute. Especially the scope of activities
(pp 7-8) seems appropriate and comprehensive.
On the other hand, there are a small number of recommendations in
Parikesit et al (2012, part 3) where a contrasting view may prove
valuable at this stage. Particularly the recommendation that the ‘board
of management’ would be separate from the ‘board of researchers’
seems worthy of challenge. This separation and distinction appears
arbitrary and counter-productive - and we recommend, by contrast, the
creation of a single board which incorporates and intertwines high-level
infrastructure research leaders with key partners, sponsors, and
recognised leaders from government and business. We feel a better
outcome is achievable where research, capability-development, and
evidence-based analysis becomes the core focus of discussion for
business and government leaders in board-level interactions with the
institute - in direct consultation and partnership with research leaders.
Neither should the institution’s organisational, governance and strategic
decision-making be kept at a distance from skilled research practitioners
– the best of whom bring track records in organisational governance and
program management to the table, in addition to their technical or
academic skills-base.
The University of Melbourne team also recommends strongly that
‘specific research topics’ (see pp 9-11) should be kept at a thematic
level at this stage, to be decided by the actual board, researchers, and
government or private sector institute members on a case-by-case basis using a system of ‘matching funds and resources’ for specific proposals.
While we accept many or most of the suggested ‘specific topics’ as
18
Parikesit et al (2012, p6) summarised a potential ‘mission’ for an
Indonesian infrastructure institute or centre thus:
These activities would include (in summary, and in-brief): research and
development exercises on agreed topics; skills development and
training; direct policy advice; stimulation of open, broad-based policy
discussion (especially through regular events and publications); and a
certain degree of self-responsibility for sourcing and growing the
institute’s own diversified funding base into the future.
Page
11. Workable Options

20. Roughly similar to the arrangement in Australian CRCs (co-operative
research centres), we suggest that membership should involve twophases of commitment to research projects, and two types of resource
contribution. Member organisations should perhaps contribute in the
following manner:


an up-front annual cash commitment – the majority of which
will cover basic institute operating costs, with another portion
thereof ventured into a ‘base research funding pool’
matching cash commitment from members on a case-by-case
basis for specific research projects that meet the needs and
criteria of a quorum of members. This second-phase cash
commitment to specific research projects is only enacted on the
basis of an accepted, detailed research proposal, which initially
The membership base
The membership of the institute should be diverse and multi-faceted, but
the role of key patron organisations is paramount – especially during
early years of the institute’s operations. We suggest that a first-tier of 35 ‘gold patron’ funding partners is required. These partners could be
committing in the order of $US 100,000 or more per annum in up-front
membership fees, depending on the institute’s ultimate financing and
ramp-up program. Beyond the top tier of funding partners, a larger
selection of between 5-10 ‘silver’ member organisations could
presumably contribute some $50,000 cash per year – as a mixture of upfront fees and ‘matching funds’ for research projects.
And finally, a much larger pool again should be allowed for from
individual medium and small-scale organisations, presumably involving
an affordable annual subscription fee (providing basic access to events)
for individual members. These ‘broader’ membership categories would
presumably not have direct access to or involvement in research
exercises, and would have no role in decision-making and governance.
19
A ‘matched’ funding mechanism for operations and research
At this stage, we put forward the suggestion that specific research
projects would be initiated through the SIG mechanism, on the basis of
demonstrated support from institute partners and members. This holds
implications for the nature of membership and financial contributions.

meets the approval of the SIG for which it is relevant. The
‘matching’ cash commitment can then be combined with pool
funds to finance the research endeavour. There should be an
annual minimum threshold for member’s cash commitment to
research initiatives. This threshold can be exceeded
a mixture of cash and ‘in-kind’ commitment overall (in both upfront annual commitments, and for specific research exercises).
‘In-kind’ contributions include important resources such as; staff
time, use of facilities and equipment, sharing of data and
expertise
Page
worthy and useful, it appears more important at this stage to work
toward those specifics subsequent to the framing influence provided by
the formation of topical special interest groups (SIGs). As such, a
potential institute structure reflecting this thinking is put forward
hereafter for initial consideration (broadly speaking, and subject to
further input and refinement). Other themes, topics, and potential SIGs
not listed above in part 11 might include: social infrastructure; legal
practice and legal reform for infrastructure; land titling and acquisition;
and tracking and publication of overall industry or sectoral performance
analytics – including perhaps the regular publication of a presumed,
projected or acknowledged ‘infrastructure pipeline’.

