National security&accelerating risks of climate change may 2014

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National Security
and the
Accelerating Risks
of Climate Change
May 2014
CNA Military Advisory Board

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CNA Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change
(Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2014)

i
Foreword
Projected climate change is a complex multi-decade challenge. Without action to build resilience,
it will increase security risks over much of the planet. It will not only increase threats to developing
nations in resource-challenged parts of the world, but it will also test the security of nations with
robust capability, including significant elements of our National Power here at home. Even though
we may not have 100 percent certainty as to the cause or even the exact magnitude of the impacts,
the risks associated with projected climate change warrant taking action today to plan and prepare
for changes in our communities, at home and abroad.
When it comes to thinking through long-term global challenges, none are more qualified than
our most senior military leaders. Not only do they have decades of experience managing risk and
responding to conflict on the battlefield, but they are also experts in geopolitical analysis and long-
range strategic planning.
Military leaders typically look at challenges with imperfect or conflicting information. Despite not
having 100 percent certainty, they weigh the consequences of various courses of action—including
the consequences of no action—and make informed decisions based on their experience and risk
forbearance.
It is through this analytical prism that 11 retired Generals and Admirals came together in 2007,
under the moniker of CNA’s Military Advisory Board, to examine the security implications of
climate change. Their landmark report, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, was
the first time that such an elite body of military leaders expressed their concern over the security
implications of climate change.
Now, seven years later, the Military Advisory Board has gathered again to re-examine the nexus of
projected climate change and national security. This update reflects their decades of experience as
risk managers and geopolitical security experts. With the foundation of CNA’s established analytical
prowess, the report deserves strong attention from not only the security community, but also from
the entire government and the American public.
The update serves as a bipartisan call to action. It makes a compelling case that climate change
is no longer a future threat—it is taking place now. It observes that climate change serves as a
catalyst of conflict in vulnerable parts of the world, and that projected changes in global migration
patterns will make the challenges even more severe. It identifies threats to elements of National
Power here at home, particularly those associated with our infrastructure and our ability to
maintain military readiness.
The update makes clear that actions to build resilience against the projected impacts of climate
change are required today. We no longer have the option to wait and see. We applaud this
group of American patriots for this important update. We commend its reading in full and its
recommendations to the Administration, to Congress, and to the American people.
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
Michael Chertoff
Former Secretary of Homeland Security
Leon Panetta
Former Secretary of Defense

iii
To the reader:
The nature and pace of observed climate changes—and an emerging scientific
consensus on their projected consequences—pose severe risks for our national
security. During our decades of experience in the U.S. military, we have addressed
many national security challenges, from containment and deterrence of the Soviet
nuclear threat during the Cold War to political extremism and transnational terrorism
in recent years. The national security risks of projected climate change are as serious
as any challenges we have faced.
Since we published our first report in 2007 on the national security implications
of climate change, we have witnessed nearly a decade of scientific discoveries
in environmental science, a burgeoning scholarly literature on global complex
interdependence among nations, and a series of reactions (or in many cases, failures
to react) to projected climate change. Hence, we were compelled to provide an update
to our report. Over several months and meetings, we listened to scientists, security
analysts, government officials, industry representatives, and the military. We viewed
their information through the lens of our military experience as warfighters, planners,
and leaders. Our discussions have been lively, informative, and very sobering.
At the end of the day, we validate the findings of our first report and find that in many
cases the risks we identified are advancing noticeably faster than we anticipated. We
also find the world becoming more complex in terms of the problems that plague
its various regions. Yet thinking about how to manage the risks of projected climate
change as just a regional problem or—worse yet—someone else’s problem may limit
the ability to fully understand their consequences and cascading effects. We see more
clearly now that while projected climate change should serve as catalyst for change
and cooperation, it can also be a catalyst for conflict.
We are dismayed that discussions of climate change have become so polarizing
and have receded from the arena of informed public discourse and debate. Political
posturing and budgetary woes cannot be allowed to inhibit discussion and debate
over what so many believe to be a salient national security concern for our nation.
Each citizen must ask what he or she can do individually to mitigate climate change,
and collectively what his or her local, state, and national leaders are doing to ensure
that the world is sustained for future generations. Are your communities, businesses,
and governments investing in the necessary resilience measures to lower the risks
associated with climate change? In a world of high complex interdependence, how
will climate change in the far corners of the world affect your life and those of your
children and grandchildren? If the answers to any of these questions make you worried
or uncomfortable, we urge you to become involved. Time and tide wait for no one.
National Security
and the
Accelerating Risks
of Climate Change
Military Advisory Board
General Paul Kern, USA (Ret.)
Brigadier General Gerald E. Galloway Jr., USA (Ret.)
Vice Admiral Lee Gunn, USN (Ret.)
Admiral Frank “Skip” Bowman, USN (Ret.)
General James Conway, USMC (Ret.)
Lieutenant General Ken Eickmann, USAF (Ret.)
Lieutenant General Larry Farrell, USAF (Ret.)
General Don Hoffman, USAF (Ret.)
General Ron Keys, USAF (Ret.)
Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti, British Royal Navy (Ret.)
Vice Admiral Ann Rondeau, USN (Ret.)
Lieutenant General Keith Stalder, USMC (Ret.)
General Gordon Sullivan, USA (Ret.)
Rear Admiral David Titley, USN (Ret.)
General Charles “Chuck” Wald, USAF (Ret.)
Lieutenant General Richard Zilmer, USMC (Ret.)

v www.cna.org/reports/accelerating-risks
The CNA Military Advisory Board
General Paul Kern, USA (Ret.)
CNA MAB Chairman
Former Commanding General, Army Materiel Command
Brigadier General Gerald E. Galloway Jr., USA (Ret.)
CNA MAB Vice Chairman
Former Dean at the United States Military Academy
Former Dean at the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, National Defense University
Vice Admiral Lee Gunn, USN (Ret.)
CNA MAB Vice Chairman
Former Inspector General of the Department of the Navy
Admiral Frank “Skip” Bowman, USN (Ret.)
Former Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
Former Chief of Naval Personnel
General James Conway, USMC (Ret.)
Former Commandant of the Marine Corps
Lieutenant General Ken Eickmann, USAF (Ret.)
Former Commander, U.S. Air Force Aeronautical
Systems Center
Lieutenant General Larry Farrell, USAF (Ret.)
Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs,
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
General Don Hoffman USAF (Ret.)
Former Commander, U.S. Air Force Materiel Command
General Ron Keys, USAF (Ret.)
Former Commander, U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command
Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti, British Royal Navy (Ret.)
Former UK Foreign Secretary’s Special Representative
for Climate Change
Former Commandant, UK Joint Services Command and
Staff College
Vice Admiral Ann Rondeau, USN (Ret.)
Former President, National Defense University
Former Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command
Lieutenant General Keith Stalder, USMC (Ret.)
Former Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Forces,
Pacific
General Gordon Sullivan, USA (Ret.)
Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Rear Admiral David W. Titley, USN (Ret.)
Former Oceanographer of the Navy
General Charles “Chuck” Wald, USAF (Ret.)
Former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command
Lieutenant General Richard Zilmer, USMC (Ret.)
Former Deputy Commandant for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs
Former Commanding General of Multi-National
Force–West in Al Anbar Province, Iraq
MAB Executive Director:
Ms. Sherri Goodman, Senior Vice President and
General Counsel, CNA Corporation
Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Environmental Security
CNA Team:
Dr. Leo Goff, Program Manager, Lead Writer
Ms. Jennifer Atkin, CNA Research Analyst
Dr. Lauren Malone, CNA Research Analyst
Mr. Chuck McCutcheon, Writer

vi www.cna.org/reports/accelerating-risks
Acknowledgements
We are thankful to many for their support of this effort. We thank Ms. Cheryl Rosenblum and Ms. Morrow Cater for
their sage insights and feedback throughout the process; Ms. Lee Woodard, who handled the design and layout of the
report; and the Wilson Center, Climate Nexus, the Freimuth Group, and the Center for Climate Security for support of
the initial release. We thank Ms. Brenda Mitchell and Ms. Jennifer Babbitts, who provided valuable administrative
support during this effort. We especially thank the Energy Foundation for its generous support of this project.
We thank the following individuals for sharing their technical, geopolitical, science, and policy expertise with the
CNA Military Advisory Board:
Lt General Thomas Bostick, U.S. Army Chief of Engineers and Commanding
General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Dr. James Clad, CNA, Senior Advisor for Asian Affairs
Mr. John Conger, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Installations and Environment
Major General Rich Engel, USAF (Ret.), Director, Environment and Natural Resources
Program, Strategic Futures Group, National Intelligence Council
Ms. Alice Hill, Senior Advisor for Preparedness and Resilience to the President’s
Assistant for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
Dr. Ron Filadelfo, CNA, Research Team Leader, Resource Analysis Division
Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg, CNA, Senior Research Scientist, Center for Strategic Studies
Mr. Kevin Knobloch, Chief of Staff, Department of Energy
Ms. Leslie-Anne “L-A” Levy, CNA, Managing Director, Safety and Security Division
Dr. Satu Limaye, CNA, Senior Advisor, Director of East-West Center
Dr. Mike MacCracken, Chief Scientist for Climate Change Programs with the Climate Institute
Dr. Jeff Marqusee, Chief Scientist, Enterprise Engineering and Environment, Noblis
BGen. Donald McGregor, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, National Guard Bureau
VADM Denny McGinn, USN (Ret.), Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations,
and Environment (EI&E)
Dr. Jerry Melillo, Chair, National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory Committee
Ms. Lindene Patton, Zurich Insurance Group
Mr. Jonathan Powers, White House Council on Environmental Quality
Ms. Nilanthi Samaranayake, CNA, Research Analyst, Center for Strategic Studies
Mr. Ghassan Schbley, CNA, Research Analyst, Center for Strategic Studies
Dr. Yee San Su, CNA, Senior Research Scientist, Safety and Security Division
Mr. Chris Steinitz, CNA, Research Analyst, Center for Strategic Studies
Ms. Nancy Sutley, Chair, White House Council on Environmental Quality
Lt General Jeffrey Talley, Chief of the Army Reserve, Commanding General,
U.S. Army Reserve Command
Mr. Roy Wright, FEMA, Deputy Associate Administrator for Mitigation

