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How far did technology influence the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war?
War and technology have always been linked together. More precisely, without technology a war
cannot be fought. Since the earliest of civilizations, man has always been looking how to improve the
effectiveness when killing his own kind. With research and investment in war technology he has
never stopped improving that effectiveness.Military technology, which is a collection of equipment,
vehicles, structures and communication systems that are designed for the use in warfare1
, is
indisputably important in determining the outcome of war. However, the importance of other
factors such as manpower, quantity of weapons, strategic intelligence, terrain, third party influence
among other things can’t be underestimated in analyzing an outcome of war. In other words, sole
technological superiority is not likely to fully determine the outcome of a war; however, it is
definitely one of the main factors when tackling the equation of war. Nothing is different in the Iran-
Iraq war, the difference in technological readiness is important throughout the whole war, but it is
not the driving factor of its outcome. This essay will take a closer look at the extent to which the
difference in military technology possessed by both countriesinfluenced the outcome of the Iran-
Iraq war.
In order to understand the outcome of the war and how it came to it, the preceding events have to
be examined first. The war started on the 22nd
of September 1980 with full Iraqi invasion of Iran. The
invasion started with the Iraqi air force attacking Iranian air fields. Iraq used few Soviet MiG-23BN jet
fighters, Tu-20 bombers and Su-17 attack aircraft. However,the attack was not considered successful
since most of the Iranian planes were safely shielded in protective aircraft hangers and some of the
Iraqi bombs either completely missed their targets or malfunctioned. Reasons for the failure include
inexperience of the Iraqi pilots and technical problems in the Soviet equipment2
. Despite the failure,
the Iraqi ground forces moved rapidly into Iranian territory, focusing on an area located in province
of Khuzestan bounded by the cities of Khorramshahr, Ahvaz, Susangrd and Musian3
. The Iraqi aerial
attack was retaliated the very next day (23rd
of September 1980) by Iran which launched Operation
Kaman 99. In the operation Iran launched the full strength of its aerial arsenal which included 58 F-4
Phantom IIs, 88 F-5 Tigers IIs and 60 F-14 Tomcats. These airplanes were supplied by the USA before
the Iranian revolution. The F-4s and F-5s were directed towards Iraqi air to damage or destroy
several locations of strategic importance, such as Iraqi areal bases, oil refineries, and several cities;
while the tomcats were scattered across Iranian airspace in case of possible Iraqi retaliation. Despite
both sides suffering roughly the same amount of losses in planes, Iran managed to do more damage
to the Iraqi areal bases. According to Iran, Iraq’s aerial efficacy was reduced by 55% declaring the
operation a successful one4
.This, in term allowed Iran to have further air raid on key cities, economic
and strategic locations. An example of this, were the 8 air raids carried over Bagdad on October 1st
.
Adding to its air superiority, Iran also had some successes on ground and at sea in terms of pushing
Iraq back within its border. The ground troops in the time frame between mid-November 1981 and
1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_technology
2
Rob Johnson – The Iran-Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 (p. 49)
3
Efraim Karsh, The Iran – Iraq War 1980-1988, Osprey Publishing, 2010 (p. 23)
4
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Kaman_99
May1982 launched 3 phases of counter offensives that eventually drove the war front back to the
border. Important aspect from a technological point of view in these offensives wasthe use of
helicopters (most notable was the use of around 120 USA purchased Boeing Ch-47 Chinooks and Ah-
1 Cobra Helicopter gunships) to cut through Iraqi defense lines. Also, a significant impact had the
extensive use of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG-7s)in which Iran became self-sufficient of during
the war. The RPGs made Iraqi armored advancement costly and by the end of the May 1982 Iraq had
lost more than half of its armored vehicles and tanks. However, Iran was inferior in terms of
numbers when it came to armored vehicles and tanks and suffered even greater losses than Iraq56
.
At sea Iran also became dominant with Operation Morvarid in which Iran managed to destroy 80%
of Iraqi navy and all of Iraqi radar sites. In the operation, Iran utilized its navy (using 6 amphibious
vessels and 2 missile boats) and air force (using F-4s, F-5s and F-14 aircraft, with Ah-1J Sea Cobras,
Bell 214s and Ch-47C Chinooks helicopters) which proved superior, despite losing 1 missile boat and
1 F-4 plane7
.
Although, the importance of the Iranian technological and weapon superiority cannot be
underestimated, several other factors also contributed towards the Iranians pushing the Iraqi forces
out of Iran. One can argue that the main factor of this was from a strategic point of view, not so
much weakness in the Iraqi forces, but rather errors in the campaign plan itself that contributed
towards Iran outplaying Iraq in battles. Another reason may be the misjudgment of the Iraqi
leadership, namely Saddam Hussein, who expected the Iranians to negotiate as soon as Iraq made
limited incursion into Iran. His expectation was unrealistic, since Iraq did not mark a decisive victory,
nor reach any of its objectives8
. Moreover, the Iraqis failed because Iran’s ground forces and
resistance was more motivated and better trained, later accompanied by a mass of less trained but
highly motivated ‘volunteers’ that wanted to help defend their country. At the point when Iran
crossed into Iraq, Iran’s soldiers counted 350000 in contrast to Iraq’s 175000. While at the onset of
the war the numbers were 150000 active personnel for Iran and 350000 soldiers for Iraq.
Theseeventsdid not have a direct impact on the outcome of the war, but rather serve as a
comparison basis for the war situation over the next 6 years. With the analysis so far, it can be
established that Iran should have won the war under the status quo when Iran managed to cross
over to Iraq, because of the same reasons that allowed Iran to fight back after the Iraqi invasion.
However, this was not the case.The decisive battles and events of the war happened during the last
2 years (1987-1988). A series of Iranian failed offensives and Iraqi won counter-offensive strategies
drove Iran and Iraq on the negotiating table at the United Nations Security Consul. They signed
Resolution 598 leading to the 20th
August 1988 cease-fire. According to some interpretations, the
war was won by Iraq, while according to other interpretations, it ended in a draw. This means that
some other factors must have changed or influenced the course of the war during the mid-war
period (1982-1987). These factors include foreign investment, change of tactics and recruitment of
new soldiers.
As soon as Iran crossed into Iraqi territory in 1982, military and financial aid dramatically increased
for Iraq. This aid was mainly coming from the USA, USSR, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, UK,
5
Rob Johnson – The Iran-Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 (p. 49 – p.66)
6
Efraim Karsh, The Iran – Iraq War 1980-1988, Osprey Publishing, 2010 (p. 23-p.29)
7
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Morvarid
8
Rob Johnson – The Iran-Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 (p. 56)
UAE, South Africa, West Germany and France.With this help Iraq managed to strengthen its aerial
arsenal, restore its navy, increase its defenses and improve its offensive weapons arsenal. Some of
the newly acquired weapons included: T-55 and T-62 tanks, BM-21 truck mounted rocket launchers
and Mi-24 helicopter gunships. All these weapons began to overtake, or at least match the quality
and size of their Iranian counterparts. Furthermore during the middle of the war, Iraq managed to
double the size of its army totaling 560000 soldiers9
. These increases in firepower and manpower,
backed up by deep and long defense lines, including trenches, minefields, marshlands, rivers,
concrete block fields, highland gun positions and so on, all contributed to the stalemate that was
more or less the situation during the period 1982-1987. The stalemate was also a product of the
change in Iraqi tactics; they started a war of attrition, which included the ‘war of the cities’ and the
‘tanker war’. While Iraq took a more defensive stance, Iran continued with its extensive offensives.
Iran managed to plan and execute around 60 more offensives after 1982, most of them either not
contributing at all towards Iranian advance, or just slightly breaking the Iraqi defense lines. The
change of velocity of the advancement of the Iranian army was due to the influence of the superior
foreign aid that Iraq had, which increased its technological superiority. The Iranian low-tech
strategies, which included human waves of poorly trained (but highly motivated) soldiersto take the
initial hits of the offensives,could not continue to cope with the Iraqi increase in performance. As the
war continued, Iran was becoming more desperate for heavy weapons such as aircraft and tanks,
since it was suffering from international sanctions and embargoes. However,Iran was not falling
behind on weapons so rapidly, as it was self-sufficient in the production of some smaller weapons
such as anti-tank TOW missiles, Scud Ballistic missiles (Shahab-1), Silkworm anti-ship missiles, Oghab
tactical rockets and producing spare parts and ammunition for their weaponry10
.
