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Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History (Entire text)
Summary
This text comprises Hegel's introduction to a series oflectures on the "philosophyof history." As an introduction,the
text lays out only the general outline ofHegel's method of"philosophic history"--anydetails tend to be about
theoretical entities and concepts,and there are very few direct analyses ofhistorical periods or events.
Hegel begins byoutlining three major types of historical method:original history,which is written during the historical
period in question;reflective history, which is written after the period has passed and which brings reflective thought
and interpretation to bear on it; and philosophic history,which uses a priori philosophical thoughtto interprethistory
as a rational process.(Reflective historyis further broken down into universal history,pragmatic,critical,and
specialized methods).
Focusing on his own method (philosophic history),Hegel gives a briefdefense of the idea that Reason rules history.
Reason is infinitelyfree because it is self-sufficient,depending on nothing outside ofits own laws and conclusions.It

2. is also infinitelypowerful,because by nature it seeks to actualize its own laws in the world.Hegel argues that, in a
very real sense,the "substance"or contentof world historyis nothing butReason,since all ofhistory is caused and
guided by a rational process.This idea,he points out, is differentfrom the idea that God has an unknowable plan that
guides history--Hegel believes thatthis is close to the truth, but that God's plan is knowable through philosophy.The
idea that Reason rules the world,he says,is both an assumption we mustmake before we practice philosophic
history and a conclusion drawn from thatpractice.
The bulk of the Introduction is concerned with the elaboration ofthree aspects ofthis guidance ofhistory by rational
Spirit. The first concerns the abstractcharacteristics ofSpirititself:the central principle ofSpirit is rational freedom
(the only true freedom),which Spirit realizes in the world through the mechanism ofhuman history.The second thing
Hegel considers,then,is this human aspect--the "means"Spirituses to actualize itselfin the world. Human interests
and passions are subjective and particular--theydo not necessarilyconform to any universal laws.Historyunfolds as
this subjective realm ofhuman passion is joined to universal principles,thus allowing Spiritto become conscious of
itselfin its subjective aspect(the aspectthat allows itto unfold in the concrete world).
The third major section ofHegel's discussion ofSpiritfocuses on this union of the subjective particular and the
objective universal.The union occurs in the form of the State (by which term Hegel means the entirety of a people's
culture and government).Thus,the State is the "material"in which universal Spiritrealizes itselfin particular forms.
Much of the remainder ofHegel's Introduction is concerned with "the course of history," the process by which Spirit
moves,changes,and transforms itselfthrough the progression ofhistorical events.This happens as States are
formed,achieve some level of perfection (in which the subjective wills ofthe citizens coincides with the universal
principle ofthe State), and decline.In actualizing itselfin the form of the State, Spiritis making an effort to actualize
its central principle ofrational freedom,to unify its own subjective and objective aspects.This happens to some
degree,but the State never remains stable indefinitely;as soon as itis perfected in its universality, times have
changed and Spiritdestroys itselfin order to arise in a new,stronger form (a new State or "spiritof a people").
Through this process ofimprovementthrough self-negation,then,Spirit drives human historythrough its stages
toward the goal of complete realization ofSpirit in self-conscious,rational freedom.The Introductionseeks to allow us
to grasp the nature of this series oftransitions both through straightphilosophical analysis and through the study of
the historical stages themselves.
Section 1
Summary
Hegel opens his lectures on the philosophyof history by giving brief accounts ofthree distincttypes of written history.
These are:
I. Original history
II. Reflective history
III. Philosophic history
Original historyconsists ofan account of actions,events, and situations lived through and witnessed (for the most
part) by the historian.Other primary sources are used,butas "ingredients only"--the accountdepends fundamentally
on the historian's own witnessing ofthe times.Hegel cites Thucydides and Herodotus as examples.He also
describes this type of recorded history as "history whose spirit[the historian]shared in,"and notes thatthe primary
task of "original history"is to create an internal,"mental representation"ofexternal events.

3. Hegel then notes some qualifications or limits to the category of original history.It excludes "legends,folksongs,[and]
traditions,"because these are "obscure modes ofmemory,proper to the mentality of pre-literate peoples."Original
history mustdeal instead with the "observed and observable reality" of a people who are self-aware and unique (who
"knew whatthey were and what they wanted").
Further, original history"cannot be of greatexternal scope";it is a limited viewpoint,a "portrait of the time." The
original historian does notoffer a greatdeal of theory about or reflection on the events and situations he or she
recounts--"he lives within the spiritof the times and cannotas yet transcend them."For Hegel,the spiritin which the
original historian is writing is the same as the spiritofthe times he or she is writing about: "the spiritof the author and
of the actions he tells of, are one and the same."
Hegel notes that speeches recorded in historical accounts mayseem to be a special case here,since theywould
seem to be reflections on the times rather than mere accounts ofthe times.But public speeches are in fact "effective
actions in their very essence,"justas much as a war or an election.For this reason,they are not removed reflections
on historybut "integral components ofhistory"recorded by the original historian,who shares the cultural
consciousness ofthe speaker.
We can distinguish three very rough stages oforiginal history.In antiquity, it was primarilystatesmen who wrote
history. In the middle ages,monks were the historians (Hegel calls their works "naive chronicles").In Hegel's own
time,"all this has changed...[our culture]immediatelyconverts all events into reports for intellectual representation."
These contemporaryoriginal histories aim for breadth and accuracy, seeking to portray things preciselyand simplyso
that we can then interpret them in other forms of writing.Hegel writes that only people "of high social standing"can
execute this kind of history: "only from a superior position can one truly see things for what they are and see
everything."