1 www.cna.org/reports/accelerating-risks
Executive Summary
CNA’s Military Advisory Board (MAB) first addressed the
national security implications of climate change in our
2007 report—National Security and the Threat of Cli-
mate Change. We gather again as a group of 16 retired
Generals and Admirals from the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps to re-examine climate change in the
context of a more informed, but more complex and
integrated world, and to provide an update to our
2007 findings.
We are compelled to conduct this update now because
of nearly seven years of developments in scientific
climate projections; observed climate changes, par-
ticularly in the Arctic; the toll of observed extreme
weather events both at home and abroad; and changes
in the global security environment. Although we have
seen some movement in mitigation and other areas
where climate adaptation and resilience are starting to
be included in planning documents, we gather again
because of our growing concern over the lack of com-
prehensive action by both the United States and the
international community to address the full spectrum
of projected climate change issues.
The specific questions addressed in this update are:
1. Have new threats or opportunities associated with
projected climate change or its effects emerged since
our last report? What will be the impacts on our
military?
2. The 2014 National Climate Assessment indicates
that climate change, once considered an issue for a
distant future, has moved firmly into the present.
What additional responses should the national secu-
rity community take to reduce the risks posed to our
nation and to the elements of our National Power
(Political, Military, Social, Infrastructure, and Infor-
mation systems (PMESII))?
Major findings:
Actions by the United States and the international
community have been insufficient to adapt to
the challenges associated with projected climate
change. Strengthening resilience to climate impacts
already locked into the system is critical, but this
will reduce long-term risk only if improvements
in resilience are accompanied by actionable agree-
ments on ways to stabilize climate change.
Scientists around the globe are increasing their con-
fidence, narrowing their projections, and reaffirming
the likely causes of climate change. As described in
Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third
National Climate Assessment: “Heat-trapping gases
already in the atmosphere have committed us to a
hotter future with more climate-related impacts over
the next few decades. The magnitude of climate change
beyond the next few decades depends primarily on the
amount of heat-trapping gases emitted globally, now
and in the future.”1
Some in the political realm continue
to debate the cause of a warming planet and demand
more data. Yet MAB member General Gordon Sullivan,
United States Army, Retired, has noted: “Speaking
as a soldier, we never have 100 percent certainty. If
you wait until you have 100 percent certainty, some-
thing bad is going to happen on the battlefield.”
Climate mitigation and adaptation efforts are emerging
in various places around the world, but the extent of
these efforts to mitigate and adapt to the projections
are insufficient to avoid significant potential water, food,
and energy insecurity; political instability; extreme
weather events; and other manifestations of climate
change. Coordinated, wide-scale, and well-executed
actions to limit heat-trapping gases and increase resil-
ience to help prevent and protect against the worst pro-
jected climate change impacts are required—now.
If you wait until you have 100 percent
certainty, something bad is going
to happen....

The potential security ramifications of global climate
change should be serving as catalysts for coopera-
tion and change. Instead, climate change impacts are
already accelerating instability in vulnerable areas of
the world and are serving as catalysts for conflict.
As we identified in our 2007 report—and as the
Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2014 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) echoed—the projected effects
of climate change “... are threat multipliers that will
aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environ-
mental degradation, political instability, and social ten-
sions—conditions that can enable terrorist activity and
other forms of violence.”2
We remain steadfast in our
concern over the connection between climate change
and national security.
In many areas, the projected impacts of climate change
will be more than threat multipliers; they will serve
as catalysts for instability and conflict. In Africa,
Asia, and the Middle East, we are already seeing how
the impacts of extreme weather, such as prolonged
drought and flooding—and resulting food shortages,
desertification, population dislocation and mass
migration, and sea level rise—are posing security chal-
lenges to these regions’ governments. We see these
trends growing and accelerating. To protect our
national security interests both at home and abroad,
the United States must be more assertive and expand
cooperation with our international allies to bring about
change and build resilience. The rapidly changing
Arctic region is a clear example where such interna-
tional cooperation and change is imperative.
Rapid population growth, especially in coastal and
urban areas, and complex changes in the global
security environment have made understanding the
strategic security risks of projected climate changes
more challenging. When it comes to thinking about
the impacts of climate change, we must guard
against a failure of imagination.
The world has added more than half a billion people
since we began the research for our 2007 report.
During this period, hundreds of millions of people
have settled in urban areas and coastal regions—areas
that are at increased risk to climate change effects. At
the same time, geopolitical power is becoming more
dispersed. Nonstate actors, such as globalized finan-
cial institutions and corporations, and even Internet-
empowered individuals—or the causes they represent
—are having increasing impacts on the political land-
scape. The world has also become more politically com-
plex and economically and financially interdependent.
We believe it is no longer adequate to think of the pro-
jected climate impacts to any one region of the world
in isolation. Climate change impacts transcend interna-
tional borders and geographic areas of responsibility.
When it comes to thinking about how the world will
respond to projected changes in the climate, we believe
it is important to guard against a failure of imagination.
For example, in the summer of 2001, it was, at least
partly, stovepipes in the intelligence community and
a failure of imagination by security analysts that
made it possible for terrorists to use box cutters to
hijack commercial planes and turn them into weapons
targeting the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Regarding these threats, the 9/11 Commission found
“The most important failure was one of imagination.
We do not believe leaders understood the gravity of
the threat. The … danger … was not a major topic for
policy debate among the public, the media, or in the
Congress….”3
Failure to think about how climate change
might impact globally interrelated systems could be
stovepipe thinking, while failure to consider how
climate change might impact all elements of U.S.
National Power and security is a failure of imagination.
... the projected impacts of climate
change will be more than threat
multipliers; they will serve as catalysts
for instability and conflict.
Climate change impacts transcend
international borders and geographic
areas of responsibility.

Accelerated melting of “old ice” in the Arctic is
making the region more accessible to a wide variety
of human activities, including shipping, resource
extraction, fisheries, tourism, and other commerce.
This activity level will accelerate in the coming
decades. The United States and the international
community are not prepared for the pace of change
in the Arctic
In 2012, the level of ice coverage in the Arctic was
lower than the historic average by more than one
million square miles. While annual figures vary, the
overall trend is clearly toward less ice coverage. The
Arctic is rich in resources, and less ice will mean
that valuable resources and shorter transit routes
will be increasingly accessible. Nations, corporations,
and even individuals will be anxious to exploit the
opening Arctic region, even if they have to accept
higher levels of risk than in other areas of the world.
While the United States and the international commu-
nity prepare for more Arctic activities in the future,
the increased activity today brings high levels of risk
to that fragile area. The U.S. military’s current con-
struct of dividing the Arctic area of responsibility
(AOR) between two Combatant Commands (CCMDs)
under DOD’s Unified Command Plan likely will slow
the Defense Department’s ability to generate require-
ments and respond. Although the United States is a
member of the Arctic Council—an intergovernmental
consultative group—its refusal to sign the UN Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea will make U.S. partici-
pation in the resolution of international disputes in
the Arctic more challenging.
As the world’s population and living standards con-
tinue to grow, the projected climate impacts on the
nexus of water, food, and energy security become
more profound. Fresh water, food, and energy are
inextricably linked, and the choices made over how
these finite resources will be produced, distributed,
and used will have increasing security implications.
From today’s baseline of 7.1 billion people, the world’s
population is expected to grow to more than 8 billion
by 2025. The U.S. National Intelligence Council assesses
that by 2030, population growth and a burgeoning
global middle class will result in a worldwide demand
for 35 percent more food and 50 percent more energy.4
Rising temperatures across the middle latitudes of the
world will increase the demand for water and energy.
These growing demands will stress resources, constrain
development, and increase competition among agricul-
ture, energy production, and human sustenance.
In light of projected climate change, stresses on the
water-food-energy nexus are a mounting security
concern across a growing segment of the world.
Projected climate change impacts inside the borders
of the United States will challenge key elements of
our National Power and encumber our homeland
security. Of particular concern are climate impacts
to our military, infrastructure, economic, and social
support systems
The projected impacts of climate change—heat waves,
intense rainfall, floods and droughts, rising sea levels,
more acidic oceans, and melting glaciers and arctic
sea ice—not only affect local communities but also, in
the aggregate, challenge key elements of our National
Power.*
Key elements of National Power include
political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and
information systems.
Military. The projected impacts of climate change
could be detrimental to military readiness, strain
base resilience both at home and abroad, and may
limit our ability to respond to future demands.
*
In a security context, National Power is the ability to remain sovereign, protect national assets, and influence the behavior
of others toward a desired outcome. Although the United States has embraced a more complex construct of National Power,
a series of formal policy documents have introduced contrasting models of power, indicating that National Power has mul-
tiple and overlapping sources. In one of its simplest paradigms, National Power is modeled in terms of the ability to exert
pressure through diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means (DIME). National Power can also be assessed by
degradations to a nation’s political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems (PMESII). We are con-
cerned about how projected climate change could degrade our National Power/PMESII.
... stresses on the water-food-energy nex-
us are a mounting security concern across
a growing segment of the world.
... impacts of climate change will
strain our military forces in the
coming decades.

