"Great October Socialist Revolution" or Bolshevik coup?
1. The Russian Revolution
1815-1924
Great October; April, 1917-January, 1918
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
2. Major Topics
• Introduction: The Hero in History
• The Sealed Train
• July Days
• Kornilov
• Great October Socialist Revolution
• Land! Peace! Bread!
• The Death of Constitutionalism
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
9. “Great Men” versus “Blind Forces”
•April Theses
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
10. “Great Men” versus “Blind Forces”
•April Theses
• July Days
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
11. “Great Men” versus “Blind Forces”
•April Theses
• July Days
•Red October
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
12. “Great Men” versus “Blind Forces”
•April Theses
• July Days
•Red October
•Brest-Litovsk
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
13. One need not believe that history is made by “great men” to
appreciate the immense importance of Lenin for the Russian
Revolution and the regime that emerged from it...the regime that he
established in October 1917 institutionalized, as it were, his
personality….Communist Russia, therefore, was throughout its
seventy-four years to an unusual extent the embodiment of the mind
and psyche of one man…
Pipes, p. 101
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
17. The locomotive
which brought the
The Sealed Train “Bolshevik
bacillus”
across Germany
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
18. 1920 photo of Lenin’s Zurich tenement
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
19. 1920 photo of Lenin’s Zurich tenement
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
20. Lenin Hits Bottom
The war years were for Lenin and Krupskaya a time of
severe trials, a time of poverty and isolation from Russia.
They lived in quarters that bordered on slums, took their
meals in the company of prostitutes and criminals, and
found themselves abandoned by many past followers who
had come to regard Lenin as a dangerous fanatic. The only
shaft of light for Lenin during this dark period was his love
affair with Inessa Armand, the daughter of two music hall
artists and the wife of a wealthy Russian. She had met
Lenin in Paris in 1910 and soon became his mistress under
the tolerant eye of Krupskaya. Armand seems to have been
the only human being with whom Lenin ever established
true intimacy.
Pipes, p. 112
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
30. For all his talk of civil war, Lenin had little faith in the imminence
of revolution. Addressing a gathering of socialist youths in Zurich
on January of 9/22 1917, he predicted that while Europe would not
escape social upheaval, “we old-timers perhaps shall not live [to
see] the decisive battles of the looming revolution.”
Seven weeks later, tsarism collapsed.
Pipes, p. 113
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
32. “There is a tide...
There is a tide in the affairs of men
Which taken at the flood, leads on
to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in
miseries.
Julius Cæsar. Act i. Sc. 3.
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
33. The Parvus Puzzle
• born in the shtetl Berezino, raised in Odessa, began
associating with The Bund
• 1886-age 19, fled the pogroms to Zurich
• 1891-PhD in philosophy, Marxist, emigrated to
Germany, joined the SPD, befriended fellow
emigreRosa Luxemburg
• 1900-meets Lenin in Munich, encourages the
publication of Iskra
• 1904-predicts Russia would lose the war with Japan,
German intelligence recruits him to work against
Imperial Russia
born Israel Lazarevich Gelfand
( Израиль Лазаревич Гельфанд)
1867-1924
• 1905-arrives in Skt-Peterburg with false papers, tries Revolutionary nom de guerre
to engineer financial collapse, exiled to Siberia PARVUS
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
34. The Strategy of “Permanent Revolution”
The final act of the 1905 Revolution was played out in Moscow. On
December 6, the Moscow Soviet, dominated by the Bolsheviks, called
for an armed uprising to overthrow the tsarist government, convene a
Constituent Assembly, and proclaim a democratic republic. The
strategy behind this action, which came to be known as one of
“permanent revolution,” was formulated by Alexander Helphand ….
Parvus argued that socialists should not allow the first stage of the
Revolution to solidify “bourgeois” rule but proceed at once to the
next, socialist phase. Witte ruthlessly crushed the Moscow uprising….
Pipes, pp. 43-44
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
35. Does Parvus finance Lenin’s return?
• 1906-all three Siberian prisoners,
pictured here, escaped to the West;
Parvus to Germany, Trotsky to NYC
• Parvus arranges to produce Maxim
Gorky’s play, The Lower Depths, with
profits divided between Gorky & the
RSDLP. He is accused of pocketing
the proceeds
• during the Balkan wars he is an agent
for Germany in Istanbul. He also
Parvus (left) with fellow Siberian exiles, profits as an arms merchant for Krupp
Lev Bronstein (Trotsky) & Lev Deich
& Vickers Ltd
(Leo Deutch) a Menshevik leader
• 1915-he convinces German intelligence
to support the Russian emigres
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
36. The support that nearly all European socialist parties gave their
national governments at the outbreak of war unquestionably
betrayed their solemn [pacifist] pledges...provoked a crisis within
the international socialist movement….
[There was a] pro-war majority against a minority with strong
Russian representation, which demanded an instant suspension of
hostilities. Lenin headed the extreme wing of that minority in that
instead of calling for immediate peace, he insisted that the
war between nations be transformed into a war between
classes [even though civil war at home entailed military
defeat by Germany].
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
37. Lenin’s anti-Russian propaganda, his open endorsement of
Russia’s defeat, attracted the attention of the German
government. One of its experts on Russian affairs was Alexander
Helphand-Parvus….After the outbreak of the war, he argued that
the interests of Russian revolutionaries and those of the German
government coincided….In 1915 he contacted Lenin in Zurich,
but at that point Lenin rejected his advances. [Lenin] agreed,
however, in return for financial help, to supply another German
agent...with reports on internal conditions in Russia sent to him
by his followers there. These activities, as well as his relations
with the Austrian government, constituted high treason and
Lenin maintained about them to the end of his life complete
silence. They only came to light after German and Austrian
archives were thrown open.
Pipes, p.111
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
38. [In 1917, after the February Revolution] the principal proponent of
the “Lenin card” was Parvus….With extraordinary foresight he
predicted that once Lenin returned home he would topple the
Provisional Government, take charge, and conclude a separate peace.
