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Implementing
OSSEC HIDS


   Jerônimo Zucco
 jczucco@gmail.com
/me

• Security guy
• blog: http://jczucco.blogspot.com
• Twitter: @jczucco
• zucco on freenode
• http://www.linkedin.com/in/jeronimozucco
Agenda
• Introduction
• Arquiteture
• Log Analysis
• Integrity Monitoring
• Rootkit Detection
• Policy audit
Agenda

• Alerts
• Active Response
• Server and Agents Instalations
• Configuration Files
• Rule Files
• Customize Rules
Security Terminology
LIDS
Integrity Checking
Rootkit Detecion
HIDS ?
Log Management
Why Log ?
System monitoring
Compliance
Forensics
Why Log ?
                                     Because we want to
                                             2%




Because we have to: (PCI-DSS, HIPAA, ISO 27K, SOX)
Standards
Syslog: RFC 3164
WELF, CBE, CEF, IDMF
CEE
     Common
 Event Expression
http://cee.mitre.org
What is OSSEC?
Daniel Cid
       @danielcid

Third Brigade, Trend Micro
• Open Source Host­based IDS (HIDS)
• File Integrity checking
• Registry Integrity checking
• Host­based anomaly detection
• Policy monitoring/enforcement
• Active response
OSSEC HIDS
complements a SIEM
OSSEC in the News

• OSSEC #1 open source security tool in the
  enterprise http://www.linuxworld.com/news/
  2007/031207-top-5-security.html
• OSSEC #2 IDS tool in the security tools
  survey. http://sectools.org/ids.html
• More: http://www.ossec.net/wiki/IntheNews
OSSEC Agents
• GNU/Linux (all distributions, including
  RHEL, Ubuntu, Slackware, Debian, etc)
• Windows XP,2000,2003,Vista,2008,Seven
• VMWare ESX 3.0,3.5 (including CIS checks)
• *BSD
• Solaris 2.7,2.8,2.9 and 10
• AIX 5.3
• HP-UX 10, 11, 11i
• MacOSX 10
Support via Syslog
• Cisco PIX, ASA and FWSM (all versions)
• Cisco IOS routers (all versions)
• Juniper Netscreen (all versions)
• SonicWall firewall (all versions)
• Checkpoint firewall (all versions)
• Cisco IOS IDS/IPS module (all versions)
• Sourcefire (Snort) IDS/IPS (all versions)
Support via Syslog

• Dragon NIDS
• Checkpoint Smart Defense (all versions)
• McAfee VirusScan Enterprise (v8 and v8.5)
• Bluecoat proxy (all versions)
• Cisco VPN concentrators (all versions)
Agentless
• Cisco PIX, ASA and FWSM (all versions)
• Cisco IOS routers (all versions)
• Juniper Netscreen (all versions)
• SonicWall firewall (all versions)
• Checkpoint firewall (all versions)
• All operating systems specified in the
  “operating systems” section
Supportted Log Formats
• DB Logs (Mysql, PostgreSQL)
• Unix like logs (dpkg, yum, su, sudo)
• Mail Server, FTP, SSH, Xinetd logs
• Web Server logs (apache, IIS, Zeus)
• Web Apps (Horde, ModSecurity)
• NIDS (Snort, Cisco IOS/IPS, Checkpoint)
• Sec.Tools (Symantec and McAfee AV, nmap)
• Windows Events
Secure by Default

• Installation script does the chroot, user
  creation, permissions, etc
• User has no choice to run it “less secure”
• Each process with limited privileges and
  tasks
DOCS
http://www.ossec.net

#ossec on freenode

- mailing lists

- wiki, manuals, etc

- source :-)
Network Communication
OSSEC Log Flow
OSSEC Log Flow
Agent -> Server
Arquitetura OSSEC
Network Communication
Internal Log Flow
Agent -> Server

