Motion to Disqualify Judge Christopher M. Keating

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THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
4th Circuit Probate Division Laconia
Estate of Richard E. Bergeron, Jr.
Docket No. 311-2022-EQ-00279
EMERGENCY MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE KEATING AND
VACATE DISMISSAL ORDERS
NOW COMES Petitioner, Richard E. Bergeron III, and respectfully requests that Judge
Keating disqualify himself immediately from this case due to a conflict of interest with Attorney
David Eby and both a pronounced bias against a self-represented party and clear favoritism shown
to attorneys representing the defendants. Bergeron also moves the court to vacate all of Keating’s
most recent formal orders in this case, specifically his recent biased orders on the motions to dismiss
filed by all defendants to this action.
In support of this motion, Bergeron provides the following:
1. Judge Keating has routinely relaxed deadline requirements for attorneys in the two equity
cases associated with this core estate, often rewarding their late offerings with granted
requests. For instance, Judge Keating accepted a request to continue the scheduling
conference for the petition case (311-2022-EQ-00313) from Attorney McGrath despite his
request being two weeks late according to duly-noticed deadlines.

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2. Rule 49 of the “Rules of the Circuit Court of the State of New Hampshire, Probate
Division” covers motions to continue and reads in part: “All such Motions shall be filed
within ten (10) days from the date of the mailing of the notice of a hearing or trial. Any
such Motion that is filed after the (10) days from the date of the mailing of such notice
shall not be considered by the Court, except for good cause shown.” Attorney McGrath
provided no excuse or any cause at all for not submitting the motion on time.
3. Judge Keating and Attorney David Eby also failed to disclose a very crucial ongoing
relationship regarding the funding of one of Eby’s professional passions: a non-profit
agency called CASA. The acronym stands for Court Appointed Special Advocates, and the
non-profit provides specialized training done by paid attorneys to instruct volunteers who
work directly with children in the New Hampshire court system.
4. Judge Keating is an active member of the Judicial Commission in New Hampshire and
was a former executive director of that entity. The Judicial Commission has had a direct
and substantive impact on providing the most significant yearly funding received for more
than a decade for CASA’s operations. David Eby lists his status as Co-Chairman of CASA
on his own professional profile on the Devine Millimet Web-site, though he is currently
listed on the official CASA Web-site as a member of the agency’s advisory council.
5. Judge Keating himself once signed the letter announcing the award of over $1 million in
funding for CASA when he was the executive director of the Judicial Council and Attorney
Eby was CASA’s Vice President. Keating also served as the executive director of the
Guardian Ad Litem Board at the same time. (See attached Affidavit and exhibits) Guardian
Ad Litems are a crucial cog in the legal system that handle issues with children in family

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court, criminal court and divorce cases. Judge Keating served on the Guardian Ad Litem
Board directly with a representative of CASA, Betsy Paine. She still works in a primary
role with the agency today as their Senior Staff Attorney. (see attached affidavit, exhibits)
6. Additionally, Judge Keating and Attorney Eby share very similar leadership roles within
the Bar Administration and the Bar Foundation here in New Hampshire. Judge Keating
continues to be an acting director of the Bar Association, as he has been for over a decade.
Both judge and attorney are “Fellows” with the Bar Association, meaning they provide a
top tier donation pledge to maintain that status over a decade. Recent records from
OpenCorporates.Com also reflect that both Keating and Eby were removed as directors of
the Bar Foundation during the exact same time frame in 2022.
7. Also crucial to the need to immediately remove Judge Keating from this case are the
admissions he made in open court for the 311-2022-EQ-00313 case on December 27, 2022
with Attorneys for Petitioners Chenette and Descarpentries in attendance along with
Bergeron as defendant in the partition case. Keating ultimately self-confessed to what
amounts to a variety of violations of the code of judicial conduct.
8. Judge Keating showed a complete lack of preparation for the scheduling conference
hearing slated for that day. Bergeron was the one who had to alert the court to the status of
a variety of pleadings, as he appeared to be the only party at the hearing who had an
updated copy of the case summary, which he had to read aloud for the court to figure out
what was filed when.

