This document discusses combustible dust hazards and safety. It provides examples of combustible dust accidents from 1980-2017 that resulted in injuries and deaths. It summarizes NFPA standards related to combustible dust hazards and outlines typical OSHA violations cited under the General Duty Clause for lack of explosion protection systems in dust collectors and inadequate housekeeping and controls for combustible dust. Employers are now testing dusts to determine combustibility and implementing safety management systems to control ignition sources and mitigate combustible dust hazards.

1. Combustible Dust
Safety
John Newquist
Draft 6 1 2017

2. Coal Dust
• Throughout a twenty‐five year
(1980‐2005) study of PRB
coal‐fired power plants, there
were an average of 11 fires or
explosions, 29 injuries, and 5
deaths per year.
• Another study conducted by the
United States Department of
Labor during the 1996‐2009
time period noted 437
workplace coal power‐related
deaths, averaging 33 deaths per
year in the United States..
Will County Power Plant Crusher Building Explosion

4. April 2017

5. May 2017
•On May 31 at approximately 11 p.m., an explosion occurred
at our milling operations located in Cambria, Wisconsin.
•The cause of the explosion is not known
•Corn milling

6. Apr 2017
• Dust collection systems
must be installed which will
safely capture potentially
explosive aluminum fines.
Metallic dusts from grinding, sawing or
cutting should be picked up by one
collection system, while dusts from
buffing and polishing should be picked up
by a different system.
This will prevent the mixing of explosive
and flammable dusts.

7. March 2017

8. May 2017
NFPA requires that an explosion isolation
device be installed on all suction side
ducts that transport material with a KST
value above zero.
KST values are used to measure the speed
at which pressure rises during a standard
explosion severity test.
EcoMAXX™ No Return Valve

10. August 2012
• WESTON, Mo. -- More than 200
people were briefly evacuated
after a small explosion and fire at
Kansas City Power & Light's Iatan
power plant in Weston.
• Coal bunker.
• Platte County fire crews were
dispatched to the coal-fired
power plant and quickly
contained the blaze.

11. September 2016
• Francesville, IN
• An employee was operating the
north leg of a grain elevator.
• Grain was being emptied from a
semi-trailer into the north pit
and then being sent to the wet
holding bin when a grain
explosion occurred.
• The employee received burns to
his body resulting in his death.
• 67/M

12. February 2016
• Rockmart, GA
• An employee was scooping
feed pellets off the floor with
a shovel.
• There was an explosion when
the dust ignited and the
employee was killed.
• 25/M

13. January 2015
• Ticonderoga, NY
• An employee was climbing a fixed ladder to change filter bags
on the bag house.
• While changing, fly ash was released from the bagger or silo.
• The employee caught on fire and died as a result of extensive
burns.
• 57/M

14. January 2015
• Farmington Hills, MI
• An employee was prepping the
north sand hopper interior walls.
• A fire started when a spark,
radiant heat and/or conductive
heat, likely ignited the fire
retardant insulation.
• One employee died (37/M) and
three were hospitalized from
smoke and soot inhalation with
complications.

15. Feb 2014• Federal inspectors
determined excessive
accumulation of grain
dust in the hammer mill
area ignited and the
explosion killed one
worker and sent five
others to area
hospitals.
• The blast caused
excessive damage to
the building and closed
the feed mill.

16. April 2014
• Corrigan TX
• Four people remain hospitalized, three in critical condition, after an
explosion and fire at a Polk County plywood mill
• a) dust collector bags impeded the venting area of the dust collector
deflagration vents.
• b) explosion vents releasing in the dust collector without taking measure
to protect employees from the fireball path
• c) dust collector vented and the deflagration traveled upstream to the
sander.
• d) responding to a fire within the sander dust collection system without
the main blower remaining in operation.
• e) responding to a fire within the sander dust collection system without a
choke between the sander dust collector and silo leading to the
briquetter.

17. May 2014
• Hartford CT
• A workbench in the
finishing room of the facility
caught fire on May 19,
2014, while an employee
cleaned titanium aircraft
parts.
• The room's dust collection
system lacked adequate fire
and explosion controls.
• Flammable titanium dust
had also settled on
electrical equipment.
Titanium Dust Collector fire
photo

18. August 2014
• 75 people were killed
and 185 others injured
after an explosion
ripped through a metal
products factory in
China’s eastern Jiangsu
Province

19. Chemical Safety Board
• From 2008 to 2012, our board documented,
50 combustible dust accidents that led to 29
fatalities and 161 injuries.