• Zlib Compressed
• Blowfish Encrypted
• udp 1514
• Centralized Management
Integrity Check
• each X time, or realtime
• File / Directory Properties
• Permissions
• Size
• Ownership
• sha1sum
• md5sum
Rootkit Checks
• Signature (Adore, Knark, LOC) and anomaly-
  based
• Files in /dev which aren't device files
• Hidden directories
• SUID files
• Files owned by root world-writable
• Running processes hidden from “ps”
• Listening ports hidden from “netstat”
• Promiscuous interfaces
Policy Monitoring
• Identify situation which can lead to a breach
• Benchmark system against CIS standard
  ( http://cisecurity.org ) or create your own
• File, registry setting, or process exists or
  does not exist (win_audit_rcl.txt,
  win_applications_rcl.txt)
• Is anti-virus installed but not running?
• Has the host firewall been disabled?
• How do you know your systems are still
  hardened?
OSSEC WebUI
Rules


• XML Files
• Levels -> 0 to 15
Rules


•   Atomic
•   Composite
Rule Sample
<!-- SSHD messages -->
<group name="syslog,sshd,">
 <rule id="5700" level="0" noalert="1">
   <decoded_as>sshd</decoded_as>
   <description>SSHD messages grouped.</description>
 </rule>
Rule Sample
<rule id="5704" level="4">
 <if_sid>5700</if_sid>
 <match>fatal: Timeout before authentication for</match>
 <description>Timeout while logging in (sshd).</description>
</rule>

<rule id="5705" level="10" frequency="4" timeframe="360">
 <if_matched_sid>5704</if_matched_sid>
 <description>Possible scan or breakin attempt </description>
 <description>(high number of login timeouts).</description>
</rule>
Analysys Tree
OSSEC in the real world

• Authentication control
• MSN usage
• Integrity checking
• Authentication logs
Authentication control
  • Alerting on every authentication success
      outside business hours ➔ Every
      authentication event is classified as
      “authentication success” (that's why we use
      if_group
  •   Added to local_rules.xml:
<rule id="100101" level="10">
    <if_group>authentication_success</if_group>
    <time>7 pm ­ 6:30 am</time>
    <description>Login during non­business hours.</
    description>
</rule>
Authentication control 2
  • Alerting on first time logins outside business
      hours
  • We have some FTS (first time seen) rules
  • Increased severity when a user logs in for
      the first time on a specific system outside
      business hours ➔ Added to
      local_rules.xml:
<rule id="100101" level="13">
    <if_sid>18119, 10100</if_sid>
    <time>7 pm ­ 6:30 am</time>
     <description>First time Login during non­bus. hours.<description>
</rule>
MSN Usage
     • Alerting on new MSN users ➔ MSN logs to
         the event log (with the email address) every
         time it starts
<rule id="100213" level="7">
     <if_sid>18101</if_sid>
     <id>102</id>
     <match>The database engine started a new instance</match>
      <description>MSN login.</description>
</rule>

2008 Apr 17 20:02:16 (xx) 192.168.2.190­>WinEvtLog WinEvtLog: Application:
INFORMATION(102): ESENT: (no user): no domain: OSSEC­HM: msnmsgr (1240) .C:
Documents and SettingsxyzLocal SettingsApplication DataMicrosoftMessenger
xyz@hotmail.comSharingMetadataWorkingdatabase_F218_E 79B_18E7_5CDBdfsr.db:
The database engine started a new instance (0)
Integrity Checking

  • Alerting with high severity on
      changes to /var/www/htdocs

<rule id="100345" level="12">
    <if_matched_group>syscheck</if_matched_group>
    <description>Changes to /var/www/htdocs – Critical file!</description>
    <match>/var/www/htdocs</match>
</rule>
Auth Logs
    •   Brute force attempts followed by a success

Rule: 5720 (level 10) ­> 'Multiple SSHD authentication failures.' Src
IP: 125.192.xx.xx Feb 11 09:31:58 wpor sshd[4565]: Failed
password for root from 125.192.xx.xx port 42976 ssh2
Feb 11 09:31:58 wpor sshd[4565]: Failed password for admin from
125.192.xx.xx port 42976 ssh2

Feb 11 09:31:58 wpor sshd[4565]: Failed password for admin from
125.192.xx.xx port 42976 ssh2 Rule: 40112 (level 12) ­> 'Multiple
authentication failures followed by a success.' Src IP:
125.192.67.136
User: admin Feb 11 09:31:58 wpor sshd[7235]: Accepted password
for admin from 125.192.xx.xx port 42198 ssh2
And many more !

