bond market

Primary dealer in the bond market
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A bond is a financial security that promises to pay a fixed (known) income stream in the future Issued by governments, state agencies (municipal bonds), and corporations
Bonds are characterized by Maturity date Face, par or principal value (i.e., the notional amount typically 1000) Coupon rate number of coupon payments/ year (typically 2) Bjorn Eraker Introduction to Bond Markets Repayment types Pure discount or zero coupon bonds: Bonds that pay no interest (coupon). They sell at a discount (price below par) to provide investor with positive return.
Coupon bonds pays fixed coupon at known times. For example, A November 2021 maturity, 8% government bond will pay its owner 40 = 8% 1000=2 every April 15th and November 15th in addition to 1000 at expiration on November 15th, 2021.
Floating rate pays variable rate coupons linked to some benchmark rate. Example: Inflation indexed bonds’ (I-bonds) coupon rate is determined by the level of inflation (as measured by the relative change in the CPI)

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Introduction to Bond Markets Government Bonds
 US government bonds are interesting because
 The default risk is thought of as zero (although it may not be)
 They are highly liquid
 They provide a basic benchmark for other fixed income securities including other sovereign bonds, corporate, munis, etc.
Despite the complexity associated with the bond market, a bond is simple and it might be consider a bit boring when compared with a stock. After all, a stock represents a piece of a company's wealth. An evaluation of a stock requires an evaluation of the entire company's worth. An ordinary bond is an agreement that merely entitles one party to make and another to receive a series of cash flows. While differences among forms of equity are small, there is a wide range of bonds; innovative financial engineers are creating new fixed-income securities almost continuously.

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CHAPTER:-2
FEATURES OF BONDS
The most important features of a bond are:
 Nominal, Principal or Face Amount — the amount on which the issuer pays interest, and which, most commonly, has to be repaid at the end of the term. Some structured bonds can have a redemption amount which is different from the face amount and can be linked to performance of particular assets such as a stock or commodity index, foreign exchange rate or a fund. This can result in an investor receiving less or more than his original investment at maturity.
 Issue Price — the price at which investor’s buy the bonds when they are first issued, which will typically be approximately equal to the nominal amount. The net proceeds that the issuer receives are thus the issue price, less issuance fees.
 Maturity Date — the date on which the issuer has to repay the nominal amount. As long as all payments have been made, the issuer has no more obligations to the bond holders after the maturity date. The length of time until the maturity date is often referred to as the term or tenor or maturity of a bond. The maturity can be any length of time, although debt securities with a term of less than one year are generally designated money market instruments rather than bonds. Most bonds have a term of up to thirty years. Some bonds have been issued with maturities of up to one hundred years, and some do not mature at all. In the market for U.S. Treasury securities, there are three groups of bond maturities:

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 Short term (bills): maturities between one to five year; (instruments with maturities less than one year are called Money Market Instruments)
 Medium term (notes): maturities between six to twelve years;
 Long term (bonds): maturities greater than twelve years.
 Coupon — the interest rate that the issuer pays to the bond holders. Usually this rate is fixed throughout the life of the bond. It can also vary with a money market index, such asLIBOR, or it can be even more exotic. The name coupon originates from the fact that in the past, physical bonds were issued which coupons had attached to them. On coupon dates the bond holder would give the coupon to a bank in exchange for the interest payment.

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CHAPTER:-3
TYPES OF BOND
 Fixed rate bonds have a coupon that remains constant throughout the life of the bond.
 Floating rate notes (FRNs) have a variable coupon that is linked to a reference rate of interest, such as LIBOR or Euribor. For example the coupon may be defined as three month USD LIBOR + 0.20%. The coupon rate is recalculated periodically, typically every one or three months.
 Zero-coupon bonds pay no regular interest. They are issued at a substantial discount to par value, so that the interest is effectively rolled up to maturity (and usually taxed as such). The bondholder receives the full principal amount on the redemption date. An example of zero coupon bonds is Series E savings bonds issued by the U.S. government. Zero-coupon bonds may be created from fixed rate bonds by a financial institution separating ("stripping off") the coupons from the principal. In other words, the separated coupons and the final principal payment of the bond may be traded separately. See IO (Interest Only) and PO (Principal Only).
 Inflation linked bonds, in which the principal amount and the interest payments are indexed to inflation. The interest rate is normally lower than for fixed rate bonds with a comparable maturity (this position briefly reversed itself for short-term UK bonds in December 2008). However, as the principal amount grows, the payments increase with inflation. The United Kingdom was the first sovereign issuer to issue inflation linked Gilts in the 1980s. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) and I-bonds are examples of inflation linked bonds issued by the U.S. government.

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 Other indexed bonds, for example equity-linked notes and bonds indexed on a business indicator (income, added value) or on a country's GDP.
 Asset-backed securities are bonds whose interest and principal payments are backed by underlying cash flows from other assets. Examples of asset- backed securities are mortgage-backed securities (MBS's), collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) and collateralized (CDOs).
 Subordinated bonds are those that have a lower priority than other bonds of the issuer in case of liquidation. In case of bankruptcy, there is a hierarchy of creditors. First the liquidator is paid, then government taxes, etc. The first bond holders in line to be paid are those holding what is called senior bonds. After they have been paid, the subordinated bond holders are paid. As a result, the risk is higher. Therefore, subordinated bonds usually have a lower credit rating than senior bonds. The main examples of subordinated bonds can be found in bonds issued by banks, and asset-backed securities. The latter are often issued in tranches. The senior tranches get paid back first, the subordinated tranches later.
 Perpetual bonds are also often called perpetuities or 'Perps'. They have no maturity date. The most famous of these are the UK Consoles, which are also known as Treasury Annuities or Undated Treasuries. Some of these were issued back in 1888 and still trade today, although the amounts are now insignificant. Some ultra-long-term bonds (sometimes a bond can last centuries: West Shore Railroad issued a bond which matures in 2361 (i.e. 24th century) are virtually perpetuities from a financial point of view, with the current value of principal near zero.
 Bearer bond is an official certificate issued without a named holder. In other words, the person who has the paper certificate can claim the value of

