1. Institutions Envisioned by the Convention on Biological
Diversity and the Challenge of Implementation
Michael Patrick MacDonald
University of Vermont
Pols 259- International Environmental Politics
Professor Robert Bartlett
April 8th, 2009

2. Abstract
This paper reviews the inadequacies that challenge the goals of the CBD. In particular,
the paper highlights the improper funding mechanism that attempts to assist countries with
conservation projects. The paper also reflects the notion that it is necessary for the CBD to
provide more incentive for developing and third world nations to reach the goals set by the CBD
instead of rejecting the goals and opting for intrusive development projects. The paper is
analyzed through a number of lenses. First, the CBD needs to consider the asymmetry of wealth
distribution around the globe in order to fully grasp the challenges that face it. The Convention
also neglects the general fundamental challenge that faces most International Institutions; the
notion that broad structural changes can be ignored in favor of minor organizational
restructuring. Without a broad change in global thinking in terms of biological conservation and
without a proper internal funding mechanism, many challenges will continue to face the CBD
over time.
2

3. Introduction
Within the past 15 years there have been increasing interests and efforts in protecting
and maintaining sustainable levels of biodiversity at a global level. At varying levels of
trepidation, scientists, policymakers, NGOs, and the general public have all made the
conservation of biodiversity a key issue that, at the international level, has become one of the
most pressing topics of discussion. Agreed upon by 150 nations at the Earth Summit in 1992,
the Convention on Biological Diversity set up the framework for a collaborative global effort in
maintaining healthy levels of biodiversity. Starting as a way to define biodiversity and to
establish a system for dealing with conservation matters, the CBD has grown to encompass a
wide range of goals with substantial global backing. Although the CBD has done well in
providing a proper definition of biodiversity and biodiversity conservation, there are still
discrepancies within the institution of the CBD. In particular, the CBD fails to adequately
address the difference in challenges that face the global north and the global south in reaching
the goals of the CBD. In order for the CBD to successfully accomplish its goals of a global
community of biodiversity conservation, it must address the lack of interest from the north in
3

4. supporting southern conservation efforts as well as make conservation measures more enticing
for the third world and developing countries of the world.
There are many leading concepts and theories that can be applied towards
understanding the difficulties that currently face the Convention on Biological Diversity. While
these ideas are not exclusive to the goals of the CBD, they provide much needed insight into the
general failures of institutions that are shaped and run similar to how the CBD functions. There
is a wide range of general institutional problems that can be applied to understanding the
mishaps within the execution of the CBD’s goals. At the core of these issues is the inherent
North-South inequality that makes it difficult for much international consensus. The global
North, which is made up of the world’s wealthiest, developed, countries plays dictator and
sponsor to the issues that often ravage the South. The South, which is made up of the rest of
the world’s developing and third world states, is then apportioned to comply with the decisions
of the North with ‘equal’ but not proportional say. To further congest the problem at hand,
organizations will often opt for minor adjustments in replacement of much needed institutional
framework change. While it is absolutely important for International Organizations to
constantly make minor adjustments in regards to their agendas as an effort to respond to the
constant changing nature of the planet, minor organizational changes will not suffice in
accomplishing much of a difference. In the case of the CBD, there are systemic institutional
flaws that ail the Organization, and without thoughts of more major or broader change the CBD
itself will likely be ever hindered in its ability to fulfill the very goals it has set.
4

5. UN Earth Summit: A Framework for Global Conservation
As the brainchild and main outcome of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and
Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is seen as a
mechanism for a change in thinking of how to approach issues surrounding conservation. Prior
to the Earth Summit, an alternative name for the conference, the focus on conservation fell
within the realm of ensuring specific species’ safety and conserving land based solely on the
need of a species, on a species to species basis. In contrast, the CBD shifted the global line of
conservation thinking to be in line with the thought that the protection of a region’s species
diversity is of the most concern (DeSombre 2006, 58). The agreement, in general, not only
supports the notion of regional biodiversity conservation but also includes guidelines for
sustainable biological resource use and sharing information about the use of genetic resources,
such as those from the biotechnologies industry (DeSombre 2006, 59). These basic goals of the
convention are indeed rather broad and encompass the overarching goals of the agreement.
The conservation policies themselves fall within the jurisdiction of the states, in essence
allowing the CBD to act as a catalyst for national institutional change as well as a forum for
positive discussion about conservation strategies and implementations.
In order to provide an ongoing source of global direction and governance for the goals
established by the convention, the United Nations, in part lead by UNEP, set up a secretariat in
an effort to help manage and facilitate the goals of the CBD. The secretariat’s Office of the
Executive Secretary, currently headed by Executive Secretary Dr. Ahmed Djoghlaf from Algeria,
manages the overall functions of the CBD. The remaining divisions of the secretariat, all of
5

