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Tcpdump, Linux Utilities, and 
BPFs for Incident Response
Quick Note 
• This talk isn’t about the full Incident Response 
process 
• We aren’t going to cover policy/reporting/etc 
• We are here to show some Kung Fu with 
tcpdump
Tcpdump for Network Forenscis 
• This presentation will show you how you can 
leverage tcpdump, Linux utilities, and BPFs to 
quickly rip through pcap 
• Understanding TCP/IP communications along 
with common attack patterns allows an 
analyst to profile suspicious behavior
• With any role in security it is critical to be the “Hunter” 
• You need to go beyond the automated tool 
– Write your own tools and scripts to address gaps in tools 
– Be able to manually perform you job function 
• #Don’t_Rely_On_Automated_Tools
Now for the boring stuff….syntax and 
some background stuff
Basic Syntax 
• Write to a file: 
– Tcpdump -ttttnnAi any -s0 -w file.cap 
• Read from a file: 
– Tcpdump -ttttnnAr file.cap 
• Command Switches Broken Down – Read the Man page: 
– -tttt: formats the time 
– -nn: prevents ports and IPs from being resolved 
– -i: interface to listen on 
– -r: read a pcap file in 
– -A: gives ASCII output 
– -s0: specifies the snap-in length so tcpdump grabs the full 
packet instead of only 96 bytes
Basic Syntax Cont. 
• -c: Useful switch to set a packet capture limit. 
• The command below sets a packet capture limit 
of 5000. This is useful to avoid having tcpdump 
processes going too far. 
– tcpdump -ttttnnAi any -s0 -w file.cap -c 5000 
• You may also find it useful to launch your 
tcpdump process via a screen session, or nohup 
the process to avoid it closing if your connection 
to the server dies.
BPF Filters 
• Berkeley Packet Filters (BPFs) allow you to 
filter for packets for interest 
– host: filter based on a specific host 
– net: filter based on a specific network range 
– tcp: match only packets that are TCP 
– udp: match only packets that are UDP 
– port: filter based on a specific port 
– Boolean Logic (and, or)
More Advanced BPF Syntax 
• Match HTTP GET requests: 
– tcp[20:4]=0x47455420 
• Match HTTP POST requests: 
– tcp[20:4]=0x504f5354 
• Match TCP packets to network 10.0.0.0/8 
– tcp and net 10.0.0.0/8 
• Match TCP SYN packets to host 192.168.56.10 
– tcp[13]=2 and host 192.168.56.10
Reading Pcap 
• You can combine Linux utilities to help 
summarize tcpdump’s output 
• The first and most common is the “less” utility. 
I commonly leverage it with “-S” to turn off 
word wrapping to which is easier for me to 
view: 
– tcpdump -ttttnnAr pcap_file.cap | less -S
Tcpdump and Linux Utilities 
• Many of the same techniques taught in our 
bash scripting lesson can be applied to 
tcpdump’s STDOUT 
• Below is a quick summary of useful utilities: 
– Grep / Egrep 
– Awk 
– Sed 
– Sort/Uniq
Tcpdump and Linux Utilities Cont. 
• Below is a quick example showing how you 
can leverage grep with tcpdump output:
Tcpdump and Linux Utilities Cont. 
• Below is an example of using sed to replace “GET” with “POST”
Tcpdump and Linux Utilities Cont. 
• Here is an example of using awk to print just the 6th element 
in the line:
Tcpdump and Linux Utilities Cont. 
• Now we can use awk again to print just the IP and 
not the port:
Tcpdump and Linux Utilities Cont. 
• Finally we can leverage sort and uniq to summarize 
the output:
Now for the fun stuff…Hunting 
Profiling Network Traffic 
• When hunting for compromise it’s a good idea to 
profile network activity 
• This involves defining the legitimate traffic and 
starting to look at the outliers 
• Let’s talk a bit about what I mean by outliers: 
– Systematic connections (TCP, UDP, DNS, Netflow) 
– Odd domain names: aldjkafsdpoiadfpoiasd.ru 
– Close to legit domain names: micosoftupdat.com
Profiling Network Traffic 
• I normally profile enterprise networks using a 
few different filters that grow to several 
hundred lines 
• I commonly break them down by: 
– DNS filter – Profile outbound DNS servers 
– Web filter – Profile web activity 
– Everything else filter – I catch the rest here
Bash For Loop 1-liner 
• Here is an really handy 1-liner I use all the time: 
for i in `ls *`; do <command> $i; done 
• This can help you automate many different 
commands you might need to do over and over, 
not just tcpdump 
• I will often move more complex automation tasks 
to Python
Incident Happens - GO 
• What do you do when you’re dealing with a potential 
compromise? 