Other factors that influenced the course of the war in the mid-war period were the so-called tanker
war and the war of the cities. These parts of the war qualified as attritions and may have had the
greatest economic toll on the countries caused by the war. The start of the war of the cities was
officially noted in February 1984 when Iraq attacked 11 Iranian cities. This started a chain of
retaliations by both sides which targeted enemy border cities, oil installations and other economic
and strategic targets. Iraq used Tu-22s, Tu-16s, MiG25s, and Su-22 bombers for raids over Iranian
cities. Some Iraqi air raids used chemical weapons. The Iranians used F-4 and F-14 fighters to
intercept Iraqi bombers and retaliate on Iraqi cities. Iran also used Scud-B surface to surface missiles
to bomb Iraqi cities, including Bagdad11
. The tanker was a series of attacks on enemy and third party
oil tankers and oil terminals carried by the Iran and Iraq. Iraq used air power, MiG-23 fighters, but
mostly helicopters F-1 Mirages most equipped with exocet anti-ship missiles. Iran used its new
Revolutionary Guard’s navy with Boghammar speedboats fitted with rocket launchers, RPGs and
heavy machine guns; also warships with ship-to-ship missiles and land-based anti-ship missiles, and
further more helicopter and F-4s with Maverick missiles and unguided rockets; all in the series of
attacks on oil tankers and oil platforms12
. These wars of attrition caused a decrease in morale in the
army and public opinion about the war in both countries.
9
Rob Johnson – The Iran-Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 (p. 109)
10
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_War
11
Rob Johnson – The Iran-Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 (p. 124-127)
12
Rob Johnson – The Iran-Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 (p. 139-150)
To compensate for their shortage of heavy weapons, the Iranian leadership managed to recruit
650000 more volunteers in 1986. With these new soldiers, the Iranian army was able to have strong
new advancements, one in the battle of al-Faw and the other in the battle of Mehran. After this the
Iraqis together with the western powers became even more determined not to allow Iran to win the
war. This meant that Iraq installed helicopter behind every defense line equipped with chemical
weapons in the case of Iranian advancement; it recruited even more soldiers, totaling 1.5 million and
possessed 5550 tanks and 900 aircraft by the end of 1987. Iraq even further recruited foreign
military personnel where it found missing competent soldiers, such as pilots. The Iranian armament
when compared to the Iraqi strength was dwarfed. This gave Iraq the confidence to start the final
offensives of the war. These offensives were begun with the final ‘war of the cities’ in which Iraq
fired more than 200 missiles at 37 Iranian cities over 2 months; also threatening to use chemical
weapons in them. Iran was unable to effectively retaliate due to the deteriorated number of
functioning aircraft. After couple of decisive victories of the Iraqi army, Iran accepted the cease-fire.
Looking in retrospect, despite being the aggressor, Iraq was mostly on the defensive side of the war
until extensive foreign involvement came to save it from Iranian victory. If the war was stopped at
any moment before 1987 it could be expected that Iran would win the war since it had the military
personnel, equipment and tactics to do so; this was seen from the fast advancement of Iranian
troops during the first 2 years, and the slow but gradual advanced in the next 5 years of the war. In
that scenario, the difference in technology would have made a significant difference, since Iran was
using helicopters to transport troops to the front lines, small effective anti-tank weapons to counter
the Iraqi armor (which was greater in number than the Iranian armor) and the areal superiority
granted by the faster and longer ranged F-4s and F-5s compared to the Iraqis shorter ranged and
slower MiG-21s and MiGs-23. However, at the end of the war, the numbers of Iraqi armor, infantry
and aircraft became so significantly greater than the Iranian due to foreign aid that it did not
significantly matter what kind of technology the Iraqi had as long as it was comparable to
contemporary weaponry. As a conclusion, in the Iran-Iraq war, the difference in technology was not
a significant determining factor in its outcome of the war, since foreign involvement and the sheer
size of the Iraqi army was enough to determine the outcome of the war.