The projected impacts of climate change will strain
our military forces in the coming decades. More
forces will be called on to respond in the wake of
extreme weather events at home and abroad, limiting
their ability to respond to other contingencies. Pro-
jected climate change will make training more dif-
ficult, while at the same time, putting at greater risk
critical military logistics, transportation systems, and
infrastructure, both on and off base.
Infrastructure. The impacts of projected climate
change can be detrimental to the physical compo-
nents of our national critical infrastructure, while
also limiting their capacities.
The nation depends on critical infrastructure for
economic prosperity, safety, and the essentials
of everyday life. Projected climate change will
impact all 16 critical infrastructure sectors identi-
fied in Homeland Security planning directives. We
are already seeing how extreme heat is damaging
the national transportation infrastructure such as
roads, rail lines, and airport runways. We also note
that much of the nation’s energy infrastructure—
including oil and gas refineries, storage tanks, power
plants, and electricity transmission lines—are located
in coastal floodplains, where they are increas-
ingly threatened by more intense storms, extreme
flooding, and rising sea levels. Projected increased
temperatures and drought across much of the nation
will strain energy systems with more demand for
cooling, possibly dislocate and reduce food produc-
tion, and result in water scarcity. Since much of the
critical infrastructure is owned or operated by the
private sector, government solutions alone will not
address the full range of climate-related issues.
Economic. The projected impacts of climate
change will threaten major sections of the U.S.
economy.
According to the 2014 National Climate Assessment,
“The observed warming and other climatic changes are
triggering wide-ranging impacts in every region of our
country and throughout our economy….”5
Most of the
U.S. economic sectors, including international trade,
will be affected by projected climate change.
Social. The projected impacts of climate change
will affect major sections of our society and stress
social support systems such as first responders.
As coastal regions become increasingly populated
and developed, more frequent or severe storms will
threaten vulnerable populations in these areas and
increase the requirements for emergency responders
in terms of frequency and severity of storms. Simul-
taneous or widespread extreme weather events and/
or wildfires, accompanied by mass evacuations, and
degraded critical infrastructure could outstrip local
and federal government resources, and require the
increased use of military and private sector support.

Recommendations:
1. To lower our national security risks, the
United States should take a global leadership
role in preparing for the projected impacts of
climate change.
This leadership role includes working with other
nations, as well as with emerging nongovernmental
and intergovernmental stakeholders—such as the
Group of Seven (G-7), the World Trade Organization
(WTO), private foundations, and so forth—to build
resilience for the projected impacts of climate change.
At the same time, the U.S. should lead global efforts
to develop sustainable and more efficient energy solu-
tions to help slow climate change.
2. Supported by National Intelligence Estimates, the
U.S. military’s Combatant Commanders (CCMDs)
should factor in the impacts of projected climate
change across their full spectrum of planning
and operations.
With partner nations, CCMDs should focus on
building capacity and sustained resilience. Across
their areas of responsibility, they should work with
nations and emerging nongovernmental and intergov-
ernmental stakeholders to lower risk in those areas
where the impacts of climate change likely will
serve as a catalyst for conflict.
3. The United States should accelerate and consoli-
date its efforts to prepare for increased access
and military operations in the Arctic.

DOD and other U.S. government agencies should
build on and accelerate plans recently put forward
in Arctic strategic planning documents. The Arctic
is already becoming viable for commercial ship-
ping and increased resource exploitation. The
time to act is now. To expedite crisis response and
requirements generation, the Arctic region should
be assigned to one CCMD. To provide the United
States with better standing in resolving future dis-
putes in the Arctic, the U.S. should become a signa-
tory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).
4. Climate adaptation planning should consider the
water-food-energy nexus to ensure comprehen-
sive decision making.
Rapidly growing population and urbanization, com-
bined with changes in weather patterns, will stress
resource production and distribution, particularly
water, food, and energy. These vital resources are
linked, and adaptation planning must earnestly
consider their interrelationships.
5. The projected impacts of climate change should
be integrated fully into the National Infrastruc-
ture Protection Plan and the Strategic National
Risk Assessment.
As military leaders, we know that we cannot wait
for certainty. The failure to include a range of
probabilities because it is not precise is unac-
ceptable. The Strategic National Risk Assessment
must include projected impacts of climate change
over the coming decades so that resilience needs
and requirements associated with these projec-
tions can be better defined in the National Infra-
structure Protection Plan.
6. In addition to DOD’s conducting comprehensive
assessments of the impacts of climate change on
mission and operational resilience, the Depart-
ment should develop, fund, and implement
plans to adapt, including developing metrics for
measuring climate impacts and resilience. The
Department should place a greater emphasis on
the projected impacts of climate change on both
DOD facilities and associated community infra-
structures.
This recommendation includes decisions to be
made through any future processes, including
base realignment and closure (BRAC), as well as
expanding climate projections in planning and
design factors for new bases, training facilities,
or other infrastructure. In new or even existing
bases, DOD should explore innovative solutions
such as public-private partnerships to build cli-
mate change–resilient infrastructure, both on and
off base. Climate change impacts should be con-
sidered in all vulnerability assessments, now and
going forward.

Voices of Experience
REAR ADMIRAL DAVID W. TITLEY, USN (Ret.)
Former Oceanographer and Navigator of the Navy
On Climate Science
As the former Oceanographer and Navigator of the Navy, Rear Admiral (ret.) David W. Titley is all too familiar with
computer modeling and other scientific ways of studying climate change. But he says its impact was illustrated most
dramatically to him during an encounter with an Inuit Eskimo aboard a U.S. Coast Guard ship.
The two men were standing on the ship’s bridge in the summer of 2010 as it sailed about 100 miles north of Barrow,
Alaska. When he noticed a gauge showing the water temperature was just above 40 degrees, Titley asked his com-
panion if he had ever seen the water that warm, or if his tribe’s oral histories ever mentioned such warmth. In both
cases, the reply was no. “That really brought this home—here we’re talking to the Inuit, the people who have lived here
for thousands of years,” Titley recalled. “They have forgotten more about how to live in the Arctic than most Western
men will ever know … and they had never seen this. That, to me, was pretty profound.”
Titley and other scientists say overall ocean temperatures have responded more slowly than Earth’s land environment
to climate change. But they have warmed enough from the oceans’ surfaces to a depth of about 2,000 feet to have a
substantial impact on corals and marine life. In addition, warmer surface water dissipates more readily into vapor,
making it easier for small ocean storms to become larger and more intense. The link between warmer oceans from
climate change and major weather events such as hurricanes isn’t conclusive. But Titley says science increasingly is
making such connections clearer.
“What we’ve seen for decades is refinement [in the science],” he said. “It’s like when you wake up in the morning, your
eyes are maybe 20/1000, and then when you try to open them, it’s 20/400. So let’s say the science is maybe 20/50 for
what we understand. We still don’t see everything perfectly, but we have sharper resolution.”
Titley speaks regularly on climate change to audiences around the country, including testifying at a 2013 hearing of the
U.S. House of Representatives Science, Space, and Technology Committee’s Subcommittee on the Environment. After
his 32-year Navy career ended, he served as Deputy Undersecretary of Commerce for Operations, the chief operating
officer position at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. He is now a meteorology professor at Penn
State University and director of its Center for Solutions to Weather and Climate Risk.
In his presentations, Titley emphasizes both the rapidity of change and the need to manage risk in a civilization that
has become globalized and interdependent. “Now as we start accelerating the changes in climate, are we going to
manage that adaptation quicker than the climate changes, or vice versa?” he asked. “If we can do it, it’ll be a bumpy
ride, but we’ll all still be in our seatbelts and the car will be okay, if we can hang on.
“We know that when things go really bad, that’s when the U.S. military is called in,” he added. “That’s why I see climate
change as a national security issue.”
Another thing the public should understand, he said, is that the scientific foundation for understanding climate change
isn’t new—it was laid more than a century ago.
It came from the work of French mathematician Joseph Fourier, who in the 1820s studied the factors influencing tem-
perature; Irish physicist John Tyndall, who demonstrated four decades later that gases such as carbon dioxide could
trap heat in the atmosphere; and Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius, who subsequently determined that an increase in
the amount of carbon dioxide would result in a certain amount of warming.
“I tell people, this is cutting-edge 19th century science that we’re now refining,” Titley said.

In 2006, CNA convened a Military Advisory Board (MAB)
of retired three-star and four-star Admirals and Generals
to assess the actual and projected impacts of global
climate change on key matters of national security. Our
2007 report, National Security and the Threat of Climate
Change, identified climate change as a “threat multiplier”
for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the
world and laid the groundwork for mounting responses
to address these threats. This military perspective is
now reflected across the security community, including
DOD’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), in which
the effects of climate change are identified as “threat
multipliers that will aggravate stressors abroad such as
poverty, environmental degradation, political instability,
and social tensions—conditions that can enable terrorist
activity and other forms of violence.”6
Seven years have passed since our initial assessment.
During this period, we have witnessed more frequent
and/or intense weather events, including heat waves,
sustained heavy downpours, floods in some regions,
and droughts in others areas. Nine of the ten costliest
storms to hit the United States have occurred in the past
10 years, including Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm
Sandy. Globally, we have seen recent prolonged drought
act as a factor driving both spikes in food prices and
mass displacement of populations, each contributing
to instability and eventual conflict. We have observed
unprecedented wildfires threaten homes, habitats, and
food supplies, not only across the United States, but also
across Australia, Europe, Central Russia, and China. We
have seen entire low-lying island nations begin to plan
for complete evacuation to escape rising sea levels.
We have seen record melting of the Arctic ice and more than
a hundredfold increase in operations in that fragile area.
In addition to observed changes in weather patterns,
we note that the scientific community continues to
coalesce around the projected impacts of climate change.
According to the 2014 U.S. National Climate Assessment:
“More than 97 percent of scientists in this field agree
that the world is unequivocally warming and that human
activity is the primary cause of the warming experienced
over the past 50 years.”7
We recognize that skepticism is important in the scien-
tific process, especially in the continual refinement of
theories, and that healthy debate in the area of climate
change can serve to advance science, but falling short
of 100 percent agreement is not a justifiable reason
for inaction. As noted by MAB member Admiral Frank
“Skip” Bowman, United States Navy, Retired:
Managing risk is seldom about dealing with
absolute certainties but, rather, involves careful
analysis of the probability of an event and the
resultant consequences of that event occurring.
Even very low probability events with devastating
consequences must be considered and mitigation/
adaptation schemes developed and employed.
We operate our nuclear submarine fleet in this
Why the MAB Is Issuing This Report Now
◀ We are already seeing the impacts of climate change that were predicted
at the time of our first report. In some cases, the impacts are developing
faster than we predicted. Action is needed now.
◀ Projected climate change scenarios could become “catalysts for conflict”
that could worsen problems both at home and abroad.
◀ We are increasingly concerned over the lack of comprehensive action by
the international community to address projected climate change issues.
The United States has an obligation to take a leadership role.
I.
Even very low probability events with
devastating consequences must be
considered....

