Sansoucy posthearing brief, George Sansoucy Sanctions, GES, Ohio

IN THE OHIO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS
UNITED LOCAL SCHOOLS BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
Appellant,
v.
COLUMBIANA COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION,
ET AL.,
Appellees.
Case No. 2016-828
GEORGE E. SANSOUCY’S POSTHEARING BRIEF OPPOSING APPELLEE
UTICA EAST OHIO MIDSTREAM LLC’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Shawn J. Organ (0042052)
Counsel of Record
David J. Twombly (0092558)
Organ Cole LLP
1330 Dublin Road
Columbus, Ohio 43215
614.481.0900
614.481.0904 (f)
sjorgan@organcole.com
djtwombly@organcole.com
Attorneys for George E. Sansoucy
Gary T. Stedronsky
Ennis Britton Co., L.P.A.
1714 West Galbraith Road
Cincinnati, Ohio 45239
gstedronsky@ennisbritton.com
Attorney for Appellant United Local School
District Board of Education
Krista R. Peddicord
Columbiana County Assistant Prosecutor
105 South Market Street
Lisbon, Ohio 44432
kpeddicord@colcoprosecutor.net
Attorney for Appellees Columbiana
County Auditor and Board of Revision
Anthony L. Ehler
Jeffrey Allen Miller
Steven L. Smiseck
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP
52 East Gay Street
P.O. Box 1008
tlehler@vorys.com
jamiller2@vorys.com
slsmiseck@vorys.com
Attorneys for Appellee Utica East Ohio
Midstream LLC

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 1
Argument ........................................................................................................................................ 4
A. Utica fails to carry its burden to prove that Mr. Sansoucy knowingly made false
statements............................................................................................................................ 5
1. Rather than evidence, Utica presents innuendo and feeble inferences ................... 5
2. Utica has no plausible explanation for why Mr. Sansoucy would lie about
the matters about which it claims he was mistaken ................................................ 6
3. Where Mr. Sansoucy made misstatements, the most plausible and fair
explanation is mistake............................................................................................. 9
4. Mr. Sansoucy was hamstrung by litigation decisions made by United ................ 15
B. Utica’s new purported “lies” are more of the same—distortions of the testimony,
or immaterial, easily explained mistakes.......................................................................... 16
1. Mr. Sansoucy did not value a deethanizer or ethane tanks or any other
equipment related to pure ethane removal or storage, and he had no motive
to lie about their existence .................................................................................... 18
2. Mr. Sansoucy did not value a debutanizer, butane tanks, or any other
equipment related to pure butane removal or storage, and he had no
motive to lie about their existence ........................................................................ 20
3. Mr. Sansoucy did not value a depropanizer or any other equipment related
to pure propane removal, and he properly classified the sole propane tank
at Kensington as real property based on its function............................................ 21
C. To try to satisfy its burden, Utica continues to resort to distortion and
misrepresentation.............................................................................................................. 23
1. Utica misrepresents the law applicable to this matter........................................... 23
2. Utica misrepresents the record and the facts of this matter .................................. 27
D. The Board lacks the authority to impose the sanctions Utica requests............................. 41
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 43

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Brown v. Runyon,
2 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1998)......................................................................................... 5
Columbus City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision,
2019 Ohio Tax Lexis 364 (BTA)........................................................................................... 41
Day v. John Hopkins Health Sys. Corp.,
907 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 2018) ................................................................................................. 43
In re Fosamax Prods. Liab.,
2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 105769 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010) ........................................................ 16
Katz v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision,
1997 Ohio Tax Lexis 1514 (BTA)......................................................................................... 43
Lottman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision,
Molden v. Davey Tree Expert Co.,
1989 Ohio App. Lexis 4570 (11th Dist. Dec. 8, 1989).......................................................... 27
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519 (2011)................................................................................................................. 1
Newman v. Wilkins,
2007 Ohio Tax Lexis 739 (BTA)....................................................................................... 2, 27
NRG Power Midwest LP v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision,
Remy v. Limbach,
Salem Med. Arts & Dev. Corp. v. Columbiana Cty. Bd. of Revision,
82 Ohio St.3d 193 (1998) ...................................................................................................... 43
Santissima Trinidad,
20 U.S. 283 (1822)............................................................................................................... 5, 9
Snodgrass v. Testa,
145 Ohio St.3d 418 (2015) .............................................................................................. 41, 42
State v. Bayless,
14 Ohio App.2d 11 (4th Dist. 1968)...................................................................................... 26

iv
State v. Beck,
2016-Ohio-8122 (1st Dist.).................................................................................................... 24
State v. Irvin,
2015-Ohio-798 (6th Dist.) ..................................................................................................... 27
State v. Lanning,
161 Ohio App.3d 853, 2005-Ohio-3484 (4th Dist.) .............................................................. 27
State v. Robie,
1988 Ohio App. Lexis 805 (6th Dist.)................................................................................... 16
Warren Local Schs. Bd. of Educ. vs. Wash. Cty. Bd. of Revision,
Westover Village LTD v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision,
Statutes and Regulations
Ohio Adm. Code 5717-1-15 ......................................................................................................... 42
R.C. 2901.03 ................................................................................................................................. 26
R.C. 2901.22 ................................................................................................................................. 26
R.C. 2921.11 ................................................................................................................................. 26
R.C. 5703.02 ................................................................................................................................. 42

INTRODUCTION
One can perhaps understand why Utica spent seven days cross-examining Mr. Sansoucy
at the hearing on the merits of this case (the “Merits Hearing”). After the Columbiana County
Auditor valued Utica’s roughly $400 million Kensington property at less than $4 million for tax
purposes, Mr. Sansoucy applied a more rigorous analysis of taxable versus nontaxable property
and concluded that the taxable value was about $76 million. With a serious increase to its tax
bill on the line, Utica had reason to attack Mr. Sansoucy and his analysis.
But since settling with United for a taxable value of Kensington upwards of $12 million,
Utica has not stopped attacking Mr. Sansoucy. Instead, it has embarked on a massive, and no
doubt extremely expensive, campaign to prevent Mr. Sansoucy from ever appearing again before
this Board. Utica has filed more than 150 pages of briefing on its Motion for Sanctions. For
context, the U.S. Department of Justice filed fewer pages defending the Affordable Care Act
before the U.S. Supreme Court. See Docket, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519
(2011), available at https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/national-federation-of-
independent-business-v-sebelius/. And Utica spent a day and a half in the sanctions hearing (the
“Motion Hearing”) largely reading excerpts of Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony to a high-level Utica
employee, Mr. Grant Hammer, and asking him to agree to the legally irrelevant proposition that
the testimony had no “rational basis.”
The purpose of this elaborate attack campaign isn’t immediately obvious. Utica isn’t
requesting damages, costs, or attorneys’ fees for any of Mr. Sansoucy’s alleged lies. Rather, it is
asking that he be permanently banned from appearing again before this Board and formally
reprimanded. There are two likely explanations for this request. First, a ban would prevent
Utica from ever having to face Mr. Sansoucy again in a tax appeal related to any of its present or
future Ohio properties. And second, Utica and its attorneys are building a record that, regardless

2
of the outcome of this matter, they can use in future proceedings to try to impeach Mr. Sansoucy
in Ohio and elsewhere.
This is not mere speculation. Parties are already using Utica’s allegations in this
proceeding, regardless of their accuracy, to try to impeach Mr. Sansoucy in other proceedings,
employing a “where there’s smoke there must be fire” approach. To see how this approach
works, look no further than this argument from Utica’s Post Hearing Brief: “Counsel for [Utica]
has [sic] 75 years of legal practice between the three of them. In that time, they have filed
exactly two sanctions request [sic] against a witness. In both cases, that person was Mr.
Sansoucy.” (Utica Br. at 10-11). In trumpeting their supposed judiciousness, counsel seem to
have forgotten that their first foray into sanctioning Mr. Sansoucy was rejected out of hand by
this Board, which, in apparent rebuke, deemed Mr. Sansoucy “credible.” Newman v. Wilkins,
2007 Ohio Tax Lexis 739, at *4 (BTA). But that doesn’t matter to Utica. Accusations, whether
true or false, are smoke, and Utica hopes the Board and future tribunals will assume there’s a
fire. (Similarly, a recent article published in a local New Hampshire newspaper provides a
lengthy, one-sided recitation of Utica’s allegations in its Motion and Post Hearing Brief,
repeating Utica’s mischaracterizations of previous cases involving Mr. Sansoucy, to conclude
that the local board of selectmen or city officials should fire Mr. Sansoucy. See Chuck Douglas,
Bow’s Utility Expert Facing Alleged False Testimony Sanctions in Ohio Case, Bow Times, Apr.
2019 at 1, available at thebowtimes.com/news/editions)
Utica’s apparent motivation and strategy are clear. Mr. Sansoucy regularly appears in
courts and tribunals across the country representing clients (like United) who are objecting to the
unreasonably low tax valuations companies (like Utica) sometimes receive from local
governments (like Columbiana County) that are eager for investment. In short, Utica (and its

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attorneys) and Mr. Sansoucy are repeat adversaries in tax litigation. Utica (and its attorneys)
stand to benefit from never seeing Mr. Sansoucy in Ohio again, or at least from having a record
of mistakes he’s made (however inconsequential) with which to try to impeach him.
With this context in mind, Utica’s evident personal animosity toward Mr. Sansoucy
makes sense, as does its willingness to believe that every mistake he makes, no matter how
small, is an intentional lie calculated to inflate the taxable value of Utica’s property. But the
evidence tells a very different story. In many cases, what Utica calls false statements are in fact
its own distortions of the record. And to the extent Mr. Sansoucy made misstatements in his
seven days of testimony, those are readily and most reasonably explained as mistakes: they
generally involve immaterial, peripheral issues and have no bearing on the valuation of
Kensington; they occurred in the context of days of cross-examination on a large, complex
project that had occurred a year earlier; and they are easily contradicted by Utica. They are thus
not the sort of misstatements that raise an inference of intentional deception. Only by
misrepresenting both the law and facts of this matter can Utica even attempt to meet its burden of
proof.
Below, Mr. Sansoucy does not follow Utica’s lead in presenting a “do over” brief. When
Utica first drafted its Motion, it assumed that it would face no opposition because Mr. Sansoucy
is not technically a party to this appeal. (See Utica Opp. to Sansoucy Notices of Appearance and
Mot. for Continuance (Jan 3, 2019)). Utica was likely dismayed and embarrassed, therefore, to
have its misrepresentations and distortions exposed and corrected in Mr. Sansoucy’s Prehearing
Statement. But the Board should not accept Utica’s invitation to whitewash the Motion; the
Motion’s overheated rhetoric and loose relationship to the truth are at the heart of this matter. In
the pages that follow, Mr. Sansoucy does not reargue the many issues addressed in the