Word count: 2285
Bibliography
Rob Johnson – The Iran-Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011
http://en.wikipedia.org/
Efraim Karsh, “The Iran – Iraq War 1980-1988”, Osprey Publishing, 2010

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Technology used in the Iran-Iraq war

  • 1. How far did technology influence the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war? War and technology have always been linked together. More precisely, without technology a war cannot be fought. Since the earliest of civilizations, man has always been looking how to improve the effectiveness when killing his own kind. With research and investment in war technology he has never stopped improving that effectiveness.Military technology, which is a collection of equipment, vehicles, structures and communication systems that are designed for the use in warfare1 , is indisputably important in determining the outcome of war. However, the importance of other factors such as manpower, quantity of weapons, strategic intelligence, terrain, third party influence among other things can’t be underestimated in analyzing an outcome of war. In other words, sole technological superiority is not likely to fully determine the outcome of a war; however, it is definitely one of the main factors when tackling the equation of war. Nothing is different in the Iran- Iraq war, the difference in technological readiness is important throughout the whole war, but it is not the driving factor of its outcome. This essay will take a closer look at the extent to which the difference in military technology possessed by both countriesinfluenced the outcome of the Iran- Iraq war. In order to understand the outcome of the war and how it came to it, the preceding events have to be examined first. The war started on the 22nd of September 1980 with full Iraqi invasion of Iran. The invasion started with the Iraqi air force attacking Iranian air fields. Iraq used few Soviet MiG-23BN jet fighters, Tu-20 bombers and Su-17 attack aircraft. However,the attack was not considered successful since most of the Iranian planes were safely shielded in protective aircraft hangers and some of the Iraqi bombs either completely missed their targets or malfunctioned. Reasons for the failure include inexperience of the Iraqi pilots and technical problems in the Soviet equipment2 . Despite the failure, the Iraqi ground forces moved rapidly into Iranian territory, focusing on an area located in province of Khuzestan bounded by the cities of Khorramshahr, Ahvaz, Susangrd and Musian3 . The Iraqi aerial attack was retaliated the very next day (23rd of September 1980) by Iran which launched Operation Kaman 99. In the operation Iran launched the full strength of its aerial arsenal which included 58 F-4 Phantom IIs, 88 F-5 Tigers IIs and 60 F-14 Tomcats. These airplanes were supplied by the USA before the Iranian revolution. The F-4s and F-5s were directed towards Iraqi air to damage or destroy several locations of strategic importance, such as Iraqi areal bases, oil refineries, and several cities; while the tomcats were scattered across Iranian airspace in case of possible Iraqi retaliation. Despite both sides suffering roughly the same amount of losses in planes, Iran managed to do more damage to the Iraqi areal bases. According to Iran, Iraq’s aerial efficacy was reduced by 55% declaring the operation a successful one4 .This, in term allowed Iran to have further air raid on key cities, economic and strategic locations. An example of this, were the 8 air raids carried over Bagdad on October 1st . Adding to its air superiority, Iran also had some successes on ground and at sea in terms of pushing Iraq back within its border. The ground troops in the time frame between mid-November 1981 and 1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_technology 2 Rob Johnson – The Iran-Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 (p. 49) 3 Efraim Karsh, The Iran – Iraq War 1980-1988, Osprey Publishing, 2010 (p. 23) 4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Kaman_99
  • 2. May1982 launched 3 phases of counter offensives that eventually drove the war front back to the border. Important aspect from a technological point of view in these offensives wasthe use of helicopters (most notable was the use of around 120 USA purchased Boeing Ch-47 Chinooks and Ah- 1 Cobra Helicopter gunships) to cut through Iraqi defense lines. Also, a significant impact had the extensive use of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG-7s)in which Iran became self-sufficient of during the war. The RPGs made Iraqi armored advancement costly and by the end of the May 1982 Iraq had lost more than half of its armored vehicles and tanks. However, Iran was inferior in terms of numbers when it came to armored vehicles and tanks and suffered even greater losses than Iraq56 . At sea Iran also became dominant with Operation Morvarid in which Iran managed to destroy 80% of Iraqi navy and all of Iraqi