2016 828 appellee sanctions reply, George Sansoucy, GES

IN THE OHIO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS
United Local Schools Board ofEducation, ) BTACASENO. 2016-828
)
Appellant, ) (REAL PROPERTY VALUE)
)
vs.
)
)
Columbiana County Board ofRevision, et al.
)
)
Appellees.
Post Hearing Sanctions Reply Brief of Appellee Utica East Ohio Midstream LLC
Gary T. Stedronsky (0079866)
Ennis Britton Co., L.P.A.
1714 West Galbraith Road
Cincinnati, Ohio 45239
(513) 421-2540
gstedronskv@ennisbritton.com
Anthony L. Ehler (0039304)
Jeffrey Allen Miller (0072702)
Steven L. Smiseck (0061615)
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP
52 East Gay Street
P.O. Box 1008
Columbus, Ohio 43216-1008
Counselfor Appellant
UnitedLocal School District Bd. ofEdn.
Counselfor Appellee, Utica East Ohio
Midstream LLC
Shawn J Organ (0042052)
David J. Twombly (0092558)
Organ Cole LEP
1330 Dublin Road
Columbus, Ohio 43215
DJTwomblv@.organcole.com
Krista R. Peddicord (0089117)
Columbiana Cormty Assistant Prosecutor
105 South Market Street
Eisbon, OH 44432
(330) 420-0140
kpeddicord@colcoprosecutor.net
Counselfor Witness
George E. Sansoucy, PE
Counselfor Appellees
Columbiana CountyAuditor and Board of
Revision

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
1
Introduction...................................................................................................................
Overview........................................................................................................................
The Board has authority to address witness misconduct and prospectively bar paid
expert witnesses from future proceedings.......................................................................
The question presented is whether the sanction ofbeing suspended from testifying
before it is warranted based upon intentionally misleading conduct. The Board is not
required to find criminal perjury.....................................................................................
Whether the false testimony had a rational basis is part and parcel of
determining intent..............................................................................................
Outlandishly false testimony is not indicative of good faith..............................
Mr. Sansoucy did not appear at the Board’s sanction hearing. He failed to provide any
explanation or excuse for his false testimony. He now attempts to make his case
outside the record....................................................................................................
Mr. Sansoucy’s accusations against counsel for UEO and everyone else has
bearing on the question ofwhether he intentionally provided false testimony....
There is no secret pilot gas piping system at Kensington...................................
Newman v. Wilkins, BTA Case No. 170,171,172 (May 18, 2007) does not
support Mr. Sansoucy........................................................................................
Accusations against Grant Hammer, witness for UEO are irrelevant to the
question ofwhether Mr. Sansoucy intentionally provided false testimony........
Mr. Sansoucy’s false testimony was repeatedly used to support
conclusions that were also false.............................................................
Mr. Sansoucy’s own testimony shows that it was not possible for him
to have performed the work he said he did to support his report............
Mr. Sansoucy’s late-breaking excuse for his false testimony (that he only analyzed the
real property in separating real property from personal property) is specious.
Mr. Sansoucy first must have analyzed all property to know which property to later
separate and why, unless he did not perform the work he claims...................................
I.
1
II.
III.
6
IV.
12
A.
14
16
B.
V.
19
no
A.
19
20
B.
C.
23
D.
24
1.
25
2.
27
VI.
28

The argument that Mr. Sansoucy did not perform a costing ofnon-existent
assets and therefore his false testimony on those assets is not material ignores
that the principal subject ofthe case was property classification, not real
property valuation...............................................................................................
Iftaken as true, Mr. Sansoucy’s day six excuse for his prior false testimony
(that he only studied drawings for real property and not those for personal
property), indicates he perjured himselfwith prior claims ofwork done in
classifying personal property..............................................................................
Mr. Sansoucy’s “excuse” also does not provide rational explanation for how he
failed to know the functional benefit ofproperty he classified and costed as real
property.............................................................................................................
Mr. Sansoucy’s “I only studied the real property” excuse for his false
testimony is irrational and not believable. An experienced expert witness does
not try to analyze and classify theoretical assets that do not exist.......................
There are two competing classifications ofreal property piping systems in the
Sansoucy report. Mr. Sansoucy applied both to add millions of dollars oftaxable real
property cost to his conclusion ofvalue. Mr. Sansoucy’s attempt to claim in briefthat
there is only one is false.................................................................................................
Mr. Sansoucy’s explanation for his claim that he used the term “affixed” under a ^
personal, subjective legal definition meaning “heavy” instead of a factual engineering
definition ofthat word is more after-the-fact excuse making.........................................
Counsel’s claim that Mr. Sansoucy can read piping drawings contradicts
Mr. Sansoucy’s own admissions in the record...............................................................
Conclusion....................................................................................................................
A.
28
B.
31
C.
34
D.
35
VII.
37
VIII.
39
DC.
42
45
X.