20. July 2013
• Springdale, MO
• 1 dead, 3 burned.
• “The dust associated
with the type of process
goes on here resulted in
some type of a flash fire
that encapsulated three
of the employees,”
McDonald said.

21. July 2014

22. Apr 2017
• If maintenance is planned and
welding or cutting is required, all
machinery, ductwork and
collectors must be shut down,
emptied and cleaned, and all
aluminum dust removed from the
area and properly disposed of.
• The interior surfaces of all
equipment must be carefully
inspected to check for possible
accumulations of fine powder,
particularly at elbows, welded
joints, etc. These surfaces must
be wiped clean.

23. OSHA
• OSHA has regularly stated that NFPA standards that have not
been specifically incorporated into OSHA standards or
adopted by state or local jurisdictions should be considered
by companies as guidance.
• At the same time, however, the NEP Compliance Directive
instructs OSHA inspectors to consult the NFPA standards to
“obtain evidence of hazard recognition and feasible
abatement methods” to support a citation under the GDC.
• Consequently, companies should consult NFPAs when
evaluating and mitigating potential combustible dust hazards
at their facilities.

24. The Long and Winding Road
• History of Hazards
• OSHA Inspections
• Issues
• Citations
• Trends

25. Trend 1 – Rare Events but Still Occurring
• Two British Columbia
sawmills
• Four dead and 52
injured
• Fines of up to $652,000
• Possible jail.
• These were wood dust
explosions

26. Metal Dust - 2011
• Hoeganaes plant TN
• Four dead, two
explosions
• The plant
manufactures metal
powder used in the
automotive industry
• CSB and OSHA
investigations
• The company issued a
statement saying it has begun
a review “to ensure that we
fully understand the cause of
the fire and have
implemented appropriate
measures to prevent a
recurrence of this incident.”
• “We have already made
significant progress on some
of the issues raised by the CSB
and we won't resume
production until we are
confident that all issues have
been addressed.”

27. Grain Dust Explosion - 2011
• Oct 29, 2011
• Six dead, 2 injured
• Five Willful, 8 serious
• $400,000 penalty
• Case in court
• Lawsuit by families

28. Grain Elevator - 1977
• Westwego, LA
• Grain Elevator
Explosion
• Dec 1977
• Spark ignited grain dust
• The explosion killed 36
people

29. Ford River Rouge Power Plant
• 2/1/1999
• Dearborn , MI
• MIOSHA General Duty
egregious
• $1,500,000 penalty
• Natural gas boiler explosion
triggered secondary coal
dust explosion that had
accumulated on building
and equipment surfaces
• No flame sensing interlock
for the gas lines

30. Imperial Sugar - 2008
• Feb 7, 2008
• 14 died
• 60 injured
• $180-220 million dollar
est. loss
• $7,700,000 Fine – OSHA

31. Trend 2 – OSHA NEP continues
• Combustible Dust
National Emphasis
Program (NEP) –
revised March 2008
• CSB issues
recommendations in
2005
• Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM) – published
October 2009
• Expert panel met May
2011
• Next action???

32. OSHA Inspections
• Over 1000 COMDUST NEP
inspections since 2008
• High Violations per
inspections (Over
6.0/inspection)
Triggers are:
• Complaint or referral
• Media reports of fires and
explosions
• Inspection Targeting List
~150-300 inspections in 2013

33. Sample Accident 2008
• Transfer of metal dust
into mixer
• What questions would
you ask?

34. Sample Accident Jan 2009
• The laminate panels pass on
a conveyor underneath a
curing UV light.
• A panel jammed up
underneath the UV light.
• The panel heated up to the
point where it charred,
smoldered and eventually
caught fire.
• The charred pieces were
sucked up into the local
exhaust system, where they
ignited in the dust collector
located outside the plant.
• The dust collector blew up,
sending a shock wave back
into/through the plant.
Several overhead doors were blown
off, and one of these struck 4
employees, injuring them.

35. COMDUST NEP
• Plant history of fires
• Employer’s Dust
Management System
• MSDS’s
• Dust Accumulation
• Dust Collectors
• Ventilation Specifications
• One liter of dust sampled
• Photos
• Interviews – Employees,
Employers

36. Sample OSHA Questions
• What is the Plant’s
Housekeeping program?
• Is there dust accumulation
of 1/32 inch thick?
• Dust collectors located
inside of buildings?
• Explosion relief venting
distributed over the
exterior walls of buildings
and enclosures?