He understood Lenin’s lust for power…
At 3:20 p.m. on March 27/April 9, thirty-two Russian émigrés left the
Zurich railway station for the German frontier. Among the
passengers were Lenin, Krupskaya, Grigorii Zinoviev with his wife
and child, and Inessa Armand….
In Stockholm, Parvus awaited them. He asked to meet Lenin, but
Lenin refused, turning him over to Karl Radek …it is virtually
certain that the two worked out the terms of German
support for the Bolsheviks.
Pipes, pp. 115-117
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
39. Swiss Communist Fritz Platten, 1883-1942
• after the collapse of the Second
International he joined the Zimmerwald
Movement and became a communist
• he was most famous for arranging the
trip in the sealed train from Zurich to
Stettin, thence by ferry to neutral
Stockholm
• 1919-Platten was active in the
foundation Third (Communist)
International and spent time in the
USSR representing the Swiss CP
Lenin and Platten in 1919
• 1938-arrested in the Stalinist purges,
sent to a camp where he was shot in
1942
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
40. The Route of the “Sealed Train”
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
41. The Route of the “Sealed Train”
• the trip in the sealed train from Zurich to
Stettin,
• thence by ferry to neutral Stockholm
• Swedish communists then arranged the
train trip north to the Swedish-Finland
border
• through Russian Finland
• to the Finland Station in Petrograd
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
50. The April Theses
The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two
meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4,
1917. In the Theses, Lenin:
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
51. The April Theses
The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two
meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4,
1917. In the Theses, Lenin:
■ Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it,
as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I
as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign
communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism.
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
52. The April Theses
The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two
meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4,
1917. In the Theses, Lenin:
■ Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it,
as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I
as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign
communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism.
■ Asserts that Russia is "passing from the first [bourgeois] stage of the revolution
—which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the
proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to its second stage, which
must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the
peasants";
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
53. The April Theses
The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two
meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4,
1917. In the Theses, Lenin:
■ Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it,
as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I
as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign
communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism.
■ Asserts that Russia is "passing from the first [bourgeois] stage of the revolution
—which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the
proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to its second stage, which
must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the
peasants";
■ Recognizes that the Bolsheviks are a minority in most of the soviets against a "bloc of all
the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, from the Popular Socialists and the Socialist
Revolutionaries down to the Organizing Committee (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), Steklov,
etc., etc., who have yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie and spread that influence
among the proletariat."
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
54. The April Theses
The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two
meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4,
1917. In the Theses, Lenin:
■ Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it,
as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I
as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign
communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism.
■ Asserts that Russia is "passing from the first [bourgeois] stage of the revolution
—which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the
proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to its second stage, which
must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the
peasants";
■ Recognizes that the Bolsheviks are a minority in most of the soviets against a "bloc of all
the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, from the Popular Socialists and the Socialist
Revolutionaries down to the Organizing Committee (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), Steklov,
etc., etc., who have yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie and spread that influence
among the proletariat."
■ Condemns the establishment of a parliamentary republic. He calls this a "retrograde
step." He instead calls for "a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Laborers'
and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom." [ALL POWER
TO THE SOVIETS, JBP]
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
55. The April Theses
The April Theses were published in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and read by Lenin at two
meetings of the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on April 4,
1917. In the Theses, Lenin:
■ Condemns the Provisional Government as bourgeois and urges "no support" for it,
as "the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear." He condemns World War I
as a "predatory imperialist war" and the "revolutionary defensism" of foreign
communist parties, calling for revolutionary defeatism.
■ Asserts that Russia is "passing from the first [bourgeois] stage of the revolution
—which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the
proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to its second stage, which
must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the
peasants";
■ Recognizes that the Bolsheviks are a minority in most of the soviets against a "bloc of all
the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, from the Popular Socialists and the Socialist
Revolutionaries down to the Organizing Committee (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), Steklov,
etc., etc., who have yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie and spread that influence
among the proletariat."
■ Condemns the establishment of a parliamentary republic. He calls this a "retrograde
step." He instead calls for "a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Laborers'
and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom." [ALL POWER
TO THE SOVIETS, JBP]
■ Calls for "abolition of the police, the army, and the bureaucracy" and for "the
salaries of all officials, all of whom are elective and displaceable at any time, not to
exceed the average wage of a competent worker."
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
57. The April Theses
Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of
Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," confiscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all
lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and
Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The
setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300
dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies)
under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account."
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
58. The April Theses
Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of
Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," confiscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all
lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and
Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The
setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300
dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies)
under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account."
■ Calls for "the immediate union of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the
institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies."
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
59. The April Theses
Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of
Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," confiscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all
lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and
Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The
setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300
dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies)
under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account."
■ Calls for "the immediate union of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the
institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies."
■ States that "it is not our immediate task to 'introduce' socialism, but only to bring social
production and the distribution of products at once under the control of the Soviets of
Workers' Deputies."
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
60. The April Theses
Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of
Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," confiscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all
lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and
Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The
setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300
dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies)
under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account."
■ Calls for "the immediate union of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the
institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies."
■ States that "it is not our immediate task to 'introduce' socialism, but only to bring social
production and the distribution of products at once under the control of the Soviets of
Workers' Deputies."
■ Lists "party tasks" as "Immediate convocation of a party congress," "alteration of the party
program, mainly: (1) On the question of imperialism and the imperialist war, (2) On our attitude
towards the state and our demand for a "commune state," amendment of our out-of-date
minimum program," and change of the Party's name." Lenin notes that "instead of "Social
Democracy," whose official leaders throughout the world have betrayed socialism and deserted to
the bourgeoisie (the 'defencists' and the vacillating 'Kautskyites'), we must call ourselves the
Communist Party." The name change would dissociate the Bolsheviks from the social
democratic parties of Europe supporting participation of their nation in World War I. Lenin first
developed this point in his 1915 pamphlet "Socialism and War," when he first called the pro-war
social-democrats "social chauvinists."