Introduction
I.
Mr. Sansoucy petitioned this Board to participate in the sanctions hearing and hriefmg on
the motion as a party. The Board obliged. Mr. Sansoucy responded by failing to take the
opportunity to explain himselfon the stand. Perhaps fearing being called back to the stand by
UEO, he was not even present at the hearing.
Counsel for Mr. Sansoucy will correctly observe that he had no obligation to testify. Even
the cold record was compelling enough to convince Mr. Sansoucy’s counsel to avoid further
exposure to him from cross examination and that the safer tactic was to attack UEO, UEO’s
counsel and UEO’s witness in brief It is much easier to attack UEO in briefwithout any facts to
support those attacks than to defend Mr. Sansoucy on the stand. Mr. Sansoucy’s decision to avoid
testifying at the sanctions hearing came as no surprise.
So be it. Mr. Sansoucy has submitted no evidence. He is left with attorney supposition and
strained excuses that masquerade as facts and legal argument. Like the witness chair made
available to him by this Board, his excuses are ... empty. Mr. Sansoucy’s briefis a determined
exercise in distraction. It distracts from the evidence in the record. It distracts from Mr. Sansoucy
and his testimony. In short, it distracts from the truth.
For organization and efficiency, UEO addresses Mr. Sansoucy’s excuses first in summary
fashion within its Overview. Fuller responses follow.
Overview
II.
• Mr. Sansoucy argues that counsel for UEO harbors animosity toward him and this is
the reason for the sanctions motion. This claim ignores the fact that the Columbiana
County Auditor (who is represented by the County Prosecutor ofColumbiana County)
similarly characterized Mr. Sansoucy’s conduct as “perjury.” It ignores that counsel for
Union Local Schools (Mr. Sansoucy’s client) expressly stated it had no objection to
1

sanctioning Mr. Sansoucy. IfUEO’s counsel is accused ofacting on personal
animosity, why does Mr. Sansoucy make no aceusations against the County Prosecutor,
the County Auditor and the Union Local School Board for their support ofthe same
sanctions? Fabricating an unsavory motive ofthe taxpayer is an attempt to play on the
sympathies ofthe Board. The victim card is easier to play against a large business
rather than against elected offieials. Mr. Sansoucy attempts to misdireet the Board
away from the plain factual question ofwhether Mr. Sansouey tried to mislead it.
• Mr. Sansoucy suggests that positions he could take in a criminal court in defense of
peijury charges are applicable at the Board. This is a false comparison. The Board is
not a criminal court determining guilt and sentencing criminals. The Board is a
quasi-judieial body examining the bare question ofwhether Mr. Sansouey intentionally
tried to mislead it such that it should act to prevent recurrenee ofthat miseonduct.
Criminal defense arguments to charges ofperjury can be made to a eriminal court if
charges are ever brought. They are ofno value here and serve only to distract.
• Mr. Sansoucy argues that he had no motive for testifying falsely and therefore his false
testimony was not intended to mislead. It now seems beyond rational dispute that
Mr. Sansoucy was too ignorant ofwhat exists at the site to have done the work and
study he claimed in support ofhis report. Yet, he was paid hundreds ofthousands of
dollars to complete this work and study. Mr. Sansoucy’s motive then for falsely
testifying was to cover up that he had not performed the work that he said he did. He
made up testimony about non-existent assets, non-existent products, and claims ofwork
done etc. to support his clearly false conclusions. False testimony was his answer to
address his lack ofknowledge occasioned by not having performed the work claimed in
2

his report. His motive for falsely testifying was to eover up his fraud and proteet his
fees.
• Mr. Sansoucy argues that UEO’s elaims are hypertechnical. He eontends that UEO
demands testimonial perfeetion. Again, this is a false comparison. Mr. Sansoucy
claimed expertise about UEO’s plant and equipment function to justify his ultimate
conclusions on property classification, which required him to analyze the benefit ofthat
property. But, he testified falsely about very basic matters like what assets exists at the
plant, the function and benefit ofequipment, and the products made there. He claimed
to have physically seen property at the plant and to have studied property in the
drawings (for hundreds ofhours) for what we now know are a large number ofnon
existent assets. He went so far as to explain how the non-existent assets function at
Kensington and testified that he personally saw them at the site. The nature and
number ofthese mistakes are themselves reasonable causes of concern especially in a
where Mr. Sansoucy claimed to have performed classification analysis that
required him to study and determine the affixation and fiinctional benefit of every asset
on the site based upon hundreds ofhours studying the drawings for those assets. He
intended to rely on the credibility his false statements created. His misconduct
undermines the Board’s critical role in assessing witness credibility. It is hardly
hypertechnical to require an expert witness to testify honestly about the work
performed to support expert conclusions.
• Mr. Sansoucy argues he was never given a chance to explain his errors and was not
given a fair opportunity to respond to criticism because the case settled before redirect
examination. This argument asks the Board to pretend that Mr. Sansoucy did not
case
3

decline the opportunity to testify at the Board’s sanctions hearing. Indeed, counsel has
offered speculative excuses largely based upon claimed matters outside the record
rather than to have Mr. Sansoucy undergo cross examination regarding those excuses.
That was a tactic oftheir own choosing. The Board gave Mr. Sansoucy the chance to
explain. He declined.
• Mr. Sansoucy argues that he did not value the many assets he testified existed that in
fact did not exist, and therefore his false testimony should be overlooked. This
argument relies on the false premise that the tax case before the Board was a plain
vanilla real property valuation dispute restricted to the listed property on the record
card. This “no harm no foul” defense conveniently ignores:
o Mr. Sansoucy applied non-existent piping systems in a fraction that he used to
proportionally classify as real property, and then value millions ofdollars ofhelical
piles and pipe racks at the site. Thus, whether he separately valued it or not, the
non-existent property was applied to increase UEO’s tax bill;
o this was a real property classification case in which Mr. Sansoucy claimed to have
parated” all property on the site, real from personal, and that he repeatedly
testified that he analyzed the affixation, benefit, function and use ofall ofthe
property on the site in order to decide that separation and classification. Ifhe did
not actually do that work, that failure grossly affected his credibility as to all ofthe
analysis done on all ofthe property;
that three ofthe fifteen piping systems he marked as existing real property at
Appendix L 383 and testified that he had studied in the engineering drawings and
physically seen at Kensington, in fact, did not exist;
se
4

o his gross ignorance as to what exists at the site indicates that his testimony as to
enormous amounts of study ofthe drawings was untrue (e.g., failing to find even
one ofthe 29 missing piping systems in all ofhis claimed hundreds ofhours of
study ofthe drawings);
o the sheer volume and repetition ofhis false testimony as to both non-existent
personal and real property and non-existent products indicates he knew he was
offering made up testimony on subjects about which he was eonseiously ignorant.
• Mr. Sansoucy argues that UEO misrepresents whieh piping systems he declared to be real
property in his report. This argument eontradicts the record and Mr. Sansoucy’s report. It
distraets from the fact that there are two different real property piping lists in his report
(Appendix F Table F-6 and Appendix L 383) each ofwhich were claimed by Mr. Sansouey
to be eorrect, and eaeh ofwhich were applied within his report to add millions ofdollars of
taxable property.
• Mr. Sansoucy contends that UEO seeks a lifetime ban as though UEO has the most extreme
goal possible. UEO’s briefis very clear in recommending a 5 year suspension, but
indicating UEO’s acceptance ofwhatever duration the Board feels is appropriate.
The sanctions question presented for the Board runs to the core ofthe Board’s proper
function and the lawful dispatch ofbusiness that eomes before it. To do this, it must maintain
order and demand attorneys and witnesses act professionally and honestly. Fundamental to this is
enforcing the oath to testify truthfully.
UEO’s post hearing briefwas as factually clear as counsel could make it. It did not
paraphrase Mr. Sansoucy. Instead, UEO provided lengthy transcript excerpts so the Board could
easily and efficiently see word-for-word what he said. The Board certainly can determine for itself
5

what Mr. Sansoucy said. It can assess the truth and import ofhis statements. It can accurately
infer Mr. Sansoucy’s intentions when he made those statements. The Board has the benefit of
testimony horn witness Grant Hammer who is a veteran ofthe U.S. armed services who was
assigned to serve and support the Joint Chiefs of Staff That witness has spent many years after
military service as a wet gas facility operator. The Board’s own hearing examiner was a firsthand
witness to Mr. Sansoucy’s provision oftestimony. Her opinion ofMr. Sansoucy’s witness
demeanor and conduct is ofparamount importance to the sanctions question. Seasons Coal Co.
V. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St. 3d 77, 80 (1984)(stating, “***the trial judge is best able to view the
witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in
weighing the credibility ofthe proffered testimony.”).
Mr. Sansoucy provided false testimony that is sufficiently egregious that no party or
attorney believes a benefit ofthe doubt should be extended to him. It is the record that makes clear
Mr. Sansoucy failed to testify honestly and in good faith. That obvious conclusion, shared by all
the parties, is the reason the case settled before UEO presented direct testimony. It was clear for
all to see that Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony was false, and intentionally misleading. That is the reason
for the sanctions motion. That is the reason all ofthe parties to the tax case support sanctions.
The Board has authority to address witness misconduct and prospectively har paid
expert witnesses from future proceedings.
Mr. Sansoucy argues in briefthat the Board lacks authority to suspend a professional
witness for testimonial misconduct from testifying in future cases despite its own rule to that effect.
See OAC 5717-1-17(A)(5). Mr. Sansoucy argues that because there is very little caselaw
addressing that point, an administrative tribunal must not have the authority to take such action.
However, just because the Board’s power on this point has not been litigated and reported does not
that the Board lacks that power. Indeed, the Board did not state that it lacked the power to
III.
mean
6

sanction a witness the last time such a motion was raised against Mr. Sansoucy. It ruled on the
motion.
The paucity of authority stems from the rarity ofoccasions when such a motion will be
both warranted and make business sense to pursue. It seems logical that only expert witness
misconduct that is egregious would support a sanctions motion. That is a very rare fact pattern at
the Board. Even further narrowing, in most instances a party simply would decide it unlikely that
it would ever to have to deal with that untruthful witness again. A cost-benefit analysis would lead
to a conclusion that the greater good for Ohio in addressing the witness misconduct is outweighed
by the individual legal fee cost ofachieving it. Thus, a business decision usually is made to let it
go. Indeed, we surmise that this is the reason Mr. Sansoucy remains folly employed as a
professional witness despite his cavalier treatment ofthe truth.
Quite a number offactors must align before a sanctions motion to bar future appearances
by an expert witness makes any sense. Thus, these are the reasons there is very little authority on
question of sanctioning a witness by suspending him from appearing in future proceedings. That
does not mean that the Board lacks authority to address the question and impose a sanction. OAC
5717-1-17(A)(5).
Common sense dictates that the Board has authority to ensure no recurrence ofwitness
misconduct by the same paid expert witness. The Board needs that authority to protect taxing
officials and taxpayers from being duped or attacked in serial fashion by the same unscrupulous
expert witness. The Board is responsible to ensure that the intended dispute resolution mission of
its forum is not coopted by unscrupulous expert witnesses using its hearing as a tool in their own
unsavory business. The Board has ruled many times in the past regarding evidence that is so
unreliable that it will not rely upon it in any case. See Syed, et al. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of
7

Revision, et al., BTA Case No. 2014-4303 (Sep. 17, 2015)(stating, “we have concluded that the
value expressed by the DCF analysis derives investment value, not market value for ad valorem tax
’); New Windsor Hous. Ltd. P ’ship v. Fairfield Cty Bd. ofRevision, BTA Case No. 2006-
R-835 (May 6,2008)(stating, “The board is particularly skeptical offinancing appraisals where the
appraiser has not been present, either at the BOR or at this board, to testify to the facts and
methodology underlying the appraisal report.”); Choice One Communs. ofOhio, Inc. v. Wilkins,
BTA Case No. 2003-K-1461; 2004-K-409 (June 9, 2006)(stating, “this board has repeatedly
questioned the impartiality and, in turn, the eredibility of experts whose method of compensation
provides them with a direct interest in the litigation.”); Am. District Telegraph Co. v. Porterfield
15 Ohio St.2d 92 (1968), (holding the Board ofTax Appeals did not unreasonably or unlaAvfully
exelude evidence in the form of affidavits because there was no opportunity for eross-
examination). Sueh statements from the Board are beneficial to potential litigants because they
forewarn that such inherently unreliable evidence will be rejeeted. It should be self-evident that
the trier offact the Board has authority to announce the unreliability of an untruthful expert witness
and bar his further appearance at the Board via sanction. This power is the natural analog to the
power to admit the witness. With one goes the other.
The Board determines admissibility ofopinion evidence of eaeh expert witness that appears
before it. In certain cireumstances, the underlying reliability ofthe expert himself can form the
basis ofexclusion under Rule 702 ofthe Rules ofEvidence. For example, federal courts have held
“a showing ofbias [is] so extreme that exelusion is appropriate under Daubert.” In re Welding
Fume Prods. Liah. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 2d 761, 766 (N.D. Ohio 2008); McClellan v. I-Flow Corp.,
710 F. Supp. 2d 1092,1125 (D.Or. 2010); see also Conde v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 804 F.
Supp. 972, 984 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (“[WJhere an expert becomes an advocate for a cause, he
purposes.
as
8

therefore departs from the ranks of an objeetive expert witness, and any resulting testimony would
be unfairly prejudieial and misleading”)- Thus, bias denotes a lack ofobjectivity so egregious
that the witness cannot be relied upon.
Similarly, if an expert witness has provided false testimony to support his opinion, he
demonstrates such a fundamental lack ofobjectivity such that he cannot be relied upon. Provision
offalse testimony by an expert witness is such an extreme assault on the integrity ofthe Board’s
proceedings that the Board is well within its authority to declare that witness unreliable as an
evidentiary matter for a specified period oftime. Calling that ruling a “sanction” does not change
the character ofthe ruling itself It is at its core an evidentiary ruling, and the need for the ruling is
driven by the policy ofprotecting both the integrity ofthe forum and litigants before it.
The Court affords the Board great authority in weighing and admitting evidence:
The BTA has discretion in admitting evidence, Ohio Turnpike
Comm. V. Ellis{955 164 Ohio St. 377, 58 Ohio Op. 179,131 N.E.2d 397,
paragraph eight ofthe syllabus; v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1966), 5 Ohio St. 2d
237, 242, 34 Ohio Op. 2d 467,470,215 N.E.2d 366, 371, weighing it, and granting
credibility to testimony. Witt Co. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of R
evision (1991) 61 Ohio
St. 3d 155, 573 N.E.2d 661. Unless the BTA abuses this discretion, we will affirm
its decision. Webb Corp. v. Lucas Cty. Bd. ofRevision (1995), 72 Ohio St. 3d 36,
647N.E.2dl62.
Bd ofEduc.for Orange City Sch. Dist. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. ofRevision, 74 Ohio St. 3d 415,
416-417 (1995). Indeed, such decision making is where the Board enjoys its greatest authority. It
is hard to see how preventing recurrence offalse testimony at the Board would be an abuse ofits
discretion. Indeed, imagine the harm to the Board and the legal process ifprofessional witnesses
become aware ofthe fact that the Board was powerless to address false testimony. Ifthere is no
evidence to support a fact driven case (e.g., valuation), then no case should be brought. However,
ifan unscrupulous expert witness is willing to simply make up the evidence that is lacking, and the
9

Board is powerless to address such false testimony, then a risk free niche business has been created
at the Board for expert witnesses willing to make up “evidence” to support groundless cases.
Mr. Sansoucy argues that the Board’s sanction rule contemplates a sanction for discovery
violations alone. However, the plain language of OAC 5717-1-15 belies that argument:
(A) Failure to comply with the rules contained in agency 5717 ofthe
Administrative Code, including the deadlines set by the appeal’s case
management schedule pursuant to rule 5717-1-07 or rule 5717-1-08 ofthe
Administrative Code, or an order ofthe board may result in any ofthe
following sanctions:
(4) The prohibition against introducing expert opinion and testimony into
evidence; _
(5) The denial or suspension ofappearing and qualifying as an expert witness in
designated matters before the board;
(6) The denial or suspension ofthe right ofany person to appear or practice
before the board;
Subsection (A)(5) very clearly provides for “the suspension of appearing and qualifying as an
expert witness in designated matters before the Board.” By its plain terms this is a sanction ofthe
expert witness. Note that the language used is that of“suspension ofappearing,” not exclusion
from “evidence” as in (A)(4). That is the same language i.e., “suspension ofthe right to appear”
used in subsection (A)(6) whereby the Board could suspend the practice privileges of an attorney
that abuses the forum. Thus, ifthe sanction in (A)(5) is aimed at the expert witness, it is axiomatic
that it is the conduct ofthe witness himselfthat would drive imposition ofthat sanction, not the
conduct ofthe party or its counsel as in a discovery violation. See e.g., OAC 5717-1-
15(A)(4)(exclusion ofintroduction into evidence ofthe expert report or testimony). Lastly, the
rule speaks in terms of“suspension” from multiple designated “matters” plural. (A)(5) is clearly
not aimed at evidentiary exclusion from a single case. It clearly is addressed to future matters.
Mr. Sansoucy also argues that he has not violated any “order” ofthe Board. However,
there is such a thing as a standing order. For example, discovery violations such as a failure to
10

interrogatories ean be sanetioned under Civ. R. 37(D) without the neeessity of a motion to
eompel or a prior order from the tribunal.
Civ.R. 37(D) “provides a one-step method for immediate imposition of sanetions
by motion” when a party fails to serve answers to interrogatories. Dafco, Inc. v.
Reynolds (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 4, 5, 9 OBR4, 457 N.E.2d 916, 916; see, also.
StaffNote to Civ.R. 37(D). Aecordingly, defendant did not have to first violate an
order to compel discovery in order for the trial court to have properly considered a
motion for defaultjudgment.
Cunningham v. Garruto, 101 Ohio App. 3d 656, 659 (3^^ Dist. 1995). Ohio follows the federal
interpretation ofthat rule. See Davis v. Byers Circle Invest., Inc., 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1255,
* 11 (10*** Dist. 1990). Federal courts have applied that rule to false testimony. Morris v.
McMaster-Carr Supply Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10484, *5-6, (N.D. III. 2002). See also
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14225, *7-8 (E.D.
PA)(applying Rule 37(d) to false testimony given at a deposition inter alia stating, “Rule 37(d) is
still applicable, ‘since a response containing misrepresentations ... is as good as no response at
answer
all.’”).
The Board can sanction an untruthful expert witness at its hearing under reasoning applied
to Civil R. 37(d) (i.e., false testimony can be sanctioned without the necessity of a superfluous and
redundant order to truthfully testify). It would be an absurdity for the Board to need to order the
witness to testify truthfully after administering the oath to truthfully testify. The order to testify
truthfully is an inherent part ofthe administration ofthe oath. The witness has agreed to testify
truthfully as a condition to being permitted by the Board to provide testimony. When the witness
violates that condition, that standing order, the Board has authority to suspend appearance by that
witness in matters it designates. OAC 5717-1-15(A)(5).
Although the rule to suspend an expert witness has not been utilized by the Board to date,
the Board’s power is set forth in plain language. OAC 5717-1-15(A)(5). It should not fail to reach
11

the sanctions question in the instant case on the artificial basis that it must continue to accept
testimony horn a witness that has provided egregiously false testimony. No court would rule that
Board must continue to accept testimony trom a professional witness caught being intentionally
untruthful in serial fashion throughout a case. Likewise, OAC 5717-1-15(A)(5) is clear regarding
the sanction available when a witness is involved in testimonial misconduct (suspension from
appearing at the Board). It is up to the Board to flesh out the proper utilization ofthat rule.
However, the idea that the Board lacks the authority to apply its own rule is wrong.
The question presented is whether the sanction of being suspended from testifying
before it is warranted based upon intentionally misleading conduct. The Board is not
required to find criminal perjury.
Mr. Sansoucy argues technical points ofcriminal perjury. But, the Board is not a criminal
IV.
court determining whether Mr. Sansoucy should go to prison. The Board’s rule on expert witness
sanction addresses demonstrated unreliability ofan expert witness and protection ofboth the
integrity ofproceedings and the litigants before it. Barring the witness from continuing to abuse
the forum in the future is more a protection for the Board and those using the Board to resolve
disputes than an actual punishment ofthe witness. Criminal perjury law is not governing authority.
The question before the Board is whether witness misconduct occurred. An expert witness
is asked by the Board to do very few things. Indeed, being truthful in the report and in testimony is
all that is asked. The Board does not issue orders to an expert witness other than its administration
ofthe oath. In this context, it seems axiomatic that the principal trigger ofthe sanction in OAC
5717-1-17(A)(5) is providing untruthful testimony with intent to mislead the Board.
The Board must determine ifMr. Sansoucy intentionally tried to mislead it. UEO indicated
in its post hearing briefthat perjury authority was analogously useful because it was instructive
with regard to determinations ofintent. It also helped describe the worst witness misconduct there
is, felony perjury. However, UEO has never argued that to prevail in its request for sanctions the
12

Board must convict Mr. Sansoucy ofcriminal perjury. That is not its job. Thus, all of
Mr. Sansoucy’s attempts to raise teehnical defenses under Ohio perjury law may be ofuse to him if
he ends up in criminal court, but are not a defense here.
UEO also raised Ohio civil fraud authority as being analogously useful for determining
what constitutes an intent to mislead for aetionable fraud:
*to be aetionable every fraud must consist of, inter alia, (1) an actual or implied
false representation of, or concealment of, a material fact, (2) with knowledge ofthe
falsity, or such utter disregardfor the truth or recklessness that knowledge may he
inferred, and (3) the intention to induce the plaintiffto rely upon the
misrepresentation. See 24 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 635, Fraud and Deceit, Section
20; Prosser, Law ofTorts (4 Ed.) 685-686, Section 105. (emphasis added).
Logsdon V. Graham Ford Co., 54 Ohio St. 2d 336, 340, (1978). UEO simply pointed out that both
criminal perjury authority and civil fraud authority are addressed to the same basic actions, i.e..
representations known to be false that are intended to induce reliance by the target ofthe false
representation. The Board’s proeeedings are civil rather than criminal.
Mr. Sansoucy struggles to make the case that he did not “intentionally” mislead the Board
as a matter ofcriminal perjury. Yet, his false testimony was gross, unexplainable, material, and
voluminous. His false testimony touched on such a multiplicity oftopics and assets. He falsely
testified regarding the work he said he did to support his conclusions. Much ofthat claimed work
could not possibly have happened, and he now has admitted that mueh ofhis elaimed study of
engineering drawings for property he classified as personalty did not happen. Intent to mislead can
be inferred easily from the character, nature and multiplicity ofMr. Sansoucy’s false testimony.
He eould not possibly have believed in each and every instanee that he falsely testified that he was
telling the truth.
Mr. Sansoucy argument seems to be that recklessly offering false testimony to the Board,
no matter the volume of sueh testimony, is not being “intentional” and therefore is permissible.
13

This is bizarre. Recklessly false testimony undermines the proper functioning ofthe Board’s
hearings. It is not legally permissible. As set forth in hornbook civil fraud law, “knowledge of
falsity” can be inferred where there is “utter disregard for the truth or recklessness.” Logsdon,
supra. The sheer multiplicity, magnitude and nature offalse testimony Mr. Sansoucy provided
leaves no doubt that he knew it was false when given. At best he had what civil fraud authorities
would call “utter disregard for the truth” or what other authorities would call “conscious disregard^
ofthe truth. When the number ofinstances and nature ofhis false testimony are considered, the
limited sanction provided by the Board’s rule ofnot appearing for a period oftime is warranted.
Whether the false testimony had a rational basis is part and parcel of
determining intent.
Mr. Sansoucy misses the point ofUEO’s observation that there was no rational basis for
much ofhis false testimony. The question ofrationality is evidentiary. It goes to the reasonability
ofthe mistake. The more unreasonable the mistake the more likely it was intentional or at least
recklessly false. Irrationally false statements are far more suspect than those that appear to have a
rational source for the error. For example, as Mr. Sansoucy knows, Mr. Hammer erroneously
testified that Mr. Sansoucy deemed 27 piping systems to be real property when the correct number
15 (or 12 depending upon which part ofhis report you look). However, 27 was the actual
number ofpiping systems Mr. Hammer determined to exist at Kensington. Thus, there is a
perfectly explainable number “27” relating to piping systems within his own testimony.
If one examines the rationality ofMr. Hammer’s mistake, it would be clear that
(1) Mr. Hammer had no reason to memorize trivia from Mr. Sansoucy’s report; (2) the number
itselfhad no bearing on Mr. Hammer’s statements offact; and (3) Mr. Hammer simply misstated a
piping system number he was familiar with and that was repeated many times at the sanctions
A.
was
14

hearing. Thus, his error was rational. We know where that number came from and Mr. Hammer
did not try to use the erroneous number to support a groundless opinion ofhis own.
On the other hand, for example, Mr. Sansoucy has told us under oath that he studied the
Kensington engineering drawings for himdreds ofhours, and performed laborious study ofthe
plant and its assets. He also testified that there is a nitrogen rejection unit that he actually saw at
the site, that he reviewