2. Wireless Sensor Networks
Composed of a large number of sensor nodes which are interconnected
through wireless links
Sensor node is low-cost
Sensor nodes are equipped with necessary sensing, data processing, and
communicating components
Sink (Data collection and processing unit)
Routers
3. Attacks to wireless sensor network
Wireless sensor networks are usually deployed at unattended or hostile
environments. Therefore, they are very vulnerable to various security attacks,
such as
selective forwarding
wormholes
Sybil attacks
injecting false data attack
4. False data attack
For an injecting false data attack, an adversary first compromises several
sensor nodes, accesses all keying materials stored in the compromised nodes,
and then controls these compromised nodes to inject bogus information and
send the false data to the sink to cause upper level error decision as well as
energy wasted in en-route nodes
An adversary could fabricate a wildfire event or report a wrong wildfire
location information to the sink, then expensive resources will be wasted by
sending rescue workers to a non-existing or wrong wildfire location
All false data are flooding into the sink simultaneously, huge energy will be
wasted in the en-route nodes, & also heavy verification burdens will
undoubtedly fall on the sink
8. BECAN Scheme Cont…
TinyECC-Based Non-Interactive Key Pair Establishment
Yi =xiG
Where yi = Public key
xi = Private key
G = Generation polynominal
Non-interactive key pair establishment
A secure Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key pair
kij =xiYj =xixjG=xjxiG=xjYi =kji
9. Advantages of BECAN Scheme
High filtering probability and energy saving.
Detect injecting false data attack.
BECAN Scheme in terms of en-routing filtering probability and false negative
rate on true reports.
Early detecting the injected false data by the en-route sensor nodes.
Sink Verification prevent/Mitigate the gang injecting false data attack from
mobile compromised sensor nodes
11. References
Bandwidth-Efficient Cooperative Authentication Scheme for Filtering Injected False Data in Wireless Sensor
Networks,“ IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol.23, pp. 32-43, Jan 2012.
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[9] X. Lin, R. Lu, P. Ho, X. Shen, and Z. Cao, “TUA: A novel compromise-resilient authentication architecture for
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