6. which fall under the authority of the Executive Secretary, include divisions of social, economic
and legal matters; scientific, technical and technological matters; biosafety; implementation
and technical support; and resource management and conference services (Secretariat 2009).
The secretariat, which has its headquarters located in Montreal, Canada, has the main focus of
preparing and servicing the Conference of Parties (COP), the CBD’s official meetings that take
place approximately every two years (DeSombre 2006, 59). The COP provides a proper forum
for member parties to discuss the current topics dealing with biodiversity and conservation as
well as a means to set the global agenda for international conservation policy. The parties that
attend the COP consist of 191 nations that have agreed to work towards accomplishing,
collectively, the international policy goals of the CBD. In order to attend the COP as a party, a
country has to ratify the CBD, accede to it (if the country did not sign the treaty during the time
of signing), approve, or accept the treaty (Secretariat 2009). Signing the treaty and becoming a
party to the CBD are not one in the same. For example, the United States signed the convention
back in 1993 but never ratified it within its government and therefore is not a party to the
convention. Conversely, Montenegro, a country which at the time of signing period was still a
part of Serbia, is a party by means of secession when it separated from Serbia in 2006. Along
with the COP, the CBD secretariat organizes and facilitates five other convention bodies: the
Scientific Body, Working Group on the Review of Implementation, Working Group on Access
and Benefit Sharing, Working Group on Article 8(J) (a working group that focuses on indigenous
communities), and a Working Group on Protected Areas (Secretariat 2009). These working
groups generally act as the COP’s research base and allows for an interim update on the
convention’s goals. Although the working groups do not work directly with the parties to the
6

7. CBD, the working groups often can provide support and information to communities at a sub-
national level.
Field(s) of Dreams: Current Agenda of the CBD
Due to the nature of the CBD’s history, its structure, and the fact that the COP meets
every couple of years, it seems as though there have been very few topics that the regime has
covered during its existence. While it may be true that there have only been nine COP meetings
spanning a total of 14 years, the CBD has indeed been able to cover quite a bit of ground in
terms of setting an international agenda for conservation issues. Disregarding the first ordinary
meeting of the conference of parties in 1994 which simply discussed the general future
direction of the CBD and established the GEF as the interim funding source, the COP has
covered a range of issues including sustainable use of biodiversity, biosafety, agricultural
biodiversity, traditional and indigenous knowledge, access to genetic resources, and technology
transfers (Secretariat 2009). These are of course by no means the entire list of topics covered
by the COP but they do show a good representation of what the CBD brings to the forefront of
the international conservation agenda.
In the two most recent meetings, the 2006 COP in Curitiba, Brazil, and the 2008 meeting
in Bonn, Germany, review of the funding mechanisms of the CBD has been a topic of discussion
(Tsioumani 2008, 222). While this topic may not seem as the most pressing in the realm of
global conservation efforts, the discussion about the CBD’s funding ability is rather high in
international importance. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was deemed the interim
7

