The document discusses efforts by the FAA and EASA to harmonize their fuel tank safety programs. It provides: 1) An overview of lessons learned from SFAR 88 reviews which revealed unexpected ignition sources and the difficulty of eliminating all risks, leading both agencies to adopt a balanced approach of continued ignition prevention efforts alongside reducing tank flammability. 2) Details on the status of ignition prevention reviews and corrective actions being implemented, as well as progress harmonizing flammability reduction standards and a plan to work towards agreement on retrofit requirements. 3) A summary that the combined ignition prevention and flammability reduction strategies should virtually eliminate the risk of future fuel tank explosions, and that FAA and E

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Air CBS Training / M-013

2. Background
Harmonization Goals
Ignition Source Prevention Status
Flammability Reduction Status
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3. Fuel Tank Safety - Background
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4. SFAR 88 Lessons Learned
Goal of SFAR 88 was to preclude ignition sources
Safety Assessments were very valuable
Design reviews revealed unexpected ignition sources
Difficulty in identifying all ignition sources
Number of previously unknown failures found
Continuing threat from still unknown failures
Unrealistic to expect we can eliminate all ignition sources
Must consider flammability reduction of high flammability
tanks as an integral part of system safety
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5. SFAR 88 Lessons Learned
A bar chart comparing
recorded temperatures
in different areas of a
747 center fuel tank
during tests that were
performed when the
tank was nearly empty
and about half full. The
tests were carried out
at 13,800 ft, the same
altitude at which TWA
Flight 800 exploded
[NTSB e, 1997].
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6. Balanced Approach with
Flammability Reduction
HAZARD
ACCIDENT
Ignition Prevention
Layer
- Some holes eliminated
(e.g. design changes to
preclude single failures)
- Other holes reduced in
size (human factors/
maintenance issues,
unknowns, etc.)
Flammability Layer
-Reducing flammability
exposure significantly
reduces holes
(flammability reduction)
-Small holes remain due
to system performance,
dispatch relief, system
reliability, etc.
ACCIDENT
PREVENTED
!
SFAR 88
Flammability Reduction /
Low Flammability
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7. Balanced Approach with
Flammability Reduction
Main Wing Tanks 2-4% Tail Tanks 2-4%
Body Tanks
• Un-pressurized >20%
• Pressurized <5%
Center Wing Tank with Adjacent Pack Bays 15-20%
• Center Wing Tanks without Pack Bays 4-7%
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8. Balanced Approach with
Flammability Reduction
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9. Harmonization Goal
To establish mutually acceptable positions between the FAA
and EASA related to fuel tank safety, working within the
requirements of the existing and developing rules and
policies, while respecting the responsibilities of the State of
Design:
Resulting in a common solution set for the operators,
and
Facilitating transfer of airplanes from country-to-country
with minimal impact on operators.
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10. Harmonization Process
FAA and EASA have closed SFAR 88 open issues
FAA and EASA are coordinating common SFAR 88
closure letters that will be sent to manufacturers
Weekly internal FAA team meetings to monitor all fuel tank
safety activity
EASA internal team coordination
Biweekly FAA, EASA and TCCA telecons to continue and
reinforce harmonization effort
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11. Ignition Prevention Status
Ignition prevention safety reviews completed
Design changes have been identified
Common solution set agreed
TC holders are preparing service bulletins and
ADs are being issued
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12. Ignition Prevention –
Operating Requirements
Operating rules compliance dates extended
FAA/EASA had required incorporation of maintenance
program changes by December 2004
FAA notice extended compliance date to
December 2008
EASA plans to extend operating rule compliance date
December 2005 for Airworthiness Limitations (ALIs,
CDCCLs)
December 2006 for other maintenance information
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13. Ignition Prevention –
Operating Requirements
Harmonized SFAR 88 maintenance policy memo published;
EASA equivalent issued
ADs being issued for safety critical maintenance
ALIs, CDCCLs
All TC holders have developed maintenance instructions
required by SFAR 88/JAA-EASA policy
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14. Ignition Prevention –
New Designs and Developments
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15. Flammability Reduction
Harmonization Status
FAA and EASA agree on flammability reduction measures
for new production airplanes and future designs
FAA and EASA continue to work toward common retrofit
position
Plan agreed for working toward harmonization
FAA proposed a flammability reduction rule
Special conditions are harmonized
FAA issued final rule 747 special conditions January 24,
2005
EASA finalizing their final rule special conditions
Harmonized special conditions are issued for other
certification projects
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16. Summary
Balanced approach of ignition prevention and reduced
flammability can provide a substantial improvement in fuel
tank safety
Reducing flammability is now practical
Ignition prevention still major protection strategy
Combined strategies should virtually eliminate risk of
future fuel tank explosions
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17. Summary
FAA and EASA have been working to harmonize fuel tank
safety programs
Ignition prevention actions are harmonized
Significant progress made in harmonizing flammability
reduction
Reached agreement on flammability reduction
standards for in- production aircraft and new
designs
Plan agreed for working toward agreement on
retrofit
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18. Summary
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19. EASA Legislation
ED Decision 2007/003/R - 13/03/2007
AMC 66.A.45(d) Type/task training and ratings.
3. Theoretical and practical training should also take into
account critical aspects such as Critical Design
Configuration Control Limitations.
EASA guidance is provided for training in Appendix IV to
AMC to 66.A.45(d).
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20. EASA Legislation
Appendix IV to AMC to 66.A.45(d) - Fuel Tank Safety training
This appendix includes general instructions for providing training
on Fuel Tank Safety issues.
1. Level of training required by this Annex is only level 2.
Level 2 Detailed training
Objectives:
The attendant should, after the completion of the training:
1. know the history and the theoretical and practical elements
of the subject, have an overview of Special Federal Aviation
Regulations (SFARs) from 14 CFR SFAR 88 of the FAA and of JAA
TGL 47, be able to give a detailed description of the concept of
CDCCL, Airworthiness Limitations Items (ALI) and using
theoretical fundamentals and specific examples, 20

21. EASA Legislation
2. have the capacity to combine and apply the separate
elements of knowledge in a logical and comprehensive
manner.
3. have detailed information on how the above items
affect the aircraft in the scope of the activity of the
organisation or in the fleet.
4. understand and carry out activities with the use of
manufacturer and regulatory authority data providing
instructions on design and maintenance, such as Service
Bulletins, Airworthiness Directives, Aircraft Maintenance
Manual, Component Maintenance Manual etc.
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22. EASA Legislation
5. use easily the manufacturer’s documentation from
various sources and apply corrective action where
appropriate.
6. identify the components or parts or the aircraft subject
to FTS from the manufacturer’s documentation, plan the
action or apply a Service Bulletin and an Airworthiness
Directive.
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23. EASA Legislation
Continuing training
The interval between continuing training shall be
established by the organisation employing such
personnel, but should not exceed two years.
The continuing training shall include knowledge on
evolution of material, tools, documentation and
manufacturer’s or competent authority’s directives.
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24. EASA Legislation
The training for the personnel designated has to be
carried out before any airworthiness review certificate is
issued or any maintenance task is certified on an aircraft
or a component.
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