1. The Seeds of Change:
The Role of State Bureaucracy and Civil
Society in Combating Child Labor in the
Hybrid Cottonseed Industry in India

2. Agenda
• Introduction to hybrid cottonseed industry
• Theory & hypotheses
• Research design
• Case study 1-Andhra
• Case study 2-Rajasthan
• Summary
• Q&A

3. Introduction to the
hybrid cottonseed industry

4. Background to Hybrid Cottonseed Industry
• Bt cotton introduced in 2002
• Transformed cotton production in India
• Led to emergence of hybrid cottonseed industry
• Hybrid cottonseed industry is single largest employer of child labor
in India (0.4 million)
• Estimates on child labor vary in India. (0.8 million to 3.2 million)
• Highest numbers of child labor in the world.

5. 25%
43%
32%
Adults
Adolescents (15-18 yrs)
Children below 15
Age-distribution of Labor in the Hybrid Cottonseed
Industry, 2008

6. A child laborer cross-pollinating a cottonseed plant in Gujarat, India

7. Reasons for choosing cottonseed industry
• New trend in child labor
• Highlights problems of implementation of India’s child labor
law.
• Snapshot of statewise variation

8. Child Work in India
60%
26%
7%
7%
Agriculture Services Industry Others
Child Labor
(Prohibition and
Regulation)Act,
1986

9. The Puzzle of State-wise Variation
10%
6%
4.70%
3.90% 4.20%
7.80%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
1991 2001 2010
Over-time variation in child labor in Andhra Pradesh
and Gujarat
Andhra Pradesh % child labor Gujarat % child labor

10. Economic growth does not explain change in child
labor rates
Gujarat Andhra
Annual Per capita
income in 2010
USD 756 USD 570
Average rate of
growth of per capita
income
14.9% 9.7%
1991-2010 Child labor
increasing
Child labor
decreasing

11. My central thesis
Educational Child Labor
deprivation

12. Theory

13. Bureaucratic Effectiveness
in the Delivery of
Elementary Education
Social Consensus on
Education
Theory

14. Bureaucratic Effectiveness
• Poor Infrastructure (2012)
-32.4% schools don’t have a toilet
-23.4 % schools don’t have
drinking water
-63.7% don’t have electricity
• Teacher-truancy
-Average teacher absenteeism
= 24%
• Poor Learning Outcomes
Dropouts (Grade I-VIII)
42%

15. Effect of Bureaucratic Effectiveness on Parental Motivation
Bureaucratic
Effectiveness in the
Delivery of
Elementary
Education
Parental
Motivation to
Send A Child
to
Work/School
Quality of
Education

16. Social Consensus on Education
Bureaucratic
Effectiveness in the
Delivery of
Elementary Education
Parental
Motivation to
Send A Child to
Work/School
Social Consensus
On Education
Quality of
Education

17. Direct Effect of Social Consensus on Parental Motivation
Bureaucratic
Effectiveness in the
Delivery of
Elementary Education
Parental
Motivation to
Send A Child to
Work/School
Social Consensus
On Education
Quality of
Schools
Peer Pressure
&
Demonstration
Effect

18. Indirect Effect of Social Consensus on Parental Motivation
Bureaucratic
Effectiveness in the
Delivery of
Elementary Education
Parental
Motivation to
Send A Child to
Work/School
Social Consensus
On Education
Quality of
Schools
Peer Pressure
&
Demonstration
Effect
Accountability

20. Going beyond economic factors to explore institutional and socio-
cultural factors affecting child labor
Bureaucratic
Effectiveness
Social Consensus
on Education
Parental
Motivation Child Labor
Household Poverty
Quality of Education
Accountability
Peer
Pressure
&
Demonstration
Effect
INSTITUTIONAL
SOCIO-CULTURAL ECONOMIC
Civil Society
Organizations

21. Empirical analysis
• Findings
• Empirical analysis gives broad patterns but does not explain
– causal mechanisms
– Over-time variation
– Role of civil society organizations (CSOs)

22. Purpose of Case Studies
i) Role of Civil Society Organizations
ii) Over-time variation
iii) Causal mechanisms

23. Hypotheses

24. Hypothesis:
CSOs that are proactive in creating a social consensus on
education should be more successful in reducing child labor
than those that focus narrowly on withdrawing children from
the labor force.