fashion. Some may argue that this continuing
process results in overdesign and overcautious-
ness. Maybe so, but our U.S. submarine safety
record testifies to the wisdom of this approach.
That’s where we should be with climate change
knowns and unknowns.
As we witness the climate around us changing, we also
observe a growing segment of the population becoming
increasingly at risk to the effects of climate changes.
Since 2006, more than half a billion people have been
added to the world’s population. Most of that popula-
tion growth has been in areas already suffering water
and food resource challenges. Across the globe, we
have also seen a tremendous shift of population to the
coasts and urban areas. Half of the world’s population
now lives in cities, and according to the United Nations,
about one billion are urban slum dwellers.
While cities can hold the promise of providing more
efficient services, the reality is that urban living pro-
motes more resource-intensive lifestyles and concen-
trates consumption and waste production. In light
of these shifting demographics, we believe that the
projected impacts of climate change will stress already-
limited resources and negatively impact governments’
abilities to provide necessary human support systems.
Populations will likely become disenfranchised and
even more vulnerable to extremists and revolutionary
influences. In these areas, climate change will not only
multiply threats, but will serve as a potential catalyst
for conflict.
DOD’s 2014 QDR observes that “average global tem-
peratures are increasing, and severe weather patterns
are accelerating. These changes, coupled with other
global dynamics, including growing, urbanizing, more
affluent populations … will devastate homes, land, and
infrastructure.”
This strategic defense planning document furthe
warns, “The impacts of climate change may increase the
frequency, scale, and complexity of future [DOD] mis-
sions.”9
At the same time, it describes the need for the
United States to make “tough choices … in a period of
fiscal austerity to maintain the world’s finest fighting
forces. These include reducing force structure in order
to protect and expand critical capabilities, modernizing
the forces, and investing in readiness.”10
As a result, we
are issuing this update to revisit the nexus of climate
change and national security, and to highlight the need
for these “tough choices” to consider fully the projected
impacts of climate change.
Recognition of the Risks
It is the MAB’s collective experience that the risks
associated with climate change, as identified in its
2007 report, are comprehensive and accelerating.
The observed rapidity of climate change has resulted
in effects that are becoming more than just “threat
multipliers.” We believe that without action to build
resilience in the most vulnerable parts of the world, the
projected impacts of climate change will likely serve as
catalysts for conflict. On the positive side, recognition
of the risk can lead to increased collaboration; thus we
see climate change also serving as a catalyst for coop-
eration and change.
Within the past seven years, the world has moved
toward a greater understanding of the threats posed
by projected climate change and is now moving to find
collaborative solutions. Most countries now identify
climate change as a national security threat, either
through national planning documents or in the pro-
nouncements of senior political leaders. The projected
impacts of climate change are also now included in the
U.S. National Security Strategy and Defense Strategic
Guidance, including National Intelligence Estimates.
All U.S. federal agencies are now directed to “evaluate
the most significant climate change–related risks to,
and vulnerabilities in, agency operations and missions
in both the short and long term, and outline actions
that agencies will take to manage these risks and
vulnerabilities.”11
As we witness the climate around us
changing, we also observe a growing
segment of the population becoming
increasingly at risk....
... climate change will not only multiply
threats, but will serve as a potential
catalyst for conflict.

Better Recognition and Better Data,
but Wild Cards Remain
Just as nations are beginning to recognize the conse-
quences of climate change and realizing the implica-
tions of the worst climate change projections, we are
seeing the scientific community coalesce and refine
their predictions. Improved models, targeted satellite
monitoring and measurements, and better data collec-
tion systems all are contributing to increased confidence
levels of projected changes, and we are increasingly able
to base assessments on measured and measurable data.
While some disagreement about the degree—and even
the occurrence—of changes to our climate continues
(particularly in U.S. political forums), the potential con-
sequences of projected climate-change events are so
significant that the prudent course is to assess how these
predictions may affect our national security, and to take
action now.
As we indicated in our earlier report, a military leader’s
perspective of risk often differs from those of scien-
tists, policymakers, or the media. Rather than assessing
a range of estimates as proof of disagreement that can
be used to justify inaction, military leaders view such
evidence through the lens of varying degrees of risk the
estimates could represent. As military leaders, we eval-
uate the probability and possible consequences of events
in determining overall risk. Even for those outcomes or
projected scenarios that have low probabilities of occur-
rence, if the consequence is high enough, the resulting
risk demands action. Today, the risks posed by pre-
dicted climate change, in our view, represent even graver
potential than they did seven years ago and require
action today to reduce risk tomorrow.
We acknowledge and are concerned about the measured
effect of rising global temperatures and the implications
they have on projected climate change around the world.
Other events that are being measured with greater accu-
racy since 2007 include:
• A longer fire season. Scientists say evidence sug-
gests more fire seasons that are longer and stronger
across all regions of the U.S. in the next 30 to 50
years. High fire years, such as the 2012 season—the
third worst in U.S. history—would likely occur two
to four times per decade by mid-century, instead of
once per decade under historic climate conditions.12
In 2013, Australia had its worst wildfires in history.
• An acceleration of sea-level rise. According to the
2014 National Climate Assessment, over the past
century average sea levels have risen eight inches,
with most of that rise occurring since 1980. The
one-hundred-year storm surge, such as that associ-
ated with Superstorm Sandy, can now be expected
every 10–20 years.13
The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) now expects area-level
rise of between 17 and 29 inches by the end of the
century—a 70 percent to 190 percent increase over
the estimation in the panel’s 2007 report.14
• The continued collapse in both the density and
volume of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean. The 2014
National Climate Assessment indicates that the
models most accurately projecting historical sea
ice trends currently suggest an essentially ice-free
Arctic summer occurring for the first time, between
2021 and 2043.15
• The movement of plant-, animal-, and vector-borne
diseases toward higher elevations and latitudes.
The National Climate Assessment notes that nor-
mally stationary flora and fauna are moving to
higher latitudes and/or to higher elevations at a rate
of 10.5 miles and 36 feet per decade.16
The unfor-
tunate consequence is a greater risk to crops from
pests and invasive species and greater threats to
humans from diseases carried by mosquitos, such as
West Nile virus and dengue fever.
• Precipitation becoming more irregular and intense.
The scientific community projects that climate
change will increase the frequency and intensity of
heavy rainstorms (or snowstorms) in some regions
of the world, and that extreme precipitation events
very likely will become even more intense and more
frequent by the end of the century as global surface
temperatures continue to increase.
• Drought and increased stress to fresh water sys-
tems. In Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation,
and Vulnerability, the Intergovernmental Panel on
... the risks posed by predicted climate
change ... represent even graver
potential than they did seven years ago
and require action today to reduce
risk tomorrow.

Climate Change found that in dry regions, drought
frequency likely will increase by the end of the
century. This trend is projected to reduce renew-
able surface water and groundwater resources
significantly and intensify competition for water.
In addition, climate change is projected to reduce
freshwater quality and pose risks to drinking water
quality due to interacting factors such as increased
sediment, nutrient, and pollutant loads from heavy
rainfall; increased concentration of pollutants
during droughts; and disruption of treatment facili-
ties during floods.17
Contributing to the ongoing climate change debate are
natural variations in weather patterns. Although pun-
dits may try, no individual weather event or weather
season can be attributed decisively to climate change.
Weather is what occurs day-to-day; climate describes
weather patterns over decades. However, rather than
wondering if any specific events are “caused” by cli-
mate change, MAB member Rear Admiral David Titley,
United States Navy, Retired, suggests an alternative
way of thinking about recent weather phenomena: “It
is more useful to think of climate as the deck of cards
from which our daily weather events are dealt. As the
climate changes, so does our deck of cards. For every
degree of warming, we add an extra ace into the deck.
Over time, unusual hands such as a full house with aces
high become more plausible and more common.”
Even though the scientific community is coalescing
around standard climate change predictions, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that some “wild cards” remain.
One of the most significant is the West Antarctic Ice
Sheet: If it melts or even calves at an accelerated rate,
it has the potential to raise sea levels by several meters
within a few decades. Scientific data indicate that the
ice sheet is losing more ice than is being replaced, yet
scientists remain uncertain about its future.
A second “wild card” is the ability of the ocean to adapt
to increased acidification. The oceans are the world’s
largest carbon “sinks,” as they absorb about one-quarter
of the carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere each
year. The more carbon dioxide that is absorbed, the
more acidic the seawater becomes. This ocean acidifi-
cation reduces the capacity of marine organisms with
shells or skeletons made of calcium carbonate (such as
corals, krill, shelled mollusks, and shellfish) to survive,
grow, and reproduce. This phenomenon affects the
entire aquatic food chain. Disruption of the food sup-
plies from the ocean could cause food shortages around
the globe, with considerable security implications. The
ability of the ocean organisms to adapt to this unprec-
edented rate of acidification is unclear.