37. Sample OSHA Questions
• Does the facility have
isolation devices to prevent
deflagration propagation
between pieces of
equipment connected by
ductwork?
• Does the facility have an
ignition control program,
such as grounding and
bonding?
Fire through a duct is bad

38. Sample OSHA Questions
• Are Vacuum cleaners
used in dusty areas and
approved for the hazard
classification?
• Are separator devices
to remove foreign
materials used?
• Can tramp metal ignite
combustible dusts in
the dust collection
systems? Check the label for Class II

39. Sample OSHA Questions
• Is the exhaust from the
dust collectors
recycled?
• Does the dust collector
system have spark
detection and
explosion/deflagration
suppression systems?

40. Sample OSHA Questions
• Are ducts designed to maintain
sufficient velocity to ensure the
transport of both coarse and fine
particles?
• What is the design basis for the
ventilation?
• Are duct systems, dust collectors,
and dust-producing machinery
bonded and grounded to minimize
accumulation of static electrical
charge?

41. Sample OSHA Questions
• Is metal ductwork used?
• Are bulk storage containers
constructed of
noncombustible materials?
• Are employees trained in
the hazards of the
combustible dust?
• Are MSDSs for the
chemicals which could
become combustible dust
under normal operations
available to employees?

42. NEP Citations
• 1910.22, Housekeeping
• 1910.38, Emergency action plans
• 1910.94, Ventilation
• 1910.132, PPE Hazard Analysis
• 1910.146, Permit-required confined
spaces
• 1910.272, Grain handling facilities
• 1910.307, Hazardous (classified)
locations
• 1910.1000 Z table, Toxic and
hazardous substances
• 1910.1200, Hazard communication
• General duty clause
5/16/2002 Vicksburg, MS
5 fatalities, 7 injured
23 serious, 2 unclassified
$210,000
Fire in the baghouse, then rubber
dust explosion
No explosion venting or
suppression in baghouse
Poor housekeeping
88 fire reports in 13 years

43. Trend 3 – OSHA will continue to use
the General Clause Violation
• Dust collectors (Air
Material Separator)
inside
• No proper explosion
protection systems
such as explosion
venting or explosion
suppression systems
NFPA 654 – 2013
7.13.1.1.1 Where an explosion hazard
exists, air-material separators with a
dirty-side volume of 8 ft3 (0.2 m3) or
greater shall be located outside of
buildings.
There are exceptions.

44. Typical 5(a)(1) Violations
• Systems were not
provided to prevent
deflagration
propagation from
dust collectors to
other parts of the
plant.
October 29, 2003 - Hayes Lemmerz
Manufacturing Plant, IN
Shawn Boone, 33, died in the
Aluminum Dust explosion

45. Typical 5(a)(1) Violations
• No explosion relief
venting distributed
over the exterior
walls and roofs of the
buildings.
CTA Acoustics 2003 – 7 dead
Fiberglass fibers and excess phenolic resin
powder probably went to the oven while
workers were using compressed air and
lance to break up a cogged bag house
filter

46. Typical 5(a)(1) Violations
• Dust Collector and
ducts do not prevent
propagation to other
parts of the plant
From BS&B

47. Typical 5(a)(1) Violations
• Ducts and system were
not grounded

48. Grounding
All equipment used in the
dust generating process
must be thoroughly
grounded to remove static
electricity.
“Recommended Practice on
Static Electricity,” NFPA 77,
should be followed.
Inspection and cleaning of all electrical equipment must be done regularly and
frequently (at least weekly).
Ground connections should be checked visually on a daily basis by the
operators.

49. Typical 5(a)(1) Violations
• Airborne fugitive dust

50. Typical 5(a)(1) Violations
• A means of tramp metal
protection was not
provided to keep any
unwanted metal
fragments out of the
air-material separators
From Duramag

51. Typical 5(a)(1) Violations
• Excessive dust
• Not cleaning per the
appropriate NFPA
Standard

52. Typical 5(a)(1) Violations
• Compressed Air was
used for cleaning
• Tip: Clean fugitive dust
• Regular program
• Access to hidden areas
• Safe cleaning methods
• Maintain dust free as possible
• No blow down unless All
electrical power and
processes have been
shutdown and other means
cannot work.
• See NFPA

53. Typical 5(a)(1) Violations
• No PVC or
nonconductive ducts

54. Typical 5(a)(1) Violations
• Not maintaining duct
velocity
• Aluminum Conveyor
velocity might be 4500
ft/min for pneumatic
conveyors