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
61. The April Theses
Calls for "The weight of emphasis in the agrarian program to be shifted to the Soviets of
Agricultural Laborers' Deputies," confiscation of all landed estates," and "nationalization of all
lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' and
Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The
setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300
dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies)
under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies and for the public account."
■ Calls for "the immediate union of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the
institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies."
■ States that "it is not our immediate task to 'introduce' socialism, but only to bring social
production and the distribution of products at once under the control of the Soviets of
Workers' Deputies."
■ Lists "party tasks" as "Immediate convocation of a party congress," "alteration of the party
program, mainly: (1) On the question of imperialism and the imperialist war, (2) On our attitude
towards the state and our demand for a "commune state," amendment of our out-of-date
minimum program," and change of the Party's name." Lenin notes that "instead of "Social
Democracy," whose official leaders throughout the world have betrayed socialism and deserted to
the bourgeoisie (the 'defencists' and the vacillating 'Kautskyites'), we must call ourselves the
Communist Party." The name change would dissociate the Bolsheviks from the social
democratic parties of Europe supporting participation of their nation in World War I. Lenin first
developed this point in his 1915 pamphlet "Socialism and War," when he first called the pro-war
social-democrats "social chauvinists."
■ Calls for a new "revolutionary International, an International against the social-chauvinists and
against the 'Center.'" This later became the Comintern (Third International) formed in 1919.
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
62. April Riots Coalition Government
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
63. April Riots Coalition Government
• a disagreement over war aims developed between the government
and the Petrograd Soviet
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
64. April Riots Coalition Government
• a disagreement over war aims developed between the government
and the Petrograd Soviet
• the Soviet wanted war till victory but “without annexations and indemnities”
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
65. April Riots Coalition Government
• a disagreement over war aims developed between the government
and the Petrograd Soviet
• the Soviet wanted war till victory but “without annexations and indemnities”
• Foreign Minister Miliukov still wanted the promised Turkish Straits and Constantinople
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
66. April Riots Coalition Government
• a disagreement over war aims developed between the government
and the Petrograd Soviet
• the Soviet wanted war till victory but “without annexations and indemnities”
• Foreign Minister Miliukov still wanted the promised Turkish Straits and Constantinople
• this led to street demonstrations by the soldiers brought out by
radical junior officers which the Bolsheviks joined
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
67. April Riots Coalition Government
• a disagreement over war aims developed between the government
and the Petrograd Soviet
• the Soviet wanted war till victory but “without annexations and indemnities”
• Foreign Minister Miliukov still wanted the promised Turkish Straits and Constantinople
• this led to street demonstrations by the soldiers brought out by
radical junior officers which the Bolsheviks joined
• in this first crisis the government appealed to the socialists in the
Soviet to enter a coalition
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
68. April Riots Coalition Government
• a disagreement over war aims developed between the government
and the Petrograd Soviet
• the Soviet wanted war till victory but “without annexations and indemnities”
• Foreign Minister Miliukov still wanted the promised Turkish Straits and Constantinople
• this led to street demonstrations by the soldiers brought out by
radical junior officers which the Bolsheviks joined
• in this first crisis the government appealed to the socialists in the
Soviet to enter a coalition
• Miliukov and Guchkov were out, six socialists from the Soviet accepted ministries, and
Kerensky [the only SR] became War Minister
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
70. By entering the “bourgeois” government, the socialists
automatically came to share the blame for everything
that went wrong, for they were now part of the
establishment. This allowed the Bolsheviks, who refused
to join, to pose as...the tr ue custodians of the
Revolution. And since under the hopelessly incompetent
administration of liberal and socialist intellectuals events
were bound to go from bad to worse, they positioned
themselves as the only party able to save Russia.
Pipes, p. 120
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
71. Delegates to the First All-Russian Session of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
photographed in the Tauride Palace, former home of the Duma, June, 1917
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
73. Street demonstration in Petrograd, June, 1917
The banner in the foreground reads:
Down with the 10 capitalist ministers/All power to the Soviets of Workers,
Soldiers and Peasants Deputies & to the Socialist Ministers/
We demand that Nicholas II be transferred to Peter and Paul Fortress
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
75. July Days
Petrograd, July 4, 1917. Street demonstration on Nevsky Prospekt just after troops of the
Provisional Government have opened fire with machine guns.
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
77. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals
1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
78. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals
1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government
2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then
pulled back:
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
79. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals
1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government
2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then
pulled back:
• they were really willing to use force, and
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
80. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals
1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government
2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then
pulled back:
• they were really willing to use force, and
• they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
81. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals
1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government
2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then
pulled back:
• they were really willing to use force, and
• they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so
3. they thought in global terms and didn’t much care what happened
to Russia, for them a mere stepping-stone to the World Revolution
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
82. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals
1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government
2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then
pulled back:
• they were really willing to use force, and
• they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so
3. they thought in global terms and didn’t much care what happened
to Russia, for them a mere stepping-stone to the World Revolution
• they could act with complete irresponsibility
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
83. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals
1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government
2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then
pulled back:
• they were really willing to use force, and
• they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so
3. they thought in global terms and didn’t much care what happened
to Russia, for them a mere stepping-stone to the World Revolution
• they could act with complete irresponsibility
• promise every group what it wanted
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
84. Bolshevik Advantages over their Rivals
1. their pose as the “sole alternative” to the Provisional Government
2. unlike the SRs and the Mensheviks who talked revolution, but then
pulled back:
• they were really willing to use force, and
• they had a unique paramilitary organization able to do so
3. they thought in global terms and didn’t much care what happened
to Russia, for them a mere stepping-stone to the World Revolution
• they could act with complete irresponsibility
• promise every group what it wanted
• encourage every destructive trend
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
85. RED GUARD
[of the]
The banner reads:
photo from 1917
factory
Vulcan
II. GR.
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
86. Red Guard bodyguards for Bolshevik
Nachalstvo (leadership)
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
87. The Other Bolshevik Tool
Pravda (Truth) financed by the German government
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
89. The antiwar propaganda was carried out in muted tones,
for the troops hated the Germans and Lenin was already
under suspicion of being their a gent. Bolshevik
newspapers distributed in vast quantities to the men in
uniform carried a subtile message that was propagandistic
rather than agitational in nature:* The soldiers were not to
lay down their arms, but ponder who wanted war and to
what end? (The answer: the “bourgeoisie”) This was a
veiled appeal for civil war. The troops were exhorted
under no circumstances to let themselves be used against
the workers (by which was meant the Bolshevik Party).