– Depends heavily on what we know and what we have access to touch 
– Network traffic is one of the most powerful sources of data when 
dealing with a compromise 
• Assuming you know “Something bad is happening” how 
would you start?
Hunting: DNS 
• I normally start by hunting in DNS because I 
personally found a lot of success with this 
technique: 
– NXDOMAIN/Loopback/BOGON Name Resolution 
– Random looking: zaweqeoinadf.ru 
– Close to legit: micosoft.com 
– Timing: Always key – is this a machine? 1min, 
5mins? 
– Hits for known bad infrastructure
Hunting: DNS Cont. 
• Below is an example of a DNS profile script:
Hunting: Mapping Infrastructure 
• Once you have 1 IP or Domain you should be able to map out more 
badguy infrastructure 
– Similar Whois Registrant Information 
– Similar sounding domains (cnndaily.com aoldaily.com) 
– Other domains pointing to same IP 
– Other domains around known bad guy IP (.12 is bad, what about .13, 
.14, .11?) 
– Any additional subdomains? 
– Other domains sharing that name server 
– Historical view of what that domain pointed to? Bad guys reuse 
infrastructure, what did that domain resolve to last year? 
• Robtext, iplist.net, nslist.net, webboar.com, Domain Dossier, 
Google, Virustotal, DNSDB, Edv-consulting,
Hunting: Outbound Connections 
• Focusing on just outbound SYNs is another 
effective profiling technique 
• The goal with this technique is to figure out what 
is normal and start to pick out the odd ball 
connection 
• I once found a SYN every 1 hour, looking into it 
further it was an encrypted communication 
stream to a badboy place 
– Automated tools don’t do this well #Hunter
Hunting: Outbound Connections 
• Here is a filter example for outbound SYNs: 
– I may have it focus on odd ports, or try to weed out ranges to more 
common ports “443/80”
Hunting: Automation 
• Let’s not try to fight this battle alone!
Hunting: Scripting 
• When hunting I find myself doing A LOT of whois lookups to 
get info then create a filter so….I automated it with Team 
Cymru’s Python whois module (tool available upon request):
Summary 
• Don’t rely on automated tools 
• Be the hunter - the one who finds what tools 
miss 
• Be flexible and able to write your own tools 
when needed

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Tcpdump hunter

  • 1. Tcpdump, Linux Utilities, and BPFs for Incident Response
  • 2. Quick Note • This talk isn’t about the full Incident Response process • We aren’t going to cover policy/reporting/etc • We are here to show some Kung Fu with tcpdump
  • 3. Tcpdump for Network Forenscis • This presentation will show you how you can leverage tcpdump, Linux utilities, and BPFs to quickly rip through pcap • Understanding TCP/IP communications along with common attack patterns allows an analyst to profile suspicious behavior
  • 4. • With any role in security it is critical to be the “Hunter” • You need to go beyond the automated tool – Write your own tools and scripts to address gaps in tools – Be able to manually perform you job function • #Don’t_Rely_On_Automated_Tools
  • 5. Now for the boring stuff….syntax and some background stuff
  • 6. Basic Syntax • Write to a file: – Tcpdump -ttttnnAi any -s0 -w file.cap • Read from a file: – Tcpdump -ttttnnAr file.cap • Command Switches Broken Down – Read the Man page: – -tttt: formats the time – -nn: prevents ports and IPs from being resolved – -i: interface to listen on – -r: read a pcap file in – -A: gives ASCII output – -s0: specifies the snap-in length so tcpdump grabs the full packet instead of only 96 bytes
  • 7. Basic Syntax Cont. • -c: Useful switch to set a packet capture limit. • The command below sets a packet capture limit of 5000. This is useful to avoid having tcpdump processes going too far. – tcpdump -ttttnnAi any -s0 -w file.cap -c 5000 • You may also find it useful to launch your tcpdump process via a screen session, or nohup the process to avoid it closing if your connection to the server dies.