The second method for writing history, reflective history, is "history whose presentation goes beyond the presentin
spiritand does notrefer to the historian's own time."Unlike the original historian,the reflective historia n is nota
participantin the events and spiritof the times ofwhich he gives an account.Reflective history is divided by Hegel
into four sub-types:
A. Universal history
B. Pragmatic history
C. Critical history
D. Specialized history
Universal reflective historyaims to give an accountof the whole history of a people or even of the world. But, since
this is reflective history, the spiritthat unites all these events in a written history is foreign to the time of the events --it
is rather the spiritof the historian's own time.In the case of broad world histories,particular events mustbe
condensed into very briefstatements,and it is almostas though the author's own thoughtis the main feature (the
"mightiestepitomist") of the text.
Pragmatic reflective historyhas a theory or ideologybehind it. The events recounted are "connected into one pattern
in their universal and inner meaning"by the historian,and the account actually consists more ofreflections on history
than simplyofhistory itself.Hegel makes a side-note here aboutthe idea that historyshould provide us with moral
lessons (a function which would be found primarilyin pragmatic history).He thinks this idea is wrong, and that if
history can be said to have "taught" us anything it is that "nations and governments have never learned anything from
history." This is largely a matter of the unrealityof the pastin relation to the present:"In the press ofworld events,
there is no help to be had from general principles...for a pale memoryhas no force againstthe vitality and freedom of
the present."

4. Critical reflective history is a kind of research into historical accounts,a history of history that tests the accuracy of
given accounts and perhaps poses alternative accounts.Hegel dislikes this kind ofhistory, which "extorts" new things
to say from existing accounts.He points out that this is a cheaper way to achieve "reality" in history, because itputs
subjective notions in place of facts and calls these notions reality.
The final type of reflective history, the "specialized,"focuses on one thread in history, such as "the historyof art, of
law, or of religion."At the same time,it represents a transitional stage to philosophic historybecause ittakes a
"universal viewpoint." The very focus taken (e.g., the history of law) represents a choice on the part of the historian to
make a universal conceptthe guiding rationale for his history. If the specialized historyis good,the author will give an
accurate account of the fundamental "Idea"(the "inner guiding soul") thatguided the events and actions discussed.
If the Idea guides the historyof nations as they pursue law,art, or religion,the "Spirit" is whatguides historyas a
whole.It is this larger process thatis the focus of the third category of history, philosophic history.We think
constantly, Hegel notes,butmosthistory (even reflective history) would seem to emphasize events over thoughtin
the end. Philosophic history,however, prioritizes thoughtbefore history, bringing pure philosophical ideas to bear on
events. The thoughts that organize the "raw material"of historical events into philosophic historycome firstand can
stand alone--theyare a priori.
Section 2
Summary
Having run through the basic types of recorded history, Hegel turns to the idea that history is essentiallya rational
process.Whatphilosophybrings to history, Hegel writes,is "the thought that Reason rules the world,and that world
history has therefore been rational in its course."Hegel sets this up as a presupposition in his historical method,but
also says that the principle will be demonstrated as his lectures continue.
Hegel next claims three characteristics ofReason itself:it is the substance ofthe historical world,itis infinite power,
and it is infinite content. It is the substance ofthe world treated in historybecause all reality comes to be by virtue of
Reason--anything actual came aboutbecause ofreason.Similarly,Reason is infinite power because itis notjustan
abstraction but also "actualizing"--itbrings things into existence.Reason is infinite contentbecause itneeds nothing
outside ofitselfto create content; it is,Hegel writes,"the only material on which it works."Reason works constantlyto
bring itselfinto external manifestation in the world--itis its own goal.
For Hegel,"nothing else is revealed in the world"except this rational "Idea," Reason itself.All "intelligence and self-
conscious will"is notsubjectto chance but only to "the self-conscious Idea."Again, this is both the presupposition of
philosophic historyand whatit will eventually demonstrate.Hegel notes a danger in a priori principles,ideas
formulated firstand broughtto bear on historical factafterwards.The Germans,he says,are especiallyba d about
this:their idea of a "primeval" Germanic people is justsuch an "a priori fabrication."But even the mostnormal,well-
meaning historian "brings his categories along with him,"and pre-thinking abouthistoryis inevitable.The key, Hegel
argues,is to use true reason and reflection rather than false association and speculation.
Hegel puts all these questions aside for the moment,however,and returns to his idea about Reason ruling history.
There are, he says, two main versions ofthis idea already out there. The first is from Anaxagoras, who firstposited
that all nature is rational in the sense thatit operates on unchangeable laws.This,however,is not the same idea as
Hegel's;Anaxagoras is not talking aboutconceptual,human,self-reflective reason,butsimplyimmutable physical
laws.Hegel notes thatSocrates was dissatisfied with Anaxagoras'accountbecause itconcerned the interactions of
the four elements rather than discussing the way reason itselfcomes to rule in nature.Anaxagoras still did not
recognize nature as "an organic whole broughtforth by Reason."Any theory aboutthe rule of Reason in the world,
Hegel says,mustaddress the process bywhich abstractReason becomes concrete reality--i.e.,it mustshow the
organic whole of the rule of Reason,not justsome rational laws.

5. The second version ofthe conviction that Reason rules the world is religious,claiming thatevents are determined by
divine "Providence." To some extent, Hegel sees this as simplyanother statementofhis own as sertion aboutReason
(a "wisdom with infinite power,realizing its own ends").But he has an objection to the Providence model thatis
similar to Socrates'objection to Anaxagoras: there is no complete theory here, since divine Providence mustremain
hidden from our view. While Anaxagoras failed to see the connection between concrete physical laws and abstract
Reason,the theory of divine Providence actually makes thatconnection impossible--God's reasons are ultimately
unknowable.