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Prehearing Statement. Nor does this brief attempt to cover every new allegation and insinuation
in Utica’s Post Hearing Brief. Instead, this brief focuses on responding to and correcting the
most prominent of Utica’s new false allegations of lying and its misrepresentations of both law
and fact in the Post Hearing Brief (“Utica Br.”). Any remaining arguments from Utica’s Brief
can be rebutted on similar grounds to those presented below.
Mr. Sansoucy testified truthfully to the best of his ability in this matter. He conducted a
massive, complex project, and the vast majority of his Report and testimony has gone
unchallenged. Moreover, many of the challenges Utica has raised have been shown to be
nothing but unfair distortions of the record. Nevertheless, Mr. Sansoucy concedes that he made
mistakes in the course of his seven days of testimony, almost all of it under cross-examination.
But Utica does not meet its burden of showing that these innocent mistakes were in fact
intentionally false statements designed to deceive the Board. The Board should therefore deny
Utica’s motion without reaching the question of its power to impose the requested sanctions and
reject, in no uncertain terms, Utica’s effort to tarnish Mr. Sansoucy’s reputation. Nevertheless,
the Board would exceed its statutory powers in imposing the requested sanctions. Accordingly,
Utica’s Motion should be denied.
ARGUMENT
There is no dispute that Utica bears the burden of proof in this matter. It did not carry its
burden in the Motion, as demonstrated in Mr. Sansoucy’s Prehearing Statement. Recognizing
this, Utica raised new allegations of lies at the Motion Hearing and argues them in its Brief.
These new allegations fare no better than the original claims, because they similarly rest on
distortions, improbable inferences, and the imposition of made-up legal standards. Moreover,
while Utica’s new-and-improved Brief has cleaned up some of the more outlandish personal

5
invective from the Motion and avoided repeating some of its misrepresentations, the Brief
continues to rely on distortions of both law and fact.
A. Utica fails to carry its burden to prove that Mr. Sansoucy knowingly made false
statements.
Utica bears the burden of proving that any misstatements Mr. Sansoucy may have made
while testifying were intentional, not merely mistaken. As explained in the Prehearing
Statement, (at 20-21), “[a] mistake is not a lie.” Brown v. Runyon, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1071
(N.D. Ill. 1998). Nor does an apparent mistake imply a knowing falsehood unless it involves
unmistakable facts, such as one’s birthplace. See Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283, 339 (1822).
Mr. Sansoucy made no such fundamental mistakes, and so Utica has offered no evidence of such
mistakes. To be sure, Utica attempts to blow up Mr. Sansoucy’s immaterial errors into such
mistakes, but the effort falls flat. In the end, Utica asks the Board to impose draconian sanctions
based on nothing more than innuendo and inferences that cannot stand up to reasoned
consideration.
1. Rather than evidence, Utica presents innuendo and feeble inferences.
In the absence of evidence of intentional falsehood, Utica’s Brief relies fundamentally on
the following specious argument: Mr. Sansoucy made misstatements in his testimony about the
property at Kensington; therefore, he must have lied about the extent of the work he did in
preparing for and drafting the Kensington Report. (See, e.g., Utica Br. 26-34; 53; 78-79). This
argument rests on two false premises: (1) that a person who has performed extensive work on a
project doesn’t make mistakes; and (2) that Mr. Sansoucy personally did all of the work and did
not rely on others for information or conclusions. The first premise is akin to arguing that
because someone makes Bluebooking errors, that person must be lying if he claims to have gone
to law school. The second premise is disproven by the record. (See, e.g., Mot. Hr’g Trans. Vol.

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II at 267:8–269:12 (noting individuals on whom Mr. Sansoucy relied in drafting his Report)).
While lying is one possible—albeit improbable—explanation for the errors, that conclusion
ignores many other, more likely explanations, such as misunderstood questions, faulty memories,
mistaken assumptions, bad information, or even minor lapses of attention. Here, such innocent
explanations make much more sense of Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony. Where they are not mere
distortions of the record, the misstatements Utica cites are generally (a) peripheral to Mr.
Sansoucy’s central task of cataloging and valuing the real property at Kensington, (b) infrequent
in the context of a massive and complex project, and (c) so easily contradicted by Utica—who
owns Kensington—that it would make no sense to lie.
2. Utica has no plausible explanation for why Mr. Sansoucy would lie about the
matters about which it claims he was mistaken.
Utica’s claims of knowing falsehood require an inference that Mr. Sansoucy’s false
statements are of such a quality that he couldn’t be mistaken; he must have been lying. One
glaring problem with drawing this inference is that it makes no sense for Mr. Sansoucy to have
been lying about what equipment exists at the Kensington facility. This is so for two principal
reasons. First, and as explained at length in the Prehearing Statement, (e.g., at 11-16), the
nonexistent equipment about which Utica complains was almost exclusively equipment that he
deemed nontaxable and did not include in his inventory and valuation of Kensington. He had
little reason to spend significant time learning about such equipment.
In addition to the examples in the Prehearing Statement, an exchange between Utica’s
counsel and Mr. Sansoucy during the Merits Hearing illustrates how Mr. Sansoucy approached
this nontaxable equipment, and why he could easily have made mistakes about whether
equipment listed on Utica’s engineering drawings even existed:
Q. Here within that piping designation there is a system called “Steam”
designated “STM”. [See Rep. App’x L at 383]. Do you see that?

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A. [Mr. Sansoucy] Yes, I do.
Q. Did you code that as real property for the purposes of your appraisal?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Can you explain why?
A. If it was any steam, and I—I did not go searching for it, but if there was any
steam, we believe it would be part of the process. We don’t believe that the
buildings were heated with steam, and there wouldn’t be any crossover.
Q. So to the extent there was steam that was in the buildings, you presumed it
was personal?
A. It’s all personal. I didn’t see any steam that—that was heating a building or
something like that. So whatever steam is there I would suspect as being used
to heat trace or to heat some part of the process.
Q. Did you confirm that with drawings or sight, or anything like that?
A. I did not go back and trace all the steam back. Once I eliminated the steam
I did not go back and say where does it all go.
Q. No, I meant by virtue of you eliminating the steam up front, would you have
confirmed that initial conclusion by either the site confirmation or the drawings,
or both?
A. Well, we did 15 systems, so you’re in the drawings, and you’d see the other
systems. And we didn’t add any, but we did delete.
Q. Right.
A. We were looking at more systems and we deleted them as we went.
Q. But they would have had steam drawings that you would have looked at?
A. I don’t know. I can’t recall if I—if I even traced the steam. I deleted it and
I can’t recall if I even went looking for it.
(Merits Hr’g Trans. Vol. IV at 778:6–779:20 (emphases added)). To the extent that Mr.
Sansoucy had a motive to inflate his valuation for his client’s benefit—and make no mistake, Mr.

8
Sansoucy absolutely did not in any way inflate his valuation—that motive cannot explain the
fabrication of nontaxable equipment.
And second, it makes even less sense to dream up the existence of equipment at
Kensington in front of Utica’s attorney and a Utica employee who oversees the equipment at
Kensington, Mr. Hammer. (Mot. Hr’g Trans. Vol. I at 35:6-9 (Mr. Hammer testifying that he
was present in the hearing room for Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony)). As Utica says itself, “It would
not take a genius to realize that counsel for [Utica] was very much aware of what did or did not
exist at Kensington.” (Utica Br. at 50. But see Utica Mot. at 28 (counsel for Utica falsely
asserting that 30 of the 56 piping systems listed on the piping legend do not exist)). And even if
Mr. Hammer hadn’t been sitting in the hearing room, Mr. Sansoucy knew that employees of
Kensington would very likely be reviewing the transcript and could easily identify misstatements
regarding the equipment at the site.
It is exceedingly odd, therefore, that Utica believes it has found a smoking gun in Mr.
Sansoucy mistakenly affirming the existence of equipment at Kensington that, if it existed,
would be “17 stories tall and occupy a space of one square mile.” (Utica Br. at 59). Utica asks
the Board to believe that Mr. Sansoucy was trying to sneak this monstrous equipment—which
would at any rate be nontaxable in Mr. Sansoucy’s analysis—by the Board, Utica’s attorneys,
Mr. Hammer, and other Utica employees. This is absurd; he might as likely have tried to fool
the Board into believing that the Ohio Statehouse is located at Kensington. Rather than impute a
preposterous lie to Mr. Sansoucy, one should instead reach the reasonable, plausible explanation
that is borne out by the evidence: Mr. Sansoucy misspoke, misremembered, or perhaps wrongly
assumed the existence of non-valued, nontaxable equipment at Kensington, likely based on his
reading about natural-gas processing, and he never discovered on his own that the assumption

9
was incorrect because it made no difference to his project, which was inventorying and valuing
the real property at Kensington. (See below; see also Merits Hr’g Trans. Vol. IV at 754-55;
Prehr’g Statement at 30-31). In this instance, Utica’s evidence about the size of non-existent
equipment only confirms that Mr. Sansoucy simply made a mistake on a peripheral issue and
had no intention of fooling the Board, Utica, or its counsel about the existence of equipment.
3. Where Mr. Sansoucy made misstatements, the most plausible and fair
explanation is mistake.
As demonstrated in the Prehearing Statement, (e.g., at 45-47), and throughout this brief,
many of Utica’s alleged false statements amount to nothing more than misrepresentations of the
record. That said, Mr. Sansoucy has conceded that in his days of testimony he made
misstatements. Misstatements have many explanations, most of which are benign. For that
reason, the safest and most fair inference to take from a misstatement is mistake. See Santissima
Trinidad, 20 U.S. at 339. In its endeavor to destroy Mr. Sansoucy’s credibility, Utica avoids this
inference at all costs and instead seeks to impose an unlawful and unfairly exacting standard on
Mr. Sansoucy. Applying that same standard to Utica itself demonstrates just how unfair it is—or
at least how readily it leads to accusations of lying.
To begin, Utica has conceded that it falsely stated the single most important fact on
which its Motion for Sanctions rests. In the Motion, Utica stated in no uncertain terms (witness
the bold and italics) that thirty of the fifty-six piping systems listed on its piping legend didn’t
exist: “30 of those systems do not exist at Kensington.” (Mot. at 28). At the Motion Hearing,
however, Mr. Hammer testified that Utica’s assertion was false:
Q. At the bottom of your Exhibit F it says that there were 29 pipe systems that do
not exist at the site, do you see that, of the 56?
A. [Mr. Hammer] Yes, sir.
Q. And yet in [Utica’s] brief seeking sanctions at page 28, it says, “The foregoing