Pipes, pp. 120-21
________________
*In the vocabulary of the Russian Revolutionaries, “agitation” meant an appeal to
immediate action, whereas “propaganda” called for planting ideas in subjects’ minds
which in due course would move them to act on their own
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
90. Kerensky as Warlord
• an offensive was scheduled for mid-June
• Kerensky’s personal contribution consisted
in rousing the troops with patriotic speeches
• these had an enormous immediate effect
which evaporated as soon as he left
• the generals regarded such rhetoric
sceptically, dubbing the Minister “Persuader
in Chief ”
• the will to fight was no longer there
• “Why should I die now when at home a new,
freer life is only beginning?” Saluting in the carriage as
troops pass in review
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
95. The Failed Kerensky Offensive
• 16 June-the offensive opens against Lwow
and Galicia--the Austrians
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
96. The Failed Kerensky Offensive
• 16 June-the offensive opens against Lwow
and Galicia--the Austrians
• the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes
good initial gains ()
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
97. The Failed Kerensky Offensive
• 16 June-the offensive opens against Lwow
and Galicia--the Austrians
• the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes
good initial gains ()
• once again, the Germans come to the aid of
their weaker ally ()
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
98. The Failed Kerensky Offensive
• 16 June-the offensive opens against Lwow
and Galicia--the Austrians
• the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes
good initial gains ()
• once again, the Germans come to the aid of
their weaker ally ()
• the Russian gains were erased and they fell
back to the dotted line positions
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
99. The Failed Kerensky Offensive
• 16 June-the offensive opens against Lwow
and Galicia--the Austrians
• the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes
good initial gains ()
• once again, the Germans come to the aid of
their weaker ally ()
• the Russian gains were erased and they fell
back to the dotted line positions
• the June offensive was the dying gasp of the
Russian army
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
100. The Failed Kerensky Offensive
• 16 June-the offensive opens against Lwow
and Galicia--the Austrians
• the Eighth Army under Kornilov makes
good initial gains ()
• once again, the Germans come to the aid of
their weaker ally ()
• the Russian gains were erased and they fell
back to the dotted line positions
• the June offensive was the dying gasp of the
Russian army
• this military failure weakened the reputation
of Kerensky and his government
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
102. The July Uprising
• 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministers
resigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over another
issue
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
103. The July Uprising
• 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministers
resigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over another
issue
• neither the Soviet nor the Bolsheviks wanted an uprising, correctly
assessing that “the correlation of forces” didn’t bode well
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
104. The July Uprising
• 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministers
resigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over another
issue
• neither the Soviet nor the Bolsheviks wanted an uprising, correctly
assessing that “the correlation of forces” didn’t bode well
• 3 July--nevertheless, when the government ordered forty-year-old
soldiers who had been furloughed to work their farms back to the
front, military demonstrations erupted
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
105. The July Uprising
• 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministers
resigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over another
issue
• neither the Soviet nor the Bolsheviks wanted an uprising, correctly
assessing that “the correlation of forces” didn’t bode well
• 3 July--nevertheless, when the government ordered forty-year-old
soldiers who had been furloughed to work their farms back to the
front, military demonstrations erupted
• 4 July--20,ooo Kronstadt sailors joined the soldiers. They marched
on both the government and the Soviet demanding that the latter
assume all power
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
106. The July Uprising
• 2 July--as news from the front turned negative, four Kadet ministers
resigned from the Provisional (Coalition) Government over another
issue
• neither the Soviet nor the Bolsheviks wanted an uprising, correctly
assessing that “the correlation of forces” didn’t bode well
• 3 July--nevertheless, when the government ordered forty-year-old
soldiers who had been furloughed to work their farms back to the
front, military demonstrations erupted
• 4 July--20,ooo Kronstadt sailors joined the soldiers. They marched
on both the government and the Soviet demanding that the latter
assume all power
• 5 July--the turning point Kerensky releases “forged” (were they?)
documents connecting the Bolsheviks to their German paymasters
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
110. Lenin’s Role?
• 4 July--originally out of Petrograd in Finland, Lenin returned hastily
and addressed the demonstrators outside the Tauride Palace
• he counseled a peaceful demonstration but echoed their demand
(originally his!) of “All Power to the Soviets”
• had he planned a coup as Lunacharsky later claimed?
• did he “chicken out” when he saw an unfavorable “correlation of
forces” as Pipes claims (p. 127)?
• was he instrumental in persuading the Bolshevik Central
Committee to take a leadership role in the uprising even though it
was doomed to fail and the party would be hunted down and
suppressed in the aftermath? (the official Soviet history and Sidney
Hook’s version)
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
111. Wiki’s “take”
No public record was ever made of the internal debates of the
Bolshevik Party around the July Days. There were some
within the Bolshevik Party who advocated an intensification of
activity on July 4th. Most prominent among those were Nikolai
Podvoisky and Vladimir Nevsky, leaders of the Bolshevik
Military Organization, Volodarsky a member of the Petersburg
Committee and Martin Latis of the Vyborg District Bolshevik
Organization, who was highly critical of the Central
Committee's decision to hold back the masses. Others in the
Bolshevik Party, including V.I. Lenin were split on what to do.
On July 5th at two or three o'clock in the morning, after the
Provisional Government dispatched a number of loyal troops
from the front to the streets of Petrograd and won the support
of a number of previously neutral garrisons of troops, the
Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party decided to call off
the street demonstrations.