8. fundraising mechanism as a result of the first COP; however 14 years later it is now important
for the CBD to provide a proper funding mechanism to fuel their increasing scope of issues on
its agenda. As the Review of Implementation of Articles 20 and 21 from the 9th Conference of
Parties states, the CBD regime finds it concerning that there is a lack of funding to help in
reaching the goals of the convention (Review 2008). Also outlined in the Review is the
importance for parties to recognize the overall cost that would occur with increasing
biodiversity loss, and that it encourages more of a north-south, as well as south-south,
cooperation in resolving the key issues facing biological diversity.
This is a key step for the CBD, but it is by no means a solution to the funding issues of
the CBD. For one, the dependency of the CBD on GEF funding is already quite high. In the
Review the CBD requests that the GEF not only continue their present funding role in existing
CBD projects but to also continue giving financial resources to parties in order to help reach the
CBD’s main goals (Review 2008). In order for the CBD to properly function however, it will be
necessary for internal fundraising and funding mechanisms to be in place. An institution with
such specific goals as the CBD needs to have a proper, reliable and constant source of funding
to promote its own agenda. The CBD’s goals can only get so far with exclusively outside help
from the GEF.
The CBD’s lack of funding particularly effects the global South, where many of the
planet’s conservation projects occur, particularly those that focus around protection of
biodiversity. It is imperative that the South receives relatively large amounts of funding in order
to meet the goals of the CBD. Without proper funding the South is likely to disregard
8

9. conservation goals in order to facilitate development and economic growth, in some cases
simply to keep the country from failing. Although the North has to come up with very similar
amounts of money in order to go through with the conservation projects that are necessary to
meet the CBD’s goals, the Northern countries cannot only afford to fund many of the projects
themselves and forgo further development practices, but they also often have necessary
conservation infrastructure already in place.
One example of a Southern nation facing the challenges of biodiversity conservation is
the case of Bangladesh. Bangladesh is a country that is located at a latitude close to the
equator, therefore contains a vibrant jungle landscape. This landscape is home to a wide range
of species and the landscape is also in serious threat due to increasing human activities.
Bangladesh is not a wealthy nation by any means, so practices of development are seen as
important in boosting the nation’s global status. Here, conservation projects that look at
protecting key biodiversity zones for the region are pushed aside, due to their costs, in favor of
development projects that aim to boost the state’s economy. Currently, Bangladesh is facing
increasing temperature and rising air pollution levels, two issues that seem to be more
important to address for the government than conservation matters set out by the CBD (Alam
2008, 3). Not only does Bangladesh see their development and economic growth as more
important than conservation challenges, but they also face other environmental challenges that
show a more immediate impact than what will be the cause of decreasing biodiversity. While
Bangladesh faces unique challenges within the country, this occurrence is not limited to the
region. Throughout the various Southern countries, the political agenda is full with economic
issues and human health matters, so conservation plans simply are not seen as the most
9

10. important. It becomes a challenge for policy makers to implement CBD’s goals in places that
cannot successfully implement policies that tackle other, more recognized, issues.
Another case of a developing country facing the difficulties of prescribing to the goals of
the CBD is that of the Middle Eastern State of Oman. While Oman is wealthy by comparison in
regards to much of the rest of the world’s developing nations, the state is by no means a
developed nation or a regional hegemon. The nation’s shrinking oil reserves pale in comparison
to its wealthier neighbors, beyond which there is not much for the people of Oman to rely on as
a driving economic force. Being that Oman is primarily a desert region, agriculture makes up as
little as 1% of the country’s economic output and they rely quite a bit on imports to make up
for the lack of an agricultural infrastructure. In an increasingly intricate global economic system,
these factors are greatly compounded and put Oman in the precarious position of deciding
whether to support further traditional development practices or to shift the shift the system of
thinking to one that regards conservation as a means for sustainable development growth.
Similar to the case of Bangladesh, Oman has alternative pressing issues that are often
regarded politically as more important than biodiversity conservation. Although Oman
comparably is not as biodiverse as its developing tropical counterparts, the misconception that
biodiversity conservation does not need to be considered in the region simply enflames the
political neglect. As the country attempts to shift from relying on the increasingly unreliable
future in oil production, some suggest that developing sustainable infrastructure that would
promote better agricultural practices and conserve the regions biodiversity could be key in
reinventing the economic structure (Ghazanfar 2008, 466). Such a transition, although not an
10