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9. Supreme Court Rule 38’s Preamble states: “Judges should maintain the dignity of
judicial office at all times, and avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
their professional and personal lives. They should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures
the greatest possible public confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity, and
competence.”
10. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.2 states that “[a] judge shall uphold and
apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.”
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
11. American Bar Association Comment [4] states: “It is not a violation of this Rule for a
judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to
have their matters fairly heard.”
12. Judge Keating’s extreme bias is obvious in this case. He is bending over backwards to
help attorneys get what they want every step of the way and giving them allowances and
considerations that defy traditional rules and set deadlines. Meanwhile Judge Keating is
denying Bergeron any fundamentally meaningful access to the process he has engaged in to
seek relief for wrongs committed against him.
13. Judicial Notice should be taken of the following comments regarding Rule 1.2 of the
Judicial Code of Conduct:
[3] Conduct that compromises or appears to compromise the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of a judge undermines public confidence in the judiciary. Because it is not practicable
to list all such conduct, the Rule is necessarily cast in general terms.
[4] Judges are encouraged to participate in activities that promote ethical conduct among judges and
lawyers, support professionalism within the judiciary and the legal profession, and promote access
to justice for all.

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[5] Actual improprieties include violations of law, court rules or provisions of this Code. The test
for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in the mind of a reasonable,
disinterested person fully informed of the facts a perception that the judge's ability to carry out
judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired. (emphasis added)
14. Judge Keating’s direct actions and calculated inaction across all three associated probate
cases demonstrate that he repeatedly and consistently violates Bergeron’s rights to due
process to appease attorneys and protect the reputation of the state bar itself by ensuring the
same attorneys do not lose to a self-represented party who will widely report such a win.
15. Rule 2.5 of the Judicial Code of Conduct governs “Competence, Diligence and
Cooperation.” The entirety of that rule reads as follows: “(A) A judge shall perform judicial
and administrative duties, competently and diligently. (B) A judge shall cooperate with
other judges and court officials in the administration of court business.”
16. The Comments for Rule 2.5 state: “[1] Competence in the performance of judicial duties
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to
perform a judge's responsibilities of judicial office. [2] Prompt disposition of the court's
business requires a judge to devote adequate time to judicial duties, to be punctual in
attending court and expeditious in determining matters under submission, and to take
reasonable measures to ensure that court officials, litigants, and their lawyers cooperate
with the judge to that end. [3] In disposing of matters promptly and efficiently, a judge
must demonstrate due regard for the rights of parties to be heard and to have issues
resolved without unnecessary cost or delay. A judge should monitor and supervise cases in
ways that reduce or eliminate dilatory practices, avoidable delays, and unnecessary costs.”
17. Judge Keating also showed a failure to supervise his staff properly by allowing probate
clerks to set an unconstitutional briefing period for the partition case scheduling

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conference. This made the normal course of filing and having a motion to continue ruled on
before the conference impossible. Judge Keating was compelled by Bergeron to rule on
that motion in the middle of a conference Bergeron sought to continue with his motion.
18. Judge Keating’s rulings have the weakest possible legal and factual support, ensuring
that the record Bergeron has created for appeal will show that Judge Keating is both biased
and unable to recognize how biased and conflicted he is in these proceedings. Instead of
addressing and controlling his severe bias, he continues to double down on the misconduct
and favoritism that proves that bias for the record.
19. This flawed judicial posture guarantees appeals to address what will surely amount to
bare denials for whatever Bergeron asks Keating for the rest of the way no matter how
proficient and correct his arguments and evidence happen to be. No matter how trivial the
ask, Judge Keating will no doubt continue to refuse Bergeron any relief or courtesy the
court would normally extend without question to the attorneys on this case.
20. The continuance situation in the partition case shows beyond any reasonable doubt that
this judge has two standards for granting or denying motions in these matters. One is for
lawyers and the other is for Bergeron. None of these two standards can be defended or
justified when the full record of appeal goes to the state Supreme Court. Judge Keating is
therefore causing a torrent of ridiculously uncalled for delay by stubbornly remaining on
these cases and continuing to reward lying attorneys with no evidence on file.
21. The Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.2 governs “Supervisory Duties” of a judge, and
section A reads: “(A) A judge shall require court staff, court officials, and others subject to