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the bond. Often they are registered by a number to prevent counterfeiting, but may be traded like cash. Bearer bonds are very risky because they can be lost or stolen. Especially after federal income tax began in the United States, bearer bonds were seen as an opportunity to conceal income or assets. U.S. corporations stopped issuing bearer bonds in the 1960s, the U.S. Treasury stopped in 1982, and state and local tax-exempt bearer bonds were prohibited in 1983.
 Registered bond is a bond whose ownership (and any subsequent purchaser) is recorded by the issuer, or by a transfer agent. It is the alternative to a Bearer bond. Interest payments, and the principal upon maturity, are sent to the registered owner.
 Treasury bond, also called government bond, is issued by the Federal government and is not exposed to default risk. It is characterized as the safest bond, with the lowest interest rate. A treasury bond is backed by the “full faith and credit” of the federal government. For that reason, this type of bond is often referred to as risk-free.
 Municipal bond is a bond issued by a state, U.S. Territory, city, local government, or their agencies. Interest income received by holders of municipal bonds is often exempt from the federal income tax and from the income tax of the state in which they are issued, although municipal bonds issued for certain purposes may not be tax exempt.
 Build America Bonds (BABs) is a new form of municipal bond authorized by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Unlike traditional municipal bonds, which are usually tax exempt, interest received on BABs is

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subject to federal taxation. However, as with municipal bonds, the bond is tax-exempt within the state it is issued. Generally, BABs offer significantly higher yields (over 7 percent) than standard municipal bonds.[6]
 Book-entry bond is a bond that does not have a paper certificate. As physically processing paper bonds and interest coupons became more expensive, issuers (and banks that used to collect coupon interest for depositors) have tried to discourage their use. Some book-entry bond issues do not offer the option of a paper certificate, even to investors who prefer them.[7]
 Lottery bond is a bond issued by a state, usually a European state. Interest is paid like a traditional fixed rate bond, but the issuer will redeem randomly selected individual bonds within the issue according to a schedule. Some of these redemptions will be for a higher value than the face value of the bond.
 Serial bond is a bond that matures in installments over a period of time. In effect, a $100,000, 5-year serial bond would mature in a $20,000 annuity over a 5-year interval.
 Revenue bond is a special type of municipal bond distinguished by its guarantee of repayment solely from revenues generated by a specified revenue-generating entity associated with the purpose of the bonds. Revenue bonds are typically "non-recourse," meaning that in the event of default, the bond holder has no recourse to other governmental assets or revenues.
 Climate bond is a bond issued by a government or corporate entity in order to raise finance for climate change mitigation or adaptation related projects or programs.

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CHAPTER 4
INTERNATIONAL BOND
An international bond is a type of long-term debt security that is generally issued to an investor in a country by a non-domestic entity. An international bond essentially works like a loan, with the investor being the lender and the issuing entity being the borrower. International bonds can provide bondholders with the ability to earn fixed interest payments for a set period of time. Most international bonds have a face value, interest rate, and maturity date. Entities that issue these types of bonds often do so in order to help finance property and equipment purchases or to help fund current operations.
In general, the process of purchasing an international bond works like a regular bond purchase. Typically, an investor purchases the international bond from an issuing company, bank, or government for a set face value. The investor then earns interest payments at periodic intervals until the bond reaches its maturity date. Once the bond matures, the initial principal is paid back to the investor in full.
The international bond market includes global bonds, foreign bonds, Eurobonds, and Brady bonds. Global bonds are offered in several countries simultaneously and can be issued in the same currency as the country of issuance. Global bonds are typically issued by international companies that possess high credit ratings. Foreign bonds are issued by foreign entities and are denominated in the currency of the domestic market. Examples of foreign bonds include Samurai bonds in Japan, Yankee bonds in the United States, and Bulldog bonds in the United Kingdom.
A Eurobond is a type of international bond that is issued using currency that differs from the domestic market country’s currency. Eurobonds are named

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according to the currency in which they are denominated in. For example, a Euro yen bond is denominated in Japanese yen.
Brady bonds are designed to help emerging market countries manage their international debt. Brady bonds are issued by an emerging market country and denominated in U.S. dollars. Brady bonds are generally backed by U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bonds.
International bond funds can provide investors with a way to diversify their investment portfolios. An international bond fund is a type of fund that invests a percentage of its assets, often 40% or greater, in international bonds. These funds generally hold investment-grade bonds from countries that are politically stable and considered developed countries. Investors that choose to place their money in an international fund can realize income from the bond interest as well as from currency fluctuations.

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Introduction to International Bond Markets
Debt certificates have been traded internationally for several centuries. Kings and emperors borrowed heavily to finance their wars. In the 14th century, for example, Edward I financed his wars through bond issues launched in Italy by the then big banking families. Centuries later, the great coalition against Louis
XIV led by William of Orange was financed by a group of Dutch families operating from The Hague.
Later, the Rothschild’s became famous for supporting the British war effort against Napoleon I through their European family network.
Although debt financing has always been international in nature, there is still no unified international bond market. The international bond market is divided into three bond market groups:
I. Domestic bonds. They are issued locally by a domestic borrower and are usually denominated in the local currency.
II. Foreign bonds. They are issued on a local market by a foreign borrower and are usually denominated in the local currency. Foreign bond issues and trading are under the supervision of local market authorities.
III. Eurobonds. They are underwritten by a multinational syndicate of banks and placed mainly in countries other than the one in whose currency the bond is denominated. These bonds are not traded on a specific national bond market.
(A) Domestic bonds.
Amoco Canada issues a bond in Canada for placement in the Canadian domestic market, i.e., with investors resident in Canada. The issue is underwritten by a syndicate of Canadian securities houses. The issue is denominated in the currency of the intended investors, i.e., CAD.

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(B) Foreign bonds.XII.2
Amoco Canada, a foreign corporation, issues bonds in the U.S. for placement in the U.S. market alone. The issue is underwritten by a syndicate of U.S. securities houses. The issue is denominated in the currency of the intended investors, i.e., USD.

