Financila markets in russia
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The paper first considers why central European countries wish to join EMU soon. The main reasons are the risk of macroeconomic instability they face outside the euro zone if they wish to grow quickly. At the same time, Central Europe is highly integrated as regards trade with EMU, so it is little exposed to asymmetric shocks that would require a realignment of exchange rates. Finally, it is argued that there is no cost in terms of slower growth from EMU accession, so that there is no trade-off, as has been claimed, between nominal convergence to EMU and real convergence to EU average GDP levels. Second, the paper assesses whether Central European accession to EMU would be disadvantageous to current members. It concludes that accession cannot increase inflationary pressure on existing EMU members, as has been claimed, but that slow growing members of EMU might suffer increased unemployment, unless they increase the flexibility of their labour markets. Incumbent members may also be unwilling to share power with Central Europeans in EMU institutions.
Authored by: Jacek Rostowski
Published in 2003CASE Network Studies and Analyses 253 - When Should the Central Europeans Joi...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 253 - When Should the Central Europeans Joi...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
The model of the Russian economy that was formed in the 2000s does not match a new stable growth path, though it helped to calmly overcome the crisis of 2008 and 2009. The state needs to provide stability in the fields under its direct control, i.e. the budgetary and monetary policies. In the budgetary policy we consider the advantages and drawbacks of a “New Budget Rule”, which is based on the long-term average price of oil. In the monetary sphere, we vote for a policy of transition to inflation targeting and prioritizing low inflation against the other goals of the monetary authorities.
Authored by: Sergey Drobyshevsky, Sergey Sinelnikov-Murylev
Published in 2013CASE Network Studies and Analyses 450 - Macroeconomic Preconditions of the Re...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 450 - Macroeconomic Preconditions of the Re...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
he paper examines theoretical literature, recent EMU accession examples, and current CEECs performance in search of the optimal currency regime for meeting the Maastricht criteria. Currency board arrangements seems to provide the fastest convergence. For other regimes, the markets may have theoretical and historical reasons to believe in the government's temptation to devalue on the ERM-2 entry. The government should announce the final date, and, possibly indicate the final exchange rate for the regime switch to avoid excessive currency and yield volatility. It should also underscore the central bank’s and EU authorities importance (even if non-existent) in the parity setting process to avoid excessive domestic debt inflation premium ahead of the accession. Recent experience shows that it will be easy to get rid of the remaining influence of cross rates on CEECs exchange rates.
Authored by: Mateusz Szczurek
Published in 2003CASE Network Studies and Analyses 266 - Exchange Rate Regimes and the Nominal...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 266 - Exchange Rate Regimes and the Nominal...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
At the beginning of 1990s the Soviet successor states started to transform their financial sectors to meet the needs of the emerging market economies.
Following a decade of transition, results differ. Although the Baltic States were able to build quite successful financial systems, in the CIS countries financial systems remain a major obstacle to economic growth. The hyperinflations of the early 1990s, the financial scandals that followed the collapse of monobank systems, and subsequent incomplete progress in constructing non-bank financial institutions and effective regulatory structures have had adverse consequences. These include weak bank balances sheets, high real interest rates, and poor access to capital for small enterprises and start ups. With a few exceptions, nontransparent regulation, inadequate disclosure frameworks, and weak protection of shareholders rights continue to limit investor participation in CIS financial markets. The absence of effective threepillar pension systems further limits the demand for domestic debt and equities.
Fortunately, there are signs of improvement. Bank lending and deposits are growing in many CIS economies, the proportion of bad debt in bank credit portfolio is falling, and lending and deposit interest rate spreads are diminishing. The solid economic growth recorded since 1999 in many CIS countries is helping memories of the 1998 financial crisis to fade, and stock exchanges in some CIS countries are currently at or near record levels. Financial systems in CIS economies may be moving toward the successful frameworks put in place in the new EU member states. However, because they have not benefited from the extensive foreign direct investment that recapitalised banks in Central Europe, financial stability in many CIS countries remains open to question.