11. enormous impact on the national agriculture production, would definitely promote more
efficient practices throughout the country and would set an example for neighboring nations to
follow. More importantly, perhaps, is that such practices can be implemented around the globe
and are perhaps better suited for success in other circumstances.
L’Analyse: Top-Down From Montreal to Those Afflicted
Implementing biodiverse conservation measures, while rightfully enticing and applicable
to some situations, is unfortunately no more than a pipe dream for many countries. From the
perspective of the country in implementing the change, often is the case that the powers at be
simply cannot commit to most forms of change. Politically, due to difficulty in passing
legislation, lack of significant resources that would be required in such a shift, or a dynamic
governmental structure that is subject often to authority change, government leaders often
have their hands tied. These challenges do not even touch upon the problem of government
corruption that occurs throughout the developing world or the proliferation of failed states.
These challenges that are presented at the national and sub-national level are exactly
why International Organizations and Regimes like the Convention on Biological Diversity have
been established. Inherent in their nature, IO’s aim to create goals that will accomplish the
daunting tasks that single nations cannot deal with on their own. In the case of defining
sustainable development through the Brundtland Report, there was an important part of the
establishment part missing. When setting out the parameters of sustainable development, the
report suggests that there are certain needs that have to be addressed in the developing world
11

12. in order to achieve a collective sense of sustainable development. However, the Brundtland
Report only goes so far as recognizing these needs. Left out of the process was actually thinking
through the problems, devising a proper definition of what threatens the developing world, and
setting the framework for possible action (Elliott 2004, 164). This same issue has been a vital
flaw in the way the CBD has operated since its inception. For one, the CBD has run on the
assumption that biodiversity can be seen as a commodity. For example, the CBD often will
protect biodiverse regions in order to gain further knowledge about the region and the
interaction of species. State actors are those that are often called upon to conduct such
research, allowing the larger actors to ‘collect’ protected species, while the local people that
often rely on the wealth of conserved species have to abide by the regulations of the
convention (Park 2008, 18). In essence, the individuals simply watch the more powerful state
flex its influence- the very state that likely had a say in developing the regulation in the first
place- while the powerless local population is left to scratch its collective head.
Furthering the maladies of the CBD is also something entirely out of its control and
something that was never intended to be an issue that would face the CBD in reaching the goals
it set forward 14 years ago. Absolutely apparent in the current global system is the asymmetry
of wealth distribution amongst countries; a minority of nations simply hold the majority of
wealth and resources. The trade of goods, the participation in global summits and the
involvement in international agreements all reflect this asymmetrical distribution (Park 2008,
63). This is completely out of the reach and scope of what the CBD’s goals are, however it is an
unfortunate burden that the CBD is forced to face. When framed in 1992, the CBD ran on the
assumption that all nations had the same ability to protect species and conserve land. Although
12

13. it was recognized that there were indeed states that were in need of more assistance than
others, completely unconsidered went the notion that overcoming challenges to conservation
in poor developing nations would be exponentially more difficult than overcoming the same
challenges in a developed nation. The asymmetry has even deeper of an impact when the
location of the CBD’s Secretariat is considered. The headquarters for the CBD are currently
located in Montreal, Canada, a member of the G8 and one of the world’s most influential
nations. With such an established top-down system to begin with, the fact that the CBD is
located among the world’s elite does not give much hope to the developing world.
The CBD’s response to this, not breaking the typical symptom based solution style of
governance that most International Organizations follow, is often to play around with the
organizational structure of the CBD itself. Unfortunately for the developing world, in the years
of the convention’s existence, not much has resulted from the minor adjustments. Rather than
tinker with the structural flaws, which are inherent in the system, the institutional system itself
needs to be adjusted (Najam 2005, 241). For the CBD, such institutional change would be to
restructure itself to consider the North’s greater influence over the South in all of the world’s
issues and come up with a solution that will empower the South by involving, but not angering,
the North. Along with this restructuring would need to be a more dependable funding source,
one that considers the extreme difficulty of meeting conservation standards in some of the
most biodiverse regions in the world that also recognizes the dichotomy of issues that
challenge the South as compared to the North. Some biodiversity issues require a different
approach to funding than others, whether it is found within the North or South, and the North
needs to be looked at differently than the South altogether.
13