10
claim that he had reviewed from the documents the function of each of the 56
systems was demonstrably false because 30 of those systems do not exist at
Kensington.” Is that incorrect?
A. It would be 29.
Q. So the 30 is incorrect?
A. Yes.
(Mot. Hr’g Trans. Vol. II at 295:6-18). Giving Utica its own treatment, Mr. Sansoucy could
point out that Utica’s false statement about the central fact in its Motion actually overstated Mr.
Sansoucy’s error. He could further note that when Utica “inflated” his error in its Motion, it did
so believing that Mr. Sansoucy was not entitled to defend himself and would never have an
opportunity to correct the false number. Finally, and again according to Utica’s own standard, he
could point out that this false statement was made not under the pressure of a live cross-
examination, but in writing, above the signature block of no fewer than three partners at a large
law firm—in this context, the chances that Utica accidentally misstated the single most important
fact in its Motion, to Mr. Sansoucy’s detriment, appear vanishingly small. The inference to be
drawn, according to Utica’s standard, is that Utica deliberately lied in its Motion, intending to
inflate Mr. Sansoucy’s errors and believing that it would never be caught in its lie. This
inference would be far more plausible than the inferences Utica asks the Board to draw regarding
Mr. Sansoucy.
To be perfectly clear, of course, Mr. Sansoucy agrees with Mr. Hammer:
Q. So the 30 is incorrect?
A. [Mr. Hammer] Yes.
Q. Do you deem that a lie?
A. Probably a miscount.

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(Id. at 295:17-20). Utica was probably not lying in the Motion; it probably just made a mistake.
But if Utica wants to argue that it wasn’t lying, then it will have to explain why Mr. Sansoucy is
held to a different standard.
Utica will also have to explain why its own witness didn’t perjure himself and earn a
lifetime ban from appearing before the Board when, during the Motions Hearing, he provided
admittedly false testimony, to Mr. Sansoucy’s detriment, consistent with a motive to lie, without
any rational basis for his false statement. On cross-examination, Mr. Hammer gave the
following testimony:
Q. If I could turn your attention back to [Appendix] F [of Mr. Sansoucy’s
Report]. You said you’d looked at this report. Do you know how many pipe
systems Mr. Sansoucy actually valued?
A. [Mr. Hammer] I think he valued 13. As taxable is that the question?
Q. As taxable, yes.
A. Yeah, it was—I think it was 27 out of 56 in his original statement.
Q. You believe in his report he valued 27 of the 56?
A. In his original statement he said those that existed at Kensington, 56 existed,
27 were taxable.
(Id. at 260:6-19 (emphases added)). Affirmatively, and without qualification, Mr. Hammer
testified falsely here. In the Report, Mr. Sansoucy’s “original statement,” Mr. Sansoucy never
claimed that twenty-seven of the fifty-six piping systems were taxable. Indeed, he identified the
twelve systems he deemed taxable in a numbered list. (Rep. at 68-69; see also id., App’x F at
14-18).
Again applying Utica’s tactics, one could start by pointing out that Mr. Hammer is a
high-level employee of Utica, who works at the site every day, who was offered as an expert on
all matters related to the site, and who knew that his employer is spending tens of thousands of

12
dollars in this litigation attempting to demonstrate that Mr. Sansoucy is a liar. As his employer’s
star witness in the effort, Mr. Hammer had a motive to put Mr. Sansoucy in as poor a light as
possible. Indeed, having been asked by his employer to conduct a full analysis of the piping
systems at Kensington solely for the purpose of proving what Mr. Sansoucy had already testified
to be true—that many of the fifty-six listed systems did not actually exist—Mr. Hammer knew
that his role was to try to make Mr. Sansoucy look bad. One could further note that Mr. Hammer
had no excuse for making such a large mistake (off by 125%): he testified that he had read Mr.
Sansoucy’s entire report, (Mot. Hr’g Trans. Vol. I at 51:3-6); that he was present for Mr.
Sansoucy’s testimony at the Merits Hearing, (id. at 39:5-7); and that he had reviewed the
transcripts of that hearing in preparation for giving his testimony, (id. at 39:8-11). Finally, there
is no “rational basis” for Mr. Hammer’s mistake (an irrelevant concept, as shown below, but one
that Utica insists on applying). The Report contradicts Mr. Hammer at least twice, (see Rep. at
68-69; id., App’x F at 14-18), as did Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony at the Merits Hearing, (see, e.g.,
Merits Hr’g Trans. Vol. 6 at 1163 (“These 12 systems are on-site, these 12 systems are the real
property systems in our view.”)).
In Utica’s play book, these facts would lead necessarily to one of two conclusions. First,
if Mr. Hammer was mistaken about what Mr. Sansoucy said in his original statement, then Mr.
Hammer lied about reviewing the Report. The piping systems were, after all, the key issue on
which Mr. Hammer’s testimony was expected to focus, making these facts undeniably material.
No expert, Utica would say, could have read the Report, attended the Merits Hearing, reviewed
the transcripts, and come away with a misunderstanding that Mr. Sansoucy classified twenty-
seven piping systems as taxable. Alternatively, if Mr. Hammer was telling the truth about his
preparations for the Motion Hearing, then he intentionally misrepresented Mr. Sansoucy’s

13
Report to inflate the number of piping systems Mr. Sansoucy deemed taxable and make his
errors appear material and more difficult to explain.
To buttress the conclusion that Mr. Hammer was lying, one could further observe that
after Mr. Hammer initially gave his false testimony about the number of piping systems Mr.
Sansoucy classified and valued as real property, he declined an opportunity to correct it and
instead invented a new lie to cover the old one:
Q. Okay. If you look at section F [on page 68 of the Report], I believe you’ll
see—and you can count them yourself, but I think you’ll see ten piping systems
identified. Do you see that?
Q. Where did you come up from this—come up with 27 from this report?
A. From his testimony.
Q. Okay. I’m not asking about his testimony, I’m asking about his report.
Where did you come—
A. No, I didn’t take that from the report, I took it from his testimony.
(Mot. Hr’g Trans. Vol. II at 260:20–261:7 (emphases added)). Confronted with his lie about
what Mr. Sansoucy said in the Report, Mr. Hammer pivoted and arguably lied again, pretending
that he hadn’t actually been referring to the Report, but rather to Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony at the
Merits Hearing. Mr. Hammer would have known that he could not so easily be contradicted on
the spot by the cumbersome Merits Hearing transcript. In short, Mr. Hammer had a motive to
lie, made a material false statement consistent with this motive, and evasively modified the false
statement when confronted with its falsity in a way that would make his false statement more
difficult to contradict. The fair inference to reach, according to Utica’s standard, is that Mr.
Hammer lied.

14
Again, to be perfectly clear, Mr. Sansoucy doesn’t believe that Mr. Hammer was lying.
Rather, the point of giving Mr. Hammer the Utica treatment (in a two-hour cross-examination,
not seven days of cross) is to demonstrate how easy it is to create a plausible tale of intentional
deception from simple mistakes on the record. As Mr. Hammer acknowledged, it’s surprisingly
easy to make false statements on cross-examination, and the reasonable and fair explanation is
generally mistake, not deliberate deceit:
Q. But the report is actually what he submitted with his valuation, right?
Q. How many systems, to your knowledge, did he value?
A. There was ten systems here in the report.
Q. Okay. And that wasn’t meant to be a trick question, but actually if you look at
[bullet points] H and J, he identifies both low-pressure and high-pressure. So
technically he valued 12, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And it’s fair to say when you said 27, you weren’t lying, true?
A. No.
Q. And it’s fair to say when you thought ten, you weren’t lying then either,
correct?
A. Correct.
Q. You were mistaken?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Your intent wasn’t to deceive me?
A. No, sir.
Q. Your intent wasn’t to deceive the tribunal?
A. No, sir.

15
(Id. at 261:8–262:7).
4. Mr. Sansoucy was hamstrung by litigation decisions made by United.
In assessing Utica’s allegations, the Board should bear in mind that Mr. Sansoucy was
not in charge of this litigation and therefore had to make do with the litigation choices made by
United. First, Mr. Sansoucy did not control the discovery process in this appeal. For example,
he received only the documents that United’s counsel requested and Utica’s counsel agreed to
provide. These notably did not include the key documents Mr. Hammer relied on to determine
how many piping systems actually existed at Kensington. (Id. at 276:4-6 (Q. Is Exhibit C where
you came up with 27 systems? A. Between [Utica’s Mot. Hr’g Exs.] C, D, and E, yes, sir.”)).
Utica had in its possession documents that detailed, in easily digestible, summary form, the
piping systems actually installed at Kensington. (See id. at 278:19–279:6). One can quickly
flip through these documents and see which piping systems exist at Kensington. (Id.) (This is a
far cry from looking at every one of hundreds of pages of drawings to determine whether any of
the fifty-six systems listed on the piping legend are represented.) Incredibly, Utica saw fit to
produce these documents only in the context of a sanctions motion against Mr. Sansoucy
based principally on his not knowing the content of those documents. Such gamesmanship
should not be rewarded.
Second, and similarly, Mr. Sansoucy had no power to request a deposition from a Utica
employee such as Mr. Hammer, which could have prevented many of the minor mistakes Utica
has identified. (See id. at 271:8–272:19). Mr. Hammer himself acknowledged that “had
[United] deposed [him], and Mr. Sansoucy had the benefit of [Mr. Hammer’s] knowledge, some
of this report—or some of the mistakes that were made in the appendices, some of his testimony
could [have] been corrected before the report was actually issued.” (Id. at 272:13-19). None of
this is to call into question the performance of United’s counsel, who was representing his client,