Authored by: Elena Golodniuk
Published in 2005CASE Network Studies and Analyses 306 - Financial Systems and Financial Refor...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 306 - Financial Systems and Financial Refor...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
The introduction of Moldovan leu has been accompanied by a monetary stabilisation policy that until 1998 proved to be one of the most successful among FSU countries. The leu showed a remarkable stability and the rate of inflation was brought down to around 10% in 1997. However, fiscal policy was driven by inertia and pressure groups, reflecting the slow path of structural reforms and the general weakness of the state. Loose fiscal policy in turn reduced the determination in reforming state structures. Arrears and nettingout operations led to the development of the non-payment culture. At macroeconomic level, expansionary fiscal policy led to high absorption in the economy that was not met by the supply side response due to the impeded restructuring process, which fuelled imports and deteriorated trade balance. The ultimate result of the policy mix was the rapid accumulation of external debt and expenditure arrears. The unsustainability of both internal and external position of the state led to the inevitable financial crisis. The turmoil that followed in 1998 the crisis in Russia was a catalyst that speeded up the collapse of monetary stabilization. The capital account losses (capital flight) immediately brought the country to the verge of default. The abrupt and probably persistent loss of major export markets will affect the real economic activity over a longer period. More over, the crisis may create a window opportunity for accelerating Moldovan reforms. A critical situation makes the public and policy makers more likely to accept the painful measures that are necessary to revert the negative tendencies accumulated in recent years, while the large external debt makes the country fully dependent on the co-operation with international organizations, especially the IMF. Indeed, the new cabinet of young and liberal reformers voted in March 1999 initiated a more energetic program of reforms. Likewise, the decline of exports to Russia forced Moldovan enterprises to search new export possibilities for many producers trying to enter non-traditional western markets.
Authored by: Artur Radziwill, Octavian Scerbatchi, Constantin Zaman
Published in 2000CASE Network Studies and Analyses 192 - Financial Crisis in Moldova - Causes ...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 192 - Financial Crisis in Moldova - Causes ...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
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The paper first considers why central European countries wish to join EMU soon. The main reasons are the risk of macroeconomic instability they face outside the euro zone if they wish to grow quickly. At the same time, Central Europe is highly integrated as regards trade with EMU, so it is little exposed to asymmetric shocks that would require a realignment of exchange rates. Finally, it is argued that there is no cost in terms of slower growth from EMU accession, so that there is no trade-off, as has been claimed, between nominal convergence to EMU and real convergence to EU average GDP levels. Second, the paper assesses whether Central European accession to EMU would be disadvantageous to current members. It concludes that accession cannot increase inflationary pressure on existing EMU members, as has been claimed, but that slow growing members of EMU might suffer increased unemployment, unless they increase the flexibility of their labour markets. Incumbent members may also be unwilling to share power with Central Europeans in EMU institutions.
Authored by: Jacek Rostowski
Published in 2003CASE Network Studies and Analyses 253 - When Should the Central Europeans Joi...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 253 - When Should the Central Europeans Joi...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
The model of the Russian economy that was formed in the 2000s does not match a new stable growth path, though it helped to calmly overcome the crisis of 2008 and 2009. The state needs to provide stability in the fields under its direct control, i.e. the budgetary and monetary policies. In the budgetary policy we consider the advantages and drawbacks of a “New Budget Rule”, which is based on the long-term average price of oil. In the monetary sphere, we vote for a policy of transition to inflation targeting and prioritizing low inflation against the other goals of the monetary authorities.
Authored by: Sergey Drobyshevsky, Sergey Sinelnikov-Murylev
Published in 2013CASE Network Studies and Analyses 450 - Macroeconomic Preconditions of the Re...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 450 - Macroeconomic Preconditions of the Re...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
he paper examines theoretical literature, recent EMU accession examples, and current CEECs performance in search of the optimal currency regime for meeting the Maastricht criteria. Currency board arrangements seems to provide the fastest convergence. For other regimes, the markets may have theoretical and historical reasons to believe in the government's temptation to devalue on the ERM-2 entry. The government should announce the final date, and, possibly indicate the final exchange rate for the regime switch to avoid excessive currency and yield volatility. It should also underscore the central bank’s and EU authorities importance (even if non-existent) in the parity setting process to avoid excessive domestic debt inflation premium ahead of the accession. Recent experience shows that it will be easy to get rid of the remaining influence of cross rates on CEECs exchange rates.
Authored by: Mateusz Szczurek
Published in 2003CASE Network Studies and Analyses 266 - Exchange Rate Regimes and the Nominal...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 266 - Exchange Rate Regimes and the Nominal...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
At the beginning of 1990s the Soviet successor states started to transform their financial sectors to meet the needs of the emerging market economies.