21. $US 400,000
Overall makeup, role and resourcing of the board
The board may presumably comprise a maximum of around 12 persons
– drawn from a mixture of government, NGOs, research organisations
(primarily universities), private sector companies, and perhaps major
international donor partners. It should also involve the director of
operations/CEO. We presume that the majority of this staffing would be
provided by partner organisations as an in-kind contribution, but it is
reasonable to expect that the ‘research’ board members might be paid an
honorarium, and there may be merit in appointing a professional chair
on a fee basis. While it is possible that the board might be covered
entirely from in-kind, we should countenance the idea of the above four
$US 156,000
Makeup and role of operations and executive team
We presume that an ultimate mature institute would require one full
time director of operations and/or CEO, and one full time administrative
staff member. Staffing beyond this level would only be countenanced
and considered on need at a later stage. On the basis of 1.0 FTE for the
CEO at $195,000 ($150,000 salary plus on-costs) and 1.0 FTE for the
admin staff member at $65,000 ($50,000 salary plus on-costs), the
annual operational staffing costs of the institute would be:
$US 260,000
Office accommodation and general operations costs
We presume (unless indications emerge otherwise) that office space and
office-related overheads would be provided as part of the in-kind
contribution from one of the main partner organisations - presumably
either a government or a university wishing to ‘house’ a pre-eminent
institute within their facilities. But a cash resource base for events,
publicity and travel would presumably also be required. At this stage,
we estimate that in mature phases an annual ‘general operations’ budget
for the Institute would be in the order of 10% of operating costs, or:
$US 80,000
20
Expectations for ongoing research endeavour and activity
Identification and proposing of potential research projects should be
resourced from a base of in-kind contribution from both the partner
organisations and the university research providers. Beyond that, we
expect that each individual ‘standard’ one-year research exercise could
involve some $50,000 in cash payment for salaries and costs to research
providers. If we presume eight projects per year, the implied cash
demand is:
positions (three research directors and a chair) being staffed
professionally at a rate of around 0.2 FTE at $195,000 (including 30%
on-costs). This equates to an implied annual cash demand of:
Page
A sustainable end position for institute staffing
After several years of operation, we would expect the institute to be
self-sustaining on the basis of an established and stable multi-tiered
membership and funding base. In this context, it is timely to estimate
the scale and resources required for sustained operation, and hence to
some degree the expectations for partner and member contributions at
that mature stage. Here below is a listing of basic institute activities, the
personnel required to deliver presumed outcomes, and an early-stage
estimate of cash resources required to deliver:

22. Indicative Organisational Structure
Board & executive staff
*strategy & governance
*operations & budget
*membership & publicity
*management of events, training, knowledge
exchange & dissemination
*research contracts
other SIG
SIG
SIG
policy & investment
commercial transport
(example only)
(example only)
other SIG
(example only)
21
SIG
Page
integrated metropolitan
infrastructure

23. This amount presumably defines the cash contributions required from
partner organisations and members, in both-up front and matched
research funds. It also partly defines the number of cornerstone partners,
and the scale of the membership base needed. The split of ‘operational
overheads’ to ‘direct research activity’ under the figures described in
previous pages is around 55/45 - and we suggest the desirability of this
balance should be vigorously debated by potential partners. There may
well be an expectation that overheads and staffing would remain largely
stable while direct research endeavour expands as the institute matures,
shifting the balance of ‘overhead’ to ‘core activity’ over time.
In rough and generic terms, a budget in the order of $900,000 would
imply a need for around four cornerstone ‘gold partners’ at $100,000
each, and some seven ‘silver’ partners at $50,000 each, plus the
remainder from fees contributed by the broader membership pool. This
seems, at face value, to be potentially workable and achievable.
Start-up process: first-steps during year one
The ‘mature’ financing and resourcing arrangement outlined above
presumably occurs at around year 2-3 of operations, or perhaps for the
2016 calendar year or later – depending on circumstances. In initial
phases, and if working on the presumption there is an interest in seeing
Equally, the scale of research activity and budget allocation to general
(non-salary) operating costs could and would presumably be
substantively lower during year one particularly. We might also expect
that provision for paid board members and a paid chair could be at least
partially foregone or limited during year one.
Development process for the institute business model
These parameters and figures are put forward at this stage only as a
starting point for discussion and debate among interested stakeholders.
We would expect the eventual arrangements to be somewhat different to
those outlined above, and determined through input and agreement from
industry and government throughout the feasibility study process and
beyond. Interested parties should make every effort to engage the
University of Melbourne study team directly, provide a formal
submission by the due date, and become involved in workshop
discussions with other potential stakeholders.
22
$US 896,000
the institute initiated at some stage during 2014, we might imagine that
many of the full-scale cost elements could be forgone in years one and
two. Under this scenario, the institute could be ‘virtual’ in not drawing
on specific office accommodation needs. We might also expect that
there would not be a full time CEO or admin staff – and that these roles
could be filled on a part-time basis initially and/or as a generous in-kind
foundation contribution from key stakeholders.
Page
Preliminary annual total budget estimate during mature phases
The sum total of these assumed annual cost elements comes to some:

24. A vehicle for sustaining broad-based economic development
Any institute would need to demonstrate its worth by acting as a key
mechanism for sustaining economic growth with responsible social and
environmental characteristics. We suggest that any specific or sectional
interest of a potential institute needs to be subsidiary to, contextualised
by, and supportive-of this over-arching economic development
rationale. Given the necessity of quality infrastructure for economic and
social development, and its profound impacts, we suggest that an
‘economic development’ rationale for a new institute is natural and
attainable, but this possibly represents an emerging nuance around
which further discussion is needed.
Relationship to government – separate but supportive
Much discussion among the project team so far has surrounded the
perceived needs and future directions of Government of Indonesia
Core focus – value-adding through enhanced skills and capabilities
We believe that a distinct and important role is available to a new
institute where it focuses on ‘value–adding’ and improved productivity
within the Indonesian infrastructure sector, and in specific infrastructure
fields. At face value, public and private sector stakeholders currently
agree a need for accelerated infrastructure delivery in Indonesia. This
then suggests that a new institute can play a framing role through
sustained support for skills and knowledge-development that enhances
sectoral working productivity. A focus on value-add, capabilities,
enhanced productivity, and new knowledge is aided by networking, but
these outcomes exist as a higher rationale than networking per se. The
institute can thus presumably distinguish itself by moving beyond
networking and into the realm of focused and sustained sectoral
performance enhancement.
Membership base – strength in diversity
There appears to be little value in a potential institute that does not
balance effectively between all the stakeholders and partners that
contribute to infrastructure thinking, policy and delivery in the
Indonesian context. While the idea of public-private interaction is
commonly advanced, the University of Melbourne team suggests that
23
During September and October, the authors of this document will seek
feedback from stakeholders regarding the, need for, benefits, scope and
nature of a potential new multi-partner Indonesian infrastructure
institute. This document serves as a platform for early-stage discussion
of important issues, with the hope that new ideas and further thinking
from industry and government is stimulated, and then articulated in both
the submissions, and the workshop series. Subject to these inputs, a final
concept will be refined and tabled in the form of a feasibility report. At
this stage though, the University of Melbourne team are willing to
provide some early recommendations to guide and stimulate further
discussion. These should not be read as final or conclusive, but are
representative of questions to be discussed and debated further.
ministries, organisations and stakeholders. It has taken a certain amount
of time to become absolutely apparent that the role of a new multipartner institute would be to support skills-development, policy
discussion, and research needs of GOI stakeholders, rather than
anticipating or being directly involved in GOI activities and decisions.
We believe the institute should have a strong working relationship and
robust membership from GOI partners - but its activities need to be
independent, and focused on sectoral capacity-building outcomes. The
institute should be supportive of the needs of GOI members, rather than
part of government.
Page
12. Recommendations – a new institute
that suits Indonesian circumstances

