Что-то там про Сторителлинг

1. Что-то там про СТОРИТЕЛЛИНГ Алексей Каптерев @kapterev

2. Презентация: ! " История Cлайды Подача

3. СТОРИТЕЛЛИНГ storytelling, «рассказывание историй» 1.Жанр искусства

4. СТОРИТЕЛЛИНГ storytelling, «рассказывание историй» 1.Жанр искусства 2.Иллюстрация кейсами

5. СТОРИТЕЛЛИНГ storytelling, «рассказывание историй» 1.Жанр искусства 2.Иллюстрация байками 3.Нарративная структура

6. Кино: # " Сценарий Картинка Игра

7. ПЕРЕДАТЧИК ПРИЕМНИК ПРИЕМНИК ПРИЕМНИК ПРИЕМНИК ПРИЕМНИК ПРИЕМНИК ПРИЕМНИК

8. Чтобы сделать хорошее кино, нужны всего 3 вещи: хороший сценарий, хороший сценарий и хороший сценарий.  АЛЬФРЕД ХИЧКОК Режиссер

9. Проблема №1: С КУ ЧН О

10. ? НУ И ЧТО Вам же платят деньги!

11. Инвесторы могут быть потрясающими людьми с впечатляющим технологическим бэкграундом, но они к тому же очень занятые люди… Представьте, что вы произносите речь передумеренно способными девятиклассниками, чье внимание можно удерживать только очень короткое время, и у которых нет ни глубоких знаний, ни интуиции, чтобы понять вашу идею.  ПИТЕР ТИЛЬ Основатель PayPal 

12. ! ВНИМАНИЕ ОЧЕ НЬ легко ПОТЕРЯТЬ и все остальное уже не важно

13. ? ПОЧЕМУ С КУ ЧН О

14. ? МОНОТОННО

15. После презентации инженера:   Зачем ты тратишь мою жизнь?!  ДЖЕФФ БЕЗОС CEO Amazon.com

16. В ИСТОРИИ ЕСТЬ ДИ НА М И К А

17. ИСТОРИЯ ВКЛЮЧАЕТ ЭМО ЦИИ

18. ИСТОРИЯ ПРОРЫВАЕТСЯ ЧЕРЕЗ «КЛАТТЕР»

19. ? Что такое «ИСТОРИЯ»

20. УМЕР МЕЛЬНИК 1-й СЫН 2-й СЫН 3-й СЫН / КОТ РУКАВИЦЫ КОРОЛЬ КРОЛИК КУРОПАТКА ОПЕРАЦИЯ «МК» «ВОРЫ» ПРИНЦЕССА ЖНЕЦЫ КОСЦЫ ЛЮДОЕД ЗАМОК ЛЕВ МЫШЬ КОРОЛЬ 3-Й СЫН+ПРИНЦЕССА=$  КОТ

21. iTunes music store presentation Steve Jobs, 2003

22. Innovate

23. The most striking thing about the 17-inch PowerBook, after the screen itself, is how brilliantly Apple managed to shrink the size of the machine built around that big display. Sure, the PowerBook is an unusually wide 15.4 inches, but itis only one inch thick. Yet, it feels solid as a rock. Itis just 10.2 inches deep and weighs only 6.8 pounds. To get an idea of how sleek those dimensions are, compare the new PowerBook with another brand-new laptop, Dell’s Latitude D800. This model also boasts a widescreen display, measuring 15.4 inches diagonally. But, even though the Dell has a signiﬁcantly smaller screen, it looks like a whale next to the 17-inch PowerBook. — Walt Mossberg, the Wall Street Journal

24. Safari

25. Innovate

26. Music

27. RIP MIX BURN

28. Acquire Manage Listen

30. 700,000

31. #1 MP3 player

32. Can anyone top that?

33. New iPods

34. 10Gb 15Gb 30Gb 2500 songs 3700 songs 7500 songs Dock, Case, Remote 299 $ 399 $ 499 $