Making God unknowable is dangerous,Hegel argues,since itleaves us with no way to decide on actions.Christianity
moves againstthis state ofaffairs to some extent, since it puts God in the realm of men (through Christ,who is God
on earth). The Christian beliefis thatGod revealed himselfto us and that it is therefore our responsibilityto try to
know Him.For Hegel,this is a "developmentofthe thinking spirit,"placing God in the realm accessible to thought.
If, in the above two examples,God (or Reason,for Hegel) reveals himselfin nature and in individuals (saints) and the
world generally,why shouldn'twe say that God also reveals himselfin world history? Hegel feels that the time to look
for this transcendentReason in history"has finallycome."In knowledge generally,Hegel writes,"we aim for the
insightthatwhatever was intended by the Eternal Wisdom has come to fulfillment."World historypresents the most
difficult subjectmatter for this task of knowledge.The only way to perform this "theodicy" (a justification ofthe ways of
God), Hegel says,is "through the recognition ofthat positive aspect,in which the negative disappears as something
subordinate and overcome."
Section 3
Summary
Hegel here decides thatthings can go no further withoutsome serious attention to the nature of Spirit itself,from its
abstractcharacteristics to its fully formed instantiation in the concrete world (he notes that by "world" he means both
mental and physical nature,but says that physical nature merely"impinges"on history, while Spiritis the actual
"substance"ofhistory). This direct consideration ofSpiritwill be broken down into three sections (sections 3;4 and 5;
and 6 of this SparkNote,respectively):
I. The abstractcharacteristics ofSpirit.
II. The "means Spirituses in order to realize its Idea."
III. The shape Spirittakes when fully realized in the world: namely,the State.
Hegel's analysis ofSpirit's abstractcharacteristics begins with a focus on freedom as the very essence ofSpirit.If the
essence ofmatter is its dependence on the external force of gravity, the essence ofSpiritis its dependence onlyon
its internal principle offreedom:Spirit "has its center in itself."All the other characteristics ofSpirit"subsistonlyb y
means offreedom,"and freedom is both the means and the end of Spirit(in the abstract).In short,"freedom is the
only truth of Spirit."
Spirit is also the opposite ofmatter in terms of unity--matter is always in parts, but Spiritis entirely unified (since it
depends on nothing outside ofitself).This being-in-itself,this non-dependence,is intimatelyrelated to freedom.Since
Spirit is entirely self-sufficientby nature, freedom is inherentin it as its central principle.Further,this self-sufficient
nature is also a self-consciousness,"the consciousness ofself."Hegel defines this brieflyas the coincidence oftwo
kinds of consciousness:"that I know" and "what I know." Spirit knows thatit knows,thereby uniting itselfas a subject
with itselfas an object. So Spirit is free, self-sufficient,and self-conscious,and all of these characteristics are
interdependentnearlyto the pointof being the same thing.

6. Hegel takes these characteristics as an "abstractdefinition"ofSpirit. With that in mind,he says again that world
history is "the exhibition of Spirit, the working out of whatit is potentially." Spiritis like a seed,which takes rootin the
world and reveals its internal nature externally in history.
The essential freedom ofSpiritplays out in history as peoples become increasinglyaware ofthemselves as free.In
the ancientOrient, Hegel claims,societies were united under one essentiallyarbitraryruler. Since they did
notknowthat they were free, they were not free. The ancientGreeks exhibited the first social consciousness of
freedom,but they failed to see freedom as an essentiallyhuman characteristic--onlysome people were free,again by
chance through birth. The Germans,Hegel claims,were the first to recognize that the "freedom of spiritcomprises
our mosthuman nature."This was possible through the tenets of Christianity,which ostensiblyrecognized all humans
as fundamentallyfree (Hegel notes that religion is often the initial vehicle for this consciousness offreedom).
It took awhile,of course,to make this realization a reality. In fact, Hegel notes,this "application ofthe principle of
freedom to worldlyreality...is the long process thatmakes up historyitself."Here Hegel emphasizes the importance of
the distinction between the abstractconceptof Spirit and its realization in the concrete world--both mustbe
considered,since itis the transition from one to the other that makes up history.
The final goal of this progress from Oriental despotism to Greek democracyand on to universal rights,the "final goal
of the world," is the maximization of "Spirit's consciousness ofits freedom,and hence also the actualization of that
very freedom."Hegel immediatelyqualifies this statement,however,by saying that, since itis the "highestpossible
concept," it is a minefield ofpotential error. He'll simplyhave to clarify these errors as the lectures proceed.
Hegel closes the discussion ofSpirit's abstractprinciples with a reminder to pay attention to the difference between
abstractprinciple and concrete reality. Nevertheless,he says,that concrete reality is implicitin the concept itself:
"freedom...contains the infinite necessityof bringing itselfto consciousness...and therebyto reality." The next thing to
consider is the means bywhich this transition happens.
Section 4
Summary
In this section on the "means ofSpirit" (covered in this section and section 5), Hegel will be addressing "the means
whereby freedom develops itselfinto a world." This process,he says,is "the phenomenon ofhistoryitse lf." Freedom,
on its own, is an "internal concept," but the means by which it realizes itselfin the world are necessarilyexternal.
These means are human:human needs,drives,passions,and interests drive history. In comparison to these (in
terms of overall history, at least),virtue and moralityare "insignificant."
In this schema,individuals countfor very little--itis the mass ofhumanitythat drives history. The resultis that history
can seem little more than a "slaughter-bench,"a series ofsenseless tragedies thatthreaten to force us into a "selfish
removal"from any interestin ongoing history.Why are these sacrifices necessary? Because theyare the means by
which Spirit unfolds in the world; human will provides the actualizing power for Spirit.