25. CSOs
Mobilizing parents
on education
Mobilizing groups on
education
If the hypothesis is see correct, this is what I would
expect to see (1/2)

26. CSOs
Creating accountability mechanisms
Collaborating with bureaucracy
If the hypothesis is see correct, this is what I would
expect to see (1/2)

27. Research Design

28. Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan are the two Indian
states selected for my case studies

29. Why Andhra and Rajasthan ?
# Parameters for case
selection
Andhra
Pradesh
Rajasthan
1. Child Labor in the Hybrid
Cottonseed Industry
Yes Yes
2. Rural per capita income USD 571 USD 405
3. Bureaucratic Effectiveness Moderate Moderate
4. Social Consensus on
Education
Low Low
5. Civil Society activity Present and
reduction in
child labor
Present but no
reduction in
child labor

30. Over-time variation of child labor in the hybrid cottonseed
industry in Andhra and Rajasthan
57.4%
42.7%
29.8%
34.9%
32.7%
24.6%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
2003 2007 2010
Andhra Pradesh - % Child Labour below 14 years
Rajasthan - % Child Labour below 14 years

31. 82,875
70,400
31,200
91,000
85,340
91,200
14,000
16,000
12,000
26,000
25,100
38,000
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
100,000
2003 2007 2010
CottonseedAcreage
ChildLaborAbsoluteNumbers
Andhra Pradesh - Total child labour Gujarat - Total child labour
Andhra Pradesh - Cotton seed Acreage Gujarat - Cotton seed Acreage

33. Within-state variation
Andhra Pradesh
Uyyalawada
Dornipadu
Rajasthan
Kotra
Jhadol

34. Testing my hypotheses in each of the four blocks
Parents Community
BureaucracySchool

35. Case Study 1- Andhra Pradesh

36. Uyyalawada – MV Foundation

37. Achievements of MV Foundation
• 0.6 million children withdrawn from the child labor
force and admitted into schools.
• 6,000 volunteers at village level.
• MVF model replicated in other states and countries.
• Innovations integrated into state and national policy

38. Former child laborers at a Residential Bridge Course (RBC) Camp,
Andhra Pradesh

39. MVF starts social mobilization on education in Uyyalawada
in 2006
Uyyalawada Dornipadu

40. Social mobilization strategies of MV Foundation in Uyyalawada
(1/2)
Parents
-Awareness
-Appeal
-Facilitation
-Sanction
Community
Community
Tying up with local groups

41. Social mobilization strategies of MV Foundation in
Uyyalawada (2/2)
School
Creating Institutional mechanisms of accountability
Bureaucracy
Bureaucracy
-Providing information & logistical support
-Bureaucracy provides legitimacy to MVF
- Spread to other blocks

42. Correlating Causal Mechanisms to Theory
Bureaucratic
Effectiveness in
Elementary
Education
Social Consensus
on Education
Parental
Motivation
(Work/School)
Child Labor
Household Poverty
Quality of Education
Accountability
Peer
Pressure
&
Demonstration
Effect
INSTITUTIONAL
SOCIO-CULTURAL
ECONOMIC

43. Impact of MV Foundation’s social mobilization in
Uyyalawada
• Between 2007-10:
• Retention rate in schools increased from 30% to 85%
• Cottonseed acreage reduced from 1067.5 acres to 653 acres.
• Child laborers in cottonseed has declined from 3336 to 405.