55. Strategy for Employers
• Test for Combustible
Dust
• Find Applicable NFPA
standards
• Implement a Safety
Management System
• Housekeeping
• Electrical Classification
• Conduct Process Hazard
Analysis for Dust
Generation Processes
• Control Ignition sources
• Develop safety
procedures for working
on dust collectors
• Investigate leaks, hot
spots, near misses
• Train Employees in
hazards of combustible
dust
• Plan for fires and
emergencies

56. NFPA References
• 654 General
• 664 Wood
• 61 Agriculture
• 484 Metal
• 850 Coal Power
Plants
• 70 National Electric Code
• 499 Classification of
Combustible Dust
• 68 Deflagration Venting
Systems
• 69 Explosion Prevention
Systems
• 91 Exhaust Systems
• 2113 Flame Resistant
Clothing

57. NFPA Objective
• Hazard control objectives:
• Prevent or limit formation of hazardous
atmosphere
• Prevent ignition of the hazardous atmosphere
• Limit the consequences of a deflagration to
acceptable levels (mitigation or control)
Includes secondary explosion protection

58. Trend 4 – Employers are Testing
• NFPA 654 recommends that determination of
dust combustibility be based on screening test
methodology per ASTM E1226 – 2010 edition
• If dust is determined explosive, further testing
may be needed to establish the properties
needed for the intended protection methods
• E1226-2010 as well as NFPA 654 recommends
testing in larger scale (e.g. in 1 m3) if dust is
marginally explosive in 20-L apparatus.

59. How Much Dust is too Much?

60. Where are Dust Sources?
• Bag Openers (Slitters)
• Blenders/Mixers
• Dryers
• Dust Collectors
• Pneumatic Conveyors
• Size Reduction Equipment (Grinders)
• Silos and Hoppers
• Hoses, Loading Spouts, Flexible Boots

61. Ignition Source Control
• Electrical equipment
• Hot Works
• Static electricity control
• Mechanical sparks & friction
• Open flame control
• Design of heating systems &
heated surfaces
• Use of tools, & vehicles
• Maintenance

62. NFPA 654 - 2013
• Chapters 1 – 3
Administrative
• Chapter 4 General
Requirements
• Chapter 5 Performance-
based Design Option
• Chapter 6 Facility and
Systems Design
• Chapter 7 Process
Equipment
• Chapter 8 Fugitive Dust
Control and
Housekeeping
• Chapter 9 Ignition
Sources
• Chapter 10 Fire
Protection
• Chapter 11 Training and
Procedures
• Chapter 12 Inspection
and Maintenance

63. Seven Key NFPA 654 Changes
• 4.2 Process Hazard
Analysis (PHA)
• TREND 5 – PHA are
conducted in less than
10% of companies, but
increasing rapidly
• OSHA VPP facilities
have conducted
numerous PHAs
• 4.2.1* The design of the
fire and explosion
safety provisions shall
be based on a process
hazard analysis of the
facility, the process, and
the associated fire or
explosion hazards.

64. NFPA 654 PHA
• Examine the facility,
process, and fire and
explosion hazards
• Actual test data required
to support analysis
• Which materials are
combustible?
• If not known, but
suspected, then data are
needed
• Closed or open processes?
• Rate of generation or
release of solids to an
environment?
• Any collection methods in
place?
• Conclusion: processes
generates or handles solids
and dusts are formed in
process, potential exists

65. Seven Key NFPA 654 Changes
• 4.3 Management of
Change. Written
procedures to manage
change to process
materials, technology,
equipment, procedures,
and facilities shall be
established and
implemented.

66. Seven Key NFPA 654 Changes
• 4.4.1* Incidents
that result in a fire
or explosion of a
magnitude that
causes property
damage,
production
shutdown time, or
injury shall be
investigated.
• 4.4.3* A written report
…
• 4.4.4* A summary of
the incident
investigation report
shall be shared with
affected personnel…

67. Seven Key NFPA 654 Changes
• 6.1.1.1 Those portions of
the process and facility
interior where dust
accumulations exist
external to equipment in
sufficient depth to
prevent discerning the
underlying surface color
shall be evaluated to
determine if a dust
explosion hazard or flash
fire hazard exists.