This actualizing power proceeds specificallythrough whatHegel refers to as "the infinite right of the subjective will,"
by which individuals committhemselves to a purpose onlyif they "find their own sense ofselfsatisfied in it" (although
these purposes generallytranscend the individual).To committhemselves to a cause,individuals mustunderstand
that cause as their own. This is especiallytrue, Hegel says,in contemporarytimes,when authority is less powerful.
Hegel will refer to this commitment to a cause seen as one's own as a "passion."
Hegel posits two elements as the immediate determinants ofworld history:the Idea and human passion (the Idea is
not clarified here,but can be taken to mean,roughly, the Spiritas grasped by humans).Their m eeting pointin history

7. is in the "ethical freedom of the State," which is builtby human passion according to the abstractIdea of rational
freedom.
Hegel further clarifies his conceptofpassion here,describing itas a truly driven sense thatoccupies a person so
thoroughlythat it is almostthe same thing as thatperson's will and identity: "through [this passion],the person is what
he is."Passion is the subjective aspectofenergy, will and activity in general--itis the "formal"(i.e. actual,formed)
aspectof these kinds ofpower. The goal of passion is another matter,butwhatever the content of a particular
passion,itis "there in one's own conviction, one's own insightand conscience."It is the highestideal ofthe State to
merge the passions ofits citizens with the "universal goal."
At the beginning ofworld history, none of this is explicit. The goal of history--to fulfill the conceptof Spirit--begins
unconsciously,and "the entire business ofworld historyis...the work of bringing itto consciousness."The subjective
will (human passion,etc.) is apparentfrom the beginning,butlacks any higher purpose.
This immediate clarityof natural human will leads some to doubtwhether there is any higher Spiritor purpose behind
human action (and these doubters should exist,since Spirittranscends individual human purpose).To counter these
skeptics,Hegel makes reference here to "metaphysical logic,"which,he says,has proven that the union of the self-
sufficientuniversal with the "individual subjective aspect"is the only form of truth. He cannotaddress this idea here,
but mustpress on under the assumption thatReason rules history,and that "the universal is still implicitin particular
goals and fulfills itselfin them."
Hegel continues here to discuss the union ofSpiritand human will in abstractterms:as the union of freedom (human
will) and necessity(abstractSpirit), and also as the union of the universal and infinite (the Idea) with the particular
and finite (human will).This union of opposites is a matter of the "Idea proceed[ing]to its infinite antithesis...its
determinate element...the ground of its formal being."This is self-consciousness,Spirit's knowing ofitselfas an
"Other." The resultis that infinite, abstractSpiritfinds a finite, "formal freedom"in the world, finding the power of
human "arbitrary free will"in itselfwhere before there was only necessity.Hegel notes thatthe understanding ofthe
"absolute bonding ofthis antithesis"is the very task of metaphysics its elf.
The particularity (or individual will) side ofthis opposition is the realm ofindividual human happiness,where we
change our environmentto suitour desires.But,Hegel writes,"world history is not the place for happiness...periods
of happiness are emptypages in history." This is because world historyprogresses preciselythrough the antithesis
discussed above.There mustbe "activity" for historyto unfold,and activity is simplythe mediating term between the
universal Idea and external, finite, human particularity.Hegel tries to clarify this with the metaphor of building a
house:the elements (fire,water, wood,etc.) are used according to their nature, but they are used for a higher
purpose thatwill eventually limitthose same elements (with a roof, fireproofing,etc). Similarly,individual humans
serve their own interests,butalso serve a larger purpose thatmay well turn againstthem.
Section 5
Summary
Hegel continues his discussion ofthe means ofSpirit, which come from the union of the abstractuniversal with the
subjective particular.Other wordings ofthis union include "the realization of the universal Idea in immediate actuality"
and "the elevation of the singular [agency] into universal truth." Although humans are generallyunaware oftheir
participation in the universal Spirit,they nonetheless generallyact in accord with accepted abstractideals such as
honor or duty.
Major historical events occur when there is a clash (on the part of an individual or a group) between these accepted
abstractideals and possible alternative ones.The emergence ofsuch new concepts is "a moving force of the
productive Idea," the immediate instrumentof Spiritin history. The individuals who introduce these world -impacting

8. concepts are "world-historical individuals"like Caesar or Napoleon.The personal will and passions ofsuch
individuals coincide to some degree with the will of the World Spirit, and they aim,whether they know it or not, at
"what the time intrinsicallydemands."These "heroes"gain their personal passions in part"from a source whose
content is hidden"rather than from tradition or the status quo.
These heroes are able to lead only because they articulate a passion thatothers recognize as their own (since it is an
articulation of the next step in the universal Idea).Though the hero may not be conscious ofit, he is bringing the
"unconscious Spirit"to consciousness,and therefore to actualization. Hegel disputes anyassumption thatthese
individuals gain happiness from their actions,buthe also discards the "psychological"view that would focus on their
quirks and immoral passions;focusing on these onlyexpresses "envy" of the heroes,and fails to recognize that they
were being used for a higher purpose.
The sole purpose ofthe world-historical individual is to foster the emergence ofthe universal from the particular
(through its negation).When historical change occurs through upheaval and struggle (as italmostalways does) this
is a clash on the level of the particular, with "the universal in the background."Hegel coins his famous phrase "the
Cunning ofReason"here to denote the process by which worldlyparticulars (which can be apparently chaotic or
random) are used by universal Reason for its own purposes.