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
112. Bolsheviks on the run
Lenin with a wig,
as a fugitive in Finland
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
113. Bolsheviks on the run
• with the arrival of loyal troops from the
front Kerensky is in control
Lenin with a wig,
as a fugitive in Finland
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
114. Bolsheviks on the run
• with the arrival of loyal troops from the
front Kerensky is in control
• he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks
Lenin with a wig,
as a fugitive in Finland
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
115. Bolsheviks on the run
• with the arrival of loyal troops from the
front Kerensky is in control
• he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks
• 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes
Premier and keeps military command
Lenin with a wig,
as a fugitive in Finland
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
116. Bolsheviks on the run
• with the arrival of loyal troops from the
front Kerensky is in control
• he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks
• 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes
Premier and keeps military command
• the Kadets return to the government and it
seems to be firmly in control
Lenin with a wig,
as a fugitive in Finland
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
117. Bolsheviks on the run
• with the arrival of loyal troops from the
front Kerensky is in control
• he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks
• 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes
Premier and keeps military command
• the Kadets return to the government and it
seems to be firmly in control
• despite these events, Kerensky fears a
right- wing, monarchist coup more than a
repetition of a Bolshevik putsch
Lenin with a wig,
as a fugitive in Finland
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
118. Bolsheviks on the run
• with the arrival of loyal troops from the
front Kerensky is in control
• he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks
• 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes
Premier and keeps military command
• the Kadets return to the government and it
seems to be firmly in control
• despite these events, Kerensky fears a
right- wing, monarchist coup more than a
repetition of a Bolshevik putsch
Lenin with a wig,
as a fugitive in Finland
• Lenin takes this time in hiding to finish his
“blueprint,” State and Revolution
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
119. Bolsheviks on the run
• with the arrival of loyal troops from the
front Kerensky is in control
• he hunts down and arrests the Bolsheviks
• 25 July--Lvov resigns, Kerensky becomes
Premier and keeps military command
• the Kadets return to the government and it
seems to be firmly in control
• despite these events, Kerensky fears a
right- wing, monarchist coup more than a
repetition of a Bolshevik putsch
Lenin with a wig,
as a fugitive in Finland
• Lenin takes this time in hiding to finish his
“blueprint,” State and Revolution
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
121. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918
• the key concept is that the “bourgeois state” (Provisional Government)
must be “shattered, broken to pieces”
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
122. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918
• the key concept is that the “bourgeois state” (Provisional Government)
must be “shattered, broken to pieces”
• quoting Marx--the state is “the instrument of class oppression” and its
bureaucracy, police and standing army must be “broken up” (zerbrechen)
and replaced by “the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Marx’s stage 2 in
The Critique of the Gotha Program)
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
123. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918
• the key concept is that the “bourgeois state” (Provisional Government)
must be “shattered, broken to pieces”
• quoting Marx--the state is “the instrument of class oppression” and its
bureaucracy, police and standing army must be “broken up” (zerbrechen)
and replaced by “the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Marx’s stage 2 in
The Critique of the Gotha Program)
• only thus can the state begin to “wither away” (stage 3)
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
124. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918
• the key concept is that the “bourgeois state” (Provisional Government)
must be “shattered, broken to pieces”
• quoting Marx--the state is “the instrument of class oppression” and its
bureaucracy, police and standing army must be “broken up” (zerbrechen)
and replaced by “the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Marx’s stage 2 in
The Critique of the Gotha Program)
• only thus can the state begin to “wither away” (stage 3)
• in place of ministers and bureaucrats, the stage 2 “dictatorship” will
employ “managers and bookkeepers” paid “workmen’s wages”
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
125. State and Revolution, Aug,1917 & 1918
• the key concept is that the “bourgeois state” (Provisional Government)
must be “shattered, broken to pieces”
• quoting Marx--the state is “the instrument of class oppression” and its
bureaucracy, police and standing army must be “broken up” (zerbrechen)
and replaced by “the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Marx’s stage 2 in
The Critique of the Gotha Program)
• only thus can the state begin to “wither away” (stage 3)
• in place of ministers and bureaucrats, the stage 2 “dictatorship” will
employ “managers and bookkeepers” paid “workmen’s wages”
• much of Lenin’s argument is to point out the errors of the Social-
Democrats like Germany’s Karl Kautsky and Russian SR, Viktor Chernov
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
126. “With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forces
passes to his associates.” (Pipes, p. 128)
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
127. “With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forces
passes to his associates.” (Pipes, p. 128)
• Trotsky is the most visible, owing to
his outstanding rhetorical gifts
Lev Davidovich Bronstein,
AKA Leon Trotsky
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
128. “With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forces
passes to his associates.” (Pipes, p. 128)
• Trotsky is the most visible, owing to
his outstanding rhetorical gifts
• operational direction of the coup is
entrusted to the Bolshevik Military
Organization headed by N.I. Podvoiskii
Lev Davidovich Bronstein,
AKA Leon Trotsky
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
129. “With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forces
passes to his associates.” (Pipes, p. 128)
• Trotsky is the most visible, owing to
his outstanding rhetorical gifts
• operational direction of the coup is
entrusted to the Bolshevik Military
Organization headed by N.I. Podvoiskii
• Trotsky compliments Lenin. Better
read, a superior speaker, he can move
crowds; whereas Lenin’s charisma is
limited to his followers
Lev Davidovich Bronstein,
AKA Leon Trotsky
