Presentation from a brown bag lunch discussion organized by the UN Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action on "Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions and Implications for Prevention", held on 23 March 2011. Please note that the designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by the United Nations in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.

1. Alex Bellamy Policy Analysis Brief for The Stanley Foundation 2011 Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict:Links, Distinctions and Implications for the Responsibility to Protect

2. Key issue - How to give effect to the prevention component of RtoP What is the relationship between mass atrocities and armed conflict? How does RtoP relate to existing prevention agendas? What are the key similarities, differences and pitfalls to avoid? How might we implement RtoP?

3. Key argument - Atrocity prevention best achieved by adding an ‘atrocity prevention lens’ to inform, and where appropriate, direct decision-making across the full spectrum of preventive activity Principal purposes of the ‘lens’ Identify countries at risk and specific factors that increase/mitigate risk in a given country Advise decision-making and program planning Structural and direct components: Providing advice that helps tailor existing programs (e.g. development, rule of law, governance, environment, displaced persons) to addressing atrocity-risk factors and identifies related areas where such programs might add value to prevention In crises, the ‘lens’ would foreground atrocity prevention and coordinate coherent multidimensional prevention strategies (much like the convening authority)

4. Prevention DilemmaAre conflict prevention and atrocity prevention linked? The debate: ICISS and Annan – conflict prevention part of atrocity prevention IPI, Ban, Evans (more recent) – agendas should not be conflated Problem 1 – what is the relationship between war and atrocities? Problem 2 – how distinct are the prevention agendas? Conflict prevention Genocide prevention RtoP prevention ICISS Ban Ki-moon

5. Armed Conflict and Mass Atrocities

6. Key points - Findings - Implications - 67% of all major cases of mass atrocities occurred in a context of armed conflict 33% occurred outside context of armed conflict Common contexts for peacetime atrocities: State-directed suppression Communal violence Post-war retribution Peacetime atrocities have become less frequent All except five began prior to 1980 Of these, four had recent experience of armed conflict/atrocities (DRC, Burundi [twice], Myanmar) Since 1980 only 15% of new episodes occurred outside armed conflict Strong link between armed conflict and mass atrocities – and getting stronger But: Not all armed conflicts produce atrocities Many atrocities occur outside armed conflict Atrocity prevention should: 1. Reduce risk of armed conflict (reducing overall risk of atrocities) 2. Reduce risk of peacetime atrocities 3. Reduce risk of atrocities being committed within context of armed conflict

7. Mass Atrocity Prevention

8. Swiss Cheese...Graphic by Jakob von HoldersteinHoltermann (Human Rights Review 2010) Cheese = layers of societal resilience to mass atrocities Holes = failures in local, national, international institutions When they align, the hazard materialises Human institutions are fallible (always have holes) Best way to reduce risk: add additional layers of resilience

9. Contending Prevention Agendas Tendency to compartmentalise prevention agendas: Conflict prevention Genocide prevention Atrocity prevention Strong overlap between them – especially conflict prevention and atrocity prevention (c. 85% the same) Similar structural measures identified by both (spanning economic, governance, security human rights, social) Similar direct measures(early warning, diplomacy, sanctions, inducements, legal, military) Why can’t we separate the agendas? Structural conditions that give rise to armed conflict (esp. civil wars) are similar to those that give rise to mass atrocities These conditions are interconnected and not easily separated Direct prevention of all varieties is about changing behaviour It makes no sense to consider reducing the tools available to policy makers There is no need, therefore, for a new repertoire of preventive measures to serve RtoP BUT: this does not means that conflict prevention tools and methods can be simply carried across to atrocity prevention

10. An Atrocity Prevention ‘Lens’ Preventive activity should be guided by atrocity-specific advice – because Atrocities and conflicts are not perfectly related Preventing conflicts and atrocities may require different things (e.g. accommodation v. coercion) Undue attention to conflict prevention may obscure the needs of atrocity prevention (e.g. Rwanda (Arusha), Bosnia) Conflict prevention may inadvertently create incentives for atrocities (groups seeking ‘place at the table’) This should be fed into existing prevention frameworks and should aim at producing cohesive and carefully tailored policies and programs An atrocity prevention lens would: Carefully assess individual situations to: Identify specific risk factors Identify local sources of resilience Utilise existing capacities and tools through tailored programs to address risks and support resilience Make the most effective use of scarce resources by targeting and tailoring existing capacities Be applied at every stage of the conflict cycle – providing a ‘moving picture’ rather than ‘one-off snapshot’ Ensure that prevention measures and capacities are carefully tailored to suit: Specific context Risk factors Goal of atrocity prevention

11. Step 1: Identifying the Risk Existing literature points to these as most common risk factors associated with atrocities We can use this to generate a reasonably accurate picture of risk E.g. based on data available in 1997, we identified 10 countries as ‘extreme risk’. Of those, 9 experienced atrocities in the following decade (exception – Burundi) 20 countries identified as ‘high’ risk – 47% succumbed to atrocities This type of modelling helps identify areas needing closer field-based analysis BUT CANNOT Identify when or where atrocities will erupt

12. Tailoring Structural Prevention Structural prevention Most UN in-country programs contribute to structural prevention Private business, NGOs and bilateral aid also contribute Tailored prevention involves examining the prevention value of this work and coordinating it effectively Atrocity prevention lens should help UN system ‘deliver as one’ on atrocity prevention Step 1: Needs assessment: Develop a shared methodology to inform planning across UN system Identify the presence and nature of local/national/regional risk factors Identify and assess sources of resilience Assess national capacity and identify protection gaps Map existing preventive activities (local and international) Identify areas needing additional support Needs assessment needs to be a rolling program of assessment and reassessment that feeds into existing program/policy planning OSAPG/RtoP is most obvious as lead office but the process needs to be consultative Initial research and drafting could be sub-contracted by OSAPG/RtoP Method might be usefully shared with regional partners

13. Step 2: Monitoring and Assessing Escalation Identifying when and where risk will escalate to imminent threat requires careful monitoring and field-based research Manifesting Risk requires Reason – perpetrators must have a purpose Means – require a sufficient number of people with capacity and will to commit atrocities Opportunity weakened internal/international restraints Chaos /war makes mass killing easier to hide (eg. Armenia 1915; RPF/ADFL in DRC) Where risk is high and these conditions exist, atrocities very likely UNLESS: Regime has capacity to end crisis before resorting to atrocities International engagement either: Resolves problem Deters atrocities by increasing costs associated with them

14. Steps of EscalationGuide only – real cases not so simple!

15. Cycle of Impunity

16. Responding to Escalation – Late and Later Prevention Responding to Crises Preventing Atrocities after Armed Conflict has Begun Important that atrocity-specific analysis be fed directly into policy making process at every stage OSAPG/RtoP advise UN policy planning Dialogue with member states and regional arrangements Use of convening authority when danger judged to be acute OSAPG/RtoP advice directly to the SG OSAPG/RtoP most appropriate lead in developing system-wide (‘narrow but deep’) responses for atrocity-specific Important to calibrate measures with long-term programming Key challenges: Much greater risk; short escalatory timeframe Pitfalls of pursing conflict resolution when atrocity prevention needed More clarity needed on relationship between prevention and reaction, humanitarian aid, and PoC Key capacities: UN staff on the ground should be able to detect and communicate warning signs of future atrocities UNHQ (OSAPG/RtoP?) should have capacity to monitor and assess field information in real time Capacity for fast-tracking early warning, assessment, advice and decision-making

17. Recommendations UN – build on the strengthening of the OSAPG/RtoP Strengthen capacity to advise on BOTH imminent crises and areas of risk where longer-term strategies required Build capacity to provide detailed assessments of individual country risks and needs – develop and share methodology Provide advice to UN agencies, funds and programs about risks Identify new and emerging conflicts that contain risk of atrocities and inform conflict prevention policymaking Serve as a convening authority and enable coordinated atrocity-prevention planning in crisis situations Use information from the field to provide ‘live’ advice to field missions and peace operations Develop a lessons learned capacity to identify best practice Regional organizations Strengthen dialogue and partnership with UN Two-way provision of atrocity prevention related information Cooperation in responding to imminent emergencies Facilitate cooperation in implementing UNSC decisions Examine ways of building an atrocity prevention lens Incorporate regional arrangements into strategic planning/implementation of programs with structural prevention component (poss: expansion of regional offices) National governments Establish national RtoP/atrocity prevention focal points

18. Further research needed - Prevention of atrocities once armed conflict under way What factors influence whether a conflict, once started, will produce atrocities? What measures (other than terminating the armed conflict) might be taken to mitigate this risk ? Global audit of preventive capacity – Where are the relevant capacities? Where are the gaps? Tailoring programs for structural prevention – A methodology for risk assessment How this works in practice (case studies) Policies and programs to address specific threats Best practice in direct prevention – Large ‘n’ studies of (a) success; (b) failures; (c) not tried Detailed case studies to see how it all ‘hangs together’

19. Thanks for your time