  • 8. BPF Filters • Berkeley Packet Filters (BPFs) allow you to filter for packets for interest – host: filter based on a specific host – net: filter based on a specific network range – tcp: match only packets that are TCP – udp: match only packets that are UDP – port: filter based on a specific port – Boolean Logic (and, or)
  • 9. More Advanced BPF Syntax • Match HTTP GET requests: – tcp[20:4]=0x47455420 • Match HTTP POST requests: – tcp[20:4]=0x504f5354 • Match TCP packets to network 10.0.0.0/8 – tcp and net 10.0.0.0/8 • Match TCP SYN packets to host 192.168.56.10 – tcp[13]=2 and host 192.168.56.10
  • 10. Reading Pcap • You can combine Linux utilities to help summarize tcpdump’s output • The first and most common is the “less” utility. I commonly leverage it with “-S” to turn off word wrapping to which is easier for me to view: – tcpdump -ttttnnAr pcap_file.cap | less -S
  • 11. Tcpdump and Linux Utilities • Many of the same techniques taught in our bash scripting lesson can be applied to tcpdump’s STDOUT • Below is a quick summary of useful utilities: – Grep / Egrep – Awk – Sed – Sort/Uniq
  • 12. Tcpdump and Linux Utilities Cont. • Below is a quick example showing how you can leverage grep with tcpdump output:
  • 13. Tcpdump and Linux Utilities Cont. • Below is an example of using sed to replace “GET” with “POST”
  • 14. Tcpdump and Linux Utilities Cont. • Here is an example of using awk to print just the 6th element in the line:
  • 15. Tcpdump and Linux Utilities Cont. • Now we can use awk again to print just the IP and not the port:
  • 16. Tcpdump and Linux Utilities Cont. • Finally we can leverage sort and uniq to summarize the output:
  • 17. Now for the fun stuff…Hunting 
  • 18. Profiling Network Traffic • When hunting for compromise it’s a good idea to profile network activity • This involves defining the legitimate traffic and starting to look at the outliers • Let’s talk a bit about what I mean by outliers: – Systematic connections (TCP, UDP, DNS, Netflow) – Odd domain names: aldjkafsdpoiadfpoiasd.ru – Close to legit domain names: micosoftupdat.com
  • 19. Profiling Network Traffic • I normally profile enterprise networks using a few different filters that grow to several hundred lines • I commonly break them down by: – DNS filter – Profile outbound DNS servers – Web filter – Profile web activity – Everything else filter – I catch the rest here
  • 20. Bash For Loop 1-liner • Here is an really handy 1-liner I use all the time: for i in `ls *`; do <command> $i; done • This can help you automate many different commands you might need to do over and over, not just tcpdump • I will often move more complex automation tasks to Python
  • 21. Incident Happens - GO • What do you do when you’re dealing with a potential compromise? – Depends heavily on what we know and what we have access to touch – Network traffic is one of the most powerful sources of data when dealing with a compromise • Assuming you know “Something bad is happening” how would you start?
  • 22. Hunting: DNS • I normally start by hunting in DNS because I personally found a lot of success with this technique: – NXDOMAIN/Loopback/BOGON Name Resolution – Random looking: zaweqeoinadf.ru – Close to legit: micosoft.com – Timing: Always key – is this a machine? 1min, 5mins? – Hits for known bad infrastructure
  • 23. Hunting: DNS Cont. • Below is an example of a DNS profile script:
  • 24. Hunting: Mapping Infrastructure • Once you have 1 IP or Domain you should be able to map out more badguy infrastructure – Similar Whois Registrant Information – Similar sounding domains (cnndaily.com aoldaily.com) – Other domains pointing to same IP – Other domains around known bad guy IP (.12 is bad, what about .13, .14, .11?) – Any additional subdomains? – Other domains sharing that name server – Historical view of what that domain pointed to? Bad guys reuse infrastructure, what did that domain resolve to last year? • Robtext, iplist.net, nslist.net, webboar.com, Domain Dossier, Google, Virustotal, DNSDB, Edv-consulting,
  • 25. Hunting: Outbound Connections • Focusing on just outbound SYNs is another effective profiling technique • The goal with this technique is to figure out what is normal and start to pick out the odd ball connection • I once found a SYN every 1 hour, looking into it further it was an encrypted communication stream to a badboy place – Automated tools don’t do this well #Hunter
  • 26. Hunting: Outbound Connections • Here is a filter example for outbound SYNs: – I may have it focus on odd ports, or try to weed out ranges to more common ports “443/80”
  • 27. Hunting: Automation • Let’s not try to fight this battle alone!
  • 28. Hunting: Scripting • When hunting I find myself doing A LOT of whois lookups to get info then create a filter so….I automated it with Team Cymru’s Python whois module (tool available upon request):
  • 29. Summary • Don’t rely on automated tools • Be the hunter - the one who finds what tools miss • Be flexible and able to write your own tools when needed