16
not Mr. Sansoucy. But a fair analysis of Mr. Sansoucy’s errors must take into account the
information available to him.
Finally, Mr. Sansoucy was given no opportunity to clarify his testimony on redirect
examination. On cross-examination, the attorney largely controls the testimony, not the witness.
See, e.g., In re Fosamax Prods. Liab., 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 105769, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4,
2010). For that reason, redirect examination is critical for a witness to provide additional context
or explanation that was not brought out during cross. See State v. Robie, 1988 Ohio App. Lexis
805, at *12 (6th Dist.) (“[T]he purpose of redirect examination is to clarify matters raised on
cross-examination . . . .”). But Mr. Sansoucy never had that opportunity. After the conclusion of
Mr. Sansoucy’s marathon cross-examination, United, rather than proceeding with redirect
examination, elected to settle the case for nearly four times the taxable valuation challenged in its
Complaint. (Incidentally, Utica argues that Mr. Sansoucy had nothing to do with this settlement
amount, conveniently overlooking that Columbiana County raised its valuation only after United
filed its Complaint, using Mr. Sansoucy’s preliminary estimate of $40 million for the taxable
value of Kensington. (See United Br. at 1-2)). Given the opportunity to clarify his testimony at
the Merits Hearing, Mr. Sansoucy would have had far less need to do so in the context of Utica’s
no-holds-barred sanctions motion.
B. Utica’s new purported “lies” are more of the same—distortions of the testimony, or
immaterial, easily explained mistakes.
Unsatisfied with the dozens of allegations it made in its Motion, Utica has gone back to
the well and returned with new claims of lies, this time revolving principally around whether
“pure” butane, ethane, and propane are extracted and stored at Kensington. (See Utica Br. at 61-
69). With characteristic bombast, Utica proclaims that “it is not possible that Mr. Sansoucy’s
testimony regarding ethane, butane and propane products at Kensington is anything other than

17
intentionally made up.” (Id. at 68). But as in so many other cases of Utica’s gripes with Mr.
Sansoucy’s testimony, the evidence here indicates that Mr. Sansoucy’s misstatements—to the
extent he made misstatements at all—were based on innocent errors such as incorrect
assumptions, misremembered facts, or simply hard-to-read documents. And as with the piping
systems, the alleged mistakes here have no bearing on the valuation of Kensington.
Utica has not identified (nor can it identify) a single piece of equipment that Mr.
Sansoucy valued that does not exist at the site. In his Report, Mr. Sansoucy says nothing about
propane, butane, or ethane being products at Kensington:
The Kensington processing plant receives the gas, treats the gas, separates out the
various components that are in the gas in addition to pure gas [i.e., methane], and
either discards or ships out the components for sale or further processing and
ships the treated gas to pipelines for market sale.
(Rep. at 10). Moreover, he notes in the Report that equipment used to process gas at Kensington
is generally nontaxable:
The fundamental collection of assets for a gas processing facility starts with the
land and land improvements required to support the land and the facility. These
will include pipelines transmitting gas in and pipelines and loading facilities to
ship the products and transport gas out of the site (land and site improvements are
real property). The next collection of improvements necessary to site the plant are
the utilities and infrastructures that improve the land and allow for the
construction and operation of the processing facilities. This collection of
improvements includes buildings, driveways, roadways, utilities such as
electricity into the site, electricity around the site that comes from electric
transformation, natural gas feed piping to bring resources into the site, site
security, site grounding, site lighting, sewer, water, drainage facilities, site safety
facilities, site fencing, site gases and compressed air, storage tanks, vessels, and
safety flares to adequately discharge the emergency fugitive gases developed at
the site. Additionally, storage tanks and storage facilities are required to handle
products for processing and streamline the use of the site (all real property). The
remaining collection of improvements and equipment are those selected by the
owner to perform the processing activities necessary to deliver the correct
product and remove the various impurities. These include the machinery,
equipment, heat exchanges, compressors, cryogenic systems, and other
miscellaneous support equipment for the processing operation (business
fixtures).

18
(Id. at 11 (emphasis added)). From the start, Mr. Sansoucy would have had little reason to study
the kind of processing equipment that removes pure butane, ethane, or propane, as such
equipment would almost certainly be nontaxable in his analysis.
At the Merits Hearing, Mr. Sansoucy explained that he “test[ed] [the tanks and vessels at
Kensington] for whether or not they were process related or site related.” (Merits Hr’g Trans.
Vol. II at 290:17-19). He further indicated that this testing consisted essentially of determining,
based on process-flow diagrams, whether a particular vessel was used strictly for storage (and
thus site related and taxable) or whether it was more integrated into gas processing (and thus
process related and nontaxable). (See id. Vol. VII at 1503:1–1506:03). The particular contents
of a vessel (e.g., butane, ethane, propane, etc.) make no difference in this analysis—the question
is simply whether the vessel is a storage tank or a more process-integrated tank. (Id. at 1504:8-
25). To the extent Mr. Sansoucy misstated the products stored at and shipped out of Kensington,
therefore, his errors were misstatements of inconsequential issues that are easily explained as
misremembered or incorrect assumptions.
Moreover, Utica’s allegations regarding ethane, butane, and propane at Kensington
cannot explain why Mr. Sansoucy would lie about easily disproven facts. Nowhere in his Report
does Mr. Sansoucy claim equipment exists at Kensington for removing and storing these
products. The logical conclusion is that, where a fair review of the record reveals that Mr.
Sansoucy indeed made misstatements about the processes at Kensington, they had no bearing on
his valuation. Below we address Utica’s central claims regarding each product.
1. Mr. Sansoucy did not value a deethanizer or ethane tanks or any other
equipment related to pure ethane removal or storage, and he had no motive
to lie about their existence.
Utica alleges as follows: “Sansoucy’s claim that deethanizers were located near the front
of the train was made up to create a perception that he had some real knowledge or memory of

19
the location of that asset at Kensington.” (Utica Br. at 61). This convoluted allegation borders
on the nonsensical, but what it seems to mean is that Mr. Sansoucy knew that no deethanizers
existed but claimed they did anyway. Why would he do this? According to Utica, to “create a
perception that he had some real knowledge or memory of the location” of non-existent
equipment. This is not of course how witnesses try to gain credibility.
Utica probably fails to enunciate its claim straightforwardly because it’s absurd.
Deethanizer towers would stand more than 150 feet tall. (Mot. Hr’g Trans. Vol. I at 132:10-12).
If Mr. Sansoucy were to make up the existence of three such towers in front of Utica’s attorneys
and Mr. Hammer (who oversees Kensington), he would certainly be caught. And even if Utica
failed to notice the lie, there would be no benefit to Mr. Sansoucy or his client in inventing such
equipment in his testimony. He did not value deethanizers, and he did not value any storage
vessels for ethane. In short, it’s wildly improbable that Mr. Sansoucy intentionally “made up”
this equipment.
But Utica refuses to accept the reasonable inference that Mr. Sansoucy just made a
mistake—perhaps he was remembering references in the Kensington drawings to a “deethanized
product cooler” (Rep., App’x L at 435, 440, 451); or he was momentarily confusing
“deethanizer” and “demethanizer”; or he was momentarily confusing equipment at the Harrison
facility (which has a deethanizer); or he misremembered something he had read about natural-
gas-processing equipment that he assumed existed at Kensington but that he never learned much
about because it would clearly be nontaxable under his analysis. Without being able to disprove
these possibilities, Utica jumps to the irrational conclusion that Mr. Sansoucy “made up” the
existence of three 150-foot towers and hoped that Mr. Hammer and Utica’s attorneys simply
wouldn’t notice. This allegation is like so many others in the Motion. Utica takes a minor

20
mistake (however large deethanizers would be, their non-existence at Kensington is entirely
immaterial to Mr. Sansoucy’s Report) and asks the Board to make an improbable inference to
conclude that Mr. Sansoucy was lying rather than mistaken.
2. Mr. Sansoucy did not value a debutanizer, butane tanks, or any other
equipment related to pure butane removal or storage, and he had no motive
to lie about their existence.
Here, Utica alleges as follows: “[Mr. Sansoucy’s] testimony that those tanks held butane,
a gas that is neither produced nor separately stored at Kensington, is plainly false.” (Utica Br. at
64). At this point, Utica scarcely even bothers to make an argument that Mr. Sansoucy’s
statement is sanctionable—it is content merely to point out an error. This appears to be an
example of Utica building a record of Mr. Sansoucy’s mistakes to trot out in future proceedings
for purposes of impeachment, regardless of the outcome of this matter. Even if the Board
exonerates Mr. Sansoucy, as happened in Newman, Utica or its attorneys on behalf of another
client will at least have developed a record of errors, however meaningless, to try to make their
case against Mr. Sansoucy.
To the extent a response is necessary, the explanations already provided above are
applicable to Utica’s allegations regarding butane. Whether butane was produced and stored at
Kensington had no impact on the valuation of Kensington; Mr. Sansoucy didn’t value any
equipment related to butane. Moreover, he wasn’t overseeing the gas-processing operations at
Kensington. He was valuing its taxable equipment. For some reason, at some point during his
testimony, he mistakenly stated that butane was stored onsite. (Incidentally, Utica’s attorney
either thought so too or was trying to trick Mr. Sansoucy on this subject during cross-
examination: “Where on the site do we store butane?” (Merits Hr’g Trans. Vol. IV at 768:8)).
This error made no difference to Mr. Sansoucy’s valuation, and there is no evidence that it was
anything but a mistake on an immaterial matter.