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CHAPTER 5
PRIMARY DEALER
Primary dealer is a dealer in government debt with whom the Central Bank transacts business. A primary dealer is a bank or securities broker-dealer that may trade directly with the Central Bank. Such firms are required to make bids or offers when the Central Bank conducts open market operations, provide information to the Central Bank’s open market trading desk and to participate actively in government’s securities transactions. Primary dealer is a formal designation of a firm as a market maker of government securities. Primary Dealers can also be referred to as Merchant Bankers to Government of India as only they are allowed to underwrite
Primary issues of government securities other than RBI who have since shed this role. Primary dealer systems are present in many countries including Canada, France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, United States and India. The system of Primary Dealers (PDs) in the Indian Government Securities Market was introduced by Reserve Bank of India in 1995 to put in place an improved, efficient secondary market trading system. This was to encourage holding of Government Securities on large scale and make the market more vibrant and liquid. In 2006-07, RBI gave Banks the option to undertake Primary Dealership business departmentally. The primary dealers have been playing a very significant role in strengthening the market infrastructure of Government Securities and helping the RBI in its monetary policy decisions. Primary dealer is a firm that buys government securities directly from a government, with the intention of reselling them to others, thus acting as a market maker of government securities. The government may regulate the behavior and numbers of its primary dealers and impose conditions of entry.

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Some governments sell their securities only to primary dealers; some sell them to others as well. Governments that use primary dealers include Belgium, Canada, China, France, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Primary dealer system can make substantial contributions to the development of the market when its establishment is appropriate for prevailing market conditions. While by no means a precondition for a well functioning government securities market, primary dealers know the market best and are the counterpart of the investors who are the debt management office’s ultimate target. The purpose of this background note is to provide some guidance on how to design a primary dealer system so as to best meet the development needs of the market as well as the legitimate expectations of the parties involved.
It is hard to over-estimate the importance of PDs’ contribution when the appointment of PDs is appropriate for the conditions of the market. PD systems are by no means a precondition for a well functioning government securities market. Generally, however, PDs know the market best. They are the counterpart of the investors who are the debt management office’s (DMO’s) ultimate target.
Yet, PD systems can be a recurrent source of frustrations and complaints. These affect both the DMO and the PDs themselves. The former say: “PDs are not committed”. The latter respond: “DMOs are too demanding”. As an illustration, some DMOs legitimately complain that their PDs cannot be depended upon to be consistent and/or fair bidders at auctions of government securities and/or that PDs do not live up to their commitment to enhance the liquidity of the secondary market by continuously quoting firm bid and offer prices. PDs respond that bidding at auctions and quoting firm prices on the secondary

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market are an expensive and risky business for which they are not adequately compensated. It can happen that both parties are making a legitimate point.
Some issues encountered by DMOs in the implementation of a PD system can be resolved by taking relatively straightforward steps. For example, in the aforementioned cases, PDs can be motivated to submit successful bids at auctions by offering them a more generous allocation of non- competitive subscriptions (NCS) after the auction. This can technically be done in a manner that is costless to the DMO. Likewise, DMOs can support the market-making activity of their PDs by putting in place a securities lending facility that will help them cover the short positions they have incurred in the process. The extension of such a facility can actually be beneficial to both parties. A number of similar steps and/or provisions are mentioned in the Handbook.
Designing a well-performing PD system remains nonetheless a complex process. It raises a large number of issues of various kinds, firstly, are PDs necessary? By whom should they be appointed? What should their duties and privileges be? How should their performance be appraised? And so on. PD systems that are not efficiently designed are often a big opportunity loss.
The Handbook builds largely on the practical experience gained from the Gem loc Peer Group Dialogue Forum 3 in addressing the aforementioned challenges. The plan is to keep this Handbook updated as new designs evolve and additional experience is gathered. Some trends and new issues are already being perceived. Currently, this refers particularly to the shifting emphasis on some PDs’ incentives and obligations, and to the changing role of PDs on electronic trading platforms.
The country illustrations mentioned in the footnotes of the Handbook are examples only. They are by no means meant to be an exhaustive list. Markets also change fast. As a result, some footnotes may not be up to date any longer

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by the time this handbook is consulted. The development of government bond markets involves a broader set of policies than just establishing a PD system. Whilst a PD system is not a necessary precondition for creating a well- functioning government securities market, a PD system can be instrumental in supporting market development. The design of the mix of obligations and privileges is an integral part of the market development strategy.
There are some preconditions for a PD system to work. Once these prerequisites are met, however, PD systems can be organized, and PDs can support DMOs, in many different ways. There is no “one- size-fits-all” PD system. Without PDs being appointed. Second, it must be verified that the prerequisites for a well- functioning PD system are present in the local market.
The next step is to select and appoint the best qualified candidates. This requires determining the PDs’ selection criteria and the procedure for their appointment. A number of issues are raised in the process. Some are of a technical nature, such as certain eligibility conditions for the status of PD, the appropriate number of PDs, who should appoint PDs, and for what period. Other issues have a strategic dimension. This refers to issues such as deciding whether PDs should serve the needs only of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) or also the needs of the central bank (CB) and/or whether foreign institutions are eligible to be appointed as PDs and, if so, whether a local establishment will be required .
PDs systems can be organized in many different ways. The status of PD always carries both obligations and rights. In both cases, however, different options may apply.
PDs usually assume six different types of duties. Some duties are fairly straightforward, such as, undertaking to be the DMO’s advisor on debt strategy and market organization, to be the DMO’s counterpart for its debt management operations, and to report on their activity, both inter-dealer and with customers.

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By contrast, the commitment of PDs to bid at auctions and to enhance the liquidity of the secondary market can be expressed in very different ways. The phrasing that matches best with the stage of development of the market and with the capabilities of the PD applicant must thus be determined first.
Some strategic decisions will again need to be made in the process. This applies in particular to the homogeneity of the PDs’ status. Should all PDs have the same duties or should some market specialists be appointed?
PDs are also entitled to some rights and privileges. These are intended to provide PDs with the tools and/or the motivation to perform. This part of the PD system design process is probably the most complex to complete. There are a wide number of options. Some privileges can be granted by the MoF and some by the CB. Amongst the privileges that can be granted by the MoF, some are of a general nature whilst some are specifically linked to the primary market or to the secondary market. Some privileges have a cost for the DMO and others do not.
The PDs’ rights and privileges are a particularly strategic issue. They will in many cases have a direct impact, both on the choice by PDs of the market segment on which they will focus their effort and on the quality of their overall performance.
The optimal combination of duties and privileges is a country-specific issue. Yet, there are some general guidelines that are apt to enhance the efficiency of the market making function.
The DMO must manage its relationship with its PDs. This includes communication to PDs, the monitoring and appraisal of their activity, and the allocation of incentives to the best performers. This part of the PD system design process is also key to support the overall quality and motivation of the