Thus,all the particular tragedy that occurs in the course ofworld history is a sacrifice of the particular for the
universal.But even given this higher reason,Hegel says,we cannot approve of a single death.There is something
divine aboutthe human,and the needs and insights ofhuman individuals have "an infinite right to be satisfied."This
is the realm of "morality, ethics,[and] religious commitment."Individuals have this divine aspect,however, only by
virtue of the Reason in them.Humans are the means ofthe greater rational goal,but they have a part in this goal
themselves.Theyare valuable ends in themselves insofar as they share this goal ofReason.They are to be valued
as free individuals preciselybecause true freedom is Reason (and Reason is freedom because itis entirely "self-
activating and self-determining").
But this very freedom also makes humans responsible for maintaining ethics and for any deterioration in those ethics.
This responsibilityoften seems neglected in history,but Hegel warns againstpessimistic preachers of"haughty"
ideals thatare ill-defined and cannotbe maintained.Too often, he says, people complain thathistoryhas been
immoral withoutchoosing moral ideals thatare truly universal (rather than simplysubjective).
There can be universal ideals,butHegel implies thatthese would correspond to the demands ofSpirit(which, in his
view, historydoes meet).Rather than complain,philosophyshould show thatthe "real world is as it oughtto be": God
governs history, and philosophyseeks to know his plan (since "Reason is the perception ofGod's work"). When
morals and ethics decline,itis because they are universals exposed to particulars,which limitthem to some degree.
Nonetheless,each decline has a higher purpose,and does noteffect the overall progress entailed bythe concept of
freedom.
Hegel closes this discussion with a rough definition of the "means"ofSpirit: "the activity of those in whom Reason is
presentas their intrinsicallysubstantial essence--though primarilyas a still obscure ground,one that is hidden from
them." This is complicated,he says,by the blurring of the distinction between humans as means and humans as
ends,which occurs when we consider individual moralityand ethics.
Section 6
Summary
Hegel now moves to his third division in the discussion ofSpirit:the immediate form ittakes in the world, the "form it
takes in actuality." This form is "the materialin which the rational end-goal is to be realized." In a basic sense,Hegel
says,this material is simplythe human subject(or subjectivityin general)--human knowing and willing bring Reason

9. into existence in the world. Unlike Spirititself, human will is dependenton external things.Nonetheless,it"moves
among essences,and has the essential itselfas the goal of its existence."
With participation in both particular passions and abstractessences,humans setup the State (a productof the
conjunction ofthese two aspects ofthe human,the subjective will and the rational will).The state is an "ethica l
totality," in which human individuals are free preciselyin as much as they recognize the universal (as embodied in the
principles and laws ofthe State).
Hegel is careful to point out that this idea of the State as true freedom (freedom in Reason) is notthe same as the
"social contract" model ofthe state, in which individual freedom is limited in order to allow others equal freedom.The
freedoms limited bythe State, Hegel argues,are nothing more than "caprice," simplythe careless whims ofthe
subjective will.The State allows the "only genuine ethical life,"because genuine ethics onlycome from freedom in
Reason (rational freedom).
World history, Hegel says,is only concerned with peoples who formed states.Any "value" and any "spiritual reality" is
through the State alone,because the State is a directembodimentofthe "rational essence"ofa given people;it is
the essence ofa people in a form that is "objectively there for them as knowers."In that sense,the State allows for
self-consciousness, both of its people,and, through them,of Spirit. Thus,the State is also the realization of the Spirit
in the world,"the divine Idea as it exists on earth," the thing in which "freedom gains its objectivity."
Ideally, the State eliminates anytrue conflict between the subjective needs ofits people and the rational laws that
govern them.In the State, "the rational is the necessary,"and the subjective and objective wills existtogether in it as
a "serene whole."
Although Hegel leaves it to the "philosophyof right"(Hegel's own philosophyof ethics) to cover the details ofthe
structure of the State, he discusses two "current"errors in the idea of the State. The firsthas already been
mentioned:the idea that humans are naturallyfree and that the State limits thatfreedom.Hegel argues that"freedom
does notexist as an original and natural state," and that the popular idea of an original,paradisiacal "state ofnature"
is incorrect. The State only limits the crudestof human drives,"caprice and [animal]passion."The initial limiting of
these drives,in fact, is part of the process bywhich humans become aware ofrational freedom (with its universal
essences oflaw) in the first place. Hegel laments thatcaprice is forever mistaken for freedom,whereas the limitation
of caprice is actually a requirement oftrue freedom.
The second misconception ofthe State makes itsimplyan expansion ofbasic,family-based patriarchal authority,
rather than a rational developmentof this authority into law.On this errantmodel,true justice can only be exercised
by the patriarch.On the contrary, Hegel argues,the patriarchal condition is "transitional"--its form as Statehood would
be nothing more than a theocracy, which limits the freedom ofits citizens solelyby authority.
Although he does not listit as one of the above setof errors,Hegel here goes on to argue againstthe "majority rules"
model ofthe State as well.On this model,every citizen mustvote on every decision ofthe State. Hegel says this is
simplyan all-outrule of subjective will,with no role for objective will.For true freedom,the State mustbe a body of
trained intelligence thathas some degree ofautonomyand exercises real authority, real "will and activity." Obedience
to such a State would seem to go againstthe conceptof freedom,butHegel says this is avoided simplyby having the
citizens choose their own degree of obedience--whatever degree is minimal for the State to function.
Hegel discusses brieflysome practical aspects ofthe State, noting that the purpose ofthe State has been seen in
different ways throughouthistory. Fenelon emphasized the education of princes for a good state, and Plato did the
same for the aristocracy(Hegel criticizes these for emphasizing the head of state over the structure of the state).
Nowadays,he says, there is less of a conception offree choice of the form of the State--the Republic is thoughtbest,
but people assume thatcertain peoples require certain "less free"states (like theocracies).This is an error; the State
should stem directlyfrom the entire culture of a people,and should maximize their freedom.