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
130. “With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forces
passes to his associates.” (Pipes, p. 128)
• Trotsky is the most visible, owing to
his outstanding rhetorical gifts
• operational direction of the coup is
entrusted to the Bolshevik Military
Organization headed by N.I. Podvoiskii
• Trotsky compliments Lenin. Better
read, a superior speaker, he can move
crowds; whereas Lenin’s charisma is
limited to his followers
• but Trotsky is unpopular with the cadres:
Lev Davidovich Bronstein,
AKA Leon Trotsky
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
131. “With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forces
passes to his associates.” (Pipes, p. 128)
• Trotsky is the most visible, owing to
his outstanding rhetorical gifts
• operational direction of the coup is
entrusted to the Bolshevik Military
Organization headed by N.I. Podvoiskii
• Trotsky compliments Lenin. Better
read, a superior speaker, he can move
crowds; whereas Lenin’s charisma is
limited to his followers
• but Trotsky is unpopular with the cadres:
• he had joined the party late
Lev Davidovich Bronstein,
AKA Leon Trotsky
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
132. “With Lenin in hiding, the command of the Bolshevik forces
passes to his associates.” (Pipes, p. 128)
• Trotsky is the most visible, owing to
his outstanding rhetorical gifts
• operational direction of the coup is
entrusted to the Bolshevik Military
Organization headed by N.I. Podvoiskii
• Trotsky compliments Lenin. Better
read, a superior speaker, he can move
crowds; whereas Lenin’s charisma is
limited to his followers
• but Trotsky is unpopular with the cadres:
• he had joined the party late
Lev Davidovich Bronstein, • he is insufferably arrogant
AKA Leon Trotsky
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
134. The event that enabled the Bolsheviks to recover from
their July debacle was one of the more bizarre episodes of
the Russian Revolution. Known to historians as the
Kornilov affair, it resulted from a struggle in Kerensky’s
mind between his sense that as head of state in a situation
of near-anarchy and a looming German offensive he
needed the army’s support, and his fear as a socialist
intellectual that the army was likely to breed a
counterrevolutionary Napoleon.*
Pipes, p. 129
___________________
* In private conversations with the author, Kerensky conceded that his actions at the time
had been strongly influenced by the experience of the French Revolution
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
139. “…[Kornilov] had made a rapid career in the army owing
to personal courage and his ability to inspire troops. He
knew little and cared less about politics; such opinions
as he had on the subject were neither conservative nor
monarchist but rather ‘progressive.’ he was an ardent
p a t r i o t . He a l w a y s d i s p l a y e d a t e n d e n c y t o
insubordination.”
Pipes, p. 129
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
140. Lavr Georgeivich Kornilov, 1870-1918
• born to a Siberian cossack military family
• graduate of the artillery school, distinguished
service in the Russo- Japanese and First World
Wars
• 1917-commanded the only successful part
of the Kerensky offensive, he was offered
command of all the Russian forces
• Kornilov accepted, but on certain
conditions:
• removal of the most harmful provisions of Order
No. 1
• reintroduction of the death penalty for desertion
or mutiny, at the front or at the rear
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
141. The Two Rivals
• “Kornilov loves freedom...but Russia comes for him first, and
freedom second, while for Kerensky...freedom and revolution come
first, and Russia second”--Boris Savinkov, Kerensky’s deputy
• negotiations dragged on for two weeks before Kornilov receives
agreement to his conditions. But Kerensky, hostage to the Soviet,
never fulfills the agreement
• 14 August--Kornilov speaks at the Moscow State Conference over
Kerensky’s objection. He is wildly cheered. Liberal and conservative
politicians look to him as the country’s savior.
• “...after the Moscow conference it was clear to me that the next
attempt at a blow would come from the right and not from the
left.”--Aleksandr Kerensky
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
142. Kornilov at the Moscow Conference
taking the crowd’s cheers as he tours in an open limosine
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
143. Misunderstanding or Kerensky Plot?
• 22-27 August--the events of the Kornilov affair are quite complex
and involve third party players who to this day remain unknown
• suffice it to say that Kerensky pretended to believe that Kornilov
was demanding dictatorial powers to deal with a suspected
Bolshevik coup
• he thereupon relieved him of command and ordered his arrest. He
also armed the Petrograd Soviet and Bolsheviks to defend against a
counterrevolutionary coup
• at this point Kornilov did rebel “but only after having been wrongly
charged with rebellion” --Pipes, p. 134
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
144. Was there a “Kornilov plot”? Almost certainly not. The
available evidence indicates there was a “Kerensky plot” to
discredit the commanding general as the ringleader of an
imaginary but widely anticipated counterrevolution, the
suppression of which would elevate the Prime Minister to a
position of unrivaled popularity...Neither Kerensky nor the
Bolsheviks have ever been able to identify a single person
who would admit, or of whom it could be demonstrated,
that he was in collusion with Kornilov: and a conspiracy of
one is an obvious absurdity.
Pipes, p. 135
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
146. Outcomes of the Affair
• Kerensky became estranged from both liberals and conservatives
but failed to solidify his position with the socialists
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
147. Outcomes of the Affair
• Kerensky became estranged from both liberals and conservatives
but failed to solidify his position with the socialists
• of the 40,000 guns distributed to the workers, a good part wound
up in the hands of the Red Guards
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
148. Outcomes of the Affair
• Kerensky became estranged from both liberals and conservatives
but failed to solidify his position with the socialists
• of the 40,000 guns distributed to the workers, a good part wound
up in the hands of the Red Guards
• September--the Bolsheviks showed gains in the municipal elections
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
149. Outcomes of the Affair
• Kerensky became estranged from both liberals and conservatives
but failed to solidify his position with the socialists
• of the 40,000 guns distributed to the workers, a good part wound
up in the hands of the Red Guards
• September--the Bolsheviks showed gains in the municipal elections
• most sinister was the break between Kerensky and the military. The
officer corps despised this treatment of their popular commander
and Kerensky’s pandering to the left. When, in late October, he
would appeal to the military to help save his government
from the Bolsheviks, he would meet with no response.