21
3. Mr. Sansoucy did not value a depropanizer or any other equipment related
to pure propane removal, and he properly classified the sole propane tank at
Kensington as real property based on its function.
Utica alleges, “Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony regarding pure propane as a product and a
pipeline to transport that non-existent product at Kensington was made up.” (Utica Br. at 68).
Utica’s claim is that Mr. Sansoucy lied about “pure propane” being a product of Kensington and
about the existence of a propane pipeline between Kensington and another Utica site, Harrison.
To begin, Utica wrongly states that Mr. Sansoucy testified to “pure propane” being a
product of Kensington. His sole reference to “pure propane” occurred during direct examination,
when he was asked to look at a map on page 31 of his Report. The map shows colored lines
running between the various Utica plants, representing pipelines. The map’s legend shows two
blue pipelines: a dark-blue line titled “Gathering Line” and a light-blue line titled “Pure Propane
Line.” At the hearing, while looking at the map, Mr. Sansoucy misread the coloration: “The
blue pipeline[s] are additional gathering spines. But the one blue on this map from Kensington
to Harrison is a pure propane line where they’re separating the propane and sending it out as pure
propane. And then over on the Leesville side on the left, you not only have the propane and the
NGL line . . . .” (Merits Hr’g Trans. Vol. I at 217:10-17). On closer inspection, the light-blue
pure propane line connects to neither Kensington nor Leesville on the map, though the dark-blue
line connects to both. The innocent nature of the mistake is obvious from the context, and Mr.
Sansoucy’s Report does not suggest the existence of such a propane pipeline from Kensington.
(See Rep. at 41). Nevertheless, Utica insists on finding bad intent and fabricates a lie.
And even if Mr. Sansoucy was not lying about the existence of the pipeline, Utica says,
then his mistake in reading the map during cross-examination can only mean he lied about the
work he performed to prepare his Report. This second allegation of lying rests on the thin reed
of what “one would expect [Mr. Sansoucy] to know” about Kensington. (Utica Br. at 66). But

22
Utica has produced no evidence about what a valuation expert working on a project the size of
Kensington would or wouldn’t need to know about the facility. As Mr. Hammer admitted, his
knowledge of the processes and equipment at Kensington can provide no insight into how deeply
Mr. Sansoucy needed to look at any documents, processes, or equipment to carry out the task of
valuing the taxable property at Kensington. (See Mot. Hr’g Trans. Vol. II at 295:21–296:8 (“I
wouldn’t know what it takes to evaluate as real or personal.”) (emphasis added)).
There is no reason for Mr. Sansoucy to have had an encyclopedic knowledge of how the
Kensington facility worked, and he never claimed such knowledge. He did not undertake to
learn how to operate the Kensington facility; he undertook to understand it to the extent
necessary to determine whether its individual assets were taxable or nontaxable. Accordingly,
Mr. Sansoucy was able to classify the single propane tank at Kensington as real property based
on process flow diagrams; he did not need to know whether the propane in that tank had been
extracted onsite or would subsequently be piped to another facility. (See Merits Hr’g Trans. Vol.
VII at 1504:2–1506:3 (“There’s only a small amount of bullet tanks that we valued of the total
on that property. There’s only a small amount that we believe were storage tanks based on the
process flow diagrams where we did not see process going in and out, we saw storage.”)). As
explained in the Prehearing Statement, (at 16), Mr. Sansoucy recognized that the Kensington tax
appeal was “an expensive endeavor for the School District” and he kept costs down where
possible.
In making its arguments about the propane issue, Utica demonstrates again its either-
way-you’re-lying approach. Either Mr. Sansoucy “made up” the existence of “pure propane” as
a product of Kensington (along with enormous depropanizers), hoping the owners of that
equipment wouldn’t notice; or he was mistaken, in which case he must have lied about the work

23
he performed. (Utica Br. at 67-68). Utica seems to think this is ironclad logic, necessarily
leading to the conclusion that Mr. Sansoucy was lying about something. What it really shows,
however, is that Utica’s reasoning is conclusion-driven and untethered from the facts; all that
matters to Utica is finding a way—no matter how implausible—to reach the conclusion that Mr.
Sansoucy is a liar who must be prevented from offering tax valuations on Ohio properties in the
future.
C. To try to satisfy its burden, Utica continues to resort to distortion and
misrepresentation.
Utica’s new Brief attempts in some respects to whitewash its Motion and pretend that this
spectacular outlay of resources to take down Mr. Sansoucy is not a personal and/or professional
vendetta. Gone are the name-calling and apoplectic emphases and exclamation points. In their
place, though, is a significant increase in the stakes. Utica now demands a lifetime ban, not just
a five-year ban. (Id. at 86). And it asks the Board to refer Mr. Sansoucy for prosecution,
breezily stating that he could “easily be tried and convicted for perjury on any number of false
claims.” (Id.). Given the increased seriousness of its demands, Utica’s continued
misrepresentations and distortions of the law and facts are particularly reprehensible.
1. Utica misrepresents the law applicable to this matter.
Utica misrepresents four aspects of the law critical to this case. First, it improperly
attempts to shift the burden of persuasion to Mr. Sansoucy. Second, it invents an unsupported
and unsupportable “rational basis” standard for judging a witness’s truthfulness on the stand.
Third, it falsely claims that the materiality of certain statements has been conceded. And finally,
it attempts to lower the mens rea standard for making an intentionally false statement from that
provided by statute.

24
a. Utica attempts to shift the burden of persuasion.
The burden of persuasion rests on Utica, who offers no legal argument to suggest
otherwise. Nevertheless, Utica improperly invites the Board to find that Mr. Sansoucy hasn’t
proven his innocence. For example, Utica repeatedly faults Mr. Sansoucy for not “offer[ing]
evidence of its own that might cast Mr. Sansoucy’s false testimony in a more favorable light.”
(Id. at 5; see also id. at 7, 19, 27 n.4).
To begin, this is false as a factual matter. Over the course of about two hours at the
Motion Hearing, Mr. Sansoucy elicited multiple false statements from Utica’s expert witness that
are much more susceptible to an inference of intentional deception than the dozens of minor
misstatements Utica has spent many days and hundreds of pages trying to turn into lies. This is
evidence that witnesses, even well-prepared expert witnesses, make false statements that in the
hands of an uncharitable opposing party can be twisted into deceit.
But more to the point, in Mr. Sansoucy’s view, no additional evidence is required in this
case to demonstrate that although he has made mistakes, he has not engaged in any deception.
The Board can read the transcript of the Merits Hearing as easily as the parties and can judge for
itself. That Mr. Sansoucy felt no obligation to spend additional days at the Motion Hearing
sparring with Utica’s counsel over the existence of nontaxable equipment at Kensington is
evidence only that he trusts the Board to see through Utica’s self-serving Motion.
b. Utica makes up a “rational basis” standard for perjury.
Utica purports to hold Mr. Sansoucy to what it calls a “rational basis” standard: “The
question in each instance will be ‘whether there is any rational basis for the false statement(s)?’”
(Id. at 18). This is a peculiar inquiry, however, because the law of perjury takes no account of
whether a false statement has a “rational basis.” See, e.g., State v. Beck, 2016-Ohio-8122, ¶ 32
(1st Dist.) (citing R.C. 2921.11). Mr. Sansoucy is aware of no Ohio case applying a “rational

25
basis” standard in the context of perjury, and Utica cites none. In short, Utica has simply made
this standard up, presumably because it believes such a standard is easier for it to meet than the
real standard of proving intent to deceive. In all events, its application invites reversible error.
The reason why there is no “rational basis” standard is obvious. Many if not most false
statements lack such a basis: people simply misremember, get confused, make mistaken
assumptions, rely on bad information, miscount, misspeak. But Utica asks the Board to ignore
such explanations. The Board should reject this invitation; there is no “rational basis” standard
in this context.
c. Utica falsely claims Mr. Sansoucy has conceded “materiality.”
Utica suggests that United, for whom Mr. Sansoucy provided expert testimony, has
already conceded on his behalf that his false statements are “material.” (See Utica Br. at 3 n.2).
There are two serious problems with this claim. First, it’s self-evident that a party potentially
subject to sanctions cannot have a third party make concessions of sanctionable conduct on its
behalf. A party makes its own concessions, and Mr. Sansoucy has never conceded that any of
the misstatements about which Utica complains were material. Utica fails throughout its briefing
to show that Mr. Sansoucy’s misstatements were material, and it may not shore up that failure by
reference to a made-up concession.
The second problem with Utica’s claim is that the “concession” it cites from United is a
generic remark that does not refer to any particular false statement. So even if United’s remark
could somehow be called Mr. Sansoucy’s own concession (and it cannot), it would not establish
the materiality of any particular statement and so cannot help Utica meet its burden.
d. Utica misrepresents the required statutory mens rea for perjury.
Utica asserts that “a reckless statement (i.e., an affirmative statement made where the
declarant was in fact consciously ignorant of the truth of that statement) will support a conviction

26
for perjury in Ohio.” (Id. at 15 (emphasis added)). This is an incorrect and (at best) careless
statement of Ohio law.
The perjury statute reads as follows: “No person, in any official proceeding, shall
knowingly make a false statement under oath or affirmation, or knowingly swear or affirm the
truth of a false statement previously made, when either statement is material.” R.C. 2921.11(A)
(emphases added). In Ohio, “knowingly” and “recklessly” are distinct mental states in statutory
criminal law. See R.C. 2901.22 (defining “knowingly” and “recklessly” as distinct culpable
mental states).
And yet Utica falsely, again inviting error, instructs the Board that “a reckless statement
. . . will support a conviction for perjury in Ohio.” Utica purportedly bases its incorrect
statement of law on what it calls the “seminal case in Ohio addressing the question of the mental
state required to support a perjury conviction.” (Utica Br. at 14 (citing State v. Bayless, 14 Ohio
App.2d 11, *14 (4th Dist. 1968))). But Utica fails to disclose two important facts about Bayless.
First, this “seminal” case has been cited just three times (in over fifty years) in relation to “the
mental state required to support a perjury conviction.” Second, and this helps to explain the first
fact, Bayless preceded the creation of perjury as a statutory crime in Ohio. As a result, the
common law crime Bayless was applying was abrogated and replaced by R.C. 2921.11, which
codified the requirement of “knowingly” making a false statement. See also R.C. 2901.03.
Unsurprisingly, then, none of the three cases citing Bayless on the subject of the mens rea
required for perjury repeat its references to “reckless” statements. Moreover, neither Bayless
itself nor any of these other cases, which refer to the “conscious ignorance” standard Utica
purports to apply, bear any comparison to this matter. See Bayless at 12 (finding a mens rea
sufficient to support suborning of perjury where the defendant offered a witness $50 to provide