Following a decade of transition, results differ. Although the Baltic States were able to build quite successful financial systems, in the CIS countries financial systems remain a major obstacle to economic growth. The hyperinflations of the early 1990s, the financial scandals that followed the collapse of monobank systems, and subsequent incomplete progress in constructing non-bank financial institutions and effective regulatory structures have had adverse consequences. These include weak bank balances sheets, high real interest rates, and poor access to capital for small enterprises and start ups. With a few exceptions, nontransparent regulation, inadequate disclosure frameworks, and weak protection of shareholders rights continue to limit investor participation in CIS financial markets. The absence of effective threepillar pension systems further limits the demand for domestic debt and equities.
Fortunately, there are signs of improvement. Bank lending and deposits are growing in many CIS economies, the proportion of bad debt in bank credit portfolio is falling, and lending and deposit interest rate spreads are diminishing. The solid economic growth recorded since 1999 in many CIS countries is helping memories of the 1998 financial crisis to fade, and stock exchanges in some CIS countries are currently at or near record levels. Financial systems in CIS economies may be moving toward the successful frameworks put in place in the new EU member states. However, because they have not benefited from the extensive foreign direct investment that recapitalised banks in Central Europe, financial stability in many CIS countries remains open to question.
Authored by: Elena Golodniuk
Published in 2005CASE Network Studies and Analyses 306 - Financial Systems and Financial Refor...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 306 - Financial Systems and Financial Refor...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
The introduction of Moldovan leu has been accompanied by a monetary stabilisation policy that until 1998 proved to be one of the most successful among FSU countries. The leu showed a remarkable stability and the rate of inflation was brought down to around 10% in 1997. However, fiscal policy was driven by inertia and pressure groups, reflecting the slow path of structural reforms and the general weakness of the state. Loose fiscal policy in turn reduced the determination in reforming state structures. Arrears and nettingout operations led to the development of the non-payment culture. At macroeconomic level, expansionary fiscal policy led to high absorption in the economy that was not met by the supply side response due to the impeded restructuring process, which fuelled imports and deteriorated trade balance. The ultimate result of the policy mix was the rapid accumulation of external debt and expenditure arrears. The unsustainability of both internal and external position of the state led to the inevitable financial crisis. The turmoil that followed in 1998 the crisis in Russia was a catalyst that speeded up the collapse of monetary stabilization. The capital account losses (capital flight) immediately brought the country to the verge of default. The abrupt and probably persistent loss of major export markets will affect the real economic activity over a longer period. More over, the crisis may create a window opportunity for accelerating Moldovan reforms. A critical situation makes the public and policy makers more likely to accept the painful measures that are necessary to revert the negative tendencies accumulated in recent years, while the large external debt makes the country fully dependent on the co-operation with international organizations, especially the IMF. Indeed, the new cabinet of young and liberal reformers voted in March 1999 initiated a more energetic program of reforms. Likewise, the decline of exports to Russia forced Moldovan enterprises to search new export possibilities for many producers trying to enter non-traditional western markets.
Authored by: Artur Radziwill, Octavian Scerbatchi, Constantin Zaman
Published in 2000CASE Network Studies and Analyses 192 - Financial Crisis in Moldova - Causes ...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 192 - Financial Crisis in Moldova - Causes ...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
The arguments for fiscal as well as monetary rules in a monetary union aiming at low inflation, the main weaknesses in the Stability and Growth Pact, and proposals for its reform are reviewed. Our own proposal for reforming the SGP is put forward: a requirement for eurozone Member States to enact entrenched legislation which would forbid budgets that led to public debt exceeding a certain proportion of GDP. Countries which failed to enact such provisions or which rescinded them could not remain in the eurozone. This would solve the key “enforcibility problem” that the SGP faces, without centralizing fiscal power in the European Commission. However, effective reform proposals are unlikely to be politically acceptable, and the SGP is likely to continue to be a dead letter. This suggests that the EMU was implemented prematurely.
Authored by: Jacek Rostowski
Published in 2004CASE Network Studies and Analyses 275 - The Stability and Growth Pact - Essen...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 275 - The Stability and Growth Pact - Essen...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
This study reviews monetary policy options that are seemingly viable for adopting the euro by the new Member States of the European Union. A fully autonomous direct inflation targeting is believed to be suboptimal for convergence to the euro as it does not incorporate convergence parameters into the central bank reaction function and instrument rules. In an attempt to correct for such deficiency, this study advocates adopting a framework of relative inflation forecast targeting where a differential between the domestic and the eurozone inflation forecasts becomes the main objective of the central bank's decisions.