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the judge's direction and control to act in a manner consistent with the judge's obligations
under this Code.”
22. A further “comment” explaining section A reads: “[1] A judge is responsible for his or
her own conduct and for the conduct of others, such as staff, when those persons are acting
at the judge's direction or control. A judge may not direct court personnel to engage in
conduct on the judge's behalf or as the judge's representative when such conduct would
violate the Code if undertaken by the judge.”
23. Bergeron handed the judge an order on scheduling during the hearing that was put out
by a court clerk, which the judge is responsible for working with to provide sensible
briefing periods. The judge handed it back and acted like he had nothing to do with the
unconstitutional nature of that order’s time constraints.
24. Judge Keating, as promised, put his order on Bergeron’s Motion to Continue and
Recuse in writing, but he only wrote one word: “denied.” Bergeron’s motion was two
motions in one. Keating could have been given a pass for not explaining an order on the
motion to continue, but he is literally breaking the rules by not adequately explaining his
order regarding the motion to recuse part of it.
25. The Rules of the Circuit Court, Probate Division are pretty clear on this subject.
Specifically, “Rule 50-A, Recusal” concludes with this telling sentence: “If the motion is
denied, the Court’s ruling shall be supported by findings of fact with respect to the
allegations contained in the motion.” (emphasis added) There is no excuse for Judge

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Keating to be ignorant of this rule other than incompetence. He broke this rule without
question with his December 30, 2022 order in the partition case.
26. Judge Keating has moved quickly through Bergeron’s equity case with targeted,
poorly-assembled, and legally deficient rulings that repeatedly failed to recognize
Bergeron’s exhibits and affidavits. The same rulings accepted repeated unsworn statements
from attorneys for the defendants with no valid corroborating testimony or affidavit-
supported evidence from the defendants themselves.
27. Judge Keating ruled on motions to dismiss and held hearings on all such motions in
Bergeron’s equity case before even scheduling a hearing for Bergeron’s motion to dismiss
in the partition case. This is despite the fact that Bergeron both filed his motion before the
defendants filed all their motions to dismiss in this case, and he reminded the judge on
October 31, 2022 in open court that no hearing had been set or held on his motion to
dismiss the petition to partition. Judge Keating confessed at the December 27, 2022 hearing
that he was not aware of Bergeron’s motion to dismiss and just opened the file that
morning.
28. Rule 2.6 of the Judicial Code of Conduct governs “Ensuring the Right to be Heard.”
Section A reads as follows: “(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal
interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.”
Comment 1 further explains: “[1] The right to be heard is an essential component of a fair
and impartial system of justice. Substantive rights of litigants can be protected only if
procedures protecting the right to be heard are observed.”

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29. Rule 2.2 of the Judicial Code of Conduct covers the subject of “Impartiality and
Fairness.” Sections A and B read as follows: “(A) A judge shall uphold and apply the law,
and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially. (B) A judge may make
reasonable efforts, consistent with the law and court rules, to facilitate the ability of all
litigants, including self-represented litigants, to be fairly heard.” (emphasis added)
30. Comment 4 for this rule is also specifically relevant and crucial here: “[4] The growth in
litigation involving self-represented litigants and the responsibility of courts to promote
access to justice warrant reasonable flexibility by judges, consistent with the law and court
rules, to ensure that all litigants are fairly heard.”
31. The New Hampshire Constitution, Part I, Article 14 reads: “Every subject of this state is
entitled to a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries he may receive
in his person, property, or character; to obtain right and justice freely, without being
obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay;
conformably to the laws.”
32. A 2013 study (see relevant pages in attached affidavit) Entitled “The Justice Gap A
Study of the Legal Needs of New Hampshire’s Low-Income Residents, February 2013”
contains the following passage: “When asked whether the number of self-represented
litigants had decreased or increased since they started working for the court, 74 per cent
said it had increased, and only 5 percent said it had decreased. This trend was particularly
strong for longer-time court employees, who were five times more likely to report that the
number of self-represented litigants had ‘increased a lot’ since they started working at the
court compared to those who have worked at the court for 5 years or less.”