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PDs. The supervision of PDs must pursue the objective of enhancing transparency in the market, protecting investors, and reducing systemic risk. Finally, the dynamic nature of the market merits a review of current and emerging trends in PDs’ obligations, rewards and means of interacting with the market through electronic trading platforms History The PD system was first implemented in the USA in 1960. With a few exceptions4, the PD system spread first to Europe from the mid eighties and thereafter to emerging markets (Ems) from the mid- nineties.
Many, but by no means all, industrial countries have a PD system. For example, Australia, Germany, New Zealand and Switzerland have no PDs.6 These markets do not see the need for PDs as they function well without them, including an active secondary market. A common feature of the government securities markets concerned is that foreign investors have a large market share.
Similarly, whilst a number of EMs and developing countries have adopted a PD system, many others have elected not to do so.7 Two often-mentioned reasons are that the market is not large enough to support a sufficient number of PDs to ensure competitive behavior and/or that the investor base is not diversified enough for financial intermediaries to be willing to commit to having a market- making activity.
2.3. Benefits Expected from a PD System
An analysis of the benefits expected from a PD system actually raises the issue of design of, and coordination in, the PD system. A PD system can be designed to meet the needs of only the MoF or of both the MoF and the CB. From a functional point of view, PDs for government securities should be distinguished from PDs for CB operations. Operationally, however, the same institutions can be awarded both roles, depending on the institutional arrangement. The authority responsible for appointing PDs has to be determined accordingly .

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DMOs expect a many different contributions from their PDs. DMOs depend on their PDs (i) to build a stable and dependable demand for government securities by submitting bids at the auctions and by broadening the DMO’s customer base, thereby decreasing market and refinancing risks; (ii) to lower the DMO’s cost of funding by enhancing price discovery, thereby contributing to the liquidity of the secondary market, and (iii) to help in establishing the debt management strategy and to facilitate the development of the market by providing advisory support to the DMO. In practice, PDs also improve the DMO’s knowledge of the market, strengthen product innovation, facilitate access to end investors and limit the number of counterparts that the DMO deals with.
It is hard to over-estimate the importance of the contribution that PDs can deliver when the appointment of PDs is appropriate for the conditions present in the market. PDs know the marketRisks Created by a PD System The principal risks are the limitations to competition and the corresponding potential incentive to collusive behavior. These risks can be addressed in two complementary ways. First, a group of PDs sufficiently large to ensure competition must be appointed. Second, an incentive system to reward good performance must be devised that makes it more profitable for PDs to compete than to collude.
Moral hazard is another risk. PDs have been selected and appointed by the government. Therefore, some market participants—PDs as well as investors— might believe that the government will not let a PD go under. As a result, some PDs might be inclined to take on more risks than they should. This is an issue to be addressed by the authorities in charge of the supervision of financial intermediaries.
2.5. Prerequisites for a PD System

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to Work The common feature of the prerequisites for a PD system to work is that it must be possible to foster a securities market. A PD is a dealer. Thus, it needs a market to function.
The corresponding requirements are numerous. A few of these requirements are: (i) stable macro- economic conditions, (ii) existence of legal and supervisory systems, (iii) adequate payment system, (iv) liberalized interest rates—the government must be committed to a market-based mechanism, (v) stable, predictable and transparent issuance policy—the government must be committed to transparent debt management practices, (vi) diversified investor base, (vii) large enough market to support a sufficient number of PDs to ensure competitive behavior, (viii) sufficiently large outstanding debt to create liquid issues, (ix) DMO’s commitment to developing the market, etc.
Yet another prerequisite is to make a primary dealership a commercially viable proposition for the financial intermediaries concerned.
Government authorities should carefully check whether their domestic market enables them to meet the aforementioned prerequisites prior to considering establishing a PD system.

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CHAPTER 6
APPOINTMENT OF PRIMARY DEALER
Appointing Authority PDs can be appointed by different authorities: the DMO or the MoF, the CB, or the MoF and the CB jointly. When PDs are appointed by the MoF and CB jointly, 8 the application must be approved by both institutions.In practice, the most frequently implemented procedure is to have PDs appointed by the DMO9 or by the MoF.10 In effect, this is essentially the same thing since the management of public debt is the political responsibility of the Minister of Finance in any case.
Appointment by the MoF is advantageous in that it creates opportunities for synergy with other branches of the government to motivate PDs to perform.
The appointment of PDs by the CB11 has the advantage of providing a link to open market operations. It may also facilitate the granting of some privileges to PDs.
It is possible for a PD system to be designed to meet the needs of both the MoF and the CB. Both authorities should then be involved in the appointment.
However, in many cases, the MoF seems best placed, both to appoint PDs and to manage the relationship. A DMO can best motivate PDs to perform. It is also best placed to support market-making activity by adapting its issuance policy to create liquid markets and by offering PDs a securities lending facility that they can use to cover their short positions12.
Selection Criteria Applying for the status of PD can be subject to a number of eligibility conditions. Some strategic issues are raised in the process.
Main Eligibility Conditions (i) Financial strength:

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Financial strength is evidenced by adequate capitalization. It generally translates into a minimum net worth requirement.13 Being a PD is a risky business. In the primary market, a PD may end up holding a large securities portfolio which is either too expensive or not saleable. Market conditions may have changed after the auction or the PD may have misjudged market pricing or investors’ demand. Similarly, in the secondary market, a PD may have bought securities at a high price or sold too cheap. As a result, losses may be suffered, with the corresponding need for a capital cushion to absorb them.
The financial strength requirement has some additional advantages. It restricts the function of PDs to the soundest institutions and limits the risk of future financial problems of PDs.
A minimum credit rating from reputed rating agencies is usually14 required only to allow a PD to be the DMO’s counterpart in transactions involving derivative products .(ii) Current active involvement in government securities market:
Current active participation in the market is the best evidence of a PD’s ability to fulfil the duties assigned to it. Some countries impose certain minimum market shares during a certain period.
(iii) Management capacity and suitable technological infrastructure:
The applicant must have the expertise to sustain an active and efficient market for government securities. This includes the technology needed to submit bids at primary auctions, to trade on the secondary market and to report on its activity.
(iv) Long-term commitment to market development:

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There is no point for either the DMO or the PD to initiate a short-term relationship. In particular, for the financial intermediary concerned, the PD status has a start-up cost that can only be amortized over a certain period.
(v) Submission of a business plan:
An increasing number of DMOs17 require PDs to submit a business plan outlining their strategy and goals with respect to the government securities market. This requirement is not restricted to applicant PDs. Sitting PDs are also required to update their business plan regularly, usually on an annual basis.
(vi) The applicant must be an organization of good reputation and standing. Issues for Resolution in Setting Eligibility Requirements
(i). Choice between banks only, and banks, brokers, and institutional investors
In emerging markets, brokers may have access to a specific customer base. In addition, the status of PD is sometimes used to entice institutional investors to participate in auctions. However, these are usually only temporary regimes. Their impact can be negative if they deter banks from applying for PD status.
In mature markets, PDs are almost always banks only. Banks are the only organizations that have both the capacity and the vocation to develop a customer base and to trade actively on the secondary market. Banks are also the only organizations for which the PD status can be used as a marketing tool to reinforce a customer relationship that is profitable in other fields. As a result, banks can afford to have a break-even or even a loss-making operation in government securities. Thus, banks have a competitive edge over other financial intermediaries.
(ii) Choice between foreign and domestic institutions

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Allowing foreign institutions to become active in local markets offers several advantages to emerging markets. Foreign institutions provide greater expertise, increased competition and increased market credibility. They may also expand the scope of financial intermediation with their foreign customer base and increase the availability of capital.
On the other hand, foreign institutions are often less loyal to the local market. They do not have the same vested interest in the well-being of the domestic market place as local PDs. Better judgment should thus be exercised in following their recommendations.
(iii) Requiring foreign institutions to have a local establishment
In government securities markets at an early stage of development, a systematic local presence seems to be necessary. This was the case in European markets up to the mid-nineties. This requirement was then given up in anticipation of the European Monetary Union that became a reality in 1999. Such requirements still exist in a number of other countries.
The requirement for a local presence usually rests on one or more of the following two views: the local presence is an evidence of commitment and/or it is the only way for the government to ensure that their business is conducted in the proper way. Neither view is necessarily true.
A local presence is an expensive proposition, which may actually not be required for a bank to develop its business in the domestic market. In addition, the local government can enter into an agreement with the supervisory authority in a country where the applicant PD has a presence of some importance so as to ensure that it is subject to adequate control. This principle has been implemented in the EU. Since the early 2000s, banks registered in at least one EU country can apply for the status of PD in any member state.

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(iv) Requiring all PDs to have a locally incorporated separately capitalized subsidiary19
This requirement can facilitate the channeling of professional expertise to the new firm by allowing the creation of new career paths and incentive schemes. It is particularly relevant in emerging markets. The objective is to ensure that the business is professionally managed and that risks are covered. In some cases, it can also facilitate supervision from a regulatory perspective. Yet, this requirement involves significant costs for PDs, some of which could be deterred as a result. This drawback needs to be weighed against the expected benefits.
3DUTIES OF PDs Defining PDs’ duties involves making several strategic decisions. One of these must be made upfront. Should the status of PD be homogeneous or can PDs be specialized?
. Homogeneous vs. Specialized Status PDs can be committed to deal in the full range of public debt instruments. Alternately, they can be allowed to specialize in certain instruments and/or market segments. Both regimes are widely prevalent.
DMOs that subject all PDs to the same obligations take the view that the status of PD is then more transparent to the market and that the PD group is easier to manage. Certain financial instruments are also more attractive for PDs to trade than others. As a result, some DMOs are concerned that they may not have enough PDs for certain debt instruments if the status of PD were split.
Other DMOs deem it more efficient to split PDs’ obligations by establishing different tiers of dealers, each tier having separate requirements and objectives. This approach is particularly useful when there is a relatively limited supply of institutions with an expertise covering all debt instruments or when the state of the market is such that the accumulation of obligations significantly increases PDs’ costs and/or market risks.

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A large number of DMOs are thus differentiating between their PDs, either for a specific instrument (“single market PDs”) or for a specific activity (“market specialists”). Some DMOs also have repo and or retail specialists. PDs are generally allowed to overlap different market segments, with some exceptions.
4.2. Inventory of Duties Most PD obligations are relatively standard. PDs are generally assigned six duties: (i) to bid on the primary market, (ii) to place government securities with final investors, (iii) to enhance the liquidity of the secondary market, (iv) to be the counterpart of the DMO for certain debt management operations, (v) to advise the DMO on its debt management strategy, and (vi) to report on their activity in the secondary market.
The common feature of these six duties is that they are all related to the funding of the government. They are connected to its amount, its stability, its cost and its management.
The obligations of PDs tend to be materialized in a similar manner by most DMOs. However, two duties in particular tend to have some country specific features: the obligation to bid at auctions and the commitment to quote prices on the secondary market. To Bid at Auctions By bidding at the auctions, PDs function as a channel between the DMO and final investors. They build a portfolio of securities that they will sell in the secondary market. The obligation of PDs to participate in auctions decreases the execution risk of the issuer.41 the introduction of fixed auction calendars has further increased the usefulness of PDs. The issuer is in the market less often and for larger amounts.
The obligation to bid at auctions generally includes the obligation for PDs to submit a certain minimum amount of bids and/or successful bids. In both cases, the minimum amount is generally expressed as a certain percentage of the total amount auctioned.

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The PDs’ obligation to bid at the auctions can be structured in different ways, with respect to both the submission of bids and the submission of successful bids.
As regards the submission of bids, PDs may be obliged either to participate regularly at auctions or to submit bids at every auction for a certain minimum amount or threshold.
The two ways of articulating the PDs’ obligation pursue the same objective. In both cases, a PD is actually expected to participate in every auction. In the first wording, however, a PD is not formally breaking a commitment if it has exceptionally missed participating in an auction.
The minimum threshold level, if any, should be set with care. A threshold too low entails the risk of a shortfall in underwriting. A threshold too high might strain the PDs’ financial capacity.
As regards the submission of successful bids, the minimum amount to be accepted is always expressed as a certain percentage of the total amount issued on a competitive basis. However, it can either be a minimum amount at every auction or a minimum amount over a certain period, usually one calendar year or the length of the appointment period.
In both cases, the minimum bidding commitment can be quantified, either as a percentage discretionarily set by the relevant DMO or as a function of a certain reference, such as the number of appointed PDs, the relative size of the PD’s balance sheet, or the amount of the PD’s trading activity in the secondary market. To Place Securities with Final Investors PDs can be an efficient securities distribution mechanism to their customer base. In the process of carrying out this duty, PDs effectively act as a government securities sub- depositary. The duty of placing securities with final customers includes doing

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marketing, research and development, i.e., to actively develop and promote products related to government securities.
To Enhance Liquidity in the Secondary Market In most mature markets, as well as in some emerging markets, PDs are committed to provide firm two-way quotes continuously. A detailed description of some frequent market practices is outlined in appendix 1, which also includes some recommendations specifically for EMs. In many emerging markets, PDs are committed to quote indicative prices only.
Prices must usually be quoted for some minimum amounts, with some maximum spreads and for a certain minimum number of hours. The size of the maximum spread can be expressed either as a number49 or as an order of magnitude.
This price quoting obligation generally applies both to prices quoted to customers and to prices quoted to other dealers. The objective of obliging dealers to quote to other dealers is to enhance price transparency by ensuring that the market is well arbitraged.
Generally, the market making program covers all maturities issued. However, securities are allocated amongst PDs so that every dealer is committed to quote only a certain number of maturities and every security is quoted by at least a certain number of market makers. PDs increasingly perform their market making obligation on electronic trading platforms.
PDs that are committed to quote firm prices are often also obliged to make a certain minimum turnover in the secondary market. The latter obligation tends to be adapted as the market develops. The minimum amount is expressed first as a percentage of the total turnover in the market, then as a percentage of the aggregate turnover done by all PDs, and finally, the minimum amount

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requirement tends to disappears. The second stage is a normal consequence of the development of the market as a result of which more participants become active in it. The third stage emerges with the realization that the main benefit of a market making commitment is not liquidity but price transparency. Thus the quality of the prices quoted matters more than the volume done, the quality of which is hard to assess in any case.
In some countries, PDs must achieve both a minimum turnover and a minimum success ratio.
Standard market making rules can apply only in normal market conditions. This raises the issue of how market making rules can be adapted in the case of disorderly markets.In Europe, most DMOs have taken all or some of the following five steps in exceptional market conditions:
(i) To relax the quoting obligation: DMOs have either widened the allowed maximum bid and offer spread or no longer imposed a maximum spread. DMOs that no longer impose a maximum spread assess the quality of their PDs’ performance by comparing the width of the spread quoted by the relevant PD with the average width of the spreads quoted by all PDs.
(ii) To decrease the number of securities to be quoted by each PD: In normal market conditions, securities are allocated to PDs so that each security is quoted by a minimum number of market makers. This number has been reduced to 2 or 3 in exceptional market conditions.
(iii) To strengthen the issuer’s support: DMOs that extend a securities lending facility to their PDs to support their market making activity have tended to increase the amount of the securities that they are willing to lend and/or to increase the length of the period during which PDs are allowed to borrow securities.

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(iv) To change the reference for assessing the quality of a PD’s price quoting performance: Initially, the reference most often used by DMOs was the amount traded by the relevant PD on the secondary market. The amount traded was considered to be both the easiest and the best index of the quality and of the timing of the quoted prices. Since the beginning of 2007, however, the prevailing view amongst DMOs in the EU is that the most important contribution of their PDs in unsettled markets is to enhance price transparency (i.e., the permanent availability of firm prices being displayed on screens), irrespective of the amount actually traded. The assessment by DMOs of the quality of the performance of their PDs has therefore shifted from volume to pricing.
(v) To increase the rewards offered to PDs: This has most often taken the form of more generous post-auction non-competitive subscriptions, either by increasing the maximum amount of the authorized allocation or by lengthening the period during which non-competitive subscriptions can be submitted.
To Advise the DMO DMOs expect PDs to advise them on their debt management strategy and on the organization of the market. This duty includes keeping the DMO informed of market developments.
To be the DMO’s Counterpart in Debt Management Operations Being the DMO’s counterpart in its debt management operations is both a duty and a privilege. It is a duty in the case of operations that offer PDs no profit opportunity, such as being counterpart in the trades done by a DMO in the money market to manage its daily liquidity position. It is a privilege in the case of profitable debt management operations that are sought after by PDs . To Report on their Activity Reporting to the DMO on its activity in the secondary market is typically part of a PD’s agreement. These reports help DMOs in evaluating developments in the market and in individual institutions

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A DMO also needs to receive qualitative reports from its PDs in order to be informed of their business strategy and implementation, and about the research and marketing efforts they have made to that effect.
Other Obligations PDs can assume a number of other commitments in addition to the above mentioned main duties. As an example, PDs can be required (i) to contribute to an automatic securities lending facility in the clearing house by allowing the clearing house to lend on their behalf some of their securities held in inventory, (ii) to quote prices for government securities at the closing of the market for publication purposes, and (iii) to facilitate an effective retail distribution. The latter commitment applies when authorities perceive that there could be significant demand for government securities from individuals.
The direct sale of government securities in the retail market is a complex issue, particularly when PDs are involved. Operating in the retail market significantly increases costs for PDs. It also creates competition between the bank’s products and government instruments within the sales network of the banks.
In any case, PDs commit to conduct their business in a correct and ethical manner. This includes avoiding disrupting their auction participation by bidding too aggressively.