radar sites. In the operation, Iran utilized its navy (using 6 amphibious vessels and 2 missile boats) and air force (using F-4s, F-5s and F-14 aircraft, with Ah-1J Sea Cobras, Bell 214s and Ch-47C Chinooks helicopters) which proved superior, despite losing 1 missile boat and 1 F-4 plane7 . Although, the importance of the Iranian technological and weapon superiority cannot be underestimated, several other factors also contributed towards the Iranians pushing the Iraqi forces out of Iran. One can argue that the main factor of this was from a strategic point of view, not so much weakness in the Iraqi forces, but rather errors in the campaign plan itself that contributed towards Iran outplaying Iraq in battles. Another reason may be the misjudgment of the Iraqi leadership, namely Saddam Hussein, who expected the Iranians to negotiate as soon as Iraq made limited incursion into Iran. His expectation was unrealistic, since Iraq did not mark a decisive victory, nor reach any of its objectives8 . Moreover, the Iraqis failed because Iran’s ground forces and resistance was more motivated and better trained, later accompanied by a mass of less trained but highly motivated ‘volunteers’ that wanted to help defend their country. At the point when Iran crossed into Iraq, Iran’s soldiers counted 350000 in contrast to Iraq’s 175000. While at the onset of the war the numbers were 150000 active personnel for Iran and 350000 soldiers for Iraq. Theseeventsdid not have a direct impact on the outcome of the war, but rather serve as a comparison basis for the war situation over the next 6 years. With the analysis so far, it can be established that Iran should have won the war under the status quo when Iran managed to cross over to Iraq, because of the same reasons that allowed Iran to fight back after the Iraqi invasion. However, this was not the case.The decisive battles and events of the war happened during the last 2 years (1987-1988). A series of Iranian failed offensives and Iraqi won counter-offensive strategies drove Iran and Iraq on the negotiating table at the United Nations Security Consul. They signed Resolution 598 leading to the 20th August 1988 cease-fire. According to some interpretations, the war was won by Iraq, while according to other interpretations, it ended in a draw. This means that some other factors must have changed or influenced the course of the war during the mid-war period (1982-1987). These factors include foreign investment, change of tactics and recruitment of new soldiers. As soon as Iran crossed into Iraqi territory in 1982, military and financial aid dramatically increased for Iraq. This aid was mainly coming from the USA, USSR, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, UK, 5 Rob Johnson – The Iran-Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 (p. 49 – p.66) 6 Efraim Karsh, The Iran – Iraq War 1980-1988, Osprey Publishing, 2010 (p. 23-p.29) 7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Morvarid 8 Rob Johnson – The Iran-Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 (p. 56)
  • 3. UAE, South Africa, West Germany and France.With this help Iraq managed to strengthen its aerial arsenal, restore its navy, increase its defenses and improve its offensive weapons arsenal. Some of the newly acquired weapons included: T-55 and T-62 tanks, BM-21 truck mounted rocket launchers and Mi-24 helicopter gunships. All these weapons began to overtake, or at least match the quality and size of their Iranian counterparts. Furthermore during the middle of the war, Iraq managed to double the size of its army totaling 560000 soldiers9 . These increases in firepower and manpower, backed up by deep and long defense lines, including trenches, minefields, marshlands, rivers, concrete block fields, highland gun positions and so on, all contributed to the stalemate that was more or less the situation during the period 1982-1987. The stalemate was also a product of the change in Iraqi tactics; they started a war of attrition, which included the ‘war of the cities’ and the ‘tanker war’. While Iraq took a more defensive stance, Iran continued with its extensive offensives. Iran managed to plan and execute around 60 more offensives after 1982, most of them either not contributing at all towards Iranian advance, or just slightly breaking the Iraqi defense lines. The change of velocity of the advancement of the Iranian army was due to the influence of the superior foreign aid that Iraq had, which increased its technological superiority. The Iranian low-tech strategies, which included human waves of poorly trained (but highly motivated) soldiersto take the initial hits of the offensives,could not continue to cope with the Iraqi increase in performance. As the war continued, Iran was becoming more desperate for heavy weapons such as aircraft and tanks, since it was suffering from international sanctions and embargoes. However,Iran was not falling behind on weapons so rapidly, as it was self-sufficient in the production of