At the same time, some attention to the exchange rate stability objective becomes necessary for facilitating the monetary convergence process. Foreign exchange market interventions, rather than interest rate adjustments, are viewed as a preferred way of achieving this objective.
Authored by: Lucjan T. Orlowski
Published in 2005CASE Network Studies and Analyses 294 - Monetary Policy Adjustments on the Fi...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 294 - Monetary Policy Adjustments on the Fi...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
An attempt is made to explore the basic implications of differences in productivity growth rates in countries within a monetary union and tailor them to the case of the EU new member countries running up to the EMU. By using the mathematical model of Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect and linking productivity and relative price dynamics with monetary policy, it is shown that: 1) productivity growth in faster-growing countries (FGC) leads to either inflation there, or union-wide exchange rate appreciation, or both in certain proportions, depending on the monetary policy stance taken by the union, but does not cause increase in inflation in slower-growing countries (SGC) by itself, unless the union’s monetary authorities take pro-inflationary policy; 2) because of presence of FGC, the SGC do not become less competitive in the world, and can benefit from increased export of their goods to FGC, provided their labour markets are flexible enough; 3) the real challenge for SGC posed by FGC is not inflation, but rather loss of jobs and export revenues, if their labour markets are not flexible enough to adjust under tight union-wide monetary policy aimed at keeping the union-wide overall price level unchanged, or the labour productivity increase in FGC is not met by adequate improvement in labour productivity in SGC. It should be noted, however, that this ‘adequate improvement’ is enough to constitute only a fraction of the productivity growth in FGC.
Authored by: Nikolai Zoubanov
Published in 2003CASE Network Studies and Analyses 257 - Uneven Growth in a Monetary Union: on...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 257 - Uneven Growth in a Monetary Union: on...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
The paper presents series of medium term economic simulations, evaluating fiscal costs of different EMU entry scenarios for six of the new EU members. Projections cover period of 2004- 2012 and use basic macroeconomic equations in an attempt to assess the value of public debtrelated costs that may occur in each of the countries, under specific assumptions. Four series of simulations were run, assuming two different EMU entry dates (2007 and 2012), and two growth scenarios (2% and 5% of real GDP growth p.a.). For each growth variant the early and late accession projections are compared in order to evaluate the net fiscal effect of delaying the EMU entry. Those effects depend on country’s starting position and are quite significant for most of the countries in question. Poland and Hungary are the biggest winners of the earlier EMU entrysimulations, both saving equivalence of 18-20% of their 2004 GDP levels (as compared to results of the late accession scenarios). It appears that the GDP growth rate does not seriously affect thevolume of the gains, which are rather generated by the faster interest rate reduction and tighter fiscal policies in case of the earlier EMU accession.
Authored by: Michal Gorzelak
Published in 2004CASE Network Studies and Analyses 277 - Fiscal Costs of Delaying the EMU Acce...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 277 - Fiscal Costs of Delaying the EMU Acce...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
The paper examines the nature of the Bulgarian banking and currency crises in 1996-1997 and evaluates the causal link between them. The analysis shows that the banking crisis has resulted from slow structural reforms, inefficient prudential regulation and prolonged unsound lending practices. The probit model estimates illustrate that excessive credit, augmented interest rate spread and overvalued exchange rate exacerbated the banks' liquidity position. The currency crisis was a consequence of expansionary monetary policy, which led to irreversible depletion of international reserves and caused eventual collapse of the exchange rate. The probit estimations found real exchange rate, money multiplier, interest rate, current account balance, ratio of broad money to reserves and credit expansion to be the most relevant indicators of the balance-of-payment crisis. The causal link between the twin crises is explained through expansionary monetary policy that comes as a response to the banking crisis. It focuses on the inability of the central bank to sustain the exchange rate when it faces a run on its reserves.