68. Seven Key NFPA 654 Changes
• 6.1.1.3* Dust flash fire or
dust explosion hazard
areas shall additionally be
determined in accordance
with any one of the
following four methods:
• Layer depth criterion
method in 6.1.3
• Mass method A in 6.1.4
• Mass method B in 6.1.5
• Risk evaluation method in
6.1.6
The NFPA 2 day course on combustible
dust covers these assessment.

69. Seven Key NFPA 654 Changes
• 6.2 Segregation, Separation, or
Detachment of Combustible Dust
Handling and Processing Areas.
• 6.2.1 General. Areas in which
combustible dusts are produced,
processed, handled, or collected such
that combustible dust accumulation
on exposed or concealed surfaces,
external to equipment or containers,
exceeds the threshold as determined
in Section 6.1, shall be detached,
segregated, or separated from other
occupancies to minimize damage
from a fire or explosion.

70. Seven Key NFPA 654 Changes
• 7.3.2* Pneumatic Conveying,
Dust Collection, and Centralized
Vacuum Cleaning Systems.
• 7.3.2.1 The design of the system
shall be documented, and the
documentation shall include the
following information:
• Data on the range of particulate
size
• Concentration of combustible
dust in the conveyance air stream
• Potential for reaction between
the transported particulates and
the extinguishing media used to
protect process equipment
• Conductivity of the particulates
• Other physical and chemical
properties that could affect the
fire protection of the process

71. Mitigation Ignition source control
• Electrical equipment
• Class II, Division 1 and 2
• Consider equipment both inside dust handling equipment and outside
• Static electricity control
• Grounding and bonding are key
• Inspection of ground and bonding means
• Vibrating equipment (e.g., sifters) may cause fatigue failure in straps
• Mechanical sparks & friction
• Rotating equipment bearing failure can lead to very hot surfaces (above the MIT)
• Sliding surfaces can develop charges
• Steel tools dropping onto concrete or steel
• Mechanical integrity management system/vibration analysis system
• Hot work program
• Open flames
• Design of heating systems & heated surfaces
• Use of tools & vehicles
• Maintenance
• Comfort heating equipment shall obtain combustion air from clean outside source

72. Damage Control
• Detachment (outside or other bldg.)
• Separation (distance within same room)
• Segregation (barrier)
• Pressure resistant construction
• Pressure relieving construction
• Pressure Venting
• Relief valves
• Maintenance
• Specialized detection systems
• Specialized suppression systems
• Explosion prevention systems
• Maintenance

73. Safety and Health Information Bulletin
• Purpose
• Background
• Elements of a Dust Explosion
• Facility Dust Hazard Assessment
• Dust Control
• Ignition Control
• Damage Control
• Training
• References

74. Resources and Questions?
• NFPA 2-day
Combustible Dust
Seminar
• Combustible Dust
Guidebook - NFPA
• OSHA SHIB
• www.csb.gov
• LinkedIn
Combustible Dust
Forums
• Facebook Grain Mill
Accident page

75. Contact
• John Newquist
• Facebook
• LinkedIn
• Johnanewquist
• Twitter
• Email Johnanewquist@gmail.com
• Cell (815) 354-6853
Sample citations follow

76. 2011
• 5(a)(1) Hammond DusKolector, model DK- 8, dry-type dust collector,
which collected combustible aluminum dust generated by the polishing of
aluminum tubing on equipment
• (1) The employer had the Hammond DusKolector, model DK-8, located
inside the building.
• (2) This dust collector did not have deflagration venting.
• (3) This dust collector did not have any barriers or other means of
protection for personnel from flash fire or shrapnel in the event of
explosion.
• (4) Ribbed, flexible, non-metallic ductwork connected the Hammond
sander. This ductwork would allow the combustible aluminum dust to
accumulate on interior surfaces, and the non- metallic material of which
the ductwork consisted would allow for the accumulation of static
charges.

77. 2011 continued
• (5) This dust collector did not get emptied at least once per day.
• (6) When employees emptied the combustible aluminum dust from the
dust collector, they did not mix the combustible aluminum dust with an
inert material (five parts inert material to one part aluminum dust), but
rather just disposed of the combustible aluminum dust in a dumpster,
where the dust commingled with various other wastes.
• (7) This dry-type dust collector recycled air back into the Polishing Room.
(b)Polishing Room - The facility had a dry-type dust collection system,
which collected combustible stainless steel dust generated by the
polishing and buffing of stainless steel tubing. This dust collection system,
located outside of the building, had the following deficiencies, on or about