14. Conclusion
The Convention on Biological Diversity is continuously adjusting its agenda in order to
configure its short-term goals to align with what the international community sees as important
to biodiversity. Recently, the CBD has put a slight emphasis on the importance of developing a
proper internal funding mechanism, however the effort has not been good enough. In the
fourteen years of its existence, the CBD regime has depended on the GEF for funding CBD
supported projects around the globe. In order for the CBD to further the progress in meeting its
goals, the CBD will need a viable source of money that it can control itself.
Perhaps more importantly, the CBD needs to improve the incentive for nations to reach
the CBD goals. As of now, the goals are simply stated as somewhat of an overarching agenda for
the entire international community. For example, the success of many Scandinavian cities to
implement sustainable urban practices is celebrated as a pan-global solution (Elander 2005,
291). It is lovely to think that successful means can be translated elsewhere but there are other
factors that often need to be considered. Basically overlooked are the economic and political
discrepancies between many of the countries in the global North and the global South. For the
North, it is seemingly easier for nations to address the conservation measures put forward by
the CBD. The North has more in terms of resources to deal with biodiversity, and for the most
part does not have as many zones where biodiversity is at a high level. On the contrary, the
South has quite a bit of diversity in terms of species, including much of the world’s jungles.
Without a proper resource base, and with a poor mechanism for funding through the CBD,
14

15. many of the third world and developing countries choose the route of development and
economic growth and forgo any attempt to reach the goals of the CBD. In order to change the
ways of the global system of conservation, the CBD must add more of an incentive for the lesser
privileged nations in order to get their commitment to conservation.
15

16. Bibliography:
Aguilar, Soledad, Aaron Laur, Rebecca Paveley, and Elsa Tsioumani. 2008. “United Nations
Activities”. Environmental Policy & Law 38(3): 114-125.
Alam, Mahbubul, A. Z. M. Manzoor Rashid, and Yasushi Furukawa. 2008. “Policy Implications
and Implementation of Environmental ICTPS in Developing States: Examples from
Bangladesh.” Electronic Green Journal 26: 1-11.
Baker, Susan. 2003. “The Dynamics of European Union Biodiversity Policy: Interactive,
Functional and Institutional Logics.” Environmental Politics 12(3): 23-41.
Cullen, Zoe. 2008. “Biodiversity and the Bottom Line.” Oryx 42(4): 481-481.
DeSombre, Elizabeth R. 2006. Global Environmental Institutions. New York: Routledge.
Elander, Ingemar, Elisabet Lundgren Alm, Bjorn Malbert, and Ulf G. Sandstrom. 2005.
"Biodiversity in Urban Governance and Planning: Examples from Swedish Citites.”
Planning Theory and Practice 6 (3): 283-301.
Elliott, Lorraine. 2004. The Global Politics of the Environment. 2nd ed. New York: New York
University Press.
Ghazanfar, Shahina A. 2008. “Conservation in Developing Countries.” Turkish Journal of Botany
32(6): 465-469.
Herkenbath, Peter. 2008. Convention on Biological Diversity: 9th Conference of the Parties.
Paper presented at the Oryx, Bonn, Germany.
Najam, Adil. 2005. "Neither Necessary, Nor Sufficient: Why Organizational Tinkering Will Not
Improve Environmental Governance." In A World Environment Organization: Solution or
Threat for Effective International Environmental Governance? Frank Biermann and
Steffen Bauer ed.: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
Park, Jacob, Ken Conca and Matthias Finger, ed. 2008. The Crisis of Global Environmental
Governance: Towards a New Political Economy of Sustainability. New York: Routledge.
"Review of Implementation of Articles 20 and 21." 2008. In Convention on Biological Diversity
9th Conference of Parties. Bonn, Germany.
Secretariat, Convention on Biological Diversity. 2009. Convention on Biological Diversity 2009
[cited March 1st 2009]. Available from http://www.cbd.int/.
16

17. Soutullo, Alvaro, Monica De Castro, and Vincente Urios. 2008. “Linking Political and
Scientifically Derived Targets for Global Biodiversity Conservation: Implications for the
Expansion of the Global Network of Protected Areas.” Diversity & Distributions 14(4):
604-613.
Tsioumani, Elsa. 2008. “United Nations Activities.” Environmental Policy & Law 38(5): 220-248.
17