25. The role of commissioned research
Another point of difference presumably arises where the new institute
has research delivery capabilities at its core. Around agreed research
projects, the clustering of policy discussion, knowledge-exchange,
progressive new ideas and value-adding presumably falls into place. In
the absence of the creation of new knowledge through research
initiatives, an institute is presumably positioned further from the cuttingedge, and networking becomes an activity undertaken for its own sake,
rather than a natural adjunct to learning, debate, and the introduction of
new policy ideas.
On the inherent & demonstrable need for an infrastructure institute
The feasibility study represented in this document, at an early stage, is
fundamentally engaged with a question of whether a new infrastructure
institute is needed in Indonesia. Relatedly - if an institute is indeed
needed, then what are its presumed benefits...? Further input will be
taken from industry and government actors. But at this stage, we suggest
that a new institute is needed at face value for the following reasons: a
demand for acceleration of infrastructure delivery among GOI and other
stakeholders (see World Bank 2012); the need for a platform of
enhanced trust and policy awareness to sustain such an acceleration (see
Parakesit et al 2012); and the question of quality outcomes in
infrastructure design, specification, procurement and performance (see
Bakker 2007) – for which sustained sectoral skill-enhancement and
capability development appears to be the prime and logical answer.
24
Topics and themes – broad coverage across infrastructure
There appears at this early stage to be sufficient depth and breadth of
interest from government and industry to suggest that the institute can
sustain a reasonably comprehensive coverage of infrastructure-related
themes and topics over time. To counterbalance breadth, we suggest that
depth of understanding can be achieved with attention to particular
needs and issues among the specific ‘special interest groups’. By
developing shared knowledge and experience among professionals with
an interest in these specific topics, we suggest that ‘depth’ will be
delivered alongside a more tailored, personalised and relevant
experience of institute membership.
The ‘Public Interest’ as driver
The culture and activities of an institute will arise and define themselves
over time from the perspectives and needs of members. But basic
understanding of the nature of infrastructure-related activities seems to
suggest that a new institute could gain greatest traction if ‘the public
interest’ were adopted as a shared intellectual driver. Recognition of
public interest perspectives and issues would seem to be of primary
importance to GOI and academic stakeholders or NGOs particularly, but
it also seems to connect with a more enlightened audience and
discussion among private sector partners – who will presumably
recognise that infrastructure investment flows more predictably when
the public interest is addressed. It appears worth tabling this perspective
in any case at this stage – with the expectation that potential
stakeholders will frame their response through formal submissions and
participation in upcoming workshops.
Page
NGOs and researchers (primarily university academics) are very much
part of the mix in a diverse and robust infrastructure discussion.
Equally, we distinguish between the roles and natures of private sector
planners, technical consultants, financiers and project principals. The
knowledge-related needs and contributions of consultants tend to be
quite different from those of corporate construction professionals (for
example), or government officials. In order to optimise sectoral
knowledge exchange and policy discussion we suggest that an invitation
be provided for each distinct stakeholder or professional group.

26. 13. Short Bibliography
Embarq
www.embarq.org
Documents
Engineers Australia
www.engineersaustralia.org.au
Bakker (2007) Trickle Down? Private sector participation and the propoor water supply debate in Jakarta, Indonesia. Geoforum 38
GAMUT (University of Melbourne)
www.abp.unimelb.edu.au/gamut
Parikesit, Black, Lea and Strang (2012) Towards a Refocused
Indonesian National Delivery Process for Infrastructure: a concept for
a Centre of Evidence-based policy analysis of infrastructure and PPP.
GREAT initiative
Hong Kong MTR Corporation
www.mtr.com.hk
American Planning Association
www.planning.org
Centre for Transportation Research – University of Stuttgart
http://www.uni-stuttgart.de/fovus
Co-operative Research Centres home page (Australian Government)
www.crc.gov.au
CRC for Water Sensitive Cities
www.watersensitivecities.org.au
Infrastructure Partnerships Australia
www.infrastructure.org.au
Infrastructure UK
www.gov.uk/government/organisations/infrastructure-uk
Institution of Civil Engineers
www.ice.org.uk
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy
www.lincolninst.edu
Ontario Infrastructure
www.infrastructureontario.ca
25
Websites
Infrastructure Investments Unit (Scotland)
www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/Finance/18232
Page
World Bank, Indonesia Office (2012) FY 2013-2015 Country
Partnership Strategy for Indonesia. The World Bank, Indonesia Office
Infrastructure Australia
www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au

27. Planning Institute of Australia
www.planning.org.au
Property Council of Australia
www.propertyoz.com.au
Public-Private Partnership Center (Phillippines)
www.ppp.gov.ph
SMART (at University of Wollongong)
www.smart.uow.edu.au
Transbay Joint Powers Authority
www.transbaycenter.org/tjpa
University of California at Berkeley – City and Regional Planning
www.ced.berkeley.edu/academics/city-regional-planning
Urban Land Institute
www.uli.org
Urban Taskforce
www.urbantaskforce.com.au
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Victorian Government – PPPs at Department of Treasury & Finance
www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Public-private-partnerships