2. At the end of this lesson, the student should be able to:
Define COUNTERINTELLIGENCE;
Identify the three types of counterintelligence;
Describe how intelligence is safeguarded internally against
counterintelligence;
Understand various issues related to the classification of information;
Define DECEPTION; and
Assess the motivations and damage done by various spies in U.S.
history.
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3. Efforts taken
to protect one’s own intelligence operations
from penetration and disruption
by hostile nations or their intelligence services.
It is both analytical and operational.
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4. Collection: Gaining information about an opponent’s
intelligence collection capabilities that may be aimed
at you
Defensive: Thwarting efforts by hostile intelligence
services to penetrate your service
Offensive: Having identified an opponent’s efforts
against your system, trying to manipulate these
attacks either by “turning” the opponent’s agents into
double agents or by feeding them false information
that they will report home
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6. Try to determine where the
officers go and with whom they
communicate or are in contact
TRADECRAFT is devoted primarily
to frustrating this sort of activity
Because this sort of surveillance is
cumbersome and expensive, it is
important to target it against
actual intelligence officers
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7. Defector: A person who gives up allegiance
to one country in exchange for allegiance to
another. This act is usually in a manner which
violates the laws of the nation from which the
person is seeking to depart (as opposed to
changing citizenship).
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8. Double Agent: A person who spies on a country
while pretending to spy for it. A spy in the service
of two rival countries or companies.
Mole: A spy who becomes part of and works
from within the ranks of an enemy
governmental staff or intelligence agency.
Dangle: An agent who pretends to volunteer to
spy for the hostile intelligence service but in fact
remains loyal to his/her country.
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9. Identify officers of the hostile intelligence service engaged in
running agents
Learn their adversaries’ operational methods
Learn about their adversaries’ tradecraft and thus become better
able counter it
Examine specialized equipment provided to double agent by
adversary
Learn about the hostile service’s priorities
May allow counterintelligence to dangle successfully another
double agent
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10. Sudden loss of a spy network
Change in military patterns that corresponds to satellite
tracks
Penetration of the other service’s apparatus that reveals
the possibility of having been penetrated as well
Odd botched operation
Failed espionage meeting or a negotiation in which the
other side seems to be anticipating your bottom line
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12. Classification of Information INFOSEC
Personnel Security
OPSEC
Physical Security
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13. Harry Truman established the
first government-wide system of
classification in 1951
Current system is governed by an
executive order promulgated by
President Clinton in 1995
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14. Current classification in degrees of damage
to national security
Top secret: exceptionally grave damage
Secret: serious damage
Confidential: damage
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15. Background investigation
Polygraph
Determines if an individual can be granted a
security clearance
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16. Seeks to safeguard not
only the material object
such as the documents
that contain information,
but also the information
itself
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18. “the attempt to mislead
an adversary’s intelligence analysis
concerning the political, military, or economic
situation he faces,
with the result that,
having formed a false picture of the situation,
he is led to act in a way that advances one’s
interests rather than his own.”
Source: Shulsky, 117.
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19. Considered a form of counterintelligence
because it attempts to thwart the fundamental
purpose of the adversary’s intelligence
operations
Deception and intelligence failure are related
things; one side’s successful deception implies
the other side’s intelligence failure
Deception can be attempted in wartime or
peacetime, but it is much more prevalent during
wartime
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20. Block: If too many true signals get through, the
adversary is unlikely to be deceived
Manufacture: Planned with adversary’s human
and technical capabilities in mind
Feedback:
Were all the real signals blocked?
Did manufactured signals reach the adversary?
Were desired conclusions drawn?
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22. Covert
Tendency to trust your own people who have
been cleared and vetted
Unwarranted suspicion can be just as
debilitating as having a spy in the midst of an
organization
Source of friction between the CIA and FBI
FBI has primary CI responsibility in the U.S.
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23. Identification of threats
Monitoring of
suspicious activity
within local
communities
Community liaison
CI component of law
enforcement operations
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24. More about Denial
and Deception than
Offensive
Counterintelligence
How do companies
accomplish CI?
Is CI in business legal?
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25. Prevent or neutralize the foreign acquisition of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) technology or equipment
Prevent the penetration of the U.S. Intelligence
Community
Prevent the penetration of U.S. Government agencies or
contractors
Prevent the compromise of U.S. Critical National Assets
Conduct aggressive CI operations focusing on those
countries that constitute the most significant threat to
U.S. Strategic interest
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26. US is becoming more aggressive in CI
2005 CI strategy called for pre-emptive action against
foreign intelligence services viewed as threats to
national security
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
(NCIX) created 2005
2009 National Intelligence Strategy made
counterintelligence a primary mission objective for
the first time
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27. 2009 National Counterintelligence Strategy
(approved in 2010) has 4 main goals:
1. Detect insider threats
2. Penetrate foreign services
3. Integrate CI with cyber
4. Assure the supply chain of the national
security community “from foreign
exploitation”
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29. John Walker, US Navy Jonathan Pollard, US Navy Ana Montes, DIA
Source: http://www.spymuseum.com/ Source: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ Source: http:// www.fbi.gov/news/
pages/agent-walker-john.html investigate/counterintelligence/cases/cases-1 stories/2008/september/montes_091209
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30. Aldrich Ames, CIA Robert Hanssen, FBI
Source: http://www.gwu.edu~
nsarchiv/nsa/publications/ie/index.html Source:
http://www.spymuseum.com/pages/agent-
hanssen-robert.html
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31. Spy Museum Interviews: http://spymuseum.org/from-
spy/spycast
June 4, 2010 features Martha Peterson, the first female CIA case
officer in Moscow and discusses her capture by the KGB
April 1, 2008 is about Col. Sergei Tretyakov, one of the most
senior Russian defectors ever
Oct. 1, 2007 features John Sullivan, the CIA’s longest-serving
polygrapher
Aug. 1, 2007 focuses on the Ana Montes case
Teague, Matthew. 2006. “Double Blind: The Untold Story
of how British Intelligence Infiltrated and Undermined the
IRA” The Atlantic Monthly 297:53-62.
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