27
specific testimony, and noting that “a litigant does not offer a prospective witness $50 to tell the
truth”); State v. Irvin, 2015-Ohio-798, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.) (finding sufficient evidence of a
knowingly false statement where appellant testified that he had “passed” two lie-detector tests
when video evidence of the tests showed that in one instance appellant had been unable to
complete it because of coughing and in the second he was told three times that he had failed the
test); State v. Lanning, 161 Ohio App.3d 853, 2005-Ohio-3484, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.) (finding
sufficient evidence of a knowingly false statement where the defendant testified that during a
phone call one month prior she had not been asked to collect money from certain individuals, but
a recording of the phone call proved that she had been asked to collect money and had agreed to
do it); Molden v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 1989 Ohio App. Lexis 4570, at *8 (11th Dist.)
(upholding trial court’s decision that there was no evidence of perjury).
To be clear, nothing in this matter turns on the distinction between recklessly and
knowingly false statements. Mr. Sansoucy made neither. But this is another example of Utica
attempting to lower the bar for finding that Mr. Sansoucy lied under oath, and the Board should
reject it. It’s little wonder that Utica thinks Mr. Sansoucy “could easily be tried and convicted
for perjury on any number of false claims,” (Utica Br. at 86)—Utica is simply making up the law
of perjury to suit itself.
2. Utica misrepresents the record and the facts of this matter.
Despite cleaning up some of the factual misrepresentations in the Motion, Utica’s Brief
repeats some of them and adds new distortions as well.
a. The Board rejected the prior attack on Mr. Sansoucy’s character by
Utica’s attorneys.
As explained in the Prehearing Statement, (at 43-44), Utica’s Motion misrepresented the
Board’s opinion in Newman v. Wilkins, 2007 Ohio Tax Lexis 739 (BTA), claiming that in that

28
opinion the Board “disregard[ed] Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony.” (Mot. at 7). This is patently false.
Notwithstanding Mr. Sansoucy’s correction, Utica continues to rely on the Newman case as if its
attorneys’ arguments had been vindicated there. (See Utica Br. at 11). They were not. See
Newman at *4 (“[T]he board finds the testimony of all experts in this matter to be credible,
subject to a board determination of the weight to be applied to such testimony.”).
Incidentally, in this context Utica’s attorney complains about being called a “‘vicious’
bad guy.” (Utica Br. at 11). This is just another misrepresentation; only Utica has stooped to
name-calling in this matter. For his part, Mr. Sansoucy referred to the Motion as a “vicious
effort to libel Mr. Sansoucy and sully his name,” (Prehr’g Statement at 2), a characterization he
invites Utica to contest, with specific attention to having publicly labeled him a “conman,” an
“unscrupulous predator,” and “pathological,” (Mot. at 2, 66, 67).
b. Utica grossly misrepresents testimony regarding whether transformers at
Kensington are “affixed” to the realty.
Perhaps recognizing that its allegations rest almost exclusively on Mr. Sansoucy’s
testimony regarding non-valued, nontaxable equipment, Utica attempted at the Motion Hearing
and in its Brief to raise some doubts about Mr. Sansoucy’s statements regarding taxable
equipment. The attempt leads Utica into fresh misrepresentations of the testimony.
Utica accuses Mr. Sansoucy of lying about whether transformers at Kensington are
“affixed to the realty,” (Utica Br. at 23), but simply reading the relevant testimony shows that
Utica is dead wrong—and knows it. Here is Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony when cross-examined on
this point:
Q. Are the transformers that you mentioned, are they built on-site, or are they
trucked to the site and placed by crane?
A. [Mr. Sansoucy] Those transformers would be placed by crane.
Q. Why do you believe those transformers are real property?

29
A. Because first and foremost, they are affixed and attached to the earth, to the
ground, on concrete foundation. They are extremely heavy. They are not
intended to be mobile.
(Merits Hr’g Trans. Vol. VII at 1336:15-25 (emphasis added)). As he had explained more
explicitly in a different context, Mr. Sansoucy’s definition of “affixed” encompasses the force of
gravity on particularly heavy equipment:
Q. The treatment of the amine tank as real property, did your view of its
attachments to the pad factor into that decision?
A. [Mr. Sansoucy] No. The amine storage tank is a storage tank. It is affixed to
the earth whether by gravity, by weight, by attachment to concrete in some
fashion, and it is part of real property because it is a storage tank that is a fixture
to the real estate.
Q. Did you say—
A. At least a fixture, if not a structure.
Q. Did you say that it could be affixed by gravity?
A. Yes, many storage—many tanks are actually put on sand foundations so that
the bottom lays on sound foundations. And they do not necessarily attach through
to a piece of concrete, or they have a concrete ring. Many storage tanks are not
necessarily on concrete.
Q. How is that permanently attached?
A. Because it’s permanently attached by virtue of its affixation, its weight, size,
and the intent of the owner to attach that to the earth in that location by gravity.
Something very, very large, its attachment is by virtue of its own gravity.
(Id. Vol. V at 986:5–987:4 (emphases added)). Thus, Mr. Sansoucy unmistakably testified that
the transformers were “affixed” by gravity by virtue of being “extremely heavy.”
At the Motion Hearing, Utica apparently sought to impeach Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony in
the following colloquy with Mr. Hammer, applying a different definition of “affixed”:
Q. So take a look at [merit] hearing transcript [page] 416, please.
A. [Mr. Hammer] 416.

30
Q. On that page we were having discussion with Mr. Sansoucy regarding
transformers, and at line 9 he states—are you there yet?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. “These are all related to the use of the realty. They are structures affixed to
the realty, and they are designed to serve the improvements and the building and
any operations that would be built on the site at this point.”
Assuming for the moment the context is correct, that he’s referring to
transformers at the site, do the transformers at your site sit on concrete pads?
A. They do.
Q. Do all of them sit on concrete pads?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are any of them bolted, attached, or affixed to their foundation?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Well, on the big ones out front, the 138 volt step down to 13,800, have you
ever done any repair or replacement work on transformers?
A. Yes, we have.
Q. So for those large transformers, you move them in and out?
A. Yes, we have.
Q. Did you see any attachment to the concrete?
A. No, sir.
Q. Is that your understanding of all your transformers at the site?
A. It is.
Q. They are kept in place by gravity?
A. They are.
(Mot. Hr’g Trans. Vol. II at 236:21–238:7 (emphases added)). From this testimony, which
confirms that the transformers were not bolted down but rather were “kept in place by gravity,”

31
Utica purports to conclude that Mr. Sansoucy “made up” the fact that the transformers were
affixed. (Utica Br. at 23).
But having double-checked Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony on this precise point—“Did you
say that it could be affixed by gravity?”—Utica can scarcely claim that it didn’t understand Mr.
Sansoucy’s definition of “affixed.” Nevertheless, it flatly accuses him of lying about the
affixation of the transformers. This is gross misrepresentation; Utica may disagree with Mr.
Sansoucy’s definition of “affixed,” but that doesn’t make him a liar. It does, however, make
Utica’s argument disingenuous, at best.
On cross-examination, Mr. Hammer himself confirmed the inappropriateness of Utica’s
false claim:
Q. One of the things you were asked about was whether the transformers were
bolted down, remember that?
A. [Mr. Hammer] Correct.
Q. And you said they aren’t.
A. To my knowledge, they are not, no.
Q. Do you know if they are affixed?
A. They are set on concrete pads, yes, sir.
Q. And do you recall, in the testimony of Mr. Sansoucy, that his position is it’s
affixed if it’s a heavy item that’s placed on concrete, doesn’t have to be bolted
down; do you recall that?
A. Well, okay, yes. Then they are sitting on concrete pads, that is correct.
Q. So in his world, they are affixed?
A. If that’s his definition, yes.

32
(Mot. Hr’g Trans. Vol. II at 264:2-17 (emphasis added)). Precisely right. Once again, Utica has
proven itself unreliable in unfairly and inaccurately characterizing the evidence before the Board
to try to paint Mr. Sansoucy as a liar.
c. Utica continues to make fundamental misrepresentations regarding the
piping systems.
In the Prehearing Statement, (at 13-18), Mr. Sansoucy demonstrated that he did not
classify as taxable real property any of the piping systems that are listed in Utica’s drawings but
are not in fact present at Kensington. He further demonstrated that Utica misrepresented this fact
in the Motion. (Id. at 32). Utica confirmed at the Motion Hearing that the twelve piping systems
Mr. Sansoucy classified and valued as real property all exist at Kensington. In its Exhibit F from
the Motion Hearing, Utica lists those piping systems that it claims exist, and all twelve of the
piping systems Mr. Sansoucy classified and valued as real property are identified by Utica as
existing. And Mr. Hammer specifically acknowledged that Mr. Sansoucy classified and valued
just twelve piping systems as real property. (Mot. Hr’g Trans. Vol. II at 261:18-19 (“Q. . . . . So
technically he valued 12, correct? A. Yes, sir.”)).
Nevertheless, at the Motion Hearing and again in its Brief, Utica continues to
misrepresent this fact. At the bottom of Utica’s Exhibit F is the following note: “Red Color
Indicates systems coded by Mr. Sansoucy as Real Property.” (Emphasis added). Given that Mr.
Sansoucy coded just twelve piping systems as real property, one would expect to count twelve
systems in red. But Utica has colored fifteen piping systems in red, the fifteen systems that Mr.
Sansoucy initially identified as likely real property and highlighted on page 383 of Appendix L
to his Report. (See Prehr’g Statement at 17). In its direct examination of Mr. Hammer, Utica
elaborated on its misrepresentation:
Q. How many systems that Mr. Sansoucy marked and treated as real property
don’t exist?

33
A. [Mr. Hammer] Two.
Q. Well, would that include fire water?
A. Oh, three. I see three.
Q. Pilot gas?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Sanitary drain?
A. Yes.
(Mot. Hr’g Trans. Vol. I at 90:2-12 (emphasis added)). This is an even more egregious
misrepresentation than on Exhibit F. Utica’s counsel asked how many piping systems Mr.
Sansoucy “marked and treated as real property,” and when Mr. Hammer didn’t provide the
desired answer, counsel led him to it.
If the question were simply how many systems Mr. Sansoucy “marked,” one could at
least give this exchange the benefit of the doubt. It’s true in a very loose sense that when Mr.
Sansoucy highlighted the fifteen systems as potential real property, they were “marked . . . as
real property.” But Utica went further, asking whether Mr. Sansoucy “marked and treated as
real property” the fifteen systems. This can only mean that he included them in his Report as
real property and placed a value on them. And yet both Utica and Mr. Hammer know that he did
not. An uncharitable view of this exchange might see Utica’s counsel suborning Mr. Hammer’s
perjury.
And still the misrepresentation didn’t stop there. Utica repeats it in the Brief, falsely
stating that “even some of the 15 piping systems Sansoucy classified as taxable real property
did not exist at Kensington.” (Utica Br. 43 (emphasis added)). Again, Utica’s language is
unambiguous: “classification” is the language Utica’s counsel consistently uses to refer to Mr.