Geopolitical stability is a primary goal for those concerned
with national security. Maintaining stability within and
among nations typically is a means of avoiding large-scale
conflicts. Conversely, instability in key areas can threaten
our security. Much of the emphasis on national secu-
rity since the end of the Cold War has been focused on
protecting stability where it exists and trying to foster it
where it does not.
Our fundamental findings in the first report remain valid:
Climate change can act as a threat multiplier for insta-
bility in some of the most volatile regions of the world,
and it presents significant national security challenges for
the United States. The report noted that climate change—
much like terrorism or cyber-attacks—falls into the genre
of threats that are unconstrained by national or interna-
tional borders. The 2007 report identified several destabi-
lizing impacts that endure:
• Reduced access to fresh water: Changes in rainfall,
snowfall, snowmelt, and glacial melt have significant
effects on freshwater supplies.
• Impaired food production: Increased desertification,
rising sea levels infiltrating agricultural land, the sali-
nization of aquifers, and drought also will lead to
changes in food production. Access to vital resources—
primarily food and water—has been the cause of many
conflicts.
• Health catastrophes: A major concern remains
the potential for significant spreading of the condi-
tions for vector-borne diseases, such as dengue fever
and malaria, and heat-related deaths in vulnerable
populations.
• Land loss and flooding leading to population
displacement: About two-thirds of the world’s
population lives near coastlines. Most of the eco-
nomically important major rivers and river deltas in
the world—the Niger, the Mekong, the Yangtze, the
Ganges, the Nile, and the Mississippi—are densely
populated along their banks.
A Changing World
Of special concern to the MAB is that we are seeing the
accelerated effects of climate change at a time when
global security conditions are also changing rapidly. It is
important to emphasize that not only is there now a more
complex global security environment, but also that the
world is increasingly interconnected and interdependent
in manufacturing, and in food and energy production.
Our first report did not address these global interrela-
tionships in depth, but subsequently we have seen inter-
related and cascading weather-related effects across
the world’s regions. U.S. leaders have highlighted the
national security implications of climate change in a
more complex-interdependent world:
• George W. Bush said in 2001: “The issue of climate
change respects no border. Its effects cannot be
reined in by an army nor advanced by any ideology.
Evolving International Implications of Climate Change
◀ Across the world, we are seeing interrelated and cascading effects from
climate change events.
◀ Complex changes in the global security environment, including urbanization,
population growth, and the movement of people to coastal areas, have cast
climate change projections as even more of a strategic security risk.
◀ Stress to the water-food-energy nexus is a growing security concern.
◀ The United States must strengthen its international alliances and partnerships in
preparing for the impacts of predicted climate change.
II.
... we are seeing the accelerated
effects of climate change at a time when
global security conditions are also chang-
ing rapidly.

GENERAL CHARLES F. WALD, USAF (Ret.)
Former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command
LT. GEN. KEITH J. STALDER, USMC (Ret.)
Former Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific
REAR ADM. NEIL MORISETTI, BRITISH ROYAL NAVY (Ret.)
UK Foreign Commonwealth, Special Representative for Climate Change
On Changing Geopolitics
At the outset of General Wald’s service in Europe in 2003, he was surprised to find that some strategies had become out-
dated. “We found out that we had not updated the war plan to make it current since 1989, when we had a current plan
based on the [Cold War–era] Warsaw Pact,” he recalled. “The reason was, we didn’t know what the world was going
to be.”
Along with General Stalder and Admiral Morisetti, General Wald believes that such planning lapses no longer can be
tolerated as the world has evolved even further over the last decade—especially when it comes to climate change. That’s
because it’s an issue that, as General Wald noted, “has no concept of what a border is,” and because problems in one
nation can have severe implications for numerous others.
Rear Admiral Morisetti, who served as the British Foreign Ministry’s top climate official, pointed to the international
effects of climate change on coastal areas—where offshore oil-drilling rigs are located—that are expected to bear the
brunt of increased severe weather, flooding, and other problems.
“That’s an economic shock; it affects our competitiveness and growth,” he said. “There’s also uncertainty about raw
materials, disruption of supply chains. These countries are often new markets as well—both the United States and the
UK look to those emerging markets for growth. So it’s tempting to see it as a local problem, but it’s a global one.”
Because of the interconnectedness of the threat, however, climate change affords the United States the opportunity to
engage with other nations. As the Obama administration looks to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, General Stalder
said, China and Japan are good potential candidates for collaboration.
“One of the things missing in the Western Pacific is this business of multilateralism,” he said. “The region is very much a
bilateral region, mostly bilateral as in the U.S. and another nation. There’s a lot better value in true multilateralism, mul-
tinational cooperation. This kind of thing could be a rallying point. The military part is the easiest part of it.... We know
how to work with other militaries, and they know how to work with us.”
Addressing climate change is expensive, so those costs should be shared as much as possible, General Wald agreed. “It’s
also massive and unpredictable as to where it’s going to be,” he said. “You’d like to interface with other governments to
arrive at an understanding of interoperability issues. When people train together, they become more accepting of what
the perceived threat is.”
Admiral Morisetti emphasized that developed nations can be of service to developing ones, particularly when it comes
to helping them develop their first-responder capabilities. Otherwise, he warned, “We are going to find our countries
having to deploy our military more frequently in this role, and it may not always be a benign environment. That it won’t
be a benign environment will be the exception rather than the norm, but I don’t think you can rule that out.”
General Stalder said he’d like to see a new multilateral arrangement emerge to address climate change. “From my per-
spective,” he said, “the opportunity that it creates is an operating construct among the coalition of the willing to respond
to things in a more cohesive way than is done right now, including a sort of standing command arrangement or coordi-
nation arrangement where countries could contribute to that and offer relief more quickly.”

Climate change, with its potential to impact every
corner of the world, is an issue that must be
addressed by the world.”18
• Thomas Fingar, chairman of the National Intel-
ligence Council under President Bush, testified
in 2008: “Global climate change will have wide-
ranging implications for U.S. national security
interests over the next 20 years.”19
• In 2013, Navy Admiral Samuel Locklear, Com-
mander of U.S. Pacific Command, identified
climate change as the pacific region’s biggest long-
term security threat. Climate change “is probably
the most likely thing that is going to happen ...
that will cripple the security environment, prob-
ably more likely than the other scenarios we all
often talk about.”20
• Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, in a 2013
address at the Halifax International Security
Forum, said that climate change “… can add to the
challenges of global instability, hunger, poverty,
and conflict. Food and water shortages, pandemic
disease, disputes over refugees and resources,
more severe natural disasters—all place additional
burdens on economies, societies, and institutions
around the world.”21
The 2007 report was comprehensive in assessing
the global threats and highlighting the potential for
the impacts of climate change to contribute to failed
states that could lead to the strengthening of non-
state actors. However, the MAB believes it is impor-
tant to emphasize the emergence of a new, more
complex global security environment. We are seeing
the steady erosion of the nation-state as the primary
international security entity. Of increasing concern
are empowered nonstate actors such as terrorists,
extremist groups and gangs, individual or state-
sponsored hackers who can launch crippling cyber-
attacks, as well as large illegitimate financial entities
and extremist political movements, powered by global
communications networks, that wield increasing influ-
ence and authority. These nonstate actors represent
“enemies without borders.”
A recent example of one such nonstate actor enabled
by the impacts of climate change is Al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali. The crises in
and around the landlocked West African nation in
2012–2014 were shaped by an intersection of three
salient trends: desertification and food insecurity
exacerbated by climate change; an ongoing rebellion
by Tuareg nomadic herdsmen in northern Mali; and
weak government institutions that could not address
the marginalization of the Tuareg and their increasing
clashes with sedentary agriculturalist tribes in the
southern and central areas of the country.22
Over-
whelmed by these challenges, the fragile government
was overthrown by a coup in March 2012. Following
the coup, the Malian political system was unable to
maintain influence in northern Mali; AQIM and other
groups moved in and took control.23
As we write this
report, in spite of the support of French and African
Union troops, the Malian government has not been
able to regain control of northern Mali from these
forces, and the conflict continues.
While climate change alone did not cause the con-
flict, it certainly added environmental stressors to
the once-coexistent relationship between the Arab
Tuareg and non-Arab Muslim ethnic groups in central
and southern Mali. In fact, the recent Malian con-
flict fits a pattern of other such conflicts in Africa’s
Sahel region, including Darfur, South Sudan, Niger,
and Nigeria. Climate change—particularly drought
and desertification—have impacted the region for
hundreds of years; yet the region’s environmental
stressors have now become a threat multiplier across
Sub-Saharan Africa, and have contributed to con-
flict dynamics in countries that have never enjoyed
popular internal sovereignty in the postcolonial era
or robust institutions to settle conflicts over vital
resources. Add to this the involvement of transna-
tional terrorist groups and militias such as AQIM and
the janjaweed (in Mali and Darfur, respectively) and
these conflicts become more complex, transforming
resource competition into ethnopolitical conflict.
In northern Africa a growing body of academic
research indicates that although environmental
stressors similarly did not “cause” the Arab uprisings
of 2011, the impacts of climate change may also have
served as catalysts for these conflicts.24
For example,
the research notes that drought conditions in Russia
and China, and subsequent global wheat shortages,
contributed to higher food prices in Northern Africa
and may have helped catalyze and sustain the Tuni-
sian and Egyptian uprisings in 2011. Syria’s ongoing
conflict was preceded by five years of devastating
droughts, coupled with unresponsive state institu-
tions, and overgrazing that decimated livestock,

