The document summarizes the conflict over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan. Ethiopia wants to use the dam for hydroelectric power and development, but Egypt fears it will significantly reduce the downstream flow of the Nile River, which it relies on for over 90% of its water. Negotiations have failed to reach an agreement on how fast Ethiopia can fill the dam reservoir and how much water must be released. The countries and African Union are aiming to finalize a deal within two to three weeks to regulate dam operations and protect all countries' water and energy interests. The document provides background on each country's perspectives and interests in the conflict over the Blue Nile waters.

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ONLINE INTERNATIONAL SIMULATION GAME
25th - 26th - 27th July 2020
‘Conference on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’
THE CONFLICT SCENARIO
Al Jazeera, 27 Jun 2020:
‘’Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan will agree a deal to fill the giant Blue Nile dam in two to three weeks,
following mediation by the African Union to broker a deal to end a decade-long dispute over water
supplies.
Tortuous negotiations over the years have left the two nations and their neighbour Sudan short
of an agreement to regulate how Ethiopia will operate the dam and fill its reservoir, while protecting
Egypt's scarce water supplies from the Nile river.
Ethiopia's water minister, Seleshi Bekele, said that consensus had been reached to finalise a deal
within two to three weeks, a day after leaders from the three countries and South African President
Cyril Ramaphosa, who chairs the African Union (AU), held an online summit.
The announcement late on Friday was a modest reprieve from weeks of bellicose rhetoric and
escalating tensions over the $4.6bn Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Ethiopia had
vowed to start filling at the start of the rainy season in July.
Ethiopia has hinged its development ambitions on the mega-project, describing the dam as a
crucial lifeline to bring millions out of poverty. Egypt, which relies on the Nile for more than 90
percent of its water supplies and already faces high water stress, fears a devastating impact on
its booming population of 100 million.
Sudan, which also depends on the Nile for water, has played a key role in bringing the two sides
together after the collapse of United States-mediated talks in February.
After the AU video conference chaired by South Africa on Friday, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah
el-Sisi said that "all parties" had pledged not to take "any unilateral action" by filling the dam
without a final agreement, according to state media.

2. Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok also indicated the impasse between the Nile basin
countries had eased, saying the countries had agreed to restart negotiations through a technical
committee with the aim of finalising a deal in two weeks.’’
Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa with 102.4 million citizens, and a population
growth of currently 2.5 % (World Bank, 2017). Since 2004, the country’s economy grew by
approximately 10 percent per year (World Bank, 2015). The country is rich of natural resources,
with high potentials for renewable energy source, including hydropower, wind power, geothermal
power, solar energy and biomass (Awulachew,2017). However, over the last decade, the country
has suffered chronic electricity shortages due to rapid economic growth outpacing the
development of the energy sector (Guta and Börner, 2015). Apparently, the Ethiopian energy
security has been facing to meet increasing 2.5 % population and the demand has increased by
30 % in every year (Asnake,2015; Guta, 2015), but the energy production is uneven. In response
to that, the government planned under the first phase of GTP I to construct multipurpose
hydropower plants to increase the energy production up to 10,000 MW in 2015 (MoFED, 2010),
and GTPII forecasted a growth in energy production of up to 17,000 MW in 2020 (MoFED, 2016).
Yet, the national grid of modern energy production has below one-third of the planned in 2018
(EEP, 2018). Consequently, there had been national grid energy shortages between 2007-2009,
then the country lost 3 % of its national GDP (Guta, 2013). Ethiopia has a shortage of water
storage facilities, the demands of institutional and infrastructure investment is high,and the
investment ability is low (Grey & Sadoff, 2007). Based on a study by the World Bank, the cost of
hydrological variability currently has been estimated to be more than one third of the annual GDP,
which indicated that increased investment in multipurpose water infrastructure could contribute to
the long-term economic development and mitigate the adverse impacts of floods and droughts
(World Bank, 2006). However, the GERD is primarily built for power generation and not for other
purposes, such as irrigation and water security (Chen and Swain, 2014). The expansion of the
hydropower capacity is based on economic studies which showed that hydropower would be
beneficial for the country and region (Schoeters, 2013). The Ethiopian electricity production
capacity has been 4,284 MW in 2017, out of which 96.6 % came from renewable sources of
energy, including hydropower, wind, geothermal, biomass and the remaining 3.4 % came from
diesel (Awulachew, 2017). Ethiopia has the potential to use the water resource across eight major
basins with an exploitable hydropower potential of 50,000 MW(EEP,2018).On the other hand, the
international energy agency and other researches mentioned that the country hydropower
potential is below, which is 45,000 MW (IEA, 2017; Awulachew, 2017; Tsegaye, 2016). Currently,