34
Sansoucy’s ultimate determinations of whether property is taxable real property. (See, e.g.,
Merits Hr’g Trans. Vol. I at 99 (“classification and separation of the property”); id. Vol. II at 278
(“So that’s why you did not classify them as a business fixture?”); id. at 290 (“And if so, how
were they classified?”); id. Vol. III at 507 (“[D]o you mean public utility property taxation as it
relates to separating a, classifying real versus personal property?”); Mot. at 15 (“items classified
as nontaxable personal property or business fixture”); id. at 16 (“the proper classification of what
constitutes real property”); Utica Br. at 1 (“failed to correctly classify real property”); id. (“The
controversy mainly centered on property classification.”).
In short, there can be no mistake: Utica knows that Mr. Sansoucy did not code, treat, or
classify fifteen piping systems as real property, and yet it says over and over again that he did.
The reason for repeating this false statement is plain: it converts immaterial misstatements about
equipment Mr. Sansoucy didn’t value and had no reason to pay particular attention to into
material misstatements that improperly inflate the valuation of Kensington. Unlike Mr.
Sansoucy’s misstatements, these false statements are very difficult to explain as mistakes.
Setting aside for the moment Utica’s misrepresentations, one additional note on pilot gas
demonstrates how misguided Utica’s effort is to twist every apparent misstatement Mr. Sansoucy
made on the stand into a lie. As described in the Prehearing Statement, (at 14), Mr. Sansoucy
saw “Pilot Gas” listed in Utica’s site drawings under the “Piping Service Designation,” and he
assumed that it existed onsite. He initially marked pilot gas as likely real property and so went
looking for it in the site drawings. (See Merits Hr’g Trans. Vol. VI at 1189). This was no simple
task, given the extent of the piping at Kensington, (see, e.g., Rep., App’x L at 464), and given
that the piping is so complex that even Mr. Hammer tied himself in knots trying to explain it at
the Motion Hearing, (Mot. Hr’g Trans. Vol II at 287:18–294:4). (For example, Mr. Hammer

35
testified that although the “High Pressure Gas” system is listed just once on the Piping Service
Designation, there are “multiple high-pressure gas systems at the site.” (Id. at 290:8-10).)
Ultimately, Mr. Sansoucy and his team found no piping in the drawings labeled “PG” for pilot
gas, and they did not value pilot gas piping in the Report. (See Rep., App’x F at 14-18; see also
Merits Hr’g Trans. Vol. VI at 1158 (“PG, we didn’t find any pilot gas as a separate system built
on-site . . . .”) (emphasis added)).
Nevertheless, there are in fact gas-fueled pilots at Kensington, though the piping that
feeds them is not labeled in the drawings with the piping service designation “PG.” (See, e.g.,
Rep., App’x L at 396, 399 (referring in the “Notes” to pilots, which are represented in the
drawings by concave hexagons)). Whether because he saw these pilots during his site tour of
Kensington or in the drawings, Mr. Sansoucy testified during the Merits Hearing that he believed
“there’s pilot gas built into the flare.” (See Merits Hr’g Trans. Vol. VI at 1199:3-11 (“I think the
only place I saw pilot gas was related to the flare, and firing off the flare. My recollection is that
was the only place we saw it, and it was just—it was just—just pilot the flare.”); see also id. Vol.
IV at 720). This is an incredibly minor detail in the context of the Kensington Report, and yet
Mr. Sansoucy essentially had it right in his testimony, despite Utica’s efforts to confuse and trap
him during cross-examination. Moreover, Utica and its attorneys know perfectly well that their
flares have gas-fueled pilots, and yet they still claim that Mr. Sansoucy lied when he testified that
he had seen pilot gas in the drawings. The complexities of Mr. Sansoucy’s project necessarily
created ambiguities and uncertainties such as this one. With no evidence that Mr. Sansoucy
intended to deceive the Board—indeed, without even a plausible motive for him to deceive the
Board (here, for instance, pilot gas was never valued in the Report)—Utica’s accusations are
weak to the point of being irresponsible.

36
d. Utica continues to make the preposterous claim that Mr. Sansoucy can’t
read engineering drawings.
Utica continues to argue that Mr. Sansoucy is unable to read engineering drawings and
that somehow implicates him in lies. (See Utica Br. at 69-83). As explained in the Prehearing
Statement, (at 39-40), this claim is frivolous. Utica’s argument relies on Mr. Sansoucy’s
admitted inability to remember what the code “RF” stood for on an engineering drawing. “It was
literally Greek to him,” Utica says. (Utica Br. at 75). But Mr. Sansoucy wasn’t looking at
alphas and omegas; he was looking at codes, and proving that he didn’t have the legend for those
codes memorized doesn’t prove that he was unable to read engineering drawings.
In fact, according to Utica’s standard, Mr. Hammer also proved himself incompetent to
read engineering drawings on cross-examination:
Q. Do you know what a KCV is?
A. [Mr. Hammer] I can look at the legend sheet.
Q. No, I’m asking you cold, because that’s how Mr. Sansoucy was asked the
question.
A. KCV as it relates to what?
Q. Instrumentation identification letters.
A. Under what heading?
Q. Under used in site instrument balloons, ISA, that’s the description, KCV?
A. No, I do not know that off the top of my head.
Q. Does that mean you don’t know how to read engineering drawings?
A. No, because I can refer to the legend so I can read those drawings, because I
can go to the legend and see what it’s meant to be.
Q. Of course anyone can go to the legend and read the drawing, but my question
is should you, with your experience operating Kensington and other facilities,
know off the top of your head every one of these designations?

37
A. No, I would say no.
Q. Do you think that’s a fair indictment of Mr. Sansoucy because he didn’t know
what the CF or what the letters being used were?
A. Well, when it comes to industry standards and knowing ANSI classes of
flanges.
Q. What does ANSI stand for again?
A. The American National Society—or Standard.
Q. You deal with it every day and you can’t recall, can you? You think you’re
right, but you don’t know. That doesn’t mean you’re a liar?
A. It’s the ANSI standard. All we refer to it as is ANSI.
Q. It doesn’t make you a liar, though, does it?
A. No.
Q. I believe your testimony was if Mr. Sansoucy had reviewed this legend he
would have known what CS meant, right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And if Mr. Sansoucy had reviewed this legend he would have known what RF
meant?
A. Yes, sir.
(Mot. Hr’g Trans. Vol. II at 297:6–298:25). Like Mr. Sansoucy, Mr. Hammer was unable to
translate engineering codes from memory. Unlike Mr. Sansoucy, however, Mr. Hammer’s day
job involves working with those specific codes. Of course, all of this proves nothing about either
of these witnesses except that neither has a photographic memory.
What Utica’s evidence here amounts to is that while under cross-examination regarding
the thousands of pages of his Report, Mr. Sansoucy admitted that he didn’t know what the RF
code referred to. The reasonable and fair inference is that Mr. Sansoucy didn’t notice that the
legend was available to him, and the point wasn’t important enough to insist on finding it. But

38
Utica avoids this inference and leaps instead to the conclusion that Mr. Sansoucy is unable to
read engineering drawings. No doubt Utica and its fellow property owners will attempt to make
hay out of these allegations to impeach Mr. Sansoucy in future proceedings—indeed, other
property owners are already citing Utica’s Motion as evidence of Mr. Sansoucy’s unreliability,
notwithstanding that no ruling has been made.
Utica’s false claim about Mr. Sansoucy’s ability to read engineering drawings morphs
into a convoluted argument apparently to the effect that Mr. Sansoucy was lying about
(a) whether he really performed a “reproduction cost new” analysis of Kensington, (see Utica Br.
at 70), and (b) what kinds of pipes are used at Kensington, (see id. at 74). As already explained
in the Prehearing Statement, (at 38-39), Utica’s disagreements with Mr. Sansoucy about how to
properly conduct a “reproduction cost new” valuation—such as what level of costing detail is
appropriate for valuing each pipe—do not amount to anything like evidence of intentional
deception. Moreover, just a few years ago this Board defended Mr. Sansoucy’s use of a
reproduction cost new methodology, citing a prior case in which the “board adopted the
valuation determined by Mr. Sansoucy using the same general methodology.” NRG Power
Midwest LP v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2016 Ohio Tax Lexis 2039, *26 (BTA). Utica’s
arguments regarding methodology are apparently nothing more than fodder for future efforts to
impeach Mr. Sansoucy in other matters involving reproduction cost new valuations.
As for the claim that Mr. Sansoucy lied about the kinds of pipes used at Kensington,
Utica rests its argument on a severe misrepresentation of Mr. Sansoucy’s deposition testimony.
The questions asked at the deposition were about how Mr. Sansoucy priced the piping at
Kensington. He testified truthfully that he used a price for a generic “medium pressure” pipe,

39
Schedule 40. (Sansoucy Dep. at 227:5 (“We used the medium pressure.”)). He justified using
this cost estimate by indicating that it was sufficiently accurate:
We used it for everything. Medium pressure pipe goes up to 1,000 PSI, and
there’s different pressures, and high pressure pipe goes up to 1,600, 1,550, and
they all have a factory safety of almost two. So your Schedule 40 steels and all of
that, they use medium pressure throughout the facility, coming in, going out, or
you know, they’re about 1,000 PSI.
(Id. at 227:8-15 (emphasis added)). Later he was asked whether he attempted to “match the
[pricing] category to the function of the pipe,” and he replied, “The medium pressure pipe is
medium pressure pipe, you don’t need to do a big match there.” (Id. at 228 (emphasis added)).
In other words, Mr. Sansoucy testified that he elected to use a standard “medium pressure” pipe
cost category because in his opinion it was basically accurate. And to the extent it was not
accurate, Mr. Sansoucy later explained at the merits hearing, it was a conservative underestimate
of the actual cost of the pipes at Kensington. (Merits Hr’g Trans. Vol. VI at 1217:23–1218:1
(“[Schedule 40] will be the minimum price you’re going to pay, and it will provide you with a
minimum estimate of what the cost is and what the value is.”)). Mr. Hammer confirmed that Mr.
Sansoucy’s estimate was conservative and benefitted Utica:
Q. There’s a lot of talk about Schedule 40 piping being used throughout the
system, admitting that it’s not used throughout the system in the actual as-built
facility at Kensington, correct?
A. [Mr. Hammer] Correct.
Q. Okay. But Mr. Sansoucy used that for purposes of valuation, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And is the actual piping used throughout Kensington more or less
expensive than the Schedule 40 piping he used for purposes of valuation?
A. Well, the majority of the process piping is more expensive, yes.
Q. Substantially more expensive?

