The document summarizes an alternative justification for democratic deliberation called symbolic-cognitive proceduralism (SCP). SCP combines elements of Estlund's epistemic proceduralism with additional rationales to argue that democratic procedures are legitimate due to their expressive symbolic functions and cognitive functions, rather than relying solely on epistemic justifications. SCP is proposed as a model that can withstand critiques of epistemic rationales like Ingham's, since it does not depend on consensus or procedure-independent standards.
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Symbolic-Cognitive Proceduralism as a Robust Justification for Democratic Deliberation
1. SYMBOLIC-COGNITIVE PROCEDURALISM
AS A ROBUST JUSTIFICATION
FOR DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION
Robert C. Richards, Jr. and John Gastil
The Pennsylvania State University
Department of Communication Arts & Sciences
Presentation at National Communication
Association, November 2013
4. Estlund: Jury Deliberation
as Model of Legitimacy
Public deems jury verdicts legitimate, provided jury
followed deliberative procedures
Source of jury’s legitimacy: “epistemic virtues” of
deliberative procedures; give jury > 0.5 probability of
reaching correct verdict
Estlund argues jury is analogous to legislature and
executive
5. Ingham’s Critique
Estlund’s model is inconsistent with “two widely shared
beliefs about democracy”:
1. Nonconvergence Constraint: Consensus is impossible in
a diverse society
2. Constraint on Evidence: Procedure-independent
standards aren’t plausible, because agreement on those
standards is impossible
6. Results of Ingham’s Critique
Estlund’s jury model violates both of Ingham’s constraints
7. Alternative Justifications for
Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democratic procedures may be justified on the
basis of their:
• Intrinsic Value
• Expressive Value
• Cognitive Value (Unrelated to Voting Decisions)
• Ethical Value
• Communal Value
9. Symbolic-Cognitive
Proceduralism (SCP)
Elements of Estlund’s epistemic proceduralist theory of
legitimacy can be included in a new model that can
withstand Ingham’s critique
This new model we call symbolic-cognitive proceduralism
10. SCP: Account of Legitimacy
Jury deliberation furnishes the model for the legitimacy of
democratic deliberative procedures
Source of legitimacy: Expressive/Symbolic and Cognitive
functions of the procedures
11. SCP: Symbolic Functions
Jury’s deliberative procedures express fundamental values
of democracy:
• Popular Sovereignty
• Equality
• Rational Discourse
12. SCP: Cognitive Functions
Jury’s deliberative procedures increase jurors’:
• Knowledge of issues and solution options
• Understanding of their own and others’ interests, values,
and cognitive repertoires
• Understanding of collective interests
• Political efficacy (internal and external)
• Willingness to be civically engaged
13. Empirical Content of SCP
Individual Level Cognition/Behavior
Reflective
self-regulation
Macro-Level Social Beliefs/Demands
Procedural
Integrity of
Democratic
Deliberation
Cognitive
function
Knowledge,
Competence, and
Civic Attitudes of
Participants
Public demand
for deliberation
Symbolic
function
Ambassadorial
function
Public Legitimacy
of Deliberative
Democratic
Processes
14. SCP: Effect on Legitimacy
Symbolic and cognitive functions lead public to deem jury’s
verdicts legitimate
Jury remains analogous to the legislature and executive
15. SCP: Not Susceptible to
Ingham’s Critique
since SCP’s account of legitimacy does not depend on an
epistemic justification
16. Conclusion
Ingham’s (2013) critique calls into question Estlund’s – and
all other – epistemic justifications for deliberative
democracy
Symbolic-cognitive proceduralism justifies democratic
deliberation on the basis of its expressive and cognitive
functions
Symbolic-cognitive proceduralism is not vulnerable to
Ingham’s critique
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23. Acknowledgements
• Grateful thanks to:
• Professor Dr. Sean Ingham, University of Georgia School of Public
and International Affairs, Department of Political Science
• Professor Dr. John Christman of The Pennsylvania State University
Department of Philosophy
24. Contact
• Robert C. Richards, Jr., JD, MSLIS, MA, BA
• PhD Candidate
• The Pennsylvania State University Department of Communication
Arts and Sciences
• Email: rcr5122@psu.edu
• Web: http://legalinformatics.wordpress.com/about/