      "Nobody knows your
environment/applications as you"
The “OSSEC Efect”
Challenges
• Deploying large amounts of agents
• Attackers who know Active Response is in
  use may try to use that to their advantage
• IPs can be spoofed, thereby triggering an
  incorrect response (whitelists, response
  timeouts)
• Alert Flooding - By default, OSSEC will only
  send 12 alerts per hour
• Log Injection
• - Tuning rules never stops !
Let`s do it !
Implementing ossec

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Implementing ossec

  • 1. Implementing OSSEC HIDS Jerônimo Zucco jczucco@gmail.com
  • 2. /me • Security guy • blog: http://jczucco.blogspot.com • Twitter: @jczucco • zucco on freenode • http://www.linkedin.com/in/jeronimozucco
  • 3. Agenda • Introduction • Arquiteture • Log Analysis • Integrity Monitoring • Rootkit Detection • Policy audit
  • 4. Agenda • Alerts • Active Response • Server and Agents Instalations • Configuration Files • Rule Files • Customize Rules
  • 15. Why Log ? Because we want to 2% Because we have to: (PCI-DSS, HIPAA, ISO 27K, SOX)
  • 19. CEE Common Event Expression http://cee.mitre.org
  • 20.
  • 22. Daniel Cid @danielcid Third Brigade, Trend Micro
  • 23. • Open Source Host­based IDS (HIDS) • File Integrity checking • Registry Integrity checking • Host­based anomaly detection • Policy monitoring/enforcement • Active response
  • 25. OSSEC in the News • OSSEC #1 open source security tool in the enterprise http://www.linuxworld.com/news/ 2007/031207-top-5-security.html • OSSEC #2 IDS tool in the security tools survey. http://sectools.org/ids.html • More: http://www.ossec.net/wiki/IntheNews
  • 26. OSSEC Agents • GNU/Linux (all distributions, including RHEL, Ubuntu, Slackware, Debian, etc) • Windows XP,2000,2003,Vista,2008,Seven • VMWare ESX 3.0,3.5 (including CIS checks) • *BSD • Solaris 2.7,2.8,2.9 and 10 • AIX 5.3 • HP-UX 10, 11, 11i • MacOSX 10
  • 27. Support via Syslog • Cisco PIX, ASA and FWSM (all versions) • Cisco IOS routers (all versions) • Juniper Netscreen (all versions) • SonicWall firewall (all versions) • Checkpoint firewall (all versions) • Cisco IOS IDS/IPS module (all versions) • Sourcefire (Snort) IDS/IPS (all versions)
  • 28. Support via Syslog • Dragon NIDS • Checkpoint Smart Defense (all versions) • McAfee VirusScan Enterprise (v8 and v8.5) • Bluecoat proxy (all versions) • Cisco VPN concentrators (all versions)
  • 29. Agentless • Cisco PIX, ASA and FWSM (all versions) • Cisco IOS routers (all versions) • Juniper Netscreen (all versions) • SonicWall firewall (all versions) • Checkpoint firewall (all versions) • All operating systems specified in the “operating systems” section
  • 30. Supportted Log Formats • DB Logs (Mysql, PostgreSQL) • Unix like logs (dpkg, yum, su, sudo) • Mail Server, FTP, SSH, Xinetd logs • Web Server logs (apache, IIS, Zeus) • Web Apps (Horde, ModSecurity) • NIDS (Snort, Cisco IOS/IPS, Checkpoint) • Sec.Tools (Symantec and McAfee AV, nmap) • Windows Events
  • 31. Secure by Default • Installation script does the chroot, user creation, permissions, etc • User has no choice to run it “less secure” • Each process with limited privileges and tasks
  • 32. DOCS http://www.ossec.net #ossec on freenode - mailing lists - wiki, manuals, etc - source :-)
  • 35. OSSEC Log Flow Agent -> Server
  • 39. Agent -> Server • Zlib Compressed • Blowfish Encrypted • udp 1514 • Centralized Management
  • 40. Integrity Check • each X time, or realtime • File / Directory Properties • Permissions • Size • Ownership • sha1sum • md5sum
  • 41. Rootkit Checks • Signature (Adore, Knark, LOC) and anomaly- based • Files in /dev which aren't device files • Hidden directories • SUID files • Files owned by root world-writable • Running processes hidden from “ps” • Listening ports hidden from “netstat” • Promiscuous interfaces