78. 2011 continued
• Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to
correct this hazard includes following National Fire Protection Association
NFPA 484, Standard for Combustible Metals, 2009 Edition, including, but not
limited to:
• *Locate dry-type dust collectors, used to collect combustible aluminum dust,
outside of buildings (NFPA 484 Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2.5).
• *Provide deflagration vents on dry collectors, used to collect combustible
aluminum dust (NFPA 484, Chapter 6, Section 6.3.5.6).
• *Provide dry-type dust collectors, used to collect combustible aluminum
dust, with barriers or other means for protection of personnel (NFPA 484,
Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2.5.2).
• *Construct ducts on dust collection systems, used to collect combustible
aluminum dust, only of conductive material fabricated and assembled with
smooth interior surfaces and with internal lap joints facing the direction of
airflow (NFPA 484, Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3.5.1), and also bond and ground
duct systems, dust collectors, and dust-producing machinery to minimize
accumulation of static electric charge (NFPA 484, Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3.6).

79. 2011 continued
• *Remove combustible aluminum dust from dry collectors at least once each
day and at more frequent intervals if conditions warrant (NFPA 484, Chapter
6, Section 6.3.5.5), and mix the combustible aluminum dust waste with an
inert material in a volume ratio of five parts inert material to one part metal
dust (NFPA 484, Chapter 6, Section 6.3.5.5.3).
• *Do not recycle air from dry-dust collectors, used to collect combustible
aluminum dust, into buildings (NFPA 484, Chapter 6, Section 6.3.6).
• *Provide each machine that produces combustible stainless steel dust with
hoods, capture devices, or enclosures connected to a dust collection system
that has sufficient suction and capture velocity to collect and transport all
the dust produced (NFPA 484, Chapter 12, Section 12.2.1.1).
• *Provide deflagration vents on dry collectors, used to collect combustible
stainless steel dust (NFPA 484, Chapter 12, Section 12.2.10.7).
• *Provide dry-type dust collectors, used to collect combustible stainless steel
dust, with barriers or other means for protection of personnel (NFPA 484,
Chapter 12,Section 12.2.1.5). *Locate the blower for drawing the dust-laden
air into the stainless steel dust collector on the clean-air side of the collector
(NFPA 484, Chapter 12, Section 12.2.10.12).

80. 2011 continued
• *Construct ducts on dust collection systems, used to collect combustible
stainless steel dust, only of conductive material fabricated and assembled
with smooth interior surfaces and with internal lap joints facing the direction
of airflow (NFPA 484, Chapter 12, Section 12.2.5.6), and also bond and
ground duct systems, dust collectors, and dust-producing machinery to
minimize accumulation of static electric charge (NFPA 484, Chapter 12,
Section 12.2.5.10).
• *Remove combustible stainless steel dust from dry collectors at least once
each day and at more frequent intervals if conditions warrant (NFPA 484,
Chapter 12, Section 12.2.10.6).
• *Do not recycle air from dry-dust collectors, used to collect combustible
stainless steel dust, into buildings (NFPA 484, Chapter 12, Section 12.2.11).
• *Do not install automatic sprinkler systems in area where combustible
metals are produced or handled (NFPA 484, Chapter 13, Section 13.3.1.1).

81. 2013
• (5)(a)(1) American Roto-Clone dust collector located outside and used to
collect aluminum dust from finishing operations.
• The dust collector lacked means of
• (1) explosion protection and
• (2) upstream ductwork was deficient, as it was: not conductive, not
bonded and grounded, not as straight and short as possible and has
capped ends that can accumulate aluminum dust. .

82. • 2014 Enforcement Case: Powderpart Inc.
• Last spring, a Woburn, Massachusetts-based 3-D printing company,
Powderpart Inc., was cited by OSHA for multiple alleged violations
involving combustible dust hazards, including violations of the GDC for
failure to furnish employment and a place of employment “which are free
from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees.” The inspection followed a
November 5, 2013 explosion and fire that inflicted third-degree burns on a
company employee. Powderpart allegedly failed to eliminate known
sources of potential ignition and follow pertinent instructions from
equipment manufacturers, did not alert Woburn Fire Department to the
workplace presence of hazardous materials, and located an employee
workstation and flammable powders next to an area with explosion
potential, among other alleged violations, according to OSHA. OSHA’s
then acting regional administrator for New England stated,
“Establishments that use metal powders in this new technology need to
scrutinize their processes and take steps to prevent and protect their
employees from fire and explosion hazards that arise with these materials