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
157. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
158. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly
• 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government
scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the first session for 28
November/10 December
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
159. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly
• 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government
scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the first session for 28
November/10 December
• Lenin’s sense of urgency was was inspired by his fear of being
preempted by this peasant, thus SR, dominated body
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
160. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly
• 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government
scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the first session for 28
November/10 December
• Lenin’s sense of urgency was was inspired by his fear of being
preempted by this peasant, thus SR, dominated body
• after November he would be rebelling, not against a “bourgeois”
government; but against the will of the “people”
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
161. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly
• 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government
scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the first session for 28
November/10 December
• Lenin’s sense of urgency was was inspired by his fear of being
preempted by this peasant, thus SR, dominated body
• after November he would be rebelling, not against a “bourgeois”
government; but against the will of the “people”
• hence the Bolsheviks could no longer pretend to act in the name of
the “people”
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
162. The Timing of the Constituent Assembly
• 9/22 August-after interminable delays, the Provisional Government
scheduled elections for 12/25 November and the first session for 28
November/10 December
• Lenin’s sense of urgency was was inspired by his fear of being
preempted by this peasant, thus SR, dominated body
• after November he would be rebelling, not against a “bourgeois”
government; but against the will of the “people”
• hence the Bolsheviks could no longer pretend to act in the name of
the “people”
• although Lenin wanted immediate action, he had to yield to the
majority of his associates who preferred the coup be carried out in
the name of the soviets
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
164. Trotsky and the MilRevCom
• 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the
Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik
revolution
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
165. Trotsky and the MilRevCom
• 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the
Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik
revolution
• this disowned the Menshevik-SR
leadership for the first time
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
166. Trotsky and the MilRevCom
• 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the
Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik
revolution
• this disowned the Menshevik-SR
leadership for the first time
• soon thereafter Trotsky was elected
chairman
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
167. Trotsky and the MilRevCom
• 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the
Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik
revolution
• this disowned the Menshevik-SR
leadership for the first time
• soon thereafter Trotsky was elected
chairman
• 18 September-Bolsheviks gained control
of the Moscow Soviet
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
168. Trotsky and the MilRevCom
• 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the
Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik
revolution
• this disowned the Menshevik-SR
leadership for the first time
• soon thereafter Trotsky was elected
chairman
• 18 September-Bolsheviks gained control
of the Moscow Soviet
• city after city followed
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
169. Trotsky and the MilRevCom
• 13 September(O.S.)-a majority of the
Petrograd Soviet voted for a Bolshevik
revolution
• this disowned the Menshevik-SR
leadership for the first time
• soon thereafter Trotsky was elected
chairman
• 18 September-Bolsheviks gained control
of the Moscow Soviet
• city after city followed
• 13 October-Petrograd established the
Military Revolutionary Committee with
Trotsky as its chairman
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
171. The precipitating event was a German naval operation in
the Gulf of Riga. When completed in early October with
the occupation of three strategic islands, it created a
direct threat to Petrograd. Fearing German capture, the
Russian General Staff proposed to evacuate the
government from Petrograd to Moscow. The Ispolkom
condemned the plan...as motivated by...the desire of the
Provisional Government to surrender the ‘capital of the
Revolution.’ ...the Bolsheviks moved and the Soviet
Plenum approved--over Menshevik objections--a motion
to form a Revolutionary Committee of Defense to
assume charge of the city’s security not only against the
Germans but also against domestic
‘counterrevolutionaries.’
Pipes, pp. 140-41
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
173. Ispolkom “caves” to a Bolshevik 2nd Congress
• Trotsky, as chair of the Petrograd Soviet, “stacks” the voting for calling a
second All-Russian Congress of Soviets for October/November
• the Ispolkom, dominated by Mensheviks and SRs, first condemned this
action in the strongest terms
• 26 Sept/9 Oct-they reversed themselves, agreeing to a Bolshevik-picked
Congress to convene on 25 Oct/7 November
• it was an astonishing and, as it turned out, a fatal capitulation
• “Although aware of what the Bolsheviks had in mind, the Ispolkom gave
them what they wanted: a handpicked body, packed with their adherents
and allies, to legitimize a coup d’etat”
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
174. The Politburo
• although the caption suggests that the
graphic reflects the eve of the October
Revolution, the prominence of Stalin
suggests a later date
• this organ is the “inner circle” of the
party, within the Central Committee
• Lenin had to convince this group that
his timing and strategy was correct
• he secretly returned to Petrograd from
Finland early in October
• 10/23 October-Lenin convinced all but
Kamenev and Zinoviev of the need to
act
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
176. Mesmerized by Bolshevik audacity, the Mensheviks and
S R s r e s i g n e d t h e m s e l v e s to a n o t h e r B o l s h e v i k
“adventure,” but they were not overly concerned, certain
that it would fail like their July putsch. Trotsky, who
during these critical days was everywhere at once, waged a
war of nerves, one day admitting, the next denying, that
an insurrection was under way. He held audiences
spellbound with speeches that alternately promised and
threatened, extolled and ridiculed.
Pipes, p.142
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
177. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
178. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd
• out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, no
more than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
179. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd
• out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, no
more than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks
• but the government could count on even fewer! Most remained
“neutral” The result of the Kornilov affair!
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
180. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd
• out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, no
more than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks
• but the government could count on even fewer! Most remained
“neutral” The result of the Kornilov affair!
• and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
181. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd
• out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, no
more than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks
• but the government could count on even fewer! Most remained
“neutral” The result of the Kornilov affair!
• and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards
• 24 October-Kerensky tried to arrest the Bolshevik commissars
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
182. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd
• out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, no
more than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks
• but the government could count on even fewer! Most remained
“neutral” The result of the Kornilov affair!
• and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards
• 24 October-Kerensky tried to arrest the Bolshevik commissars
• the Winter Palace was garrisoned with a pathetically inadequate force
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
183. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd
• out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, no
more than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks
• but the government could count on even fewer! Most remained
“neutral” The result of the Kornilov affair!
• and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards
• 24 October-Kerensky tried to arrest the Bolshevik commissars
• the Winter Palace was garrisoned with a pathetically inadequate force
• 24-25-that night the Bolsheviks seized key points throughout
Petrograd, cadet guards, told to withdraw, either did so or were
disarmed
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
184. Seizing the Key Points in Petrograd
• out of the total force of 240,000 soldiers in the capital & environs, no
more than 10,000 actively supported the Bolsheviks
• but the government could count on even fewer! Most remained
“neutral” The result of the Kornilov affair!