3. the installed capacity is of 3,813 MW, generating annually 4,954 GWH so far (IHA, 2017).On the
other hand, the country faces enormous challenges to generate and supply electricity (Guta and
Börner, 2015).The country has been implementing different hydropower projects, including the
grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) for producing energy (Schoeters, 2013). In fact, the
GERD is a multi-purpose infrastructure that can help transform Ethiopia’s economy through
sustainable provision of cheap power, irrigation systems and storage capacities to protect from
floods and droughts while maintaining the environment regulation (Tan, et al., 2017). In Ethiopia,
there are some existing main dams such as Koka, Fincha, Tana Beles and Tekeze with significant
reservoir storage capacities, and which were originally all intended for hydropower production
(SWECO, 2008). Nevertheless, the country’s geographical electricity access is approximately
55% in 2015 (Asnake, 2015). The (MoWIE) is the responsible organ of the Government of Ethiopia
(GoE) for the country’s water, irrigation and electricity sector development and expansion. As a
state-owned project, the GERD is operated by Ethiopian Electric Power which is a department of
the Ministry of Water, Irrigation, and Electricity.
In 2000, the World Commission on Dams (WCD) published a comprehensive report on large
dams (defined as dams greater than 15 m in height and storage capacity greater than 3 million
m3), recommending that sustainable improvements to human welfare from economic, social, and
environmental perspectives be demonstrated prior to construction (WCD, 2000). The report
emphasizes that the large dam debate should clearly extend beyond infrastructure to include
environmental impacts, sustainability, economic and financial aspects, and equitable sharing of
project costs and benefits across the region. In light of the WCD report, the GERD is a
controversial project in the Nile basin (Chen and Swain, 2014), particularly considering the long-
standing agreement between Egypt and Sudan, namely the 1959 Nile Treaty. This agreement
allocates 55.5 billion and 18.5 billion m3 of the Nile River water to Egypt and Sudan, respectively;
an additional 10 billion m3 are lost to infiltration and evaporation from Lake Nasser. These
allocations and losses account for the annual average total of 84 billion m3 reaching the High
Aswan Dam (HAD) (Murakami, 1995). In response to the GERD, downstream countries (Sudan
and Egypt) have raised concerns regarding the possible reduction of water, constituting a breach
of the 1959 Treaty. Ethiopia and riparian countries on the White Nile River contest that they are
not party to the 1959 Treaty and are entitled to an “equitable share” as long as there is no
significant harm to downstream users. This stance was formalized through the recent Cooperative
Framework Agreement, although unsurprisingly Egypt and Sudan did not sign on (NBI,2015).
Numerous studies highlight the potential negative impacts of the GERD on Egypt and Sudan (e.g.,
Chen and Swain, 2014; J-WAFS, 2014; Ahmed and Elsanabary, 2015; Bastawesy, 2015). Chen