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33. Judge Keating’s bias against Bergeron’s self-representation is extremely troubling if it
translates across the entire field of self-represented parties under his judicial authority.
34. It is clear looking at the past associations and connections between Keating and Eby
that Judge Keating specifically acted to kill Bergeron’s instant equity case so the judge and
Bar Association/Foundation director could help Attorney David Eby and Attorney Michael
McGrath press an extremely weak and poorly-framed partition case that has no merit.
35. Judge Keating is already looking past Bergeron’s motion to dismiss by pre-scheduling
discovery periods and setting a proposed trial window. The judge refuses to give
Bergeron’s pleading the timely attention and due respect it deserves (this is a motion filed
at the end of July, 2022 that is just now being set for a hearing sometime prior to February
1, 2023). The posture of the case indicates he plans to deny this motion no matter what.
36. Judge Keating referred repeatedly to a “trial” at the scheduling conference hearing
(which he completely misrepresented in his most recent scheduling order filed on
December 30, 2022). He refers to that “trial” now as a “final hearing” despite the fact that
Bergeron intends to formally request a jury trial in the event any legitimate scheduling
conference is allowed if and when Judge Keating’s scheduling conference order is
overturned by the appeals court. The order itself never mentions Bergeron’s repeated
objections and insistence that Judge Keating recuse himself from the case.
37. The 311-2022-EQ-00313 scheduling order completely disrespects Bergeron’s chances
to get his motion to dismiss approved by the court and is as good as an advance denial of
that motion. Judge Keating is attempting to schedule a pre-trial management conference a

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month after the deadline for holding the hearing on Bergeron’s motion to dismiss. It is as if
the judge is only going through the motions and nothing Bergeron may present at the
hearing will change his mind on his intent to deny Bergeron access to the process and equal
treatment under the law.
38. Judge Keating’s confession at the December 27 hearing is also troubling since he
actually had to make a direct ruling on the response paperwork for Bergeron’s motion to
dismiss to allow a late objection. How could he tell the court he was not familiar with a
motion to dismiss filed by Bergeron that he allowed a petitioner to respond late to?
39. The posture of this case betrays the fact that Judge Keating gives attorneys every
priority and allowance possible. Bergeron continues to have his own due process rights
violated at the same time. Bergeron asked for one continuance in this court and was
verbally denied in the middle of the hearing on the conference he sought to continue.
However, Attorney Willis Sloat was previously granted a continuance in this instant case
for the exact same reasoning as Bergeron was asking for one in the petition case.
40. Rule 2.15 of the Judicial Code of Conduct governs Responding to Judicial and Lawyer
Misconduct. Section B reads: “(B) A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed
a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question regarding
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform
the appropriate authority.”
41. Section B of the above-referenced rule also states: “(B) A judge having knowledge that
a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a

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substantial question regarding the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer
in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.”
42. The attorneys in this case have all repeatedly lied about different circumstances and
facts involved in all three associated probate cases. Attorney Sloat committed full blown
perjury. This is a clear violation of their professional rules of conduct, but Judge Keating
has taken no action to even casually chastise the attorneys in these cases for those lies.
43. Judge Keating’s denial of such a similar continuance request—with the only difference
being which party filed it—is extremely hard to classify as anything less than an
undeniable act of severe, pronounced bias.
44. Rule 2.3 of the Judicial Code of Conduct governs “Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment.”
Section A reads: “(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including
administrative duties, without bias or prejudice.”
45. Judge Keating’s protection and insulation of attorneys who continue to violate
professional standards is very concerning in all these closely related matters.
46. Judge Keating’s failure to disclose his Bar-related leadership roles in common with
Attorney Eby and his position as a direct decision maker on funding an organization Eby
has a major role in and history with also violates the judicial code of conduct.
47. Rule 2.11, governing disqualification of judges specifically explains: “(A) A judge shall
disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances: (1) The
judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal

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knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding. (2) The judge knows that the
judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the third degree of
relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is: (a) a
party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or
trustee of a party; (b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (c) a person who has more
than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or
(d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.” (emphasis added)
48. “De Minimis Interest” here means an insignificant interest that would not lead
reasonable persons to question a judge's impartiality. The CASA connection regarding the
judge being directly tied to the funding of an organization attorney Eby holds near and dear
to his heart is by itself not too damning. However, coupled with even a cursory
investigation of the current posture of this case, the connection is alarmingly troubling.
49. Further, Judge Keating’s common leadership roles with Eby in the Bar Association and
Bar Foundation here in New Hampshire are direct conflicts of interest. Both Eby and Judge
Keating are obviously intent on battling against the inevitable current of more and more
self-represented parties seeking fair access to the process due to economic necessity and
general public distrust of paid attorneys. The judge and attorney seem to be trying to make
the road for pro-se parties impossible to navigate without the help of an at-bar attorney.
50. The high costs of attorney representation in these times is a key factor in the increase of
self-represented parties in New Hampshire courts. This increase in self-represented parties
threatens the rule of lawyers over the current system. Both Eby and Keating will have a
more difficult time advancing the careers of their fellow lawyers if Keating is forced to