40
A. Yes.
Q. How much more expensive on a magnitude, three times, four times?
A. Well, that would depend on several things. Can you clarify—I mean, the
piping that he stated was carbon steel Schedule 40.
Q. Correct.
A. What specific piping are you talking about? Because there’s a number of
different pipes beyond—
Q. Understood. But the majority of the piping, as you’ve already identified in
Kensington, had he priced it at a replacement value of the actual piping used as
opposed to using the assumption that we’ll just use Schedule 40 for purposes of
valuation, the value of that piping would go up substantially, correct?
A. It would go up, yes.
Q. Substantially?
A. I do not know. I would need to price out those systems.
Q. So you’d agree with me by using Schedule 40 piping he was actually being
conservative in his valuation?
A. He was.
(Mot. Hr’g Trans. Vol. II at 245:10–246:23). Whatever point Utica is trying to make about Mr.
Sansoucy’s testimony, it is stuck with the fact that Mr. Sansoucy’s costing estimate was
conservative and benefitted Utica in the valuation of Kensington. There is simply no reason for
him to have used Schedule 40 piping as an estimate other than what he testified: to
conservatively capture “a minimum estimate of what the cost is.” (Merits Hr’g Trans. Vol. VI at
1217:25–1218:1).
One might pause here to note that, under Utica’s unforgiving standard, Mr. Hammer
blatantly perjures himself (again) in this passage. When first asked whether the majority of the
piping at Kensington is substantially more expensive than Schedule 40 piping, Mr. Hammer
says, without hedging or reservation, “Yes.” But when asked the same question again just

41
seconds later, he answers, “I do not know. I would need to price out those systems.” How could
he know then not know in a span of seconds? What “rational basis” could there be for such
contradictory testimony? One rational basis is that Mr. Hammer, who must have understood that
his role at the hearing was to provide testimony unfavorable to Mr. Sansoucy, realized that his
first answer favored Mr. Sansoucy, and so he lied when given a second chance. But perhaps
there’s a more non-rational (and more charitable) explanation. Maybe he just answered too
confidently the first time, without thinking the question through. Or he at first forgot about
certain piping systems that were not substantially more expensive than Schedule 40. Or he
misheard the question. To prove that Mr. Hammer was lying under oath, one would have to
negate each of these innocent explanations. Simply making conclusory allegations isn’t enough.
D. The Board lacks the authority to impose the sanctions Utica requests.
“Absent proof of gross and/or repeated disobedience or noncompliance with the Orders
of this Board or the rules of this Board, sanctions are not warranted and will not be imposed
against a party.” Remy v. Limbach, 1987 Ohio Tax Lexis 664, *7 (BTA). Mr. Sansoucy has
done nothing to deserve sanctions, let alone shown “gross and/or repeated disobedience or
noncompliance” with any order of the Board. The Board should therefore deny Utica’s Motion
without reaching the question of this Board’s statutory authority, and instead state forcefully that
Mr. Sansoucy carried out his duties in this matter professionally and that Utica has wasted this
Board’s time and resources with its extravagant effort to sully Mr. Sansoucy’s name.
Nevertheless, as explained in the Prehearing Statement, (at 47-51), the Board’s statutory
powers do not encompass imposing the sanctions Utica requests. See Snodgrass v. Testa, 145
Ohio St.3d 418, ¶ 35 (2015); Columbus City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision,
2019 Ohio Tax Lexis 364, *4 (BTA) (citing Snodgrass and concluding that the Board “lacks
authority to sanction frivolous or bad faith conduct, outside the context of discovery”); Lottman

42
v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2018 Ohio Tax Lexis 2063, *4 (BTA) (same). If this was true
when Utica was requesting a draconian five-year ban on Mr. Sansoucy’s ability to serve as an
expert witness in proceedings before the Board, it is more plainly so now that Utica has
expanded its request to a lifetime ban. (See Utica Br. at 86).
Utica offers little response to Mr. Sansoucy’s arguments regarding the Board’s statutory
powers, and its own central claim rests on a non sequitur. If the Board lacks power to ban Mr.
Sansoucy from serving as an expert witness before it, Utica argues, then the Board must also lack
the power to make everyday evidentiary rulings regarding the reliability and admissibility of
expert testimony. (See Utica Br. at 6). This conclusion doesn’t follow. Controlling evidence in
matters before the Board is undoubtedly within the Board’s statutory powers. See
R.C. 5703.02(D) (authorizing the Board to make and enforce “[r]ules establishing procedures to
control and manage appeals filed with the board”); see also Snodgrass at ¶ 33 (noting “the
authority of the BTA to make a finding of bad faith and award sanctions in the context of
discovery during proceedings that occur before the BTA”). Banning individuals from appearing
before the Board on all future matters is of course an entirely different matter, and the two
powers bear no relation to one another. As the Court put it in Snodgrass, “It is one thing to
postulate that an administrative tribunal has an inherent authority to control the conduct of
litigation before it; it is quite another to ask this court to accord to the BTA a power that is not
set forth in the enabling statutes.” Snodgrass at ¶ 34 (emphasis added).
For similar reasons, Utica gains no support from its reliance on the Board’s rule
providing for the “denial or suspension of appearing and qualifying as an expert witness in
designated matters before the Board.” (Utica Br. at 5 (quoting Ohio Adm. Code 5717-1-
15(A)(5))). This rule is irrelevant here. No doubt, as section 5717-1-15(A)(5) indicates, the

43
Board’s power to sanction discovery violations gives it latitude to exclude expert testimony in
“designated matters” under certain circumstances. See Katz v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision,
1997 Ohio Tax Lexis 1514, *11-13 (BTA) (citing section 5717-1-15(A) as authority to exclude
expert testimony as a potential discovery sanction); Westover Village LTD v. Hamilton Cty. Bd.
of Revision, 1995 Ohio Tax Lexis 1373, *7 (BTA) (same); see also Salem Med. Arts & Dev.
Corp. v. Columbiana Cty. Bd. of Revision, 82 Ohio St.3d 193, 196-97 (1998) (recognizing the
Board’s power to impose discovery sanctions); Warren Local Schs. Bd. of Educ. vs. Wash. Cty.
Bd. of Revision, 1994 Ohio Tax Lexis 886, *7-8 (BTA) (excluding expert witness as a discovery
sanction). But Utica does not request Mr. Sansoucy’s suspension from a “designated matter”; it
seeks a wholesale ban. The Board’s rule regarding expert sanctions is inapplicable here.
It bears repeating that in all its pages of briefing, Utica fails to cite a single case in the
history of the Board’s existence imposing anything like the requested sanctions. This lack of
precedent is highlighted by the sole case Utica cites in its argument related to the Board’s
statutory powers. Utica quotes Day v. John Hopkins Health System Corp., 907 F.3d 766, 773
(4th Cir. 2018), for the proposition that “[t]ribunals can disqualify unscrupulous witnesses from
appearing in future proceedings.” Not only is the case nonbinding, but the statement itself is
(a) dictum, (b) unsupported by a citation, and (c) entirely unrelated to the Board’s powers under
Ohio statutory law. Such a statement cannot override the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in
Snodgrass.
CONCLUSION
In a couple hours of cross-examination at the Motion Hearing, Mr. Hammer made
multiple indisputably false statements that, under Utica’s standard, can be easily (and unfairly)
characterized as perjury. By contrast, Mr. Sansoucy was cross-examined for days, and the “lies”
Utica accuses him of are far less plausible. The truth in this case is that the evidence falls far

44
short of showing that either witness made knowingly false statements. Cross-examination, not
sanctions, is the proper avenue for testing the credibility of such witnesses.
For the reasons stated herein, in the Prehearing Statement, and at the Motion Hearing,
Mr. Sansoucy respectfully asks the Board to deny the Motion for Sanctions.
Date: April 26, 2019 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Shawn J. Organ
Shawn J. Organ (0042052)
Counsel of Record
David J. Twombly (0092558)
Organ Cole llp
1330 Dublin Road
614.481.0900
614.481.0904 (f)
sjorgan@organcole.com
djtwombly@organcole.com
Attorneys for George E. Sansoucy

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on April 26, 2019, a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing was sent by email to all counsel of record, including:
Gary T. Stedronsky
Ennis Britton Co., L.P.A.
1714 West Galbraith Road
Cincinnati, Ohio 45239
gstedronsky@ennisbritton.com
Attorney for Appellant United Local
School District Board of Education
Krista R. Peddicord
Columbiana County Assistant Prosecutor
105 South Market Street
Lisbon, Ohio 44432
kpeddicord@colcoprosecutor.net
Attorney for Appellees Columbiana
County Auditor and Board of Revision
Anthony L. Ehler
Jeffrey Allen Miller
Steven L. Smiseck
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP
52 East Gay Street
P.O. Box 1008
tlehler@vorys.com
jamiller2@vorys.com
slsmiseck@vorys.com
Attorneys for Appellee Utica East Ohio
Midstream LLC
/s/ David J. Twombly
Attorney for George E. Sansoucy

1
Thomas, Tamika
From: David J. Twombly <DJTwombly@organcole.com>
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 4:26 PM
To: BTA Docket
Cc: Shawn J. Organ
Subject: Filing in Case No. 2016-828, United Local Schools Board of Education v. Columbiana County Board of Revision, et al.
Attachments: Sansoucy Posthearing Brief.pdf
Please find attached a Posthearing Brief, filed by attorney Shawn Organ on behalf of George E. Sansoucy in the above‐captioned matter.

Although Mr. Organ is registered in the Board’s electronic filing system, the system does not permit Mr. Organ to submit documents.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Best regards,

David J. Twombly
Organ Cole LLP
1330 Dublin Road
614.869.3220
614.481.0904 (fax)
www.organcole.com

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Sansoucy posthearing brief, George Sansoucy Sanctions, GES, Ohio

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