4. and Swain (2014) evaluate strategic priorities, sustainability standards according to the WCD’s
framework, and geopolitical significance, concluding that project planning and protocol has largely
ignored the WCD’s guidelines and offered limited transparency. A major concern they present is
the estimated displacement and relocation of over 12,000 people, which is substantial but smaller
than other large dam projects (Whittington et al. 2015). International Rivers (2015) estimates a
total displacement of 40 to 80 million people worldwide because of large dams, most of them in
China and India. While the displacement of people at any rate is undesirable, compared to the 1
million people displaced by the Three Gorges Dam in China to generate 22,000 MW (National
Geographic 2010), the 12,000 displaced by the GERD (Chen and Swain 2014) to generate 6,000
MW is notably less. Most people living in proximity to the dam are impoverished subsistence
farmers, fisher-people, and hunters (Veilleux 2013). Preserving this rural/traditional lifestyle (with
no dam) may be preferable to some, however others argue that potentially raising millions of
people out of poverty through energy and economic growth outweighs preserving traditional
lifestyles and some environmental damages (Bekele and Lautze 2009). Additionally, they argue,
compensation is provided for displaced people (Abdelhady et al. 2015; Fortin 2014). The expected
impact on cultural heritage loss is low, as the location of the GERD is in a sparsely populated part
of Ethiopia. Reductions in downstream river flows will likely be most significant during the reservoir
filling stage. While this is consequential for both Sudan and Egypt, only the latter is largely
dependent on the Nile as a sole water source for all water related activities. Abdelhaleem and
Helal (2015) conclude that a reduction of more than 5–15% may significantly affect Egypt’s water
supply, irrigation, and safe navigation, however Mulat and Moges (2014) find that the filling period
would not adversely affect Egypt’s ability to irrigate. Zhang et al. (2015) provide a set of plausible
filling polices and associated average reduction in streamflow, finding that impounding 10% (25%)
of monthly streamflow during the first 5 years of filling may result in a corresponding average
reduction of 6% (14%) at Lake Nasser, behind Egypt’s HAD. These figures may vary significantly,
between 0.6 and 15.4%, depending on the hydro-climatic conditions of the first few years of filling.
According to Mulat and Moges (2014), a reduction in annual energy production from the HAD is
estimated at 12% and 7% during and after the filling stage, respectively, under a 6-year filling
period plan, however this assumes that the HAD’s operations do not change. Thus, Egypt may
incur economic losses during the filling stage, which may be further affected by hydro-climatic
conditions and Sudan’s level of withdrawals (Kahsay et al. 2015).
According to the Ethiopian government (MoFED 2010), hydroelectricity from the GERD is
expected to primarily satisfy national demand long-term, with surpluses exported to neighboring
countries. However, since GERD production is likely to outpace domestic consumption due to

5. insufficient infrastructure in the near future (e.g., peak demand was approximately 1,500 MW in
2014; World Bank 2014), exports to neighboring countries are highly likely (EAPP 2005). In 2014
Ethiopia generated 3,967 GWh of surplus energy, with projections for the coming years at
approximately 20,000 GWh (Cuesta-Fernández 2015). Given this domestic and regional influx of
energy, and simultaneously considering various hydrologic and withdrawal scenarios, the
expected positive impact of the GERD on real GDP in the Eastern Nile region may be 5.5–8.8%
during both the filling and operational stages (Kahsay et al. 2015). In addition, a 5.5% increase in
employment of unskilled labor in Ethiopia is estimated during the construction stage of the project
(Kahsay et al. 2015). The minimum annual net benefit for Sudan and Egypt is expected to
increase from $4.9 to $5.6 billion in the agriculture and energy sectors with the GERD online;
much of this increase is a result of the GERD’s ability to provide supplemental flow (Kahsay et al.
2015; Arjoon et al. 2014). The availability of regulated streamflow for downstream countries better
supports hydropower generation and provides options for year-round irrigated agriculture. This is
particularly the case for Sudan as the Roseries dam reservoir is currently only able to support
irrigation water for a few months per year (Pearce 2015). The GERD’s ability to regulate
hydrologic variability is also likely to lead to a reduction in property losses due to flooding,
especially in Khartoum (Whittington et al. 2015). Sediment yield from the Upper Blue Nile basin
is approximately 131 million / year (Betrie et al. 2011), and trapping this behind the GERD may
cause both positive and negative externalities on downstream countries. Reduced sediment loads
will likely extend reservoir life in Sudan and Egypt and lessen silt build-up in irrigation canals; it is
estimated that Sudan could save $50 million per annum in dredging costs alone (Tesfa 2013;
Swanson 2014). Similarly, pumping head to overcome silt build up on irrigated cropland may
increase more slowly. Finally, improved water quality and reduced treatment costs for drinking
water supply may also result. In contrast, downstream soil fertility is likely to fall, particularly
affecting flood-recession agriculture in Sudan (in conjunction with the likely elimination of annual
bank flooding), with estimated losses in recession agricultural land on the order of tens of
thousands of hectares (J-WAFS 2014).
ADDITIONAL SOURCES ABOUT THE CONFLICT
Below we listed some sources you might want to visit to prepare for your role.
These are just some initial recommendations! Keep in mind that there is always the aspect of
subjectivity, fake news, or misinformation.
An outstanding infographic in full perspective, by Aljazeera
https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2020/saving-the-nile/index.html

6. An independent and well rounded 150 second video on the crisis and the general background of
the issue, by International Crisis Group
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uZiBANM7IiE