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CHAPTER 7
COMPANIES WORKING AS A PRIMARY DEALER IN INDIA
TYPES OF PRIMARY DEALERS
Primary dealers can be classified as:
i) Bank Primary Dealers and
ii) Stand Alone Primary Dealers
Bank PDs are those which take up primary dealer business departmentally as part of the bank itself. On the other hand, Stand Alone Primary Dealers are NBFCs that exclusively take up primary dealer business At present there are 20 primary dealers doing business of primary dealership as listed below:
Stand Alone Primary Dealers Bank Primary Dealers
1. ICICI Securities Primary Dealership
Limited
2. Morgan Stanley India Primary Dealer
Pvt. Ltd.
3. Nomura Fixed Income Securities Pvt.
4. PNB Gilts Ltd.
5. SBI DFHI Ltd
6. STCI Primary Dealer Limited
7. Goldman Sachs (India) Capital Markets
Pvt. Ltd.

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1. Bank of Baroda
2. Canara Bank
3. Citibank N.A
4. Corporation Bank
5. HDFC Bank Ltd
6. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation Ltd.(HSBC)
7. J P Morgan Chase Bank N.A, Mumbai
Branch
8. Kodak Mahindra Bank Ltd.
9. Standard Chartered Bank
10. Axis Bank Ltd.

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CHAPTER 8
OBJECTIVES OF PRIMARY DEALERS
Primary dealers are expected to play an active role in the government securities market, both in its primary and secondary market segments. The system of Primary Dealers in government securities market was introduced with the objectives to:
I. strengthen the infrastructure in the government securities market in order to make it
ii. Vibrant, liquid and broad based
iii. Commit participation as Principals in Government of India issues through bidding in auctions.
iv. Provide underwriting services
v. offer firm buy - sell / bid ask quotes for T-Bills & dated securities
vi. Improve Secondary Market trading system
vii. Make PDs an effective conduit for conducting open market operations.

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CHAPTER 9
SEBI GUIDELINE
SEBI said the debt segment would provide separate trading, reporting, membership, clearing and settlement rules Mumbai: Continuing with its efforts to develop the country's corporate debt market, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) issued elaborate guidelines for setting up a separate debt segment on stock exchanges where entities like banks and pension funds can execute trades, reports PTI.
The decision to have separate debt segment on the bourses was taken at market regulator SEBI's board meeting last week.
SEBI said the debt segment would provide separate trading, reporting, membership, clearing and settlement rules.
Debt securities may be called debentures, bonds, deposits, notes or commercial paper depending on various factors including maturity periods.
In the proposed debt segment, trading would be from 0900 hours to 1700 hours.
"Institutions such as scheduled commercial banks, primary dealers, pension funds, provident funds, insurance companies, mutual funds... can trade on the debt segment either as clients of registered trading members or directly as trading member on proprietary basis only.

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"Such institutions desirous of trading on own account only shall be given trading membership under SEBI (Stock Broker and Sub-Broker) Regulations, 1992 as proprietary trading member," SEBI said in a circular.
According to the regulator, the market for debt securities differs from equity markets in several ways such as risk, returns, liquidity, and type of participants and method of trading.
"While publicly issued debt securities are listed, traded and settled in a manner similar to equity, privately placed debt is usually traded between institutional investors on 'over the counter' (OTC) basis. Such OTC transactions are mandatorily reported on reporting platforms at FIMMDA, BSE and NSE," SEBI said.
The regulator said an existing stock exchange or new bourse willing to set up debt segment is required to make an application with SEBI providing operational, regulatory and any other necessary details.
SEBI said minimum capital deposit required to be maintained by a stock broker for trading in the debt segment would up to Rs50 lakh.
"With the view to infuse liquidity in the market, market makers shall be permitted in the debt segment. Market making may be provided by merchant bankers, issuers through brokers or any other entity as may be specified," it said.
The debt segment has to list all the securities and debt instruments and has offer electronic, screen-based trading system.

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As per SEBI, the trading facility for the bond market can make use of access methods such as internet and mobile trading. Further, the segment should have separate trading platforms for retail as well as institutional players.

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CHAPTER:-10
.ROLE OF PRIMARY DEALER
PDs are expected to play an active role in primary the government securities market, both in its primary and secondary segments. A Primary Dealer will be required to have a standing arrangement with RBI based on the execution of an undertaking and the authorization letter issued by RBI covering inter-alia the following aspects: (i) A Primary Dealer will have to commit to aggregative bid for Government of India dated securities on an annual basis of not less than a specified amount and auction Treasury Bills for specified percentage for each auction. The agreed minimum amount/ percentage of bids would be separately indicated for dated securities and Treasury Bills.
(ii) A Primary Dealer would be required to achieve a minimum success ratio of 40 per cent for dated securities and 40 per cent for Treasury Bills. (iii) Underwriting of Dated Government Securities: Primary Dealers will be collectively offered to underwrite up to 100% of the notified amount in respect of all issues where the amounts are notified. A Primary Dealer can offer to underwrite an amount not exceeding five times of its net owned funds. The amount so arrived at should not exceed 30% of the notified amount of the issue. If two or more issues are floated at the same time, the limit of 30% is applied by taking the notified amounts of both the issues together.

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In the case of devolvement, allotment of securities will be at the competitive cut-off price/yield decided at the auction or at par in the case of pre-determined coupon floatation. Obligations under items (i) to (iii) above would be confined for the present only to Central Government dated securities and obligations under items (i) to (ii) to Treasury Bills. (iv) Treasury bill issues are not underwritten. Instead, Primary Dealers are required to commit to submit minimum bids at each auction. The commitment of Primary Dealer’s participation in treasury bills subscription works out as follows: (a) Each Primary Dealer individually commits, at the beginning of the year, to submit minimum bids as a fixed percentage of the notified amount of treasury bills, in each auction. (b) The minimum percentage of the bids for each Primary Dealer is determined by the Reserve Bank through negotiation with the Primary Dealer so that the entire issue of treasury bills is collectively apportioned among all Primary Dealers. (c) The percentage of minimum bidding commitment determined by the Reserve Bank remains unchanged for the entire financial year or till furnishing of undertaking on bidding commitments for the next financial year, whichever is later. In determining the minimum bidding commitment, the Reserve Bank takes into account the offer made by the Primary Dealer, its net owned funds and its track record. (v) A Primary Dealer shall offer firm two-way quotes either through the Negotiated Dealing System or over the counter telephone market or through a