devastated 75 percent of crops in some regions, and
forced millions to migrate to urban areas. In both
rural areas affected by water and land insecurity, and
urban areas burdened by inadequate support systems,
antigovernment forces were emboldened. It is the
MAB’s hope that a better understanding of these types
of cascading climate-related impacts, along with pro-
active efforts, can help avoid similar future conflicts.
Risk to Emerging Economies
and Markets
Emerging economies are working to understand the
threats they face from climate change projections, but
they are far from prepared to deal with the challenges.
Many of the emerging economies—from Ethiopia to
Panama to Timor-Leste—lack resilience against expo-
sure to sea level rise, warming temperatures, flooding,
droughts, and other climate change effects—which
threaten not only their fragile internal stability, but also
the effectiveness and value of their part of the supply
chains on which the global economy relies. Climate
change impacts both emerging economies as suppliers of
raw materials, and emerging markets as buyers and inter-
mediate suppliers of global goods and services.
In short, the volatile mixture of population growth, insta-
bility due to the growing influence of nonstate actors,
and the inevitable competition over scarce resources will
be multiplied and exaggerated by climate change. MAB
member Rear Admiral Titley warned of the potential for
the military to be drawn into future situations: “We are
going to look back and say that if climate change was just
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief for the mili-
tary, we had it good.... I am afraid that we will soon start
getting into varsity-level instability.”
All of these developments dramatically underscore the
need to strengthen U.S. alliances and strategic partner-
ships with other nations, to build capacity in those
nations, and improve coordination and response opera-
tions, while working on interoperability and standardiza-
tion. This applies to equipment and procedures, as well
as command-and-control capabilities during crises.
Asia and the Changing U.S.
Security Posture
As described in DOD’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense
Review, the United States is shifting the strategic focus
of its foreign policy through a “rebalancing of force
structure to the Asia-Pacific region to preserve peace and
stability in the region.”25
As the United States seeks to exercise greater influ-
ence in the Asia-Pacific, it must consider the potential
devastating impacts of projected climate change in that
region. In 2007, we correctly identified that the major
projected impacts from climate change in Asia were
associated with water: In some areas we suggested there
would be too little water, while in other areas (or at
different times) there would be too much.
Over the coming decades, projected climate change likely
will cause Australia, portions of India, and much of inland
China to experience sustained drought, resulting in low-
ered agricultural production and food security issues.
Similarly, many of the major river systems in South Asia
are fed by glacial melt, which in the future may not pro-
vide enough water to meet year-round demand. A 2012
National Intelligence Council assessment held that water
challenges likely will increase the risk of instability and
state failure, exacerbate regional tensions, and divert
attention from working with the United States and other
key allies on important policy objectives.26
While drought may be a long-term climate change chal-
lenge in Asia, too much water is a problem in the near
term. Larger monsoons are becoming an increasing
threat to the region, rather than a seasonal source of
water for the region’s agriculture. Typhoons are now a
year-round phenomenon hitting China’s coastal region
and the Philippines with greater frequency and inten-
sity—witness the destructive force of Typhoon Haiyan in
2013. Warmer oceans mean heavier downpours. As the
sea level rises, storm surges will become more invasive,
more destructive, costlier, and deadlier. Densely popu-
lated areas, including many large cities along coasts or
major waterways are particularly vulnerable to monsoon
and storm surge flooding:

• Asia has 15 of the world’s 20 largest urban areas,
including Tokyo, Jakarta, Mumbai, and Dhaka, and
most are on the coast or alongside low-lying deltas.
• Burgeoning cities put enormous pressure on urban
infrastructure—pressure that is only exacerbated by
the effects of climate change, such as flooding.
• Low-lying nations, such as Bangladesh, and entire
island countries, such as the Maldives and Kiribati,
face existential threats in the near term from sea
level rise and devastating storm flooding.
• Projected sea level rise will put critical regions at
risk, including the entire Mekong Delta, eastern
India, and Bangladesh, which combined produce the
bulk of the region’s primary food staple, rice.
While many of these areas have battled episodic
flooding for decades, two important changes have
occurred since the 2007 MAB report. The first is accel-
erated interdependence. “Just-in-time logistics” are
more dependent on transport hubs like Singapore or
parts manufacturers in Thailand, Indonesia, and China.
Sustained flooding in these countries has occasionally
shut down supply chains for manufacturers on the
other side of the world until the flood waters subsided.
Second, the United States is bolstering its security coop-
eration with Asian countries as part of its “rebalancing”
of forces; HA/DR operations likely will increase in the
U.S. Pacific Command’s AOR and more countries in
the region likely will reach out for assistance following
weather-related disasters. In a recent Atlantic Council
speech, Admiral Locklear, Commander of U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM), reported that he tells commanders
when they join PACOM that they might not engage in a
conflict with another military during their tenure, but
that they will inevitably have a natural disaster to
contend with, and they will have to assist or manage
the consequences. “That has been true every year,”
he said.27
Asia has 15 of the world’s 20 largest cities,
including Tokyo, Jakarta, Mumbai, and
Dhaka, and most are on the coast or
alongside low-lying deltas.

Water-Food-Energy Nexus
If the world is going to feed and sustain eight billion
people by 2025, achieving collective security for water,
food, and energy is critical. The U.S. National Intelli-
gence Council’s Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds
found that, because of increases in the global popula-
tion and the consumption patterns of an expanding
global middle class, in less than two decades demand
for food would increase by 35 percent, freshwater by
40 percent, and energy by 50 percent.28
Over the next
few decades the areas with the highest levels of popu-
lation growth are those already suffering from fresh-
water shortages. Also, the projected impacts of climate
change are most profound in areas where the water-
food-energy nexus is already stressed.
It is increasingly clear that water, food, and energy
are inextricably linked. Water is needed not only for
human sustenance, but also for agriculture and energy
production. Food production requires water to grow
crops and energy to plant and harvest—and to make
energy-rich fertilizers. In some parts of the world,
forests are burned to produce charcoal, and crops are
converted to biofuel instead of food. In other parts of
the world, energy-intensive desalinization uses fuel
to make freshwater. As major waterways flow across
national boundaries, and food grown in temperate
areas is shipped to feed millions in dry, poor growing
areas, trans-boundary cooperation in ensuring food
and water security becomes increasingly important.
Isolated solutions aimed at just one sector of the
water-food-energy nexus may have unintended or even
fatal consequences in other sectors.
As population grows, pressures mount
And the relationships between food, water, and energy supplies become critical
Water-
Food-
Energy
Nexus
Population
Increase
PRESSURE:
PRESSURE:
PRESSURE:
PRESSURE:
Demands of
Larger Middle
Class
PRESSURE:
PRESSURE:
Increased
Urbanization
freshwate
r +40%
Demand
for ene
rgy+50%
De
m
andfor
food +35%
Demand for
Because of growth in global population and the consumption patterns of an expanding
middle class, in less than two decades three key demands will sharply increase ...
• Food production
requires water
• Food production requires
energy to plant and harvest
• Crops are being
converted into
biofuels in some
countries
• Energy-intensive desalinization efforts
use energy to produce drinkable water
... the projected impacts of climate
change are most profound in areas
where the water-food-energy nexus is
already stressed.

ArcticCircle
500 km
500 miles
Atlantic
Ocean
Atlantic
Ocean
Pacific
Ocean
Pacific
Ocean
Sea of
Okhotsk
Sea of
Okhotsk
Barents
Sea
Barents
Sea
Norwegian
Sea
Norwegian
Sea
Baffin BayBaffin Bay
North
Pole
RUSSIARUSSIA
CANADACANADA
ASIAASIA
FINLANDFINLAND
SWEDENSWEDEN
NORWAYNORWAY
ICELANDICELAND
Alaska
(U.S.)
Alaska
(U.S.)
Greenland
(DENMARK)
Greenland
(DENMARK)
Arctic
Ocean
Arctic
Ocean
Chukchi
Sea
Chukchi
Sea
East
Siberian
Sea
East
Siberian
Sea
Kara
Sea
Kara
Sea
Beaufort
Sea
Beaufort
Sea
Northern Sea Route
35-day transit, 7,600
nautical miles
Suez Canal Route
48-day transit, 11,300
nautical miles
Northwest Passage
Possible
Central Arctic
Route
Northern Sea Route
Shipping, oil and gas
exploration, tourism – all could
become more accessible as
thick ice recedes
Arctic open for commerce
As ice melts, a wide range of activities increase
Potential oil
and gas fields
Extent of arctic
sea ice, 2012
The Arctic: An Area of Special
International and Domestic Emphasis
As Arctic ice diminishes, the region offers a newly acces-
sible abundance of resources—not only energy and fish-
eries, but also new shipping routes and even tourism.
Geologists estimate that more than one-tenth of the
world’s undiscovered oil and one-third of the undiscov-
ered gas lie under the waters of the Arctic. We expect
more activity of all kinds in the region as the ice con-
tinues to retreat and energy and other resources become
more accessible. As one of only eight nations with terri-
tory north of the Arctic Circle, the United States holds a
tangible security interest in the region’s future.
Over the past seven years, the Arctic has witnessed
unprecedented change. Studies confirm that the
mass and volume of old ice in the Arctic is rapidly
decreasing.29
Surface, or young ice, comes and goes each
year—sometimes increasing, sometimes decreasing—but
the newly formed young ice is typically less than 30
centimeters thick and is not a significant safety hazard
for most ships. Even ice that has been in place for a year
rarely grows beyond 1 to 2 meters and is relatively soft
due to the inclusion of brine cells and air pockets.30
It is
the old, hardened, thick ice that has been a traditional
barrier to shipping and human activity, and it is this old
ice that is rapidly disappearing.
Because of the changes in Arctic ice coverage, we
already are seeing increases in human activity,
resource extraction, maritime transit, fishing, and
tourism in this region of the world. Transiting
through the Arctic reduces the sailing distance