Authored by: Preslava Kovatchevska
Published in 2000CASE Network Studies and Analyses 204 - The Banking and Currency Crises in Bu...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 204 - The Banking and Currency Crises in Bu...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
This paper discusses the processes of nominal and real convergence and their dependence on exchange rate regimes adopted in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in thecontext of their future EMU accession. We focus our argument on the possibility of trade-off between the pace of disinflation and the maintenance of competitiveness and growth. Fixednominal exchange rate shifts the burden of adjustment on to the tradable sector but whether this pressure results in faster restructuring and faster productivity growth or becomes a straightjacket for the economy is an open question. The paper implements a simple empirical assessment of convergence of inflation to EU levels and economic growth of 7 CEE economies which had adopted different exchange rate regimes in period 1993-2002. Results indicate that fixed exchange rates seem to have been a better tool of fighting inflation as compared to floating exchange rates or intermediate regimes. The presence of a fixed exchange rate has also been characterised byhigher real GDP growth rates implying an absence of trade-off between nominal and real convergence in the investigated sample. Qualifications attached to these results are discussed.
Authored by: Przemyslaw Kowalski
Published in 2003CASE Network Studies and Analyses 270 - Nominal and Real Convergence in Alter...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 270 - Nominal and Real Convergence in Alter...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
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The arguments for fiscal as well as monetary rules in a monetary union aiming at low inflation, the main weaknesses in the Stability and Growth Pact, and proposals for its reform are reviewed. Our own proposal for reforming the SGP is put forward: a requirement for eurozone Member States to enact entrenched legislation which would forbid budgets that led to public debt exceeding a certain proportion of GDP. Countries which failed to enact such provisions or which rescinded them could not remain in the eurozone. This would solve the key “enforcibility problem” that the SGP faces, without centralizing fiscal power in the European Commission. However, effective reform proposals are unlikely to be politically acceptable, and the SGP is likely to continue to be a dead letter. This suggests that the EMU was implemented prematurely.
Authored by: Jacek Rostowski
Published in 2004CASE Network Studies and Analyses 275 - The Stability and Growth Pact - Essen...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 275 - The Stability and Growth Pact - Essen...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
This study reviews monetary policy options that are seemingly viable for adopting the euro by the new Member States of the European Union. A fully autonomous direct inflation targeting is believed to be suboptimal for convergence to the euro as it does not incorporate convergence parameters into the central bank reaction function and instrument rules. In an attempt to correct for such deficiency, this study advocates adopting a framework of relative inflation forecast targeting where a differential between the domestic and the eurozone inflation forecasts becomes the main objective of the central bank's decisions.
At the same time, some attention to the exchange rate stability objective becomes necessary for facilitating the monetary convergence process. Foreign exchange market interventions, rather than interest rate adjustments, are viewed as a preferred way of achieving this objective.
Authored by: Lucjan T. Orlowski
Published in 2005CASE Network Studies and Analyses 294 - Monetary Policy Adjustments on the Fi...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 294 - Monetary Policy Adjustments on the Fi...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
An attempt is made to explore the basic implications of differences in productivity growth rates in countries within a monetary union and tailor them to the case of the EU new member countries running up to the EMU. By using the mathematical model of Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect and linking productivity and relative price dynamics with monetary policy, it is shown that: 1) productivity growth in faster-growing countries (FGC) leads to either inflation there, or union-wide exchange rate appreciation, or both in certain proportions, depending on the monetary policy stance taken by the union, but does not cause increase in inflation in slower-growing countries (SGC) by itself, unless the union’s monetary authorities take pro-inflationary policy; 2) because of presence of FGC, the SGC do not become less competitive in the world, and can benefit from increased export of their goods to FGC, provided their labour markets are flexible enough; 3) the real challenge for SGC posed by FGC is not inflation, but rather loss of jobs and export revenues, if their labour markets are not flexible enough to adjust under tight union-wide monetary policy aimed at keeping the union-wide overall price level unchanged, or the labour productivity increase in FGC is not met by adequate improvement in labour productivity in SGC. It should be noted, however, that this ‘adequate improvement’ is enough to constitute only a fraction of the productivity growth in FGC.
Authored by: Nikolai Zoubanov
Published in 2003CASE Network Studies and Analyses 257 - Uneven Growth in a Monetary Union: on...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 257 - Uneven Growth in a Monetary Union: on...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
The paper presents series of medium term economic simulations, evaluating fiscal costs of different EMU entry scenarios for six of the new EU members. Projections cover period of 2004- 2012 and use basic macroeconomic equations in an attempt to assess the value of public debtrelated costs that may occur in each of the countries, under specific assumptions. Four series of simulations were run, assuming two different EMU entry dates (2007 and 2012), and two growth scenarios (2% and 5% of real GDP growth p.a.). For each growth variant the early and late accession projections are compared in order to evaluate the net fiscal effect of delaying the EMU entry. Those effects depend on country’s starting position and are quite significant for most of the countries in question. Poland and Hungary are the biggest winners of the earlier EMU entrysimulations, both saving equivalence of 18-20% of their 2004 GDP levels (as compared to results of the late accession scenarios). It appears that the GDP growth rate does not seriously affect thevolume of the gains, which are rather generated by the faster interest rate reduction and tighter fiscal policies in case of the earlier EMU accession.