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recognized Stock Exchange of India and deal in the secondary market for Government securities and take principal positions. (vi) A Primary Dealer shall maintain the minimum capital standards at all points of time. (vii) A Primary Dealer shall achieve a sizeable portfolio in government securities before the end of the first year of operations after authorization. (viii) The annual turnover of a Primary Dealer in a financial year shall not be less than 5 times of average month end stocks in government dated securities and 10 times of average month end stocks in Treasury Bills. Of the total, turnover in respect of outright transactions shall not be less than 3 times in respect of government dated securities and 6 times in respect of Treasury Bills. The target should be achieved by the end of the first year of operations after authorization by RBI. (ix) A Primary Dealer shall maintain physical infrastructure in terms of office, computing equipment, communication facilities like Telex/Fax, Telephone, etc. and skilled manpower for efficient participation in primary issues, trading in the secondary market, and to advise and educate the investors. (x) A Primary Dealer shall have an efficient internal control system for fair conduct of business and settlement of trades and maintenance of accounts. (xi) A Primary Dealer will provide access to RBI to all records, books, information and documents as may be required, (xii) A Primary Dealer shall subject itself to all prudential and regulatory guidelines issued by RBI.

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(xiii) A Primary Dealer shall submit periodic returns as prescribed by RBI. (xiii) A Primary Dealer’s investment in G-Sacs and Treasury Bills on a daily basis should be at least equal to its net call borrowing plus net RBI borrowing plus net owned funds of Rs 50 crore. The Reserve Bank would extend the following facilities to PDs to enable them to effectively fulfill their obligations: (i) Access to Current Account facility with Reserve Bank Of India, (ii) Access to Subsidiary General Ledger (SGL) Account facility (for Government securities), (iii) Permission to borrow and lend in the money market including call money market and to trade in all money market instruments, (iv) Access to liquidity support through Repo operations with RBI in Central Government dated securities and Auction Treasury Bills up to the limit fixed by RBI. The Scheme is separately notified every year, (v) Access to Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) of Reserve Bank of India, (v) Favored access to open market operations by Reserve Bank of India. RBI will have access to records and accounts of an authorized Primary Dealer and the right to inspect its books. A Primary Dealer will be required to submit prescribed returns to RBI, IDM Cell a daily report on transactions and market information, monthly report of transactions in securities, risk position and performance with regard to participation in auctions, quarterly return on capital adequacy, an annual report on its performance together with annual audited accounts and such other statements and returns as are prescribed either specifically or generally by Reserve Bank of India vide any of its institutions/circulars/ directives. Further, PDs are required to meet such registration and other requirements as stipulated by Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) including operations on the Stock Exchanges. Authorized PDs are expected to join self-

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regulatory organizations (SROs) like Primary Dealers Association of India (PDAI) and Fixed Income Money Market and Derivatives Association (FIMMDA) and abide by the code of conduct framed by them and such other actions initiated by them in the interests of the securities markets. In respect of transactions in government securities, a Primary Dealer should have a separate desk and should maintain separate accounts and have an external audit of annual accounts. The Primary Dealer should maintain separate accounts in respect of its own position and customer transactions. A Primary Dealer should bring to the RBI’s attention any major complaint against it or action initiated/taken against it by authorities such as the Stock Exchanges, SEBI, CBI, Enforcement Directorate, Income Tax, etc. Reserve Bank of India reserves the right to cancel the Primary Dealership if, in its view, the concerned institution has not fulfilled any of the prescribed performance criteria contained in the authorization letter. Reserve Bank of India reserves its right to amend or modify these guidelines from time to time, as may be considered necessary.

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CHAPTER: - 11 RECOMMANDATION I have highlighted the criticality of corporate bond market in the economy as it allocates resources efficiently and enables long-term resource raising to sectors, such as, infrastructure. A vibrant corporate bond market provides an alternative to conventional bank finances and also mitigates the vulnerability of foreign currency sources of funds. From the perspective of financial stability, there is a need to strengthen the corporate bond market. Limited investor base, limited number of issuers and preference for bank finance over bond finance are some of the other obstacles faced in development of a deep and liquid corporate bond market. I have also briefly discussed the growth and structure of Indian corporate bond market and outlined measures taken by the regulators, in particular the Reserve Bank of India to develop the market. I have flagged some of the issues and challenges faced by this market and the approach to be adopted to address them in order to enable the market to reach its potential. The task before us is to improve liquidity, enhance transparency, provide safe and sound market infrastructure, enable appropriate institutional structure, such as, robust bankruptcy framework, etc. The regulators have taken proactive steps and provided the market with tools of risk management. Efforts are on to enable wider participation the market and create scope for market making. The regulators, like Reserve Bank, have always followed a consultative approach and welcomed suggestions from the stakeholders. It is also expected that the market participants need to be more active and participate in corporate bond market and make use of risk management tools/financial products. This would enable growth of the corporate bond market and cater to the needs of the real economy and the financial sector. I am sure that the panellists of the next

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session would deliberate on some of the issues raised above and other related issues and provide useful and implementable suggestions to meet the challenges of developing a more vibrant corporate bond market in India

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CHAPTER:-12 CONCLUSION The Federal Reserve introduced the primary dealer credit facility in March 2008 to protect the repo market and other u.s.funding markets from disruption following the near-bankruptcy of bear Stearns. Six months later, in the wake of new strains in the repo market, the fed enhanced the facility by broadening the types of collateral acceptable for pdcf loans. The facility provedto be a critical recourse for primary dealers at the time of thelehman brother’s bankruptcy. As a source of emergency credit, the pdcf is parallel to the Federal Reserve’s discount window for banks, but it specifically addresses the needs of the institutions most at risk in modern financial crises. The Federal Reserve introduced the primary dealer credit facility in March 2008 to protect the repo market and other us. Funding markets from disruption following the near- bankruptcy of bear Stearns. Six months later, in the wake of new strains in the repo market, the fed enhanced the facility by broadening the types of collateral acceptable for pdcf loans. The facility provedto be a critical recourse for primary dealers at the time of the Lehman brother’s bankruptcy. As a source of emergency credit, the pdcf is parallel to the Federal Reserve’s discount window for banks, but it specifically addresses the needs of the institutions most at risk in modern financial crises.

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CHAPTER:-13 WEBLOGRAPHY WWW.RBI.ORG.IN WWW.MONEYCONTROL.COM WWW.WIKIPEDIA.ORG.IN WWW.SEBI.GOV.IN

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