Shamit Saggar presented at a conference on integration challenges in a radicalizing world. In his presentation, he discussed key gaps in evidence about sympathy for terrorism. He argued there is a "circle of tacit support" surrounding extremist actions and violence. However, the relationship between non-violent and violent extremism is complex, involving issues like identity, trust in institutions, and marginalization. Saggar also noted governments must be careful when intervening, as overly aggressive policies aimed at countering violent extremism could backfire and erode trust, potentially multiplying problems. He advocated better research, engagement with Muslim communities, addressing social exclusion, and sensitizing public policies as preferable approaches for governments.

1. Sympathy for terrorism:
inspecting the evidence
Shamit Saggar
ISER, University of Essex
International conference „Integration Challenges in a Radicalizing World“
29 – 30 November 2016, Tallinn, Estonia

2. Overview
The circle of tacit support for violent extremism
a) what are the key gaps in the evidence base?
b) is there a relationship between non-violent
extremism and violent extremism?
c) what is the sensible place for government to
intervene?

3. The circle of tacit support
Extremist
action
including
violence
Moderate,
mainstream
Circle of tacit
support for
extremism
When you see
what’s going on
in Israel,
something comes
into your mind,
something just
goes.”
[Mohammed
Zahid, 23, quoted
in NYTimes,
5/03, following
Tel Aviv suicide
bombing]

4. Gaps in policy-relevant knowledge
• Timeliness and availability
• Muslim identity as a collective transcending identity
• Objective exclusion / subjective marginalization
• Newtonian principles
• Organizational behaviour

5. Violent and non-violent extremism
• The human condition
• Expressing sympathy vs condoning violence
• Muslim identity as a replacement identity due to
alienation
• Trust in institutions
• Political efficacy/influence
• Participation
• Sense of belonging
• Misplaced attention on Muslim integration

6. Government intervention I
• Aligning research insights with policy
instruments:
• Authority – laying down rules in
advance - monitoring compliance
and shrewd use of enforcement
• Transactional – specifying outputs
in advance and holding others to
account for these
• Persuasional – collaboration, co-
production through invitation,
cajoling, criticism, praise, etc.
• Boomerang traps: e.g. tackling violent
extremism – erosion of trust erosion
and problem multiplication

7. Government intervention I I
1. Levels and patterns of social
exclusion - e.g. in the labour
market, in schools, etc.
2. Trending toward isolation or
connectedness – e.g. particular
key elements of bridging and
bonding social capital
3. Presence of an external
reference or oppositional rallying
call – e.g. “left behind” groups
and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis
4. Dynamics of global Islam –
e.g. the “hotness” of these
influences in Britain
> Better engagement with
BMCs by government
> Fostering greater capacity
within mainstream Islam
> More informed choices in
policing extremism and
marginalising tacit support
for extremism
> Greater sensitising of
existing public policy, e.g. in
education, family law,
citizen redress, etc.
> Building improved human
capital and delivering
economic integration
Key policy
choices
√

8. Presentation given at International conference
Integration Challenges in a Radicalising World
29 – 30 November 2016 in Tallinn, Estonia
For more conference materials and presentations
please visit www.misakonverents.ee