ADMIRAL FRANK L. “SKIP” BOWMAN, USN (Ret.)
Former Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
Former Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors,
National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy
On Opening of the Arctic
Having served over 38 years in the nuclear submarine community, including over eight years as the head of the Navy’s
nuclear propulsion program, Admiral Bowman acknowledges and is proud that he has been molded by the principles
espoused by the “Father of the Nuclear Navy,” Admiral Hyman Rickover. As Rickover’s third successor, Admiral Bowman
describes the key tenets among these principles as:
• Face facts.
• Respect even small amounts of risk.
• Adhere to the concept of total responsibility.
• Require continual rising standards of performance.
It is through this lens that Admiral Bowman views the rapidly evolving roles and missions of the Department of Defense
and the Department of Homeland Security in the Arctic. “As access continues to improve and expand in the area,” he
notes, “there will be an upward spiral of new opportunities for natural resource exploration and recovery, increased
shipping traffic, and a need for broadened naval partnerships and cooperation.” He further identifies an increase in risk:
“Expect increased calls for search-and-rescue operations and disputes over territorial waters and Exclusive Economic
Zones to continue with higher frequency.” Admiral Bowman notes “with jaundiced eye” the Russians’ planting of a
titanium flag on the Artic seabed, near the North Pole: “The geopolitical situation is ever more nuanced and complex.
The risk of maritime events, or even unpredictable flashpoints, endemic to national security is growing.”
To their credit, Admiral Bowman said, the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security are
acknowledging this growing risk—at least on paper. Several recent planning documents have been issued, including the
National Strategy for the Arctic Region and its Implementation Plan; the Department of Defense Arctic Strategy; the U.S.
Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030; and the U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Strategy. But in looking at responsibility for U.S.
national security, Admiral Bowman is increasingly concerned that, “the United States, in particular the Navy and Coast
Guard, is woefully ill prepared to execute the anticipated plethora of mission requirements in the Arctic.”
“The Navy,” he observes, “has precious few ice-hardened vessels to apply to the task, with the exception of nuclear sub-
marines that are poorly suited for most Arctic missions. As a result, it has allowed its Arctic and cold-weather training
to atrophy. The Coast Guard has but one fully ready icebreaker in its inventory, and even it represents old technology.”
In addition, he said, “U.S. land-based infrastructure to support Arctic operations is lacking. The ability to communicate
is hampered and limited in Arctic regions, and new technology is only slowly being applied to the problem.” He also
laments that accurate nautical charts in the polar region are limited, describing how even nautical charts around Alaska
show large areas that have never been surveyed with modern instruments.
Admiral Bowman worries that the recent outpouring of Arctic planning documents, while well-intentioned, may paint too
rosy a picture of our Arctic capability or the ease of achieving that necessary capability. He cited Admiral Rickover’s fre-
quent railings over reactor concepts that were not yet built, calling them “paper reactors.” Admiral Bowman remarked,
“Rickover would note that these reactors had much in common: they typically were simple, small, cheap, lightweight,
could be built quickly, with little research and development, because they could use off-the-shelf technology, and … they
were not being built.”
Admiral Bowman worries the Arctic planning documents lay out a “paper” way ahead, noting that the United States is
not yet building the capacity envisioned. Without the assets, he said, “the U.S. cannot begin the requisite training and
qualification that will bring the rising standards of performance that Admiral Rickover demanded.” Admiral Bowman
concludes that hard work and difficult decisions lie ahead, especially at this “exactly wrong time” to take on added mis-
sions in the face of budget cuts, downsizing, and restructuring throughout the military.

between Asian ports and Northern Europe by 40 per-
cent and can save shippers thousands of dollars in
fuel costs and emissions. In 2006, while researching
our first report the MAB found that few ships were
operating in the Arctic and none routinely transited. In
2013, Russia granted 372 permits to transit the Arctic
via the Northern Sea Route along its Siberian coastline.
This figure represents nearly a tenfold increase from
the 46 permits granted in 2012, and nearly a hundred-
fold increase over the four granted in 2011. While
only 71 of these ships actually conducted a full transit
across the Arctic, they included commercial cargo ves-
sels from China and Korea, as well as other non-Arctic
nations, for the first time. In 2013, a Danish-owned,
coal-laden cargo ship sailed through the Northwest
Passage, north of Canada—the first-ever commercial
transit of this passage.
In addition to transit, more than 1,000 vessels trav-
eled into the High Arctic in 2013 for operations pri-
marily associated with Russian energy development.
Geologists estimate that more than one-tenth of the
world’s undiscovered oil and one-third of the undis-
covered natural gas lie under the waters of the Arctic.
We expect more vessels of all kinds in the region as
the ice continues to retreat and energy and other
resources become more accessible.
We are encouraged to see U.S. policymakers
preparing for the changing Arctic. Planning docu-
ments now cover the full spectrum of strategic and
operational concepts of operations (CONOPS) in the
Arctic, including: the National Strategy for the Arctic
Region and its Implementation Plan; the Department
of Defense Arctic Strategy; the U.S. Navy Arctic
Roadmap for 2014 to 2030; and the U.S. Coast Guard
Arctic Strategy.
Although the planning documents are comprehensive,
we believe that in some areas the pace of developing
capability and capacity is too slow. While we recognize
that well-established shipping companies may not
divert significant portions of their fleet through the
Arctic anytime soon, entrepreneurs and early adopters
are already pushing Arctic operations, despite the
high risks. In light of the rapid pace of increased ship-
ping and other activity in the Arctic, we are particu-
larly concerned that increased capability is required
today to communicate reliably and to conduct search
and rescue. We need better charts and navigation
aids, communications capability, enhanced disaster
response capabilities, and the ability to exercise
freedom of navigation.
We are also concerned that the Unified Command Plan
splits Arctic responsibility between two Combatant
Commands: U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and
U.S. European Command (EUCOM). This division of
the area of responsibility (AOR) runs counter to the
concept of unity of command and the tenet of total
responsibility residing in one commander. This dual
responsibility creates unnecessary tension and has
negative impacts on the generation of requirements
and sourcing of assets. For simplification, unity of
command, and timely execution of requirements and
sourcing, we recommend NORTHCOM as the sole
Combatant Command for the Arctic region.
Although we regard the likelihood of conflict in the
Arctic as low, especially in the near term, the long-
term geopolitical situation is complex, nuanced, and
uncertain. Maritime issues involving existing and
potential claims of the extended outer continental
shelf and shipping routes already exist. As a warming
planet affords increased access to the Arctic, the MAB
cannot rule out new disputes arising over natural
resource exploration and recovery, fishing, and future
shipping lanes.
The international framework for resolving complex
maritime issues is the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) treaty, which provides the frame-
work for maritime partnership and cooperation. Since
the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, it will be
more difficult to have maximum operating flexibility
in the Arctic, and it complicates negotiations with
maritime partners and other Arctic nations. Moreover,
by not being an UNCLOS signatory, the U.S. will have
limited or no say in any future changes to UNCLOS.
entrepreneurs and early adopters are
already pushing Arctic operations,
despite the high risks. In light of the rapid
pace of increased ... activity in the Arctic,
we are particularly concerned that
increased capability is required today...

GENERAL PAUL J. KERN, USA (Ret.)
Former Commander, Army Materiel Command
BRIGADIER GENERAL GERALD E. GALLOWAY, USA (Ret.)
Former Dean at the United States Military Academy, West Point
On Infrastructure
When he commanded a brigade at south-central Georgia’s Fort Stewart in the 1980s, General Kern found himself
dealing with an unexpected threat—wildfires. “It’s hard to believe that you can burn a swamp down, but we did,” he
recalled. With climate change expected to be a cause of future wildfires, among other problems, he and Galloway (who
share a background in civil engineering) are concerned about the enhanced risk to the military’s infrastructure.
At the same time, General Kern noted that much of the infrastructure on which the DOD relies—roads, bridges, and
such—doesn’t actually belong to the military. He also said he is concerned about coastal installations that could be vul-
nerable to sea-level rise, which is considered one of the most serious impacts of a rapidly changing climate.
“We should also be looking at our overseas installations, particularly facilities in Japan along the coast,” he said. “One
of my concerns is that we get so focused on the continental United States that we don’t look outside of our borders.”
He said he remembers his experiences serving in Vietnam, “when one of our principal problems was getting supplies
ashore. We had hundreds of supply ships not getting in; they were backed up in the harbors.”
Brigadier General Galloway praised the Army Corps of Engineers’ efforts in collaboration with PACOM in helping with
long-range planning in the Mekong River Basin affecting Vietnam and other nearby nations. He said Vietnam’s coast is
disappearing much like the Mississippi Delta, and that as flooding affects that region’s rice paddies it creates potential
food-shortage problems that are a source of instability.
Flooding at home also is a major potential worry for General Galloway, a past president of the American Water
Resources Association. He testified before the U.S. Senate’s Energy and Natural Resources Committee’s panel on water
and power last year about how climate change, combined with population increases, will affect the nation’s aging water
and sewer lines, dams, and related infrastructure.
“Structures designed to protect against current or past flooding and coastal erosion threats may not be able to stand
up against the forces of larger events, or deal with the increased magnitude of these events,” he warned in his tes-
timony. “Increases in population will in many cases require current water and wastewater systems to be not only
upgraded but also to be sized to the increased demands that will be expected. Additional surface or subsurface storage
may be required, and older facilities may not be in a position to be modified or expanded. Major storm flows, which are
currently stressing many existing dams and levees, may increase even more under climate change and further threaten
those that rely on these structures.”
General Kern said that New York City’s experience with flooding during Superstorm Sandy reinforced his belief that
military planners should take particular interest in guarding against the threats to communications lines, backup
supplies, and anything else located in basement areas. “The message there is, look carefully at what you’ve got below
ground in the areas where there’s potential for flooding,” he said.
Both Kern and Galloway hope there can be sustained political momentum to address the issue. “There’s a saying that
the half-life of a memory of a flood is relatively short,” General Galloway said. “When your house is patched up and the
clamor has stopped about funding, you can get into the ‘It probably won’t happen here again’ mindset. The military
can’t afford to have that happen.”