  • 42. Policy Monitoring • Identify situation which can lead to a breach • Benchmark system against CIS standard ( http://cisecurity.org ) or create your own • File, registry setting, or process exists or does not exist (win_audit_rcl.txt, win_applications_rcl.txt) • Is anti-virus installed but not running? • Has the host firewall been disabled? • How do you know your systems are still hardened?
  • 44. Rules • XML Files • Levels -> 0 to 15
  • 45. Rules • Atomic • Composite
  • 46. Rule Sample <!-- SSHD messages --> <group name="syslog,sshd,"> <rule id="5700" level="0" noalert="1"> <decoded_as>sshd</decoded_as> <description>SSHD messages grouped.</description> </rule>
  • 47. Rule Sample <rule id="5704" level="4"> <if_sid>5700</if_sid> <match>fatal: Timeout before authentication for</match> <description>Timeout while logging in (sshd).</description> </rule> <rule id="5705" level="10" frequency="4" timeframe="360"> <if_matched_sid>5704</if_matched_sid> <description>Possible scan or breakin attempt </description> <description>(high number of login timeouts).</description> </rule>
  • 49. OSSEC in the real world • Authentication control • MSN usage • Integrity checking • Authentication logs
  • 50. Authentication control • Alerting on every authentication success outside business hours ➔ Every authentication event is classified as “authentication success” (that's why we use if_group • Added to local_rules.xml: <rule id="100101" level="10"> <if_group>authentication_success</if_group> <time>7 pm ­ 6:30 am</time> <description>Login during non­business hours.</ description> </rule>
  • 51. Authentication control 2 • Alerting on first time logins outside business hours • We have some FTS (first time seen) rules • Increased severity when a user logs in for the first time on a specific system outside business hours ➔ Added to local_rules.xml: <rule id="100101" level="13"> <if_sid>18119, 10100</if_sid> <time>7 pm ­ 6:30 am</time> <description>First time Login during non­bus. hours.<description> </rule>
  • 52. MSN Usage • Alerting on new MSN users ➔ MSN logs to the event log (with the email address) every time it starts <rule id="100213" level="7"> <if_sid>18101</if_sid> <id>102</id> <match>The database engine started a new instance</match> <description>MSN login.</description> </rule> 2008 Apr 17 20:02:16 (xx) 192.168.2.190­>WinEvtLog WinEvtLog: Application: INFORMATION(102): ESENT: (no user): no domain: OSSEC­HM: msnmsgr (1240) .C: Documents and SettingsxyzLocal SettingsApplication DataMicrosoftMessenger xyz@hotmail.comSharingMetadataWorkingdatabase_F218_E 79B_18E7_5CDBdfsr.db: The database engine started a new instance (0)
  • 53. Integrity Checking • Alerting with high severity on changes to /var/www/htdocs <rule id="100345" level="12"> <if_matched_group>syscheck</if_matched_group> <description>Changes to /var/www/htdocs – Critical file!</description> <match>/var/www/htdocs</match> </rule>
  • 54. Auth Logs • Brute force attempts followed by a success Rule: 5720 (level 10) ­> 'Multiple SSHD authentication failures.' Src IP: 125.192.xx.xx Feb 11 09:31:58 wpor sshd[4565]: Failed password for root from 125.192.xx.xx port 42976 ssh2 Feb 11 09:31:58 wpor sshd[4565]: Failed password for admin from 125.192.xx.xx port 42976 ssh2 Feb 11 09:31:58 wpor sshd[4565]: Failed password for admin from 125.192.xx.xx port 42976 ssh2 Rule: 40112 (level 12) ­> 'Multiple authentication failures followed by a success.' Src IP: 125.192.67.136 User: admin Feb 11 09:31:58 wpor sshd[7235]: Accepted password for admin from 125.192.xx.xx port 42198 ssh2
  • 55. And many more ! "Nobody knows your environment/applications as you"
  • 57. Challenges • Deploying large amounts of agents • Attackers who know Active Response is in use may try to use that to their advantage • IPs can be spoofed, thereby triggering an incorrect response (whitelists, response timeouts) • Alert Flooding - By default, OSSEC will only send 12 alerts per hour • Log Injection • - Tuning rules never stops !
  • 58.