Authored by: Michal Gorzelak
Published in 2004CASE Network Studies and Analyses 277 - Fiscal Costs of Delaying the EMU Acce...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 277 - Fiscal Costs of Delaying the EMU Acce...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
The paper examines the nature of the Bulgarian banking and currency crises in 1996-1997 and evaluates the causal link between them. The analysis shows that the banking crisis has resulted from slow structural reforms, inefficient prudential regulation and prolonged unsound lending practices. The probit model estimates illustrate that excessive credit, augmented interest rate spread and overvalued exchange rate exacerbated the banks' liquidity position. The currency crisis was a consequence of expansionary monetary policy, which led to irreversible depletion of international reserves and caused eventual collapse of the exchange rate. The probit estimations found real exchange rate, money multiplier, interest rate, current account balance, ratio of broad money to reserves and credit expansion to be the most relevant indicators of the balance-of-payment crisis. The causal link between the twin crises is explained through expansionary monetary policy that comes as a response to the banking crisis. It focuses on the inability of the central bank to sustain the exchange rate when it faces a run on its reserves.
Authored by: Preslava Kovatchevska
Published in 2000CASE Network Studies and Analyses 204 - The Banking and Currency Crises in Bu...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 204 - The Banking and Currency Crises in Bu...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
This paper discusses the processes of nominal and real convergence and their dependence on exchange rate regimes adopted in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in thecontext of their future EMU accession. We focus our argument on the possibility of trade-off between the pace of disinflation and the maintenance of competitiveness and growth. Fixednominal exchange rate shifts the burden of adjustment on to the tradable sector but whether this pressure results in faster restructuring and faster productivity growth or becomes a straightjacket for the economy is an open question. The paper implements a simple empirical assessment of convergence of inflation to EU levels and economic growth of 7 CEE economies which had adopted different exchange rate regimes in period 1993-2002. Results indicate that fixed exchange rates seem to have been a better tool of fighting inflation as compared to floating exchange rates or intermediate regimes. The presence of a fixed exchange rate has also been characterised byhigher real GDP growth rates implying an absence of trade-off between nominal and real convergence in the investigated sample. Qualifications attached to these results are discussed.
Authored by: Przemyslaw Kowalski
Published in 2003CASE Network Studies and Analyses 270 - Nominal and Real Convergence in Alter...
CASE Network Studies and Analyses 270 - Nominal and Real Convergence in Alter...CASE Center for Social and Economic Research
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Financila markets in russia
- 1. Financial markets in Russia
- 5. At the same time, the yield of RUS-15, which belong to the category of the ‘shortest’ securities tradable on that market, displayed a drop by 4.6% (Fig. 1). On 31 October, the coupon income paid on RUS-15 and RUS-20 totaled $ 123.75m. Over the period from 27 October to 22 November 2011, the combined turnover of the secondary market of OFZ bonds amounted to Rb 60.12bn, while the average daily turnover amounted to about Rb 3.34bn, which corresponds to the 4.3% drop of the average daily turnover over than month by comparison with the previous period. Between 27 October and 22 November, 3 primary placement auctions of OFZ bonds were held in Russia (vs. 2 auctions one month earlier) (Table 1). Although the weighted average yield was high, the actual placement volume amounted to only 51.3% of the planned figure. No additional auctions for additional placement of OFZ on the secondary market were held over that period.
- 8. Among the domestic factors in the dynamics of the Russian stock market, we should note information on the increase in capital outflow from the Russian Federation as seen by the results of the year 2011; and on the drop in the volume of Russia’s international reserves; as well as the growth of the unemployment level in Russia in October to 6.4% (vs. 6% in September). At the same time, in November the market was propped up by the Bank of Russia’s decision to keep its rate of refinancing unchanged; the release of their positive financial results in Q3 2011 by some biggest Russian companies (OJSC Gazprom neft’, RUSAL); as well as Russia’s GDP growth over Q3 2011 by 4.8% per annum.