36. AAC

38. Instant gratiﬁcation

39. It’s stealing

40. 1 Vast selection 2 Unlimited CD burning 3 Unlimited MP3 players 4 Unlimited computers 5 Free

41. 6 Unreliable downloads 7 Unreliable encoding 8 No previews 9 No album cover art 10 It’s stealing

42. No legal alternative

43. PressPlay RHAPSODY

44. PressPlay “You can play your downloaded songs as long as your membership is active.”

45. RHAPSODY “Only subscribers to the All Access subscription plan at $9.99 per month will get the ability to burn tracks for an additional fee per track.”

46. Subscriptions The wrong path

47. Buy downloads Just like LP’s, cassettes & CDs

48. Own music Broad set of personal rights

49. Music Store Music downloads done right

50. 1 Vast selection 2 Unlimited CD burning 3 Unlimited MP3 players 4 Unlimited computers 5 Free

51. “The Big Five”

52. " The music business is a cruel and shallow money trench, a long plastic hallway where thieves and pimps run free, and good men die like dogs. There's also a negative side." — Hunter S. Thompson

53. Landmark Deals with all Big Five

54. 200,000

55. Unlimited CD burns For personal use

56. Unlimited iPods Past, present & future models

57. Play on 3 Macs We download to one you do the rest

58. Use in applications Soundtrack of your life

59. 99¢ Per song

60. 99¢ No subscription fee!

61. 99¢ = 99¢ 99¢

62. 1 Vast selection 200,000 songs 2 Unlimited CD burning 3 Unlimited MP3 players iPod 4 Unlimited computers Up to 3 Macs 5 Freeper song 99¢

64. You never ﬁnd one song –   you ﬁnd 50 or 60 songs

65. The download is slow as paralysis,   then it just craps out halfway through

66. After 15 minutes you ﬁnally succeed   in getting a clean version of the song

67. You spend an hour to get 4 songs   that cost $3.96 from Apple

68. You’re working for   under minimum wage

69. You’re stealing – it’s best not to mess with Karma

71. Pristine encoding

72. AAC at 128 kbps

73. Free 30-sec previews

74. Album cover art

75. 6 Unreliable downloads Fast, reliable downloads 7 Unreliable encoding Pristine encoding 8 No previews Preview for every song 9 No album cover art Album cover art 10 It’s stealing Good Karma

76. 1 200,000 songs 2 Unlimited CD burning 3 Unlimited iPods players 4 Up to 3 Macs 5 99¢ per song

77. Beyond

78. 1-Click One-click shopping

79. BUY SONG One-click downloads

80. BUY ALBUM One-click downloads

81. Search

82. Browse

83. Exclusive tracks

84. U2 Eminem Bob Dylan Sting Sheryl Crow … 20+ artists

85. iTunes Music Store

86. Demo 20 minutes

87. 200,000

88. Unlimited CD burns

89. Unlimited iPods

90. Play on 3 Macs

91. Pristine encoding

92. Free 30-sec previews

93. Album cover art

94. BUY SONG One-click downloads

95. Deliver oceans of bits fast and reliably Process millions   1-Click of transactions Integrate with   popular jukebox Work seamlessly with iPods

96. Only Apple

97. U.S. Only To start with…

98. Today

99. iTunes.com

100. Free  software  update

102. Buy. Mix. iPod.

103. Mac only

104. End of the year

105. Video & TV ads 15 minutes

106. AppleMusic.com

107. UNNOVATIONS POWERBOOK SOFTWARE MUSIC RIP.MIX.BURN ITUNES IPOD GRAMMY LISTEN IPOD CAN ANYONE TOP THAT? PRICES MANAGE ITUNES 4 THINGS ACQUIRE NAPSTER 5 GOOD THINGS 5 BAD THINGS ITUNES STORE 4+ GOOD THINGS 5 EVEN BETTER THINGS 4 THINGS BETTER STILL ONLY APPLE TODAY ETC

108. Платформы Цена XMind Win, Mac,   Linux Freemium MindMeister Flash Freemium

109. Герой Цель Проблема / Слабость Злодей Решение Цена Мораль

110. МОРАЛЬ Если вы сделаете Х то будет Y иначе будет Z

111. The U.S. Army Afghanistan & Iraq 2009 

112. Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan

113. Potential Fractiousness of Society Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace COIN operations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously: • Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition. • Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a supportive disposition. • Retain supportive individuals. These operations are conducted in an environment where tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents • This environment may suggest courses of action aimed at reinforcing or widening seams Support for HN Government

114. • An increase in Coalition funding will influence economic investment and development. Coalition Funding • A strengthened economy will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group. Economic Investment Potential Fractiousness of Society Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Economic Development Support for HN Government

115. Developing and Restoring Essential Services Breakdown of Essential Services Essential Services Coalition Funding Satisfaction with Essential Services Economic Investment Expectations for Essential Services Time to Develop Essential Services Potential Fractiousness of Society Support for Insurgency • An increase in Coalition funding will significantly impact the restoration of essential services. • Improvements in the provision of essential services will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group. Neutral Populace Economic Development Support for HN Government

116. Developing and Restoring Essential Services Breakdown of Essential Services Expectations for Essential Services Essential Services Time to Develop Essential Services Satisfaction with Essential Services Psychological Operations Effectiveness Support for Insurgency Governance Potential Fractiousness of Society • Send a positive, credible message of success to the populace. • Provide an environment that enhances stable employment of the workforce. • Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider becoming supporters. Economic Investment Economic Development Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Available Workforce Perceived Security A government that is established, recognized, and that maintains a secure environment is in a position to Time to Develop Governance Coalition Funding External Material Support Insurgent Acts of Violence

117. Developing and Restoring Essential Services Breakdown of Essential Services Psychological Operations Effectiveness Impact of Illegitimate Actions Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Insurgent to Force Density Ratio significant impacts on • The Expectations for restoration of essential services. Economic Investment Essential Services Governance • The populace’s perception of security. Essential Services Time to Develop Essential Services Coalition An appropriate force mix, and correct operational Satisfaction with Funding Time to Develop Essential Services tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very Governance Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures Support for Insurgency • The Potential Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in their communications efforts with the populace. Fractiousness Economic of Society Development Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Available Workforce Perceived Security External Material Support Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Density Coalition Force Density Information Time to Develop HN Security Forces Host Nation Security Forces Host Nation Force Density

118. Developing and Restoring Essential Services Time to Develop Essential Services Satisfaction with Essential Services Breakdown of Essential Services Expectations for Essential Services Essential Services Psychological Operations Effectiveness Impact of Illegitimate Actions Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Insurgent to Force Density Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures Time to Develop Governance Economic Investment Governance Potential Fractiousness of Society Support for Insurgency Economic Development Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Available Workforce Perceived Security Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Coalition Funding External Material Support Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Density Coalition Force Density The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24 Information Time to Develop HN Security Forces Host Nation Security Forces Host Nation Force Density

119. Developing and Restoring Essential Services Breakdown of Essential Services Expectations for Essential Services Essential Services Time to Develop Essential Services Psychological Operations Effectiveness Impact of Illegitimate Actions Support for Insurgency Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Insurgent to Force Density Ratio Satisfaction with Essential Services Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures Time to Develop Governance Economic Investment Governance Potential Fractiousness of Society Economic Development Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Available Workforce Perceived Security External Material Support Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Density Coalition Force Density The Basic Information Ops Loop Coalition Funding Information Time to Develop HN Security Forces Host Nation Security Forces Host Nation Force Density

120. Popular Support – Sympathizers and Active Supporters Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Gov’t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR SUPPORT © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 9 Neutral/On the Fence Potential Attractiveness of Govt vs. Insurgent Path Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

121. Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Insurgents Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’t and CF Perception of Insurgent Strength and Intent Fear of Ins. Attack, Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Perception of Gov’t Strength and Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Perceived Security Page 10 Expectations for Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment

122. Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Perceived Security Page 11 Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Perception Of Govt Strength & Intent Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Neutral/On the Fence Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

123. Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics Insurgent Damages & Casualties Ins Strategic Comm/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Fear of Gov’t / ANSF / Coalition Repercussions Territory Not Under Gov’t Control Havens / Ability to 1 Operate Insurgent Insurgent Coordination Leadership Offensives & Among Ins Factions Training, Skill Presence & Exper (Clear & Hold) Ins Provision of Gov’t & Services Ins Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Insurgent expansion: Insurgent factions with havens as base can expand their presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory. (Permissive population contribution to Havens / Ability to Operate input from separate sector). 2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed / policed territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 12 Outside Support / Enablement of Ins. 2 Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Insurgent Terrain Advantage Insurgent Recruiting, Retention, Manpower, & ISR Likelihood of Crime/ Violence/ Ins Support for Payment Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric Production Trade & Employment Terrain Harshness & Breadth

124. Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics Ins. Damages & Casualties OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun /IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov ’t Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security Page 13 Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF INSURGENTS Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Neutral/On the Fence Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Terrain Harshness & Breadth NARCOTICS Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels IllegitAgric Production, Trade & Employment

125. Infrastructure, Services, & Economy Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spending enables agricultural production. Production can boost economic activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment. (Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.) 2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets. (Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.) Legit Agric Production 2 Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Legit Other Production & Services Non-Agric Fraction of Workforce and Agric. Legit vs Illegit Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Legit vs Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity 1 Infr. Services, Econ, Policy & Execution/ Perceived Fairness © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Private Sector Capital Mgmt, Investment & Spending Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Page 14 Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment

126. Infrastructure, Services, & Economy Ins. Damages & Casualties OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 15 INSURGENTS Ties to Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Neutral/On the Fence NARCOTICS Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Terrain Harshness & Breadth Legit Agric Private Sector Production Workforce Skill & Avail Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs.Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Legit Other Production Services (SWET, & Services Non- Agric Healthcare, Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY Ability to Move Private Sector People Capital Mgmt., & Goods Investment & Rapidly Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment

127. Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts Gov’t Security Policy Quality & Investment Central Gov’t Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov’t Funding Adequacy Gov’t Training, Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Gov’t Workforce Skill & Avail Gov’t Professionalism, Policy Quality & Fairness Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments Gov’t Integration of Local Tribal Structures Gov’t / ANSF StratCom/IO Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins ’ ’ Overall Gov’t Reach, Execution, Capacity & Investment Gov’t/Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Relative Message Quality Gov’t vs Ins Tax Revenues Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures & Beliefs Feedback Loop Example: Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well…another key loop) © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 16

128. Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts Ins. Damages & Casualties OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun / IO Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Transparency of Gov’t Gov't Overall Gov't Processes & Professionalism Reach, Investments Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Relative Message Quality Gov’t ’ Ins. vs Tax Revenues POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 17 INSURGENTS Ties to Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment TRIBAL GOVERNANCE Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & & SERVICES ECONOMY ECONOMY Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Terrain Harshness & Breadth Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric NARCOTICS Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment

129. Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support Coalition Knowledge & Understanding of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition COIN Support Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Avg COIN Experienc e & Skill Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities Resource Levels (Mil. & Civ. Forces and Levels) Coalition StratComm/IO US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support US Gov’t Support for Breadth of Operation Coalition & Support Coalition Dev. Ops-ANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Dev. Ops-Gov’t Advisory & Aid Coalition Visibility to Population Western Affiliation Backlash Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Afghan Methods US Domestic/ Int’l StratComm & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan Coalition Dev. OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ Advisory & Aid Page 18 Provide Humanitarian Relief

130. Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support Ins. Damages & Casualties Coalition Knowledge & Underst of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition COIN Support Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun . & Diplomacy COALITION Media Sensationalism Bias DOMESTIC SUPPORT Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. OVERALL OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY CAPACITY Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid Breadth of US Domestic Coalition & Support Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Western Affiliation Backlash Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement TRIBAL TRIBAL GOVERNANCE Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Perceived Security Page 19 Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion INSURGENTS Ties to Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Average Connectedness of Population Tax Revenues Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Provide Humanitarian Relief © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Coalition Visibility to Population Gov't Funding Adequacy Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Coalition Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES US Gov't Support for Operation Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Coalition Coalition Avg COIN Experience Execution Capacity & & Skill Priorities Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun ./IO Forces, Aid Levels) OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Duration of Operation Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & & SERVICES ECONOMY ECONOMY Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Terrain Harshness & Breadth Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric NARCOTICS Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment

131. ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops ANSF & Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Capacity 1 ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Funding Adequacy 2 1 Total Security Force Capacity & focus ANSF Unit Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Security Ops (Hold) ANSF Avg Professionalism, Skill, Discipline & Morale ANSF Appropriate Use of Force ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Feedback Loop Examples: 1. ANSF success and informal momentum: ANSF professionalism and skill contributes to tactical capacity which enables effective operations. Success and experience feeds back into professionalism, skill and morale which further reinforces both leadership & tactical capacity and recruiting / retention. 2. ANSF institutional capacity: Institutional capacity and processes enable manpower, formal training, logistics, planning & budgeting, etc that reinforce informal gains support ANSF capacity over time. © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 20 Counter Narcotics /Crime Ops

132. ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ANSF TACTICAL Coalition Knowledge & Underst of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition COIN Support Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan COALITION COALITION CAPACITY & CAPACITY & PRIORITIES PRIORITIES Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Forces, Aid Levels) US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity US Gov't Support for Operation Gov't Funding Adequacy Breadth of Coalition & Support Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Infrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail Total Security Force Capacity & Focus Sweep Ops (Clear) Ins. Damages & Casualties Policing & Security Ops (Hold) ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale ANSF Training & Mentoring Targeted Strikes ANSF Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment OVERALL OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY CAPACITY Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement TRIBAL TRIBAL GOVERNANCE Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Perceived Security Page 21 Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion INSURGENTS Ties to Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Counter Narcotics/ Crime Ops Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Provide Humanitarian Relief © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS Average Connectedness of Population Tax Revenues Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) ANSF Appropriate Use of Force R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness OUTSIDE SUPPORT OUTSIDE SUPPORT TOTO INSURGENT INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS Havens / Ability to Operate ANSF INSTITUTIONAL Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment COALITION DOMESTIC Gov't/ Contractor SUPPORT Corruption & Coalition SUPPORT Tribal Favoritism Dev.Ops- Media Sensationalism Bias ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities ISR / Open Source Ops Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Duration of Operation Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & & SERVICES ECONOMY ECONOMY Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Terrain Harshness & Breadth Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric NARCOTICS Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment

133. Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics = ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ANSF TACTICAL Coalition Knowledge & Underst . of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition ‘COIN Support ’ Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun ./IO Forces, Aid Levels) ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population CENTRAL Gov't GOV’T Funding Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Breadth of US Domestic Coalition & Support Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail COALITION Media Sensationalism Bias DOMESTIC SUPPORT Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Ins. Damages & Casualties Havens / Ability to Operate ANSF Appropriate Use of Force Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Relative Message Quality Gov’t ’ Ins. vs OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun / IO Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Perceived Damages & Use of Force Ins. Targeted by Ins. Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov ’t Ins. Strategic Commun /IO & Affiliation w/ Population R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Western Affiliation Backlash Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Recognition/ TRIBAL Engagement to Integrate Rivalry GOVERNANCE Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Structures& Beliefs Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition Tax Revenues Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov vs ’t Insurgents Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t POPULAR SUPPORT Neutral/On the Fence NARCOTICS Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov vs. ’t Insurgent Path Perceived Security Satisfaction w/ Gains in Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Population Actively Supporting Insurgency IllegitAgric Production, Trade & Employment Terrain Harshness & Breadth Duration of Operation Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Provide Humanitarian Relief Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. INSURGENTS Ties to Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Population Actively Supporting Gov’t & SF Counter Narcotics/ Crime Ops Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS Average Connectedness of Population Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) ANSF INSTITUTIONAL ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Policing & Security Ops (Hold) ANSF Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Transparency of Gov’t Gov't Overall Gov't Processes & Professionalism Reach, Investments Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun . & Diplomacy Total Security Force Capacity & Focus ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid US Gov't Support for Operation ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Coalition Avg COIN Experience Execution Capacity & & Skill Priorities ISR / Open Source Ops Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment Significant Delay Legit Agric Private Sector Production Workforce Skill & Avail Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs.Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Legit Other Production Services (SWET, & Services Non- Agric Healthcare, Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY Ability to Move Private Sector People Capital Mgmt., & Goods Investment & Rapidly Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment WORKING DRAFT – V3 © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 22

134. Key Feedback Loop: Securing and Empowering the Population ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops 1 2 ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population alition Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of ov’t visory Afghan Methods Aid Total Security Force Capacity & Focus ANSF Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Ins. Damages & Casualties Policing & Security Ops (Hold) Havens / Ability to Operate Territory Not Under Gov ’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) ANSF Appropriate Use of Force Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition Fear is a key mechanism for insurgent factions to prevent the population from engaging and Gov't/ANSF supporting the actively Strategic Central Gov't Commun/ Government. Institutional & IO Execution Relative WOM Securing populated territory (clear and hold ops) can reduce Capacity Message Relative t Amplification insurgent ability to target and intimidateMessagepopulation such the ng Gov’t vs Ins Impact Gov’t Gov't acy that Gov’t sympathizersofare willing to be vs Ins active supporters. Integration Gov't Training Western Local Tribal Mentoring, HUMINT: The population will beAffiliation willing to provide intel more Structures Gov't Perception of Vetting, and Backlash Workforce Coalition Intent Hiring if they Skill &not fear insurgent repercussions. do Avail & Commitment ANA & ANP Development: ANSF recruiting and development sparency Gov’t Gov't Overall Gov't facilitated Reach,the expansion Strength of by of secure regions. (ANA and cesses & isProfessionalism Religious stments ANP leaders, families, facilities, etc less likely to be targeted or Policy Quality Execution Ideology & & Fairness Capacity & Tribal overrun. Investment Ability to Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Relative Message Quality Gov’t ’vs Ins. Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Reconcile Page 23 Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov ’t Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Neutral/On the Fence S w Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security Services Infrastructure Dev Adequacy Private Workf Skill &

135. Key Feedback Loop: Government Engagement and Integration of Tribal Governance han ANSF Institutional & Execution tion Capacity OpsSF sory Aid Appropriate Use of Force ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Training, Skill & Experience & Pakistan) Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Critical for the Government to recognize andPerceived the make Gov't Damages/Use of effort toSecurity engage existing tribal Relative structures andForce by Policy Gov’ t & Coalition Perception of Quality & Message Insurgent Governance if they are to be accepted by the population. Investment Quality Strength & alition/Homeland Gov’t ’vs Ins. Acceptance of Ties to local governance can gain popular support and Intent fghan Methods rapidly expand the Government’s overall capacity and Gov't/ANSF Strategic ‘reach’ which further increases their capacity and ability Central Gov't Commun/ Institutional & IO to engage the population. Execution Fear of Ins. Relative WOM ANSF Coalition Funding sibility to Adequacy opulation Capacity Training oring, g, and ring Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs v't/ ractor ption & avoritism Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Provide Humanitarian Relief © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Population Actively Supporting Gov’t & SF Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Attack/ Repercussions Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Perceived Security Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Page 24 Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly N & Illegit A Produc Trad Employ Terrain Harshness & Breadth Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov ’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Tax Revenues Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Retention, Manpower & ISR Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs Rela Econo Opport Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment

136. Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – SECURITY Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Coalition Knowledge & Underst. of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition ‘ COIN Support’ Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Military Commun./IO Forces, Civilian Forces, Aid Levels) Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Breadth of Coalition & Support Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Likelihood of Active Ins. Support for Payment Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Perceived Security Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr., Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Provide Humanitarian Relief Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Terrain Harshness & Breadth Duration of Operation Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Tax Revenues Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Ins. Damages & Casualties ANSF Appropriate Use of Force ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Policing & Security Ops (Hold) ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) ANSF Capacity & Priorities Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity US Gov't Support for Operation Total Security Force Capacity & Focus Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Private Sector Capital Management, Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment WORKING DRAFT © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 26

137. Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – GOVERNANCE Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Coalition Knowledge & Underst. of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition ‘ COIN Support’ Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Forces, Aid Levels) Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Breadth of Coalition & Support Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail WORKING DRAFT Ins. Damages & Casualties Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Tax Revenues Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Perceived Security Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr., Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Provide Humanitarian Relief Page 27 Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Terrain Harshness & Breadth Duration of Operation Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Reconciliation Effectiveness © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate ANSF Appropriate Use of Force ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Policing & Security Ops (Hold) ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) ANSF Capacity & Priorities Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity US Gov't Support for Operation Total Security Force Capacity & Focus Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment

138. Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – DEVELOPMENT Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Coalition Knowledge & Underst. of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition ‘ COIN Support’ Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Forces, Aid Levels) Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Gov't Funding Adequacy Breadth of Coalition & Support Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) ANSF Appropriate Use of Force ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Policing & Security Ops (Hold) ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Perceived Security Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr., Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Provide Humanitarian Relief Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Terrain Harshness & Breadth Duration of Operation Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Tax Revenues Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) ANSF Capacity & Priorities Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity US Gov't Support for Operation Total Security Force Capacity & Focus Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment WORKING DRAFT © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 28

139. Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Claim the Information Initiative Message availability is constrained by low “average connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM Counter- Narcotics/ Targeted Crime Strikes tends to Damages negative messages more strongly than positive, but also Ops tends to Ins. amplify Fear of Sweep Ops & Casualties Gov’ t/ANSF/ (Clear) be biased towards current sentiments. Coalition ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Coalition Knowledge & Underst. of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition ‘ COIN Support’ Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Military Commun./IO Forces, Civilian Forces, Aid Levels) Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Breadth of Coalition & Support Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid Repercussions Outside Havens / Government Support/ “Western affiliation backlash” may undermineAbility to Enablement messages if they are Operate of Ins. seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an Coordination Ins. Among Ins. Offensives & Insurgent overly Western Not Territory posture Factions Presence Terrain Ins. Insurgent Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) (Clear & Hold) Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Perceived Security Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Infr., Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness Provide Humanitarian Relief = Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Funding & Material Support to Insurgents Relative Popular Support/ Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Likelihood of Active Ins. Support for Payment Population Actively Supporting Insurgency Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Terrain Harshness & Breadth Duration of Operation Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Tax Revenues Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 ANSF Appropriate Use of Force ANSF Training & Mentoring Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Policing & Security Ops (Hold) ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity US Gov't Support for Operation Total Security Force Capacity & Focus ANSF Capacity & Priorities ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility. Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit Agric Production Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Private Sector Capital Management, Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment WORKING DRAFT Significant Delay Page 29

140. Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Claim the Information Initiative & Morale h n ANSF Institutional & Execution n Capacity s- ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism y ANSF alition Funding bility to Adequacy ulation on/Homeland ceptance of an Methods Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition Provide Humanitarian Relief Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Neutral/On the Fence Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Fun Ma Sup Insu Popu Sympa w/ Insu T Ha & Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Tax Revenues © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment tor on & oritism Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity ining ng, and g ANSF Appropriate Use of Force Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and Private Sector Satisfaction availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing Workforce w/ Gains in Infrastructure Skill & Avail the population. Government message quality has been Security, Services Dev. Adequacy & relative strongerEmploymentto Visible Gains factions (who have typically not insurgent & Sustainment In Security, made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian Services & Employment beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message Expectations Civilia Legit Other credibility. for Security, Servic Production Services, & & Services (SWE Employment Non- Agric Message availability is constrained by low “average Healthc Perceived Educat Security connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most to Private Sector Ability message propagation Capital Move / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM tends to Management, People Infr., Services, Econ. negative messages more strongly than positive, but amplify & Goods Investment & Spending Policy & Execution Rapidly /Perceivedalso tends to be biased towards current sentiments. Fairness “Western affiliation backlash” may undermine Government messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture Page 30

141. Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Population Security p cal ty ANSF Capacity & Priorities ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism g Security Ops (Hold) p Havens / Ability to Operate Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) ANSF Appropriate Use of Force R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness ty y & ent Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition forces impact perceived security. Insurgents rely targeted “attacks on progress”Strength of to generate fear and intimidation to limit sympathizers moving towards active Religious Ideology & supporters. They often threaten or target civilian and security force Tribal individuals who are visibly supporting the government – the Cultural Erosion/ Structures fear this Displacement generates is powerful in slowing or reversing positive momentum. ecognition/ gagement to In addition to near term security concerns, the population is Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry assessing ‘who will win’ over the Integrate long term by comparing Tribal tructures& perception of Insurgent strength to perception of Government Beliefs strength and also considering perceived Coalition commitment. (A key input to perceived strength is how much of the population lives in region secured by the Government.) They will hesitate to actively support the government if they feel they will fail, particularly if they have been witness to “clear and leave” operations. Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Page 31 Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Perceived Security I f © PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents Neutral/On the Fence Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t Potential Attractivenes of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Pa Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Relative Message Impact Gov’t Population Security: Security is a function of day to day conditions Gov't vs Ins and also perception of ‘who will win’tegrationlonger term: Western over of ocal Tribal Affiliation Structures Actual damages by both the Insurgents and ANSF /Backlash Coalition Coordination Among Ins. Factions Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Outsid Suppor Enablem of Ins. S i E Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment Priv W Ski Legit Other Production & Services Non-Agric Ability to Move People Private Se Capita Managem Investme

142. How to win in Al Anbar

143. How to Win the War in Al Anbar by CPT Trav HI! This is an American Soldier. We'll call him Joe. Joe wants to win in Al Anbar But sometimes it seems like other people don't share that idea. How can Joe win in Al Anbar? By fighting the insurgents?

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151. What You’ll Learn • Web Inspector overview • Inspection and tweaking • Performance analysis • Debugging issues

152. Web Inspector Overview

153. Navigation Sidebar

155. Resource Navigator (⌃1) • Frames and resources • Extra scripts • Anonymous scripts

156. Storage Navigator (⌃2) • Cookies • Local and session storage • Databases and tables • Application cache

157. Instrument Navigator (⌃3) • Timelines Network Requests ■ Layout and Rendering ■ JavaScript and Events • JavaScript profiles ■ • CSS selector profiles

158. Search Navigator (⌃4) • Full text resource search • DOM tree search

159. Issue Navigator (⌃5) • JavaScript exceptions • Console API errors and warnings • HTML and XML parsing issues • Network errors

160. Debug Navigator (⌃6) • Current call stack when paused

161. Breakpoint Navigator (⌃7) • Special exception breakpoints • Current resource breakpoints

162. Log Navigator (⌃8) • Current log with JavaScript console • Previous logs on reload

164. Content Browser and Quick Console

169. Navigation Bar

170. Navigation Bar • Sidebar toggle buttons

171. Navigation Bar • Sidebar toggle buttons • Back and forward buttons

172. Navigation Bar • Sidebar toggle buttons • Back and forward buttons • Content path

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