The 2014 National Climate Assessment predicts that in
the U.S. there will be “increasingly frequent and intense
extreme heat, which causes heat-related illnesses and
deaths and, over time, worsens drought and wildfire
risks, and intensifies air pollution; increasingly frequent
extreme precipitation and associated flooding that can
lead to injuries and increases in marine and freshwater-
borne disease; and rising sea levels that intensify coastal
flooding and storm surge.”31
While some changes associ-
ated with climate change will bring benefits, like longer
growing seasons, many will have detrimental effects
because our systems and institutions were built to
operate based on historical conditions and geographical
settings, not on projected future scenarios.
Military
The military’s fundamental purpose is to protect the
homeland, build security globally, protect power, and
win our nation’s wars. We agree with DOD’s 2014 QDR
that climate change may increase the frequency, scale
and complexity of future military missions. Yet the
MAB resolves that we should not build our military
forces merely to respond to the projected impacts of
climate change. Instead, our forces must be ready to
meet the full mission set. In this context, readiness is
measured by having sufficient numbers of service men
and women who are properly trained, equipped, and
organized to execute the mission. We are increasingly
concerned that projected climate changes have the
potential to stress many of the components that con-
tribute to readiness. We expect that projected climate
change impacts will:
• Likely increase demand for Guard, reserve, and
active forces in response to extreme weather events,
natural disasters, and a wider range of Defense Sup-
port to Civilian Authorities (DSCA) inside the U.S.,
potentially restricting the ability of the military
services to respond to other simultaneous or subse-
quent missions.
• Require that we improve training flexibility to
accommodate increasingly challenging climate
change–related barriers.
• Challenge our bases and surrounding communities,
where failure to change and build the necessary
resilience could limit our ability to generate readi-
ness and deploy forces.
• Challenge public and DOD-owned logistic infrastruc-
ture and transportation systems needed to provide
“just-in-time” logistics and equip forces. “Just-in-
time” logistics requires the movement of material to
a specific location just before the material is needed
in the operational or training process.
Maintaining readiness in a constrained budgetary envi-
ronment is already on the minds of military leaders.
In his forwarding letter for the 2014 QDR, Secretary of
Defense Hagel describes “the need for tough choices in a
Domestic Implications of Climate Change
◀ Projected climate change impacts within the United States will place key
elements of our National Power at risk and threaten our homeland security.
← The projected impacts of climate change can be detrimental to military
readiness, strain base resilience both at home and abroad, and may limit our
ability to respond.
← The projected impacts of climate change can be detrimental to the physical
components of infrastructure and information systems, while also limiting
their capacities.
← The projected impacts of climate change will threaten major sectors of the
U.S. economy.
← The projected impacts of climate change will threaten major sections of our
society and stress social support systems such as first-responders.
III.

VICE ADMIRAL LEE GUNN, USN (Ret.)
Former Inspector General, Department of the Navy
GENERAL DON HOFFMAN, USAF (Ret.)
Former Commander, Air Force Materiel Command
On Energy Efficiency and Innovation
When Admiral Gunn thinks about climate change, he remembers a plaque on the desk of the late Vice Admiral
Paul Butcher, a gruff, cigar-chomping figure with whom he served in the 1970s: “Lead, follow, or get the hell out of
the way.”
“That’s the kind of the way I feel about this—we need to be leaders,” said Admiral Gunn, a 35-year Navy veteran who is
president of CNA’s Institute for Public Research. He has given numerous speeches about reducing the military’s
reliance on oil by catalyzing clean energy technology innovation and adoption.
“During the last seven years, it appears that America has begun to surrender world leadership in this collection of
issues dealing with climate change and national security,” he said. “Ceding this has serious economic and national
security implications, and as the U.S. desires to provide security and stability in various parts of the world, the fact
that we are ceding our leadership will make it more and more difficult.”
Technologies such as wind and solar not only increase energy independence, Admiral Gunn said, but emit far fewer
of the greenhouse gases blamed for causing global warming. He said the MAB’s other reports on energy and national
security offer a clear road map to how the military can lead on the issue.
One way, he said, is to encourage the DOD to work cooperatively with other agencies, as it has with the Department
of Energy. He also would like to see more public-private partnerships that echo the successful work that has been
done in housing, managing electrification projects, and water purification and conservation.
Vice Admiral Gunn praised the department’s move toward increasing its use of biofuels. “That is an example where
the DOD can help incubate new advances in technology,” he said. “Even if the services don’t end up buying
enormous amounts of these fuels, providing a market early on in their development that supports financing of
these projects is a great contribution.”
Reducing dependence on oil also is a serious concern for General Hoffman, who remembers the Air Force reaction
during the oil shocks of the late 1970s. “I saw the behavior before and after to address that, and then I see how we’re
addressing it today, and it’s disappointing,” he said. “We did some remarkable things back then.”
One program from that era that the military could return to, he said, is putting in place incentives in which organi-
zations keep a portion of the energy savings they achieve, with the freedom to plow that money back into training,
quality-of-life projects, or any other pressing needs.
“The bottom line was, by paying attention to every energy flow, we really did a lot of great stuff on the bases,” he said.
“You have to incentivize behavior if you want to make change. And not just incentivize it—you have to incentivize it as
close to the point of consumption as you can, so that the airmen or the airmen’s kids feel that they benefit from sav-
ings. That’s what’s missing now [from what] I saw in the ‘70s.”
When it comes to energy efficiency, General Hoffman is trying to practice what he preaches. He designed his Wisconsin
home for passive solar and has installed photovoltaic panels, as well as geothermal infrastructure.
“I live in an energy laboratory that doubles as my house,” he said, laughing. “Net zero is my ultimate goal.”

period of fiscal austerity ... including reducing force struc-
ture … expanding critical capabilities, modernizing the
force, and investing in readiness.” The QDR subsequently
then warns: “The impacts of climate change may under-
mine the capacity of our domestic installations to support
training activities.” The challenge for the U.S. military is
not simple: reduce force size, increase capabilities and
readiness, fix our bases so climate change will not under-
mine our training and deployment activities—all in the
context of a constrained budget. Unfortunately, we cannot
wait 20 years to begin to factor in the projected impacts
of climate change in force-shaping decisions. We must
add those impacts to the decision matrix today.
Military Capacity
The MAB sees several major areas of potential impact on
readiness relating to climate change. Chief among them
is the military’s overall capacity for mission performance.
Response to humanitarian assistance/ disaster response
(HA/DR) and other missions related to increases in
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, both
at home and abroad, will stress the National Guard,
reserves, and Army Corps of Engineers (ACE), and require
increased use of active forces in Defense Support of Civil
Authorities (DSCA).
To fight and win our nation’s most complex wars, the mil-
itary relies on a “total force” concept and certain capa-
bilities that exist only in the National Guard, reserves, or
Army Corps of Engineers. Yet the Guard, reserves, and the
ACE already are being called on more frequently to battle
wildfires, respond to flooding and major snow events,
and move water to drought-stricken areas, at home and
abroad. We believe that the increased frequency, dura-
tion, and magnitude of these extreme weather events will
stress these organizations’ capacities and increase the
degree to which active forces will be called on in DSCA
missions. While response to HA/DR and other related
missions should not be a force-sizing parameter for active
forces, the increased demand on the Guard, reserves, and
ACE must be factored into future war plans. Planners
should not assume that all forces will be able to deploy
on short notice.
Military Training
A second area of impact from climate change on mil-
itary readiness is in training. Extreme weather events,
including high and low temperatures, drought and
floods, high and damaging winds, and heavy or blowing
snow have significant impacts on military operations.
These impacts include increased risk to life and safety,
injury, and a degrading effect on mission performance. In
war and other critical operations, commanders are forced
to take larger risks during extreme weather because of
the mission, although often with less than ideal results. In
peacetime training, commanders should not put the lives
of their charges at risk because of high temperatures or
extreme weather. The concern of the MAB is that changes
in weather patterns that will result from projected climate
change will lower the number of training days and reduce
training opportunities.
If conditions are too dry, there is also an increased risk of
wildfires, and certain types of training, such as live fire,
high explosive rounds, or the use of tracer rounds will be
suspended or require that extraordinary measures be put
in place. For example, in Fort Hood, Texas, the use of live
rounds and tracer rounds was suspended for so long in
2011 that commanders were forced to use helicopters to
drench certain areas with water while pre-positioning fire-
fighting equipment, just so soldiers could train with live
ammunition. Similarly, at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar
in California, live-fire training using high explosive muni-
tions is prohibited because of the wildfire concern. If it is
too hot and humid, there is a risk of loss of life due to heat
stress/stroke, and that training will be suspended. This is
a “black flag,” a condition in which non–mission essential
physical training and strenuous exercise must be suspended
or moved indoors.
In other parts of the country, the MAB believes training
days will be reduced by more intense storms and heavier
rainfall. Heavy rainfall and low visibility increases risk and
makes ineffective the many forms of training where visual
feedback is required. Finally, sea-level rise will disrupt our
low-lying training facilities, while changes in coastal eco-
systems may increase regulatory restrictions on the use of
these facilities.
Those charged with operating, maintaining, and building
new training facilities must consider the projected impacts
of climate change on future training operations. Resilience
and training flexibility should be hallmarks of all future
state-of-the-art facilities.
Military Infrastructure
Infrastructure is the third area of a readiness-related impact
from climate change. Climate change impacts such as
drought and sea-level rise will threaten military infrastruc-

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