14
recuse himself for any reason and/or if Eby is defeated by a self-represented party as one of
the bar’s most esteemed attorneys. Both Eby and Keating are “Fellows” to the Bar,
meaning they provide top tier donations yearly.
51. Bergeron was denied due process of law under both Part I, Article 35 of the New
Hampshire Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
when Judge Keating neither disqualified himself nor disclosed to the parties the basis for
his potential disqualification. See In the Matter of Tapply & Zukatis, 162 N.H. 285 (2011);
Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 135 N.H. 589 (1992); Sup. Ct. R. 38.
52. Judge Keating might have a legitimate defense to charges of bias if there was even a
single affidavit filed by any defendant in either of the pending equity cases. However, the
judge has allowed only the bare allegations of bar-card-carrying attorneys to sway all of his
written decisions in these cases. Meanwhile he’s completely ignored duly authenticated
exhibits and multiple sworn statements provided by the self-represented Bergeron. Bare
assertions standing alone are insufficient to create material facts. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at
247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505.
53. Rule 18 of the “Rules of the Circuit Court of the State of New Hampshire, Probate
Division” reads in full: “No Attorney shall be compelled to testify in any Cause in which
the Attorney is retained, unless the Attorney has been notified in writing, not less than
thirty (30) days prior to the hearing that the Attorney will be summoned as a witness
therein.”
54. Rule 50-A of the “Rules of the Circuit Court of the State of New Hampshire, Probate
Division” provides:

15
“All grounds for recusal that are known or should reasonably be known prior to trial or
hearing shall be incorporated in a written Motion for recusal and filed promptly with the
Court. Grounds for recusal that first become apparent at the time of or during the hearing
shall be immediately brought to the attention of the Court. Failure to raise a ground for
recusal shall constitute a waiver as specified herein of the right to request recusal on such
ground. If a record of the proceedings is not available, the trial judge shall make a record of
the request, the Court's findings, and its order. The Court's ruling on the motion shall issue
promptly. If the motion is denied, the Court’s ruling shall be supported by findings of
fact with respect to the allegations contained in the motion.” (emphasis added)
55. The only attorney in this case who can testify on behalf of his client is the one who
is his own client: Willis Sloat. He has provided multiple perjured statements to this court,
namely repeating the lie that he had nothing to do with Bergeron’s “successor in interest”
designation with the mortgage company on the Cotton Hill Road property, Mr. Cooper.
56. Sloat literally provides his own testimony against himself in a written email to Bergeron
admitting calling the successor in interest department for the mortgage broker on
Bergeron’s behalf. Sloat repeatedly contradicted his own repeated false statements when he
admitted in open court that “the intention” was to transfer the Cotton Hill Road property to
Bergeron. Judge Keating has never taken action to admonish or warn Sloat for lying to the
court so blatantly. He has instead rewarded the dishonest attorney with granted requests.
57. Sloat made his first perjured statements in the core estate case under oath, as were all
parties who spoke at the April 21, 2022 hearing on various motions connected to the
reversed license to sell secured by Sloat on behalf of the estate. Sloat additionally presented
perjured statements at the Halloween, 2022 hearing for this equity case as his own witness

16
and attorney all in one. (See Bergeron Declaration filed in Case 311-2022-EQ-00279 on
11/29/2022).
58. “It is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as impartial as the lot of humanity
will admit.” N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 35. The New Hampshire Code of Judicial Conduct
requires a judge to avoid even the appearance of impropriety, to conduct himself at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, and to disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including, but not limited to instances where the judge has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer. Tapply, 162 N.H. at 296,
302; Blaisdell, 135 N.H. at 593; Sup. Ct. R. 38, Canons 1, 2.
59. “The party claiming bias must show the existence of bias, the likelihood of bias, or an
appearance of such bias that the judge is unable to hold the balance between vindicating the
interests of the court and the interests of a party.” Tapply, 162 N.H. at 297 (quotation
omitted). “The existence of an appearance of impropriety is determined by an objective
standard, i.e., would a reasonable person, not the judge himself, question the impartiality of
the court.” Id. at 302 (quotation omitted).
60. “The objective standard is required in the interests of ensuring justice in the individual
case and maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process which
depends on a belief in the impersonality of judicial decision making.” Id. (quotation
omitted). “The test for an appearance of partiality is whether an objective, disinterested
observer, fully informed of the facts, would entertain significant doubt that justice would be
done in the case.” Id. (quotation omitted).

