1. REBUILDING
AMERICA’S
DEFENSES
Strategy, Forces and Resources
For a New Century
A Report of
The Project for the New American Century
September 2000

2. ABOUT THE PROJECT FOR THE
NEW AMERICAN CENTURY
Established in the spring of 1997, the Project for the New American Century is a non-
profit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership.
The Project is an initiative of the New Citizenship Project. William Kristol is chairman
of the Project, and Robert Kagan, Devon Gaffney Cross, Bruce P. Jackson and John R.
Bolton serve as directors. Gary Schmitt is executive director of the Project.
“As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the
world’s most preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in
the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does
the United States have the vision to build upon the achievement of
past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a
new century favorable to American principles and interests?
“[What we require is] a military that is strong and ready to meet
both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and
purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national
leadership that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities.
“Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its
power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global
leadership of the costs that are associated with its exercise. America
has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia,
and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite
challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20th
century should have taught us that it is important to shape
circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they
become dire. The history of the past century should have taught us
to embrace the cause of American leadership.”
– From the Project’s founding Statement of Principles
____PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY____
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Suite 510, Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone: (202) 293-4983 / Fax: (202) 293-4572

3. REBUILDING
AMERICA’S
DEFENSES
Strategy, Forces and Resources
For a New Century
DONALD KAGAN GARY SCHMITT
Project Co-Chairmen
THOMAS DONNELLY
Principal Author

6. REBUILDING AMERICA’S DEFENSES
Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Key Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
I. Why Another Defense Review? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Four Essential Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
III. Repositioning Today’s Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
IV. Rebuilding Today’s Armed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
V. Creating Tomorrow’s Dominant Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
VI. Defense Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Project Participants

8. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
INTRODUCTION
The Project for the New American Either alternative seemed to us
Century was established in the spring of shortsighted. The United States is the
1997. From its inception, the Project has world’s only superpower, combining
been concerned with the decline in the preeminent military power, global
strength of America’s defenses, and in the technological leadership, and the world’s
problems this would create for the exercise largest economy. Moreover, America stands
of American leadership around the globe at the head of a system of alliances which
and, ultimately, for the preservation of includes the world’s other leading
peace. democratic powers. At present the United
States faces no global rival. America’s
Our concerns were reinforced by the grand strategy should aim to preserve and
two congressionally-mandated defense extend this advantageous position as far into
studies that appeared soon thereafter: the the future as possible. There are, however,
Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review potentially powerful states dissatisfied with
(May 1997) and the report of the National the current situation and eager to change it,
Defense Panel (December 1997). Both if they can, in directions that endanger the
studies assumed that U.S. defense budgets relatively peaceful, prosperous and free
would remain flat or continue to shrink. As condition the world enjoys today. Up to
a result, the defense plans and now, they have been deterred from doing so
recommendations outlined in the two reports by the capability and global presence of
were fashioned with such budget constraints American military power. But, as that
in mind. Broadly speaking, the QDR power declines, relatively and absolutely,
stressed current military requirements at the the happy conditions that follow from it will
expense of future defense needs, while the be inevitably undermined.
NDP’s report emphasized future needs by
underestimating today’s defense Preserving the desirable strategic
responsibilities. situation in which the United States now
finds itself requires a globally preeminent
Although the QDR and the report of the military capability both today and in the
NDP proposed different policies, they future. But years of cuts in defense
shared one underlying feature: the gap spending have eroded the American
between resources and strategy should be military’s combat readiness, and put in
resolved not by increasing resources but by jeopardy the Pentagon’s plans for
shortchanging strategy. America’s armed maintaining military superiority in the years
forces, it seemed, could either prepare for ahead. Increasingly, the U.S. military has
the future by retreating from its role as the found itself undermanned, inadequately
essential defender of today’s global security equipped and trained, straining to handle
order, or it could take care of current contingency operations, and ill-prepared to
business but be unprepared for tomorrow’s adapt itself to the revolution in military
threats and tomorrow’s battlefields. affairs. Without a well-conceived defense
policy and an appropriate increase in
i

9. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
defense spending, the United States has been of the DPG, in our judgment, remain sound.
letting its ability to take full advantage of the And what Secretary Cheney said at the time
remarkable strategic opportunity at hand slip in response to the DPG’s critics remains true
away. today: “We can either sustain the [armed]
forces we require and remain in a position to
With this in mind, we began a project in help shape things for the better, or we can
the spring of 1998 to examine the country’s throw that advantage away. [But] that
defense plans and resource requirements. would only hasten the day when we face
We started from the premise that U.S. greater threats, at higher costs and further
military capabilities should be sufficient to risk to American lives.”
support an American grand strategy
committed to building upon this The project proceeded by holding a
unprecedented opportunity. We did not series of seminars. We asked outstanding
accept pre-ordained constraints that defense specialists to write papers to explore
followed from assumptions about what the a variety of topics: the future missions and
country might or might not be willing to requirements of the individual military
expend on its defenses. services, the role of the reserves, nuclear
strategic doctrine and missile defenses, the
In broad terms, we saw the project as defense budget and prospects for military
building upon the defense strategy outlined modernization, the state (training and
by the Cheney Defense Department in the readiness) of today’s forces, the revolution
waning days of the Bush Administration. in military affairs, and defense-planning for
The Defense Policy Guidance (DPG) drafted theater wars, small wars and constabulary
in the early months operations. The papers were circulated to a
of 1992 provided a At present the group of participants, chosen for their
blueprint for United States experience and judgment in defense affairs.
maintaining U.S. faces no (The list of participants may be found at the
preeminence, end of this report.) Each paper then became
precluding the rise
global rival. the basis for discussion and debate. Our
of a great power America’s goal was to use the papers to assist
rival, and shaping grand strategy deliberation, to generate and test ideas, and
the international should aim to to assist us in developing our final report.
security order in While each paper took as its starting point a
line with American preserve and shared strategic point of view, we made no
principles and extend this attempt to dictate the views or direction of
interests. Leaked advantageous the individual papers. We wanted as full
before it had been and as diverse a discussion as possible.
formally approved,
position as far
the document was into the future Our report borrows heavily from those
criticized as an as possible. deliberations. But we did not ask seminar
effort by “cold participants to “sign-off” on the final report.
warriors” to keep defense spending high and We wanted frank discussions and we sought
cuts in forces small despite the collapse of to avoid the pitfalls of trying to produce a
the Soviet Union; not surprisingly, it was consensual but bland product. We wanted to
subsequently buried by the new try to define and describe a defense strategy
administration. that is honest, thoughtful, bold, internally
consistent and clear. And we wanted to
Although the experience of the past spark a serious and informed discussion, the
eight years has modified our understanding essential first step for reaching sound
of particular military requirements for conclusions and for gaining public support.
carrying out such a strategy, the basic tenets
ii

10. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
New circumstances make us think that were forced to work from many untested
the report might have a more receptive assumptions about the nature of a world
audience now than in recent years. For the without a superpower rival. We have a
first time since the late 1960s the federal much better idea today of what our
government is running a surplus. For most responsibilities are, what the threats to us
of the 1990s, Congress and the White House might be in this new security environment,
gave balancing the federal budget a higher and what it will take to secure the relative
priority than funding national security. In peace and stability. We believe our report
fact, to a significant degree, the budget was reflects and benefits from that decade’s
balanced by a combination of increased tax worth of experience.
revenues and cuts in defense spending. The
surplus expected in federal revenues over Our report is published in a presidential
the next decade, however, removes any need election year. The new administration will
to hold defense spending to some need to produce a second Quadrennial
preconceived low level. Defense Review shortly after it takes office.
We hope that the Project’s report will be
Moreover, the American public and its useful as a road map for the nation’s
elected representatives have become immediate and future defense plans. We
increasingly aware of the declining state of believe we have set forth a defense program
the U.S. military. News stories, Pentagon that is justified by the evidence, rests on an
reports, congressional testimony and honest examination of the problems and
anecdotal accounts from members of the possibilities, and does not flinch from facing
armed services paint a disturbing picture of the true cost of security. We hope it will
an American military that is troubled by inspire careful consideration and serious
poor enlistment and retention rates, shoddy discussion. The post-Cold War world will
housing, a shortage of spare parts and not remain a relatively peaceful place if we
weapons, and diminishing combat readiness. continue to neglect foreign and defense
matters. But serious attention, careful
Finally, this report comes after a thought, and the willingness to devote
decade’s worth of experience in dealing with adequate resources to maintaining
the post-Cold War world. Previous efforts America’s military strength can make the
to fashion a defense strategy that would world safer and American strategic interests
make sense for today’s security environment more secure now and in the future.
Donald Kagan Gary Schmitt
Project Co-Chairmen
Thomas Donnelly
Principal Author
iii

11. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
KEY FINDINGS
This report proceeds from the belief that The challenge for the coming century is to
America should seek to preserve and extend preserve and enhance this “American
its position of global leadership by peace.”
maintaining the preeminence of U.S.
military forces. Today, the United States Yet unless the United States maintains
has an unprecedented strategic opportunity. sufficient military strength, this opportunity
It faces no immediate great-power will be lost. And in fact, over the past
challenge; it is blessed with wealthy, decade, the failure to establish a security
powerful and democratic allies in every part strategy responsive to new realities and to
of the world; it is in the midst of the longest provide adequate resources for the full range
economic expansion in its history; and its of missions needed to exercise U.S. global
political and economic principles are almost leadership has placed the American peace at
universally embraced. At no time in history growing risk. This report attempts to define
has the international security order been as those requirements. In particular, we need
conducive to American interests and ideals. to:
ESTABLISH FOUR CORE MISSIONS for U.S. military forces:
• defend the American homeland;
• fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars;
• perform the “constabulary” duties associated with shaping the security environment in
critical regions;
• transform U.S. forces to exploit the “revolution in military affairs;”
To carry out these core missions, we need to provide sufficient force and budgetary
allocations. In particular, the United States must:
MAINTAIN NUCLEAR STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY, basing the U.S. nuclear deterrent upon a
global, nuclear net assessment that weighs the full range of current and emerging threats,
not merely the U.S.-Russia balance.
RESTORE THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH of today’s force to roughly the levels anticipated in
the “Base Force” outlined by the Bush Administration, an increase in active-duty strength
from 1.4 million to 1.6 million.
REPOSITION U.S. FORCES to respond to 21st century strategic realities by shifting
permanently-based forces to Southeast Europe and Southeast Asia, and by changing naval
deployment patterns to reflect growing U.S. strategic concerns in East Asia.
iv

12. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
MODERNIZE CURRENT U.S. FORCES SELECTIVELY, proceeding with the F-22 program while
increasing purchases of lift, electronic support and other aircraft; expanding submarine
and surface combatant fleets; purchasing Comanche helicopters and medium-weight
ground vehicles for the Army, and the V-22 Osprey “tilt-rotor” aircraft for the Marine
Corps.
CANCEL “ROADBLOCK” PROGRAMS such as the Joint Strike Fighter, CVX aircraft carrier,
and Crusader howitzer system that would absorb exorbitant amounts of Pentagon funding
while providing limited improvements to current capabilities. Savings from these canceled
programs should be used to spur the process of military transformation.
DEVELOP AND DEPLOY GLOBAL MISSILE DEFENSES to defend the American homeland and
American allies, and to provide a secure basis for U.S. power projection around the world.
CONTROL THE NEW “INTERNATIONAL COMMONS” OF SPACE AND “CYBERSPACE,” and pave
the way for the creation of a new military service – U.S. Space Forces – with the mission of
space control.
EXPLOIT THE “REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS” to insure the long-term superiority of
U.S. conventional forces. Establish a two-stage transformation process which
• maximizes the value of current weapons systems through the application of advanced
technologies, and,
• produces more profound improvements in military capabilities, encourages competition
between single services and joint-service experimentation efforts.
INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING gradually to a minimum level of 3.5 to 3.8 percent of gross
domestic product, adding $15 billion to $20 billion to total defense spending annually.
Fulfilling these requirements is essential choices. They are also false economies.
if America is to retain its militarily dominant The “savings” from withdrawing from the
status for the coming decades. Conversely, Balkans, for example, will not free up
the failure to meet any of these needs must anywhere near the magnitude of funds
result in some form of strategic retreat. At needed for military modernization or
current levels of defense spending, the only transformation. But these are false
option is to try ineffectually to “manage” economies in other, more profound ways as
increasingly large risks: paying for today’s well. The true cost of not meeting our
needs by shortchanging tomorrow’s; defense requirements will be a lessened
withdrawing from constabulary missions to capacity for American global leadership and,
retain strength for large-scale wars; ultimately, the loss of a global security order
“choosing” between presence in Europe or that is uniquely friendly to American
presence in Asia; and so on. These are bad principles and prosperity.
v

13. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
I
WHY ANOTHER DEFENSE REVIEW?
Since the end of the Cold War, the Paradoxically, as American power and
United States has struggled to formulate a influence are at their apogee, American
coherent national security or military military forces limp toward exhaustion,
strategy, one that accounts for the constants unable to meet the demands of their many
of American power and principles yet and varied missions, including preparing for
accommodates 21st century realities. Absent tomorrow’s battlefield. Today’s force,
a strategic framework, U.S. defense plan- reduced by a third or more over the past
ning has been an empty and increasingly decade, suffers from degraded combat
self-referential exercise, often dominated by readiness; from difficulties in recruiting and
bureaucratic and budgetary rather than retaining sufficient numbers of soldiers,
strategic interests. Indeed, the proliferation sailors, airmen and Marines; from the effects
of defense reviews over the past decade of an extended “procurement holiday” that
testifies to the failure to chart a consistent has resulted in the premature aging of most
course: to date, there have been half a dozen weapons systems; from an increasingly
formal defense reviews, and the Pentagon is obsolescent and inadequate military
now gearing up for a second Quadrennial infrastructure; from a shrinking industrial
Defense Review in 2001. Unless this “QDR base poorly structured to be the “arsenal of
II” matches U.S. military forces and democracy” for the 21st century; from a lack
resources to a viable American strategy, it, of innovation that threatens the techno-
too, will fail. logical and operational advantages enjoyed
by U.S. forces for a generation and upon
These failures are not without cost: which American strategy depends. Finally,
already, they place at risk an historic and most dangerously, the social fabric of
opportunity. After the victories of the past the military is frayed and worn. U.S. armed
century – two world wars, the Cold War and forces suffer from a degraded quality of life
most recently the Gulf War – the United divorced from middle-class expectations,
States finds itself as the uniquely powerful upon which an all-volunteer force depends.
leader of a coalition of free and prosperous Enlisted men and women and junior officers
states that faces no immediate great-power increasingly lack confidence in their senior
challenge. leaders, whom they believe will not tell
unpleasant truths to their civilian leaders. In
The American peace has proven itself sum, as the American peace reaches across
peaceful, stable and durable. It has, over the the globe, the force that preserves that peace
past decade, provided the geopolitical is increasingly overwhelmed by its tasks.
framework for widespread economic growth
and the spread of American principles of This is no paradox; it is the inevitable
liberty and democracy. Yet no moment in consequence of the failure to match military
international politics can be frozen in time; means to geopolitical ends. Underlying the
even a global Pax Americana will not failed strategic and defense reviews of the
preserve itself. past decade is the idea that the collapse of
1

14. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
the Soviet Union had created a “strategic
Cold War 21st Century
pause.” In other words, until another great-
Security Bipolar Unipolar
power challenger emerges, the United States
system
can enjoy a respite from the demands of
international leadership. Like a boxer Strategic Contain Preserve Pax
between championship bouts, America can goal Soviet Americana
afford to relax and live the good life, certain Union
that there would be enough time to shape up
for the next big challenge. Thus the United
Main Deter Soviet Secure and
States could afford to reduce its military
military expansionism expand zones
forces, close bases overseas, halt major
mission(s) of democratic
weapons programs and reap the financial
peace; deter
benefits of the “peace dividend.” But as we
rise of new
have seen over the past decade, there has
great-power
been no shortage of powers around the
competitor;
world who have taken the collapse of the
defend key
Soviet empire as an opportunity to expand
regions;
their own influence and challenge the
exploit
American-led security order.
transformation
of war
Beyond the faulty notion of a strategic
pause, recent defense reviews have suffered
Main Potential Potential
from an inverted understanding of the mili-
military global war theater wars
tary dimension of the Cold War struggle
threat(s) across many spread across
between the United States and the Soviet
theaters globe
Union. American containment strategy did
not proceed from the assumption that the
Cold War would be a purely military strug- Focus of Europe East Asia
The multiple challenges of the
strategic
gle, in which the U.S. Army matched the
Red Army tank for tank; rather, the United competition War world.
post-Cold
States would seek to deter the Soviets
militarily while defeating them economi-
cally and ideologically over time. And, Over the decade of the post-Cold-War
even within the realm of military affairs, the period, however, almost everything has
practice of deterrence allowed for what in changed. The Cold War world was a bipolar
military terms is called “an economy of world; the 21st century world is – for the
force.” The principle job of NATO forces, moment, at least – decidedly unipolar, with
for example, was to deter an invasion of America as the world’s “sole superpower.”
Western Europe, not to invade and occupy America’s strategic goal used to be
the Russian heartland. Moreover, the bi- containment of the Soviet Union; today the
polar nuclear balance of terror made both task is to preserve an international security
the United States and the Soviet Union environment conducive to American
generally cautious. Behind the smallest interests and ideals. The military’s job
proxy war in the most remote region lurked during the Cold War was to deter Soviet
the possibility of Armageddon. Thus, expansionism. Today its task is to secure
despite numerous miscalculations through and expand the “zones of democratic
the five decades of Cold War, the United peace;” to deter the rise of a new great-
States reaped an extraordinary measure of power competitor; defend key regions of
global security and stability simply by Europe, East Asia and the Middle East; and
building a credible and, in relative terms, to preserve American preeminence through
inexpensive nuclear arsenal. the coming transformation of war made
2

15. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
possible by new technologies. From 1945 to reduced military force that has emerged
1990, U.S. forces prepared themselves for a from the defense “drawdown” of the past
single, global war that might be fought decade. Today, America spends less than 3
across many theaters; in the new century, the percent of its gross domestic product on
prospect is for a variety of theater wars national defense, less than at any time since
around the world, against separate and before World War II – in other words, since
distinct adversaries pursuing separate and before the United States established itself as
distinct goals. During the Cold War, the the world’s leading power – and a cut from
main venue of superpower rivalry, the 4.7 percent of GDP in 1992, the first real
strategic “center of gravity,” was in Europe, post-Cold-War defense budget. Most of this
where large U.S. and NATO conventional reduction has come under the Clinton
forces prepared to repulse a Soviet attack Administration; despite initial promises to
and over which nuclear war might begin; approximate the level of defense spending
and with Europe now generally at peace, the called for in the final Bush Administration
new strategic center of concern appears to program, President Clinton cut more than
be shifting to East Asia. The missions for $160 billion from the Bush program from
America’s armed 1992 to 1996 alone. Over the first seven
Today, America forces have not years of the Clinton Administration,
spends less than diminished so approximately $426 billion in defense
much as shifted. investments have been deferred, creating a
3 percent of its The threats may weapons procurement “bow wave” of
gross domestic not be as great, immense proportions.
product on but there are
national defense, more of them. The most immediate effect of reduced
During the Cold defense spending has been a precipitate
less than at any War, America decline in combat readiness. Across all
time since before acquired its services, units are reporting degraded
the United States security readiness, spare parts and personnel
“wholesale” by shortages, postponed and simplified training
established itself global deterrence regimens, and many other problems. In
as the world’s of the Soviet congressional testimony, service chiefs of
leading power. Union. Today, staff now routinely report that their forces
that same are inadequate to the demands of the “two-
security can only be acquired at the “retail” war” national military strategy. Press
level, by deterring or, when needed, by attention focused on these readiness
compelling regional foes to act in ways that problems when it was revealed that two
protect American interests and principles. Army divisions were given a “C-4” rating,
meaning they were not ready for war. Yet it
This gap between a diverse and was perhaps more telling that none of the
expansive set of new strategic realities and Army’s ten divisions achieved the highest
diminishing defense forces and resources “C-1” rating, reflecting the widespread
does much to explain why the Joint Chiefs effects of slipping readiness standards. By
of Staff routinely declare that they see “high contrast, every division that deployed to
risk” in executing the missions assigned to Operation Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991
U.S. armed forces under the government’s received a “C-1” rating. This is just a
declared national military strategy. Indeed, snapshot that captures the state of U.S.
a JCS assessment conducted at the height of armed forces today.
the Kosovo air war found the risk level
“unacceptable.” Such risks are the result of These readiness problems are
the combination of the new missions exacerbated by the fact that U.S. forces are
described above and the dramatically poorly positioned to respond to today’s
3

16. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
crises. In Europe, for example, the admit that rapid technological changes
overwhelming majority of Army and Air makes it uncertain which new weapons
Force units remain at their Cold War bases systems to develop, the armed services cling
in Germany or England, while the security ever more tightly to traditional program and
problems on the continent have moved to concepts. As Andrew Krepinevich, a
Southeast Europe. Temporary rotations of member of the National Defense Panel, put
forces to the Balkans and elsewhere in it in a recent study of Pentagon experi-
Southeast Europe increase the overall mentation, “Unfortunately, the Defense
burdens of these operations many times. Department’s rhetoric asserting the need for
Likewise, the Clinton Administration has military transformation and its support for
continued the fiction that the operations of joint experimentation has yet to be matched
American forces in the Persian Gulf are by any great sense of urgency or any
merely temporary duties. Nearly a decade substantial resource support.…At present
after the Gulf War, U.S. air, ground and the Department’s effort is poorly focused
naval forces continue to protect enduring and woefully underfunded.”
American interests in the region. In addition
to rotational naval forces, the Army In sum, the 1990s have been a “decade
maintains what amounts to an armored of defense neglect.” This leaves the next
brigade in Kuwait for nine months of every president of the United States with an
year; the Air Force has two composite air enormous challenge: he must increase
wings in constant “no-fly zone” operations military spending to preserve American
over northern and southern Iraq. And geopolitical leadership, or he must pull back
despite increasing worries about the rise of from the security commitments that are the
China and instability in Southeast Asia, U.S. measure of America’s position as the
forces are found almost exclusively in world’s sole superpower and the final
Northeast Asian bases. guarantee of security, democratic freedoms
and individual political rights. This choice
Yet for all its problems in carrying out will be among the first to confront the
today’s missions, the Pentagon has done president: new legislation requires the
almost nothing to prepare for a future that incoming administration to fashion a
promises to be very different and potentially national security strategy within six months
much more dangerous. It is now commonly of assuming office, as opposed to waiting a
understood that information and other new full year, and to complete another
technologies – as well as widespread quadrennial defense review three months
technological and weapons proliferation – after that. In a larger sense, the new
are creating a dynamic that may threaten president will choose whether today’s
America’s ability to exercise its dominant “unipolar moment,” to use columnist
military power. Potential rivals such as Charles Krauthammer’s phrase for
China are anxious to exploit these trans- America’s current geopolitical preeminence,
formational technologies broadly, while will be extended along with the peace and
adversaries like Iran, Iraq and North Korea prosperity that it provides.
are rushing to develop ballistic missiles and
nuclear weapons as a deterrent to American This study seeks to frame these choices
intervention in regions they seek to clearly, and to re-establish the links between
dominate. Yet the Defense Department and U.S. foreign policy, security strategy, force
the services have done little more than affix planning and defense spending. If an
a “transformation” label to programs American peace is to be maintained, and
developed during the Cold War, while expanded, it must have a secure foundation
diverting effort and attention to a process of on unquestioned U.S. military preeminence.
joint experimentation which restricts rather
than encourages innovation. Rather than
4

17. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
II
FOUR ESSENTIAL MISSIONS
America’s global leadership, and its role has invited challenges; states seeking to
as the guarantor of the current great-power establish regional hegemony continue to
peace, relies upon the safety of the probe for the limits of the American security
American homeland; the preservation of a perimeter. None of the defense reviews of
favorable balance of power in Europe, the the past decade has weighed fully the range
Middle East and surrounding energy- of missions demanded by U.S. global
producing region, and East Asia; and the leadership: defending the homeland,
general stability of the international system fighting and
of nation-states relative to terrorists, None of the winning multiple
organized crime, and other “non-state defense reviews large-scale wars,
actors.” The relative importance of these of the past conducting
elements, and the threats to U.S. interests, constabulary
may rise and fall over time. Europe, for decade has missions which
example, is now extraordinarily peaceful weighed fully preserve the
and stable, despite the turmoil in the the range of current peace, and
Balkans. Conversely, East Asia appears to transforming the
be entering a period with increased potential
missions U.S. armed forces
for instability and competition. In the Gulf, demanded by to exploit the
American power and presence has achieved U.S. global “revolution in
relative external security for U.S. allies, but leadership, nor military affairs.”
the longer-term prospects are murkier. Nor have they
Generally, American strategy for the coming adequately adequately
decades should seek to consolidate the great quantified the quantified the
victories won in the 20th century – which forces and forces and
have made Germany and Japan into stable resources resources
democracies, for example – maintain necessary to
stability in the Middle East, while setting the necessary to execute these
conditions for 21st-century successes, execute these missions
especially in East Asia. missions separately and
successfully.
A retreat from any one of these
successfully. While much
requirements would call America’s status as further detailed
the world’s leading power into question. As analysis would be required, it is the purpose
we have seen, even a small failure like that of this study to outline the large, “full-
in Somalia or a halting and incomplete spectrum” forces that are necessary to
triumph as in the Balkans can cast doubt on conduct the varied tasks demanded by a
American credibility. The failure to define a strategy of American preeminence for today
coherent global security and military and tomorrow.
strategy during the post-Cold-War period
5

18. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
HOMELAND DEFENSE. America must defend its homeland. During the Cold War,
nuclear deterrence was the key element in homeland defense; it remains essential. But the
new century has brought with it new challenges. While reconfiguring its nuclear force, the
United States also must counteract the effects of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction that may soon allow lesser states to deter U.S. military action
by threatening U.S. allies and the American homeland itself. Of all the new and current
missions for U.S. armed forces, this must have priority.
LARGE WARS. Second, the United States must retain sufficient forces able to rapidly
deploy and win multiple simultaneous large-scale wars and also to be able to respond to
unanticipated contingencies in regions where it does not maintain forward-based forces.
This resembles the “two-war” standard that has been the basis of U.S. force planning over
the past decade. Yet this standard needs to be updated to account for new realities and
potential new conflicts.
CONSTABULARY DUTIES. Third, the Pentagon must retain forces to preserve the
current peace in ways that fall short of conduction major theater campaigns. A decade’s
experience and the policies of two administrations have shown that such forces must be
expanded to meet the needs of the new, long-term NATO mission in the Balkans, the
continuing no-fly-zone and other missions in Southwest Asia, and other presence missions in
vital regions of East Asia. These duties are today’s most frequent missions, requiring forces
configured for combat but capable of long-term, independent constabulary operations.
TRANSFORM U.S. ARMED FORCES. Finally, the Pentagon must begin now to exploit the so-
called “revolution in military affairs,” sparked by the introduction of advanced technologies
into military systems; this must be regarded as a separate and critical mission worthy of a
share of force structure and defense budgets.
Current American armed forces are ill- requirement for peacekeeping operations;
prepared to execute these four missions. unless this requirement is better understood,
Over the past decade, efforts to design and America’s ability to fight major wars will be
build effective missile defenses have been jeopardized. Likewise, the transformation
ill-conceived and underfunded, and the process has gotten short shrift.
Clinton Administration has proposed deep
reductions in U.S. nuclear forces without To meet the requirements of the four
sufficient analysis of the changing global new missions highlighted above, the United
nuclear balance of forces. While, broadly States must undertake a two-stage process.
speaking, the United States now maintains The immediate task is to rebuild today’s
sufficient active and reserve forces to meet force, ensuring that it is equal to the tasks
the traditional two-war standard, this is true before it: shaping the peacetime enviro-
only in the abstract, under the most nment and winning multiple, simultaneous
favorable geopolitical conditions. As the theater wars; these forces must be large
Joint Chiefs of Staff have admitted enough to accomplish these tasks without
repeatedly in congressional testimony, they running the “high” or “unacceptable” risks it
lack the forces necessary to meet the two- faces now. The second task is to seriously
war benchmark as expressed in the warplans embark upon a transformation of the
of the regional commanders-in-chief. The Defense Department. This itself will be a
requirements for major-war forces must be two-stage effort: for the next decade or
reevaluated to accommodate new strategic more, the armed forces will continue to
realities. One of these new realities is the operate many of the same systems it now
6

19. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
does, organize themselves in traditional more effective nuclear weapons; brought
units, and employ current operational underground testing to a complete halt; and
concepts. However, this transition period allowed the Department of Energy’s
must be a first step toward more substantial weapons complex and associated scientific
reform. Over the next several decades, the expertise to atrophy for lack of support. The
United States must field a global system of administration has also made the decision to
missile defenses, divine ways to control the retain current weapons in the active force for
new “international commons” of space and years beyond their design life. When
cyberspace, and build new kinds of combined with the decision to cut back on
conventional forces for different strategic regular, non-nuclear flight and system tests
challenges and a new technological of the weapons themselves, this raises a host
environment. of questions about the continuing safety and
reliability of the nation’s strategic arsenal.
Nuclear Forces The administration’s stewardship of the
nation's deterrent capability has been aptly
Current conventional wisdom about described by Congress as “erosion by
strategic forces in the post-Cold-War world design.”
is captured in a comment made by the late
Les Aspin, the Clinton Administration's first
secretary of defense. Aspin wrote that the
collapse of the Soviet Union had “literally
reversed U.S. interests in nuclear weapons”
and, “Today, if offered the magic wand to
eradicate the existence and knowledge of
nuclear weapons, we would very likely
accept it.” Since the United States is the
world’s dominant conventional military A new assessment of the global
power, this sentiment is understandable. But nuclear balance, one that takes
it is precisely because we have such power
account of Chinese and other nuclear
that smaller adversarial states, looking for an
equalizing advantage, are determined to
forces as well as Russian, must
acquire their own weapons of mass precede decisions about U.S. nuclear
destruction. Whatever our fondest wishes, force cuts.
the reality of the today’s world is that there
is no magic wand with which to eliminate Rather than maintain and improve
these weapons (or, more fundamentally, the America’s nuclear deterrent, the Clinton
interest in acquiring them) and that deterring Administration has put its faith in new arms
their use requires a reliable and dominant control measures, most notably by signing
U.S. nuclear capability. the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). The treaty proposed a new
While the formal U.S. nuclear posture multilateral regime, consisting of some 150
has remained conservative through the 1994 states, whose principal effect would be to
Nuclear Posture Review and the 1997 constrain America's unique role in providing
Quadrennial Defense Review, and senior the global nuclear umbrella that helps to
Pentagon leaders speak of the continuing keep states like Japan and South Korea from
need for nuclear deterrent forces, the Clinton developing the weapons that are well within
Administration has taken repeated steps to their scientific capability, while doing little
undermine the readiness and effectiveness of to stem nuclear weapons proliferation.
U.S. nuclear forces. In particular, it has Although the Senate refused to ratify the
virtually ceased development of safer and treaty, the administration continues to abide
by its basic strictures. And while it may
7

20. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
make sense to continue the current needed first is a global net assessment of
moratorium on nuclear testing for the what kinds and numbers of nuclear weapons
moment – since it would take a number of the U.S. needs to meet its security
years to refurbish the neglected testing responsibilities in a post-Soviet world.
infrastructure in any case – ultimately this is
an untenable situation. If the United States In short, until the Department of
is to have a nuclear deterrent that is both Defense can better define future its nuclear
effective and safe, it will need to test. requirements, significant reductions in U.S.
nuclear forces might well have unforeseen
That said, of all the elements of U.S. consequences that lessen rather than
military force posture, perhaps none is more enhance the security of the United States
in need of reevaluation than America’s and its allies. Reductions, upon review,
nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons remain might be called for. But what should finally
a critical component of American military drive the size and character of our nuclear
power but it is unclear whether the current forces is not numerical parity with Russian
U.S. nuclear arsenal is well-suited to the capabilities but maintaining American
emerging post-Cold War world. Today’s strategic superiority – and, with that
strategic calculus encompasses more factors superiority, a capability to deter possible
than just the balance of terror between the hostile coalitions of nuclear powers. U.S.
United States and Russia. U.S. nuclear force nuclear superiority is nothing to be ashamed
planning and related arms control policies of; rather, it will be an essential element in
must take account of a larger set of variables preserving American leadership in a more
than in the past, including the growing complex and chaotic world.
number of small
nuclear arsenals – The Forces for Major Theater Wars
from North Korea
to Pakistan to,
administration’s
The one constant of Pentagon force
perhaps soon, stewardship of planning through the past decade has been
Iran and Iraq – the nation’s the recognized need to retain sufficient
and a modernized deterrent combat forces to fight and win, as rapidly
and expanded and decisively as possible, multiple, nearly
Chinese nuclear
capability has
simultaneous major theater wars. This
force. Moreover, been described constant is based upon two important truths
there is a question by Congress as about the current international order. One,
about the role “erosion by the Cold-War standoff between America and
nuclear weapons its allies and the Soviet Union that made for
should play in design.”
caution and discouraged direct aggression
deterring the use against the major security interests of either
of other kinds of weapons of mass destruc- side no longer exists. Two, conventional
tion, such as chemical and biological, with warfare remains a viable way for aggressive
the U.S. having foresworn those weapons’ states to seek major changes in the
development and use. It addition, there may international order.
be a need to develop a new family of nuclear
weapons designed to address new sets of Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait reflected
military requirements, such as would be both truths. The invasion would have been
required in targeting the very deep under- highly unlikely, if not impossible, within the
ground, hardened bunkers that are being context of the Cold War, and Iraq overran
built by many of our potential adversaries. Kuwait in a matter of hours. These two
Nor has there been a serious analysis done truths revealed a third: maintaining or
of the benefits versus the costs of maintain- restoring a favorable order in vital regions in
ing the traditional nuclear “triad.” What is
8

21. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
the world such as Europe, the Middle East in the early 1990s. The experience of
and East Asia places a unique responsibility Operation Allied Force in the Balkans
on U.S. armed forces. The Gulf War and suggests that, if anything, the canonical two-
indeed the subsequent lesser wars in the war force-sizing standard is more likely to
Balkans could hardly have been fought and be too low than too high. The Kosovo air
won without the dominant role played by campaign eventually involved the level of
American military might. forces anticipated for a major war, but in a
theater other than the two – the Korean
Thus, the understanding that U.S. armed peninsula and Southwest Asia – that have
forces should be shaped by a “two-major- generated past Pentagon planning scenarios.
war” standard rightly has been accepted as Moreover, new theater wars that can be
the core of America’s superpower status foreseen, such as an American defense of
since the end of the Cold War. The logic of Taiwan against a Chinese invasion or
past defense reviews still obtains, and punitive attack, have yet to be formally
received its clear exposition in the 1997 considered by Pentagon planners.
Quadrennial Defense Review, which argued:
To better judge forces needed for
A force sized and equipped for building an American peace, the Pentagon
deterring and defeating aggression in needs to begin to calculate the force
more than one theater ensures that the necessary to
United States will maintain the protect, The Joint Chiefs
flexibility to cope with the unpredictable
and unexpected. Such a capability is
independently, have admitted
the sine qua non of a superpower and is U.S. interests they lack the
essential to the credibility of our overall in Europe, East
Asia and the forces necessary
national security strategy….If the
United States were to forego its ability Gulf at all to meet the two-
to defeat aggression in more than one times. The war benchmark.
theater at a time, our standing as a actions of our
global power, as the security partner of adversaries in these regions bear no more
choice and the leader of the than a tangential relationship to one another;
international community would be it is more likely that one of these regional
called in to question. Indeed, some
powers will seize an opening created by
allies would undoubtedly read a one-
war capability as a signal that the deployments of U.S. forces elsewhere to
United States, if heavily engaged make mischief.
elsewhere, would no longer be able to
defend their interests…A one-theater- Thus, the major-theater-war standard
war capacity would risk should remain the principal force-sizing tool
undermining…the credibility of U.S. for U.S. conventional forces. This not to say
security commitments in key regions of that this measure has been perfectly applied
the world. This, in turn, could cause in the past: Pentagon analyses have been
allies and friends to adopt more both too optimistic and too pessimistic, by
divergent defense policies and postures,
turns. For example, the analyses done of the
thereby weakening the web of alliances
and coalitions on which we rely to requirement to defeat an Iraqi invasion of
protect our interests abroad. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia almost certainly
overestimates the level of force required.
In short, anything less than a clear two- Conversely, past analyses of a defense of
war capacity threatens to devolve into a no- South Korea may have underestimated the
war strategy. difficulties of such a war, especially if North
Korea employed weapons of mass destruc-
Unfortunately, Defense Department tion, as intelligence estimates anticipate.
thinking about this requirement was frozen Moreover, the theater-war analysis done for
9

22. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
the QDR assumed that Kim Jong Il and unavoidable diet for U.S. armed forces for
Saddam Hussein each could begin a war – many years to come: “Based on recent
perhaps even while employing chemical, experience and intelligence projections, the
biological or even nuclear weapons – and demand for SSC operations is expected to
the United States would make no effort to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years,”
unseat militarily either ruler. In both cases, the review concluded. Yet, at the same
past Pentagon wargames have given little or time, the QDR failed to allocate any forces
no consideration to the force requirements to these missions, continuing the fiction that,
necessary not only to defeat an attack but to for force planning purposes, constabulary
remove these regimes from power and missions could be considered “lesser
conduct post-combat stability operations. In included cases” of major theater war
short, past Defense Department application requirements. “U.S. forces must also be
of the two-war standard is not a reliable able to withdraw from SSC operations,
guide to the real force requirements – and, reconstitute, and then deploy to a major
of course, past reviews included no analysis theater war in accordance with required
of the kind of campaign in Europe as was timelines,” the review argued.
seen in Operation Allied Force. Because
past Pentagon strategy reviews have been
budget-driven exercises, it will be necessary
to conduct fresh and more realistic analyses
even of the canonical two-war scenarios.
In sum, while retaining the spirit of past
force-planning for major wars, the
Department of Defense must undertake a
more nuanced and thoroughgoing review of
real requirements. The truths that gave rise
to the original two-war standard endure:
America’s adversaries will continue to resist
the building of the American peace; when
they see an opportunity as Saddam Hussein The increasing number of
did in 1990, they will employ their most ‘constabulary’ missions for U.S.
powerful armed forces to win on the battle- troops, such as in Kosovo above, must
field what they could not win in peaceful be considered an integral element in
competition; and American armed forces Pentagon force planning.
will remain the core of efforts to deter,
defeat, or remove from power regional
aggressors. The shortcomings of this approach were
underscored by the experience of Operation
Forces for ‘Constabulary’ Duties Allied Force in the Balkans. Precisely
because the forces engaged there would not
In addition to improving the analysis have been able to withdraw, reconstitute and
needed to quantify the requirements for redeploy to another operation – and because
major theater wars, the Pentagon also must the operation consumed such a large part of
come to grips with the real requirements for overall Air Force aircraft – the Joint Chiefs
constabulary missions. The 1997 of Staff concluded that the United States
Quadrennial Defense Review rightly was running “unacceptable” risk in the event
acknowledged that these missions, which it of war elsewhere. Thus, facing up to the
dubbed “smaller-scale contingencies,” or realities of multiple constabulary missions
SSCs, would be the frequent and will require a permanent allocation of U.S.
armed forces.
10

23. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
Nor can the problem be solved by era, the Defense Department is more than
simply withdrawing from current able to conduct a useful assessment to
constabulary missions or by vowing to avoid quantify the overall needs for forces
them in the future. Indeed, withdrawing engaged in constabulary duties. While part
from today’s ongoing missions would be of the solution lies in repositioning existing
problematic. Although the no-fly-zone air forces, there is no escaping the conclusion
operations over northern and southern Iraq that these new missions, unforeseen when
have continued without pause for almost a the defense drawdown began a decade ago,
decade, they remain an essential element in require an increase in overall personnel
U.S. strategy and force posture in the strength and U.S. force structure.
Persian Gulf region. Ending these opera-
tions would hand Saddam Hussein an impor- Transformation Forces
tant victory, something any American leader
would be loath to do. Likewise, withdraw- The fourth element in American force
ing from the Balkans would place American posture – and certainly the one which holds
leadership in Europe – indeed, the viability the key to any longer-term hopes to extend
of NATO – in question. While none of the current Pax Americana – is the mission
these operations involves a mortal threat, to transform U.S. military forces to meet
they do engage U.S. national security new geopolitical and technological
interests directly, as well as engaging challenges. While the prime directive for
American moral interests. transformation will be to design and deploy
a global missile defense system, the effects
Further, these constabulary missions are of information and other advanced techno-
far more complex and likely to generate logies promise to revolutionize the nature of
violence than traditional “peacekeeping” conventional armed forces. Moreover, the
missions. For one, they demand American need to create weapons systems optimized
political leadership rather than that of the for operations in the Pacific theater will
United Nations, as the failure of the UN create requirements quite distinct from the
mission in the Balkans and the relative current generation of systems designed for
success of NATO operations there attests. warfare on the European continent and those
Nor can the United States assume a UN-like new systems like the F-22 fighter that also
stance of neutrality; the preponderance of were developed to meet late-Cold-War
American power is so great and its global needs.
interests so wide that it cannot pretend to be
indifferent to the political outcome in the Although the basic concept for a system
Balkans, the Persian Gulf or even when it of global missile defenses capable of
deploys forces in Africa. Finally, these defending the United States and its allies
missions demand forces basically configured against the threat of smaller and simpler
for combat. While they also demand ballistic missiles has been well understood
personnel with special language, logistics since the late 1980s, a decade has been
and other support skills, the first order of squandered in developing the requisite
business in missions such as in the Balkans technologies. In fact, work on the key
is to establish security, stability and order. elements of such a system, especially those
American troops, in particular, must be that would operate in space, has either been
regarded as part of an overwhelmingly so slowed or halted completely, so that the
powerful force. process of deploying robust missile defenses
remains a long-term project. If for no other
With a decade’s worth of experience reason, the mission to create such a missile
both of the requirements for current defense system should be considered a
constabulary missions and with the chaotic matter of military transformation.
political environment of the post-Cold War
11

24. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
As will be argued more fully below, marks the new century places these
effective ballistic missile defenses will be advantages at risk. Today’s U.S.
the central element in the exercise of conventional forces are masters of a mature
American power and the projection of U.S. paradigm of warfare, marked by the
military forces abroad. Without it, weak dominance of armored vehicles, aircraft
states operating small arsenals of crude carriers and, especially, manned tactical
ballistic missiles, armed with basic nuclear aircraft, that is beginning to be overtaken by
warheads or other weapons of mass destruc- a new paradigm, marked by long-range
tion, will be a in a strong position to deter precision strikes and the proliferation of
the United States from using conventional missile technologies. Ironically, it has been
force, no matter the technological or other the United States that has pioneered this new
advantages we may enjoy. Even if such form of high-technology conventional
enemies are merely able to threaten warfare: it was suggested by the 1991 Gulf
American allies rather than the United States War and has been revealed more fully by the
homeland itself, America’s ability to project operations of the past decade. Even the
power will be “Allied Force” air war for Kosovo showed a
deeply distorted version of the emerging paradigm
compromised.
For the United of warfare.
Alas, neither States to retain the
Admini- technological and Yet even these pioneering capabilities
stration tactical advan- are the residue of investments first made in
strategists nor the mid- and late 1980s; over the past
Pentagon
tages it now decade the pace of innovation within the
force planners enjoys, the Pentagon has slowed measurably. In part,
seem to have transformation this is due to reduced defense budgets, the
grasped this effort must be overwhelming dominance of U.S. forces
elemental today, and the multiplicity of constabulary
point; considered as missions. And without the driving challenge
certainly, pressing a military of the Soviet military threat, efforts at
efforts to fund, mission as innovation have lacked urgency.
design and Nonetheless, a variety of new potential
develop an
preparing for challenges can be clearly foreseen. The
effective today’s theater Chinese military, in particular, seeks to
system of wars. exploit the revolution in military affairs to
missile offset American advantages in naval and air
defenses do not reflect any sense of urgency. power, for example. If the United States is
Nonetheless, the first task in transforming to retain the technological and tactical
U.S. military to meet the technological and advantages it now enjoys in large-scale
strategic realities of a new century is to conventional conflicts, the effort at
create such a system. transformation must be considered as
pressing a mission as preparing for today’s
Creating a system of global missile potential theater wars or constabulary
defenses is but the first task of missions – indeed, it must receive a
transformation; the need to reshape U.S. significant, separate allocation of forces and
conventional forces is almost as pressing. budgetary resources over the next two
For, although American armed forces decades.
possess capabilities and enjoy advantages
that far surpass those of even our richest and In addition, the process of transfor-
closest allies, let alone our declared and mation must proceed from an appreciation
potential enemies, the combination of of American strategy and political goals.
technological and strategic change that For example, as the leader of a global
12

25. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
network of alliances and strategic general terms, it seems likely that the
partnerships, U.S. armed forces cannot process of transformation will take several
retreat into a “Fortress America.” Thus, decades and that U.S. forces will continue to
while long-range precision strikes will operate many, if not most, of today’s
certainly play an increasingly large role in weapons systems for a decade or more.
U.S. military operations, American forces Thus, it can be foreseen that the process of
must remain deployed abroad, in large transformation will in fact be a two-stage
numbers. To remain as the leader of a process: first of transition, then of more
variety of coalitions, the United States must thoroughgoing transformation. The break-
partake in the risks its allies face; security point will come when a preponderance of
guarantees that depend solely upon power new weapons systems begins to enter
projected from the continental United States service, perhaps when, for example,
will inevitably become discounted. unmanned aerial vehicles begin to be as
numerous as manned aircraft. In this regard,
Moreover, the process of transformation the Pentagon should be very wary of making
should proceed in a spirit of competition large investments in new programs – tanks,
among the services and between service and planes, aircraft carriers, for example – that
joint approaches. Inevitably, new would commit U.S. forces to current
technologies may create the need for entirely paradigms of warfare for many decades to
new military organizations; this report will come.
argue below that the emergence of space as
a key theater of war suggests forcefully that, In conclusion, it should be clear that
in time, it may be wise to create a separate these four essential missions for maintaining
“space service.” Thus far, the Defense American military preeminence are quite
Department has attempted to take a separate and distinct from one another –
prematurely joint approach to none should be considered a “lesser included
transformation. While it is certain that new case” of another, even though they are
technologies will allow for the closer closely related and may, in some cases,
combination of traditional service require similar sorts of forces. Conversely,
capabilities, it is too early in the process of the failure to provide sufficient forces to
transformation to choke off what should be execute these four missions must result in
the healthy and competitive face of problems for American strategy. The failure
“interservice rivalry.” Because the separate to build missile defenses will put America
services are the military institutions most and her allies at grave risk and compromise
attuned to providing forces designed to carry the exercise of American power abroad.
out the specific missions required by U.S. Conventional forces that are insufficient to
strategy, they are in fact best equipped to fight multiple theater wars simultaneously
become the engines of transformation and cannot protect American global interests and
change within the context of enduring allies. Neglect or withdrawal from
mission requirements. constabulary missions will increase the
likelihood of larger wars breaking out and
Finally, it must be remembered that the encourage petty tyrants to defy American
process of transformation is indeed a interests and ideals. And the failure to
process: even the most vivid view of the prepare for tomorrow’s challenges will
armed forces of the future must be grounded ensure that the current Pax Americana
in an understanding of today’s forces. In comes to an early end.
.
13

26. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
III
REPOSITIONING TODAY’S FORCE
Despite the centrality of major theater is on the road to becoming a NATO
wars in conventional-force planning, it has protectorate. In the Persian Gulf region, the
become painfully obvious that U.S. forces presence of American forces, along with
have other vital roles to play in building an British and French units, has become a semi-
enduring American peace. The presence of permanent fact of life. Though the
American forces in critical regions around immediate mission of those forces is to
the world is the visible expression of the enforce the no-fly zones over northern and
extent of America’s status as a superpower southern Iraq, they represent the long-term
and as the guarantor of liberty, peace and commitment of the United States and its
stability. Our role in shaping the peacetime major allies to a region of vital importance.
security environment is an essential one, not Indeed, the United
to be renounced without great cost: it will be States has for
difficult, if not impossible, to sustain the decades sought to
Guarding the
role of global guarantor without a substantial play a more American
overseas presence. Our allies, for whom permanent role in security peri-
regional problems are vital security interests, Gulf regional meter today –
will come to doubt our willingness to defend security. While
their interests if U.S. forces withdraw into a the unresolved
and tomorrow –
Fortress America. Equally important, our conflict with Iraq will require
worldwide web of alliances provides the provides the changes in U.S.
most effective and efficient means for immediate deployments and
exercising American global leadership; the justification, the
benefits far outweigh the burdens. Whether need for a installations
established in permanent bases or on substantial overseas.
rotational deployments, the operations of American force
U.S. and allied forces abroad provide the presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of
first line of defense of what may be the regime of Saddam Hussein. In East
described as the “American security Asia, the pattern of U.S. military operations
perimeter.” is shifting to the south: in recent years,
significant naval forces have been sent to the
Since the collapse of the Soviet empire, region around Taiwan in response to
this perimeter has expanded slowly but Chinese provocation, and now a contingent
inexorably. In Europe, NATO has of U.S. troops is supporting the Australian-
expanded, admitting three new members and led mission to East Timor. Across the
acquiring a larger number of “adjunct” globe, the trend is for a larger U.S. security
members through the Partnership for Peace perimeter, bringing with it new kinds of
program. Tens of thousands of U.S, NATO missions.
and allied troops are on patrol in the
Balkans, and have fought a number of The placement of U.S. bases has yet to
significant actions there; in effect, the region reflect these realities – if anything, the
14

27. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
worldwide archipelago of U.S. military the true American commitment to our allies
installations has contracted as the perimeter and their security interests – but they also
of U.S. security interests has expanded. need to be highly versatile and mobile with a
American armed forces far from ideally broad range of capabilities; they are the
positioned to respond to the needs of the cavalry on the new American frontier. In
times, but the Pentagon remains tied to the event of a large-scale war, they must be
levels of forward-deployed forces that bear able to shape the battlefield while
little relationship to military capabilities or reinforcing forces based primarily in the
realities. The air war in Kosovo provides a United States arrive to apply decisive blows
vivid example: during Operation Allied to the enemy. Not only must they be
Force, U.S. and NATO warplanes were repositioned to reflect the shifting strategic
spread out across the continent of Europe landscape, they also must be reorganized
and even into Asiatic Turkey, forced into a and restructured to reflect their new
widely dispersed and very complex pattern missions and to integrate new technologies.
of operations – requiring extensive refueling
efforts and limiting the campaign itself – by Europe
a lack of adequate air bases in southeastern
Europe. The network of American overseas
At the end of the Cold War, the United
installations and deployments requires
States maintained more than 300,000 troops
reconfiguration. Likewise, the structure of
in Europe, including two Army corps and 13
U.S. forces needs to be reconsidered in light
Air Force wings plus a variety of indepen-
of the changing mission of the American
dent sub-units, primarily based in Germany.
military. Overall U.S. military force
The central plain of Germany was the
structure must be rationalized to accommo-
central theater of the Cold War and, short of
date the fact that the presence of these forces
an all-out nuclear exchange, a Soviet
in far-flung outposts or on patrol overseas
armored invasion of western Europe the
may be as important as their theater-
principal threat faced by the United States
warfighting missions, especially in Europe.
and its NATO allies. Today Germany is
The requirements of Balkans stabilization,
unified, Poland and the Czech Republic
NATO expansion (including Partnership for
members of NATO, and the Russian army
Peace) and other missions within the theater
has retreated to the gates of Moscow while
render it unrealistic to expect U.S. forces in
becoming primarily engaged in the
Europe to be readily available for other
Caucasus and to the south more generally.
crises, as formal Pentagon planning
Though northern and central Europe are
presumes. The continuing challenges from
arguably more stable now than at any time
Iraq also make it unwise to draw down
in history, the majority of American forces
forces in the Gulf dramatically. Securing
in Europe are still based in the north,
the American perimeter today – and
including a theater army and a corps of two
tomorrow – will necessitate shifts in U.S.
heavy divisions in Germany and just five
overseas operations.
Air Force wings, plus a handful of other,
smaller units.
American armed forces stationed abroad
and on rotational deployments around the
But while northern and central Europe
world should be considered as the first line
have remained extraordinarily stable, and
of American defenses, providing recon-
the eastern Germany, Poland and the Czech
naissance and security against the prospect
Republic have become reintegrated into the
of larger crises and conducting stability
mainstream of European political, economic
operations to prevent their outbreak. These
and cultural life, the situation in south-
forces need to be among the most ready,
eastern Europe has been a tumultuous one.
with finely honed warfighting skills – and
The Balkans, and southeastern Europe more
only forces configured for combat indicate
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28. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
generally, present the major hurdle toward Despite the shifting focus of conflict in
the creation of a Europe “whole and free” Europe, a requirement to station U.S. forces
from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The delay in northern and central Europe remains. The
in bringing security and stability to south- region is stable, but a continued American
eastern Europe has not only prevented the presence helps to assure the major European
consolidation of the victory in the Cold War, powers, especially Germany, that the United
it has created a zone of violence and conflict States retains its longstanding security
and introduced uncertainty about America’s interest in the continent. This is especially
role in Europe. important in light of the nascent European
moves toward an independent defense
“identity” and policy; it is important that
NATO not be replaced by the European
Union, leaving the United States without a
voice in European security affairs. In
addition, many of the current installations
and facilities provide critical infrastructure
for supporting U.S. forces throughout
Europe and for reinforcement in the event of
a crisis. From airbases in England and
Germany to headquarters and Army units in
Belgium and Germany, much of the current
The continuing deployment of forces in network of U.S. bases in northern and
central retains its relevance today as in the
the Balkans reflects a U.S. commitment
Cold War.
to the region’s security. By refusing to
treat these deployments as a shift of the However, changes should be made to
permanent American presence in reflect the larger shift in European security
Europe, the Clinton Administration has needs. U.S. Army Europe should be
increased the burden on the armed transformed from a single corps of two
services exponentially. heavy divisions and support units into
versatile, combined-arms brigade-sized units
At the same time, the continuing capable of independent action and
deployment of forces in the Balkans reflects movement over operational distances. U.S.
what is in fact a long-term American Air Force units in Europe need to undergo a
commitment to the security of the region. similar reorientation. The current
But by refusing to treat these deployments infrastructure in England and Germany
as an expansion – or shift – of the permanent should be retained. The NATO air base at
American presence in Europe, reflecting an Aviano, Italy, long the primary location for
enduring interest, the Clinton air operations over the Balkans, needs to be
Administration has increased the burden on substantially improved. As with ground
the armed services exponentially. Rather forces, serious consideration should be given
than recognizing the need to reposition and to establishing a permanent and modern
reconfigure U.S. forces in Europe away NATO and U.S. airfield in Hungary for
from the north to the southeast, current support to central and southern Europe. In
policy has been to rotate units in and out of Turkey, Incirlik Air Base, home of
the Balkans, destroying their readiness to Operation Northern Watch, also needs to be
perform other missions and tying up an expanded, improved and perhaps
increasingly large slice of a significantly supplemented with a new base in eastern
reduced force. Turkey.
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