some smaller weapons such as anti-tank TOW missiles, Scud Ballistic missiles (Shahab-1), Silkworm anti-ship missiles, Oghab tactical rockets and producing spare parts and ammunition for their weaponry10 . Other factors that influenced the course of the war in the mid-war period were the so-called tanker war and the war of the cities. These parts of the war qualified as attritions and may have had the greatest economic toll on the countries caused by the war. The start of the war of the cities was officially noted in February 1984 when Iraq attacked 11 Iranian cities. This started a chain of retaliations by both sides which targeted enemy border cities, oil installations and other economic and strategic targets. Iraq used Tu-22s, Tu-16s, MiG25s, and Su-22 bombers for raids over Iranian cities. Some Iraqi air raids used chemical weapons. The Iranians used F-4 and F-14 fighters to intercept Iraqi bombers and retaliate on Iraqi cities. Iran also used Scud-B surface to surface missiles to bomb Iraqi cities, including Bagdad11 . The tanker was a series of attacks on enemy and third party oil tankers and oil terminals carried by the Iran and Iraq. Iraq used air power, MiG-23 fighters, but mostly helicopters F-1 Mirages most equipped with exocet anti-ship missiles. Iran used its new Revolutionary Guard’s navy with Boghammar speedboats fitted with rocket launchers, RPGs and heavy machine guns; also warships with ship-to-ship missiles and land-based anti-ship missiles, and further more helicopter and F-4s with Maverick missiles and unguided rockets; all in the series of attacks on oil tankers and oil platforms12 . These wars of attrition caused a decrease in morale in the army and public opinion about the war in both countries. 9 Rob Johnson – The Iran-Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 (p. 109) 10 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_War 11 Rob Johnson – The Iran-Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 (p. 124-127) 12 Rob Johnson – The Iran-Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 (p. 139-150)
  • 4. To compensate for their shortage of heavy weapons, the Iranian leadership managed to recruit 650000 more volunteers in 1986. With these new soldiers, the Iranian army was able to have strong new advancements, one in the battle of al-Faw and the other in the battle of Mehran. After this the Iraqis together with the western powers became even more determined not to allow Iran to win the war. This meant that Iraq installed helicopter behind every defense line equipped with chemical weapons in the case of Iranian advancement; it recruited even more soldiers, totaling 1.5 million and possessed 5550 tanks and 900 aircraft by the end of 1987. Iraq even further recruited foreign military personnel where it found missing competent soldiers, such as pilots. The Iranian armament when compared to the Iraqi strength was dwarfed. This gave Iraq the confidence to start the final offensives of the war. These offensives were begun with the final ‘war of the cities’ in which Iraq fired more than 200 missiles at 37 Iranian cities over 2 months; also threatening to use chemical weapons in them. Iran was unable to effectively retaliate due to the deteriorated number of functioning aircraft. After couple of decisive victories of the Iraqi army, Iran accepted the cease-fire. Looking in retrospect, despite being the aggressor, Iraq was mostly on the defensive side of the war until extensive foreign involvement came to save it from Iranian victory. If the war was stopped at any moment before 1987 it could be expected that Iran would win the war since it had the military personnel, equipment and tactics to do so; this was seen from the fast advancement of Iranian troops during the first 2 years, and the slow but gradual advanced in the next 5 years of the war. In that scenario, the difference in technology would have made a significant difference, since Iran was using helicopters to transport troops to the front lines, small effective anti-tank weapons to counter the Iraqi armor (which was greater in number than the Iranian armor) and the areal superiority granted by the faster and longer ranged F-4s and F-5s compared to the Iraqis shorter ranged and slower MiG-21s and MiGs-23. However, at the end of the war, the numbers of Iraqi armor, infantry and aircraft became so significantly greater than the Iranian due to foreign aid that it did not significantly matter what kind of technology the Iraqi had as long as it was comparable to contemporary weaponry. As a conclusion, in the Iran-Iraq war, the difference in technology was not a significant determining factor in its outcome of the war, since foreign involvement and the sheer size of the Iraqi army was enough to determine the outcome of the war. Word count: 2285 Bibliography Rob Johnson – The Iran-Iraq War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011
  • 5. http://en.wikipedia.org/ Efraim Karsh, “The Iran – Iraq War 1980-1988”, Osprey Publishing, 2010