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61. “Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion.” Id. at 297 (quotation omitted). “Opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts
introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior
proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id.
(quotation omitted, emphasis added).
62. Judge Keating crafted his rulings in this instant case with so much bias permeating his
thought process that one of his rulings contradicted itself and the other relied on a
completely false accounting of the record, facts not in evidence, and the purposeful
disregarding of all of Bergeron’s duly presented legal arguments and 33 exhibits of
authenticated, unchallenged evidence from Bergeron’s initial complaint.
63. “It is the judge’s responsibility to disclose, sua sponte, all information of any potential
conflict between himself and the parties or their attorneys when his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned,” and his “failure to disclose to the parties the basis for his or her
disqualification under [the Code of Judicial Conduct] will result in a disqualification of the
judge.” Blaisdell, 135 N.H. at 593-94.
64. Bergeron implored the judge at the October 31, 2022 hearing in this case to allow him
the opportunity to amend his pleading in lieu of any dismissal. Bergeron made this request
primarily so he could include ongoing facts and circumstances that impacted the case.
65. A trial judge may not deny any party procedural due process rights by preempting that
party’s ability to present a case as Judge Keating has done here by ignoring duly presented

18
evidence filed by Bergeron and embracing unsworn statements made by the attorneys on
the inter-related cases. Judge Keating is actively violating Bergeron’s due process rights.
66. A more recent NH Supreme Court case involving a family court issue resulted in an
order issued on December 16th
, 2021. The appeal of a matter within the case of Katherine
Albrecht v. Dana Albrecht (Case No. 2021-0192) resulted in the forced disqualification of a
judge who made insensitive statements during the self-represented defendant’s testimony
and later self-reported those statements to the Judicial Conduct Committee. The Supreme
Court also vacated orders that may have been improperly influenced by the judge’s bias
against the defendant.
67. The only difference between this case and the Albrecht case is the self-confessed
statements indicating violations of the judicial code of conduct were made loud and clear
here in open court by Judge Keating and not confessed to the Judicial Conduct Committee
by phone. The judge in the Albrecht matter initially made the offending remarks under his
breath at the hearing involved. Judge Keating knew he would be heard when he made the
offending statements about his lack of preparation for the hearing in this scenario.
68. The Supreme Court’s decision in the Albrecht case contained the following statement
from the justices: “Under these circumstances, we conclude that it was error for the judicial
officer to have presided over the hearing in this case. Accordingly, we vacate the trial
court’s orders, and remand for a new hearing on the extension of the protective order
before a different judicial officer of the circuit court.”

19
69. Rather than be forced by a Supreme Court ruling to step down due to his consistent,
severe bias and conflicts of interest, Judge Keating should be compelled to stop wasting the
court’s time and disqualify himself from this case as soon as possible. Keating should also
voluntarily vacate all the dismissal orders in the case under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, Richard E. Bergeron III, pro-se, requests that this Court:
1. Grant this emergency request for disqualification and assign a new, impartial judge to this
case promptly.
2. Vacate all orders in the instant case that could have been influenced by Judge Keating’s
bias, prejudice and conflicts of interest. (ie all dismissal orders)
3. Provide any and all additional relief necessary and fair under the circumstances.
Dated this 5th day of January, 2023
Respectfully submitted,
_____________________
Richard E. Bergeron III
Pro-Se
107 Cotton Hill Road
Belmont, New Hampshire 03220

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a full paper copy of the foregoing emergency motion and supporting
affidavit was served on this date by United States Postal Service to David Eby at Devine,
Millimet & Branch, PA located at 111 Amherst Street in Manchester, New Hampshire 03101.
Eby is the registered attorney in this case for Defendant Amy Chenette. An additional paper copy
was served on this date by Priority Mail to Attorney Michael S. McGrath at his office at Upton &
Hatfield LLP located at 10 Centre Street, Concord, NH 03301. McGrath has entered his appearance
as legal representation for Defendant Maryjane Descarpentries. I additionally served Defendant and
Attorney Willis Sloat a paper copy by Priority Mail at Bailin Sloat Law, PLLC, 835 Hanover Street,
Suite 302, Manchester, NH 03104. I also sent courtesy digital copies of this motion and supporting
affidavit by email to all involved parties.

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Dated: January 5, 2023 By, ______________________
Richard E. Bergeron III

Motion to Disqualify Judge Christopher M. Keating

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