• and the Bolshevik Military Organization had 20,000 Red Guards
• 24 October-Kerensky tried to arrest the Bolshevik commissars
• the Winter Palace was garrisoned with a pathetically inadequate force
• 24-25-that night the Bolsheviks seized key points throughout
Petrograd, cadet guards, told to withdraw, either did so or were
disarmed
• no resistance was encountered, no shots exchanged
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
186. The Latvian Riflemen
• military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to
defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I.
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
187. The Latvian Riflemen
• military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to
defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I.
• Initially the battalions were formed by volunteers, and from 1916 by
conscription among the Latvian population.
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
188. The Latvian Riflemen
• military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to
defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I.
• Initially the battalions were formed by volunteers, and from 1916 by
conscription among the Latvian population.
• A total of about 40,000 troops were drafted into the Latvian
Riflemen Division.
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
189. The Latvian Riflemen
• military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to
defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I.
• Initially the battalions were formed by volunteers, and from 1916 by
conscription among the Latvian population.
• A total of about 40,000 troops were drafted into the Latvian
Riflemen Division.
• 1917-resentments towards their tsarist generals led most to side with
the Bolsheviks
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
190. The Latvian Riflemen
• military formations assembled starting 1915 in Latvia in order to
defend Baltic territories against Germans in World War I.
• Initially the battalions were formed by volunteers, and from 1916 by
conscription among the Latvian population.
• A total of about 40,000 troops were drafted into the Latvian
Riflemen Division.
• 1917-resentments towards their tsarist generals led most to side with
the Bolsheviks
• these units became Lenin’s most reliable troops during the entire
civil war (1918-1921)
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
192. TO THE CITIZENS OF RUSSIA!
The Provisional Government has been deposed. Government
authority has passed into the hands of an organ of the Petrograd
Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, the Militar y
Revolutionary Committee, which stands at the head of the
Petrograd proletariat and garrison.
The task for which the people have been struggling--the
immediate offer of a democratic peace, the abolition of landlord
property in land, worker control over production, the creation of a
Soviet Government--this task is assured.
Long Live the Revolution of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants!
proclaimed by Lenin, 9 a.m., 25 October 1917
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
193. Fact versus Myth
• the cabinet that Lenin had declared deposed sat in
the Winter Palace awaiting help
• their protectors: two or three detachments of
military cadets, the Woman’s Death Battalion of
140 volunteers, some cossacks, a bicycle unit, and
40 war invalids commanded by an officer with
artificial legs
• at dawn a half-hearted attack went forward but
retreated at the first hostile fire
• 6:30 p.m. an ultimatum to surrender was ignored
• 9:00 p.m. the cruiser Aurora, with no live
ammunition, fired a blank salvo
• 11:00 p.m. the guns of Petropavlovsk fortress
opened fire. Two of thirty-five rounds fired hit the
target
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
194. Iconic scenes from Eisenstein’s Oktyabr, 1928
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
195. Iconic scenes from Eisenstein’s Oktyabr, 1928
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
196. The Congress of Soviets “rubber stamps”
the coup
• 25 October-Lenin delayed the opening of the Congress until the fall
of the Winter Palace and the arrest of the ministers
• only Kerensky escaped, disguised as a Serbian military officer, with
the U.S. Embassy’s aid
• Of the 650 delegates 338 were Bolshevik. They were supported by
the Left SRs, another 98. This gave Lenin a two-thirds majority
• around 1 a.m. 26 October word arrived that the Winter palace was in
Bolshevik hands
• thereafter followed the Decree on Peace and the Land Decrees
along with creation of a new provisional government, the Council of
People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) and a Central Executive
Committee (C.E.C./ЦИК orTsIK) of the Congress of Soviets, both
dominated by the Bolsheviks
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
197. Creation of the One Party State
• in the weeks and months that followed “Great October” Lenin
quietly discarded the pretense of a government coalition
• some of the Bolsheviks expected to share power with the other
socialists and the left SRs
• this was never Lenin’s plan
• Sovnarkom was originally styled the Provisional Government before
the meeting of the Constituent Assembly
• this led many to believe that nothing important had really changed
with the coup
• after the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly, the “provisional”
was quietly dropped
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
201. One of the first acts of the Bolshevik leaders was aimed at
satisfying the peasant demand for land. Taking a leaf from the
agrarian program of the left SRs, Lenin had proposed on 8
November [N.S.], and the Congress of Soviets had accepted, a
decree on land. This decree, the most radical approach to the
agrarian question ever undertaken in Russia, provided that all
land owned by landlords, the crown, the churches and
monasteries, together with all livestock and implements on
such land, be transferred without compensation to the former
owners into the temporary custody of peasant land committees
and peasant soviets until the meeting of the Constituent
Assembly. Title to the land was to be vested in the state, but
the use of it was to be given to the peasants in perpetuity.
Harcave, pp. 495-96
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
203. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October”
1) solidify their power in Petrograd
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
204. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October”
1) solidify their power in Petrograd
2) expand it nationwide and globally
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
205. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October”
1) solidify their power in Petrograd
2) expand it nationwide and globally
1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
206. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October”
1) solidify their power in Petrograd
2) expand it nationwide and globally
1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential
2)only during peace could they have a peredyshka, a “breathing spell”
during which to:
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
207. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October”
1) solidify their power in Petrograd
2) expand it nationwide and globally
1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential
2)only during peace could they have a peredyshka, a “breathing spell”
during which to:
1) consolidate their authority
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
208. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October”
1) solidify their power in Petrograd
2) expand it nationwide and globally
1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential
2)only during peace could they have a peredyshka, a “breathing spell”
during which to:
1) consolidate their authority
2) organize an administration
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
209. Bolshevik Goals after “Great October”
1) solidify their power in Petrograd
2) expand it nationwide and globally
1)in order to do this Lenin believed peace was essential
2)only during peace could they have a peredyshka, a “breathing spell”
during which to:
1) consolidate their authority
2) organize an administration
3) build a new, revolutionary army
Tuesday, October 20, 2009