44. Dornipadu-No CSOs

45. Dornipadu: No NGOs
Responses of stakeholders (1/2)
Parents:
----
“We hide the children” –Cottonseed farmer
Community:

46. Dornipadu: No NGOs
Responses of stakeholders (2/2)
School
Bureaucracy
“I am struggling to keep children in
school” ~ Dornipadu principal of
government school.
“There are no child labor in
Dornipadu”~ Block Revenue Officer,
Dornipadu

47. Impact on child labor in Dornipadu
• Total cottonseed acreage has increased to 4386.5.
• Child labor in Dornipadu=1577
• “Dornipadu is a new area in which cottonseed farming has
been started. Both cottonseed acreage and child labor is
increasing in Dornipadu” ~Davuluri Venkateswarlu,
Independent Researcher.

48. Case study 2: Rajasthan

49. Block 3
Jhadol - Dakshini Rajasthan Mazdoor Union (DRMU)

50. Children being trafficked across the Rajasthan-Gujarat border
to work in hybrid cottonseed farms.

51. DRMU action and government response
• Registering migrant workers.
• Stopped child labor from going to Gujarat.
• Widespread media attention
• Diverse institutional measures by the government
– Anti trafficking cell
– Special Protocol
– District Task Force
– Special child labor schools
– Reality on the ground different
– DRMU Movement died down

52. Impact of DRMU’s strategies on stakeholders
Parents:
No interaction with parents
Competition with other NGOs
Community:

53. Impact of DRMU mobilization on stakeholders
School
Bureaucracy
“It is not our job” ~DRMU
member
Antagonistic relationship with the
bureaucracy

54. Correlating Causal Mechanisms to Theory
Bureaucratic
Effectiveness in
Elementary
Education
Social Consensus
on Education
Parental
Motivation
(Work/School)
Child Labor
Household Poverty
Quality of Education
Accountability
Peer
Pressure
&
Demonstration
Effect
INSTITUTIONAL
SOCIO-CULTURAL
ECONOMIC

55. Impact of DRMU’s action on child labor in Jhadol
834 households surveyed in 2012:
Out of 845 children, 77 migrated.
9% children migrated in Jhadol

56. Block -4
Kotra (Rajasthan) –Aastha Foundation

57. Impact of Aastha Foundation’s strategies on
stakeholders
Parents:
-Individual follow-up with parents
-Tribal Development Forum
-Ekal Nari Shakti Sangathan
-Rajsamand Women’s Forum
Community:

58. Impact of DRMU mobilization on stakeholders
School
Bureaucracy
Monitoring of 257 schools in 25
villages
No collaboration with the
bureaucracy

59. Correlating Causal Mechanisms to Theory
Bureaucratic
Effectiveness in
Elementary
Education
Social Consensus
on Education
Parental
Motivation
(Work/School)
Child Labor
Household Poverty
Quality of Education
Accountability
Peer
Pressure
&
Demonstration
Effect
INSTITUTIONAL
SOCIO-CULTURAL
ECONOMIC

60. Impact on child labor in Kotra
Decline in few villages like Maldar but effort hasn’t spread to
other villages.

61. Summary

62. Andhra Pradesh Rajasthan
Uyyalawada
(MV
Foundation)
Dornipadu
X
Kotra
(Aastha
Foundation)
Jhadol
(DRMU)
√ X √ X
√ X √ X
√ X √ X
√ X X X
IMPACT -Decline in child
labor
-Decrease in
cottonseed
acreage
-Effort spreads to
other blocks
-Increase in child
labor.
-Increase in
cottonseed
acreage
-Child labor
declines in a few
villages.
-Effort remains
very loclized
9% children
migrating for
cottonseed work.
- Decline in
blocks covered
by DRMU

63. Conclusions:
• If India does not pass a child labor law that banishes all forms
of child labor, bureaucratic effectiveness and social consensus
on education will be mandatory for India to achieve universal
literacy.
• If India passes a child labor law that banishes all forms of
child labor, a social consensus on education would still be
necessary for such a law to be made effective because it is
unlikely that any law in India will impose penalty on parents if
they fail to send them to school.