10. The State is an ethical and cultural whole,from which governmentcannotbe dealtwith separately.As the "spiritual
totality" of a people,it is a part of the history determined bythe progress ofSpirit. Even the mostprimitive,despotic
States effect a union of individual wills with a universal idea (and this union is the Idea itself). As history progresses,
individualityasserts itselffurther,driving monarchies to become constitutional in accordance with the progress in the
spiritof the people.On this model,the mostimportantfactor in building a State is the current stage of the
developmentofthe rational condition of the people (the stage of rationally self-conscious freedom).
In sum,then, the State "is the Idea of Spirit in the externalized form of human will and freedom."In the State, the Idea
and the subjective will "cohere together exactly." The State is the actualized form of Spirit, and "the elements ofthe
Idea are reflected in the State as various political principles."These principles differ widelyfor differentstates at
different times,and there is no value in taking older models for new states.
The union of subjective will and the Idea in the State means thatthe State is also the enabling basis for other aspects
of culture. Religion is atthe "pinnacle"of this union,because itis where the worldly version of Spirit becomes aware
of the absolute form of Spirit(as God)--religion dismisses the particular altogether.Art is a much more sensory
endeavor, which seeks notto know the mind of God but to make Him visible,to reveal the "outer form" of the
absolute.Philosophydoes try to know the absolute in and of itself,and is therefore the highest,freestand wisestof
these three "configuration[s]of Spirit."
Thus,what is universal in the State is preciselythe culture of the nation,and the "concrete actuality" of that universal
culture is "the Spiritof the people itself." Religion is the mostpowerful aspectofculture by which the people may
become aware oftheir own Spirit as the union between the subjective and objective wills.This self-awareness,Hegel
says,is crucial to the developmentofSpirit. Religion provides a people with a definition ofthe deepesttruth,with a
"universal soul ofall particular things."Thus,the way a people represents God constitutes their "general foundation,"
their absolute justification for the details ofsecular life.Religion gives the State a supreme justification,allowing its
principles to be recognized as "determinations ofthe divine nature itself." Thus,the link between religion and the
State mustbe preserved.
Closing his discussion ofthe State, Hegel gives the example of Athena as the "Spirit" of the people ofAthens: the
Spirit of a people is their sum,their rationale,their central abstractprinciple,"the basis and contentof[their] self-
consciousness."Such a Spirit is also a determinate stage ofworld history, a step in the progress ofthe larger Spirit.
Hegel reminds us thatself-consciousness,which Spiritmustachieve through human self-consciousness,
necessitates objectivity(the selfknown as an object). This objectivity is found in "all the differentiated spheres of the
objective Spirit" as it is expressed in the various institutions ofthe State and culture.The concept of Spirit is defined
by the realization of this state of affairs, as States progress through the determinate stages ofworld history.
Section 7
Summary
Hegel pauses here to listwhathe's outlined so far: the nature of Spirit, "the means ituses to realize its Idea, and the
form that it takes in the complete realization ofits existence:the State." It remains,he says,to consider the actual
"course of world history." Hegel contrasts this course with the course of nature, which is an essentiallycyclical
process where nothing trulynew ever arises.World history, on the other hand,since it actualizes a drive toward
perfectibility, often introduces true and fundamental change.
Such change mayseem to conflict with religion,Hegel notes,and also with the aim of some states to remain stable --
both seem to wish for an unchanging order.But, while he can concede that "perfectibility" in itselfis an indefi nite idea,
Hegel insists thateven the basic conceptof "development"implies the emergence ofsome fundamental ground in
history, some essential principle.This principle,ofcourse,is Spirit,which uses chance occurrences in history"for its
own purpose."In fact, he notes,even nature "brings forth"new forms,even if it does notchange its essential

11. elements.Rather,like Spirit,it is always "making itselfinto what it implicitlyis."The difference is that Spirit, unlike
nature, realizes itselfthrough "consciousness and will"--human characteristics.
Humankind begins as a partof nature, with natural,unconsidered desires and acts.But, because human
consciousness is essentially"animated bySpirit," it moves through historical change toward the realization of the
principles ofSpirit.Thus, Spiritrealizes itselfnot through a quiescent,natural process,butrather through a struggle
againstthe natural impulses ofthe very humans in whose consciousness Spiritresides.In this sense,"Spirit,within
its own self,stands in opposition to itself.It mustovercome itselfas its own truly hostile hindrance."
The overall goal of this process is,again,for Spirit to be increasingly"in conformitywith its essence,the conceptof
freedom."This goal,Hegel says,is both the object and the content of what we know as "development."The more
common notion ofdevelopmentis a "merelyformalistic"one,to which state- wide disasters like the decline and fall of
Rome are unintelligible.Hegel's broader view of development,rather than being formalistic,is both "concrete"and
"absolute":"world history presents the stages in the developmentof the principle whosecontentis the consciousness
of freedom."On this view, no disaster,fall of a state, or other major change need be anything but concrete
"development"itself.
The general,abstractnature of these stages ofdevelopmentis a matter for philosophical logic to address (since
those stages are simplythe unfolding of the rational Spirit). Their concrete nature,however, is the subjectofthe
"philosophyofspirit," which finds them to be the following:1) the "immersion ofSpiritin natural life;" 2) the
"emergence ofSpirit into the consciousness ofits freedom,"which represents a partial tearing away of Spirit from
nature; and 3) the "evolution of Spirit out of this still particular form of freedom into its pure universality--into self-
consciousness."The details ofhow these stages come aboutand fall away, the "process of[each stage's]own
formation and the dialectic of its own transition in turn," are whatphilosophic historyaddresses,and Hegel implies
that he will discuss these details later.
