2. Chalmers, David J. (1996) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a
Fundamental Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press
The problem of explaining how and why we
have qualia or phenomenal experiences
— how sensations acquire
characteristics, such as colors and tastes.
The hard problem of consciousness
3. Philosophical zombie
A philosophical zombie is a hypothetical
being who is physically identical to a
normal human being, but completely
lacks conscious experience.
David Chalmers
http://consc.net/zombies.html
If a philosophical zombie is possible, then
conscious experience is independent of
physical world.
8. if the idea that a violet produced in one
man's mind by his eyes were the same
that a marigold produced in another
man's, and vice versa
Locke, J., 1825 (1690), 'An Essay Concerning Human Understanding'
Inverted spectrum
Violet and marigold qualia. Image credit: Helen Klus/CC-NC-SA
http://www.thestargarden.co.uk/Locke-and-Berkeley.html
Marigold
Violet
11. YOU
It is red.
It is green.
YOU
500 600 700
500 600 700
Inverted spectrum
12. In his (Ned’s) class,
~2/3 of the students usually say,
‘Oh yeah, I see what you’re talking about’
and some of them even say,
‘Oh yeah, I’ve wondered about that since
I was a kid.’
~1/3 of people say,
‘I don’t know what you’re talking about.’
Susan J. Blackmore (2006). Conversations on consciousness: What
the best minds think about the brain, free will, and what it means to
be human. Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press
Inverted spectrum
13. Chalmers, David J. (1996) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a
Fundamental Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Qualia or phenomenal experiences:
“How sensations acquire characteristics,
such as colors and tastes.”
<==>
Awareness:
“a state wherein we have access to some
information, and can use that information
in the control of behavior.”
“the psychological concept of mind”
Two kinds of consciousness
14. What we are interested in here as a target of scientific
investigation is a component that is reportable or
behaviorally measurable.
So I will use the word awareness rather than consciousness.
Block, N. (1995) On a confusion about the function of consciousness. Behav. Brain Sci. 18, 227-287
Two kinds of consciousness
Phenomenal consciousness (= qualia):
experience;
the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state
is what it is like to be in that state.
Access-consciousness (= awareness):
functional, psychological aspect;
availability for use in reasoning and rationally
guiding speech and action