Although each stage in the developmentofSpirit is perfect in itself(for its particular time),there is still a d rive toward
overall perfection.This drive manifests itselfpreciselythrough imperfection, when some aspectofa given stage is
recognized to be imperfect.This aspectis then negated and replaced,allowing for development.
Hegel here turns to address the popular pseudo-historical idea ofa "state of nature," in which prehistoric man is
thoughtto have lived in a pure, naive state,with total access to God. Hegel refers to Schlegel as a major proponent
of this idea, and also notes the massive bodyof scholarship aboutancientcivilizations thathas sprung up recently. If
humans once lived in this ideal state, then history would simplybe a matter of searching for the mostancienttexts
and cultural relics,as scholars are doing with,say, Sanskrittexts. The aim would be to reconstructan originary,
cross-cultural communityof God.
Hegel thinks this idea is largelyfallacious,primarilybecause itdoes notdeal with true "history" so much as with myth
and speculation.True history, he argues,begins "atthe point where rationalitybegins to enter into worldly existence."
It requires a basic conceptof individuality, moral right,and law- -in short, true historyrequires "substantial universal
objects"and their instantiation in the State (this, Hegel notes,is the nature of freedom itself).Historybegins when
history begins to be recorded as history, and this cannothappen withoutthe concepts available through the State
(namely,the idea of law or a "universallybinding directive," which makes individual actions counton a universal scale
in order to serve the State).
The State also brings abouthistorypartly because itneeds historyin order to understand itself,to give itselfan
"integrated understanding ofitself."Hegel uses the advanced social hierarchyof ancientIndia (which nevertheless
had no real recorded history) in contrastto the idea of State-enabled history.Ancient India may have had a complex
social system,butthis was more ofa setof taboos than a universal ethical system.In order to enable history, it would
have needed a purpose "thatrelates both to the actual world and to substantial freedom."Such a purpose,Hegel
argues,is the precondition of history.

12. Ancient languages are similarlydeficientwith regard to the historical progress ofSpirit. Although often complexand
deep,they have nothing to do with "a will becoming self-conscious,nor [with] a freedom thatis expressing itselfin...a
genuinelyexternal activity." No matter how advanced ancientlanguage and culture is,it is external to history until it
begins to actualize the idea of freedom via a State.
Section 8
Summary
In this broad discussion ofthe "course of world history," Hegel has been primarilydiscussing the beginnings ofhistory
(defining the point at which history begins).Now,he says, he will move on to consider the course of world historyas it
proceeds from thatbeginning.World history, he writes,"presents the developmentofconsciousness,the
developmentofSpirit's consciousness ofits freedom,and the actualization that is produced by that consciousness."
The concepton which history runs is dialectical in nature (though Hegel does notuse that term here): it "posits
determinations in itself,then negates them,and thereby gains...an affirmative,richer, and more concrete
determination."The abstractdetails ofthis process,however,are a matter for pure philosophical logic to address.
Each stage in the process has its own "distinctdifferentiation ofSpirit," which is the particular principle ofa given
people (their Volksgeist, or "spiritof the people").
It remains for historical studyto show,from the details ofa given society on up, that there is such a "distinct
particularity" for each people.This pursuitrequires prior (a priori) knowledge ofthe Idea, in the sense thatthe
physical laws ofthe planets deduced by Kepler required that he first know the rules of geometry. Hegel rejects the
view, held by "empirical"historians,thatsuch a priori knowledge compromises historical accuracy.Philosophydoesn't
use the same categories as science,butinstead allows us to see the "essential."If particular historical details would
seem to counter Hegel's arguments aboutthe progress ofhistory,this is due simplyto a lack of understanding ofhis
conceptual theory. In fact, as with "monstrosities"in nature,any minor exceptions to Hegel's theorysimplyprove the
rule.
Exceptions to the "progress"model can be found anywhere, if we are only looking on the level of fickle, subjective
morality--Homer's principles can be found in ancientHindu texts, and civilized morals can be found in savages.For
Hegel,such comparisons are specious notations ofsimilarityin form (rather than in actual conceptual content); they
are "bare formalism"withoutany "concrete principle."World history deals with a higher ethical level than subjective
morality.
Some figures in world historymay also presentexceptions to historical progress,butthey too fall into the formalism
trap. They exercise their "formal right" to deny progress but,preciselybecause theydeny Spirit in doing so,their
actions have no real content. World-historical individuals,on the other hand,often have dubious personal morals
even as they advance the developmentof Spirit. Historyhas nothing to do with moral judgments on such figures or
on their actions;it is concerned only with the "actions of the Spirit of peoples."Philosophic historycannotconcern
itselfwith formalism,which breaks everything down into parts and analyses the similarities and differen ces between
those parts.Philosophymustinstead pursue "thoughtaboutthought,"seeking and explicating "free universality."
General culture, which contains a great deal of differentiated content, is a prerequisite for the emergence of
philosophy.But culture itselfis nothing other than the capacity to lend universalityto such differentiated content,
melding the two so that all formal distinctions are bound to a universal content. The forms that culture brings about
(law, religion,etc.) are actually "forms of universality," not entirely separate pieces offormal content.
Thus,all "plastic arts"(visual arts) require "the shared civilized life of a human community,"though poetry does not
(as Hegel has alreadysaid,language is capable ofvery high developmentwithoutany State). Philosophyarises for
certain in any such community,preciselybecause contentbecomes culture through thought(and thoughtis the

13. "material"and subjectmatter of philosophy).All cultures,at certain times,reach a pointwhere comfortable traditions
are "flattened" by the ideals and reflections ofindividuals.This is a necessarystep,since Reason mustthen be
broughtin to constructa replacement.
Thus,all world-historical peoples will develop poetry, plastic arts,science,and philosophy.Hegel emphasizes again
that what is importantin these cultural institutions is notjusttheir form but primarilytheir content. In any case,their
form and contentmustbe recognized as so intimatelybound together that one entails the other--a "form can be
classic onlyinsofar as the content is classic."The differences between various cultures atvarious stages ofhistoryis
very real, a matter of fundamental difference in "concrete content."
There are, however, some aspects ("spheres") of culture that remain the same through history.These include any
aspects thatdeal directly with "the thinking Reason and freedom,"with the human necessityto know oneselfas an
instance ofa universal and therefore as "inherentlyinfinite." Even subjective morality,though dependenton
individuals,can generate this unchanging aspectin as much as itrecognizes universal,"objective"commandments
and links them with the subjective. Hegel mentions Confucian moralityand Hindu ascetic practices as having
garnered recentpraise from Europeans in this respect,butonce again concludes thatthose systems do notcontain
true universal principles (specifically,they lack "the essential consciousness ofpersonal freedom"which is the link
between universal Reason and subjective morality).
World history("in its course") deals with the "concrete Spiritof a people,"which is the form universal Spirittakes in
order to know itselfobjectively: "Spirit seeks to bring itself...to the sightof itself[and to]...the thoughtof itself."In the
successive Spirits ofgiven peoples,universal Spiritbrings forth stages ofitselfthat function and then decline in favor
of a newer, stronger stage.This series oftransitions is the course ofworld history. Hegel says that attention to these
transitions should draw our attention to the interconnectedness ofthe whole of history as "the unfolding of [universal
Spirit] in time."
Nonetheless,the "restless succession"ofworld-historical events can be awesome in its seeming chaos and
randomness--huge results stem from minor incidents (and vice-versa),and beautiful civilizations are destroyed
withoutany immediatelyapparentreason.These events draw our interestand raise our emotions as historians.As
one historical event passes on to another, the clearestconceptwe find is simplythatof change.We may sorrow at
the collapse ofa civilization, but our "next thought" mustbe that any such decline is also a rebirth.Hegel remarks,
however, that the legend of the phoenix consuming its elfin fire and rising anew from its ashes is inadequate here--
Spirit doesn'tmerelyrise again as itwas before, but rather emerges in a new "exalted and transfigured"form.
Thus,these changes in Spirit(these declines and rebirths in human enterprise) are "elaborations ofits own self,"
Spirit's experiments with unfolding its universal nature in the world. It is true, Hegel says,that Spirit can be stymied
sometimes in the face of certain "natural conditions,"buthe points outthat such temporaryfailings are due only to
Spirit's own activities (not to any conscious counteraction on nature's part).Therefore,these failings can only call our
attention to the fact that the historical decline itselfis a matter of spiritual activity. "It is the essence of Spiritto act,"
Hegel writes,"to make itselfexplicitly into what it already is implicitly...so that its own existence is there for it to be
conscious of."Thus,Volksgeistis also a matter of action: "a people is whatits deeds are." A people is strong if it does
what it wills--i.e.,if its subjective aspectmeets its objective aspect.
When this ideal state of affairs (in which a people's Spiritis fully realized in their society) actually occurs,however,
"the activity of Spiritis no longer needed"in that society--it becomes static or stagnant,a matter of "habit." This
should lead to a slow,natural death (as in old age), but the restlessness ofSpiritmeans thatStates will more often
commit"national suicide"after reaching a static state.Any abstract category, any "genus,""carries its negative within
it," Hegel says.Eventually, the perfected State falls apart, and Spirit is reborn in a new form.Hegel uses the figure of
Zeus here: Zeus founded the firstethical State by defeating Time (notby waiting for the natural death of what came
before).

14. Spirit manifests itselfthrough thought,which is the only medium bywhich a people and Spirititselfcan come to know
themselves in their universal dimension.This thoughtmustatfirst be differentfrom the way the society actually
works--Hegel cites Plato as an example of this "dichotomy"between universal principle and actual culture.
Nonetheless,thoughttends to show the faults of tradition,and eventually replaces thattradition.Zeus defeats Time to
build his State, and then he himselfis defeated bythought (as reason and cognition replace traditional deity-worship).
Thus,thought destroys aspects ofthe "finite being"or particularity of a culture,but at the same time itresurrects
culture in a new and stronger form by applying universal principles to it. Again, this is a case of Spirittransfiguring
itselfby negating itself(which is possible onlybecause itis essentiallyself-conscious).In making itselfan object,
Spirit "destroys the particular determinacyofits being [and] grasps its own universality." This allows itto "give a new
determination ofits principle."Grasping this transition (this back and forth or constantself-re-creation) is the most
importantthing in grasping the meaning of the course ofhistory itself.
In summing up,Hegel uses the seed metaphor again to describe the unfolding ofSpirit. This time,however, he
extends it: the seed blossoms and bears fruit,which "the life of a people brings...to ripeness."The people feasto n
this fruit, even though it eventually proves poison to them (after the State has been perfected and begins to decline).
Then new seeds ofthe fruit take hold, and the process begins again.
Each National Spiritin this series is a phase in the development ofone universal Spirittoward an eventual "self-
comprehending totality." Philosophic history,then, is in a sense onlyconcerned with an eternal present--"the Idea is
ever present,[and]Spirit is immortal...the presentform ofSpirit contains all the earlier stages within itself."In as much
as philosophic historydeals with history,the cycle of stages ofSpirit are past. In as much as philosophic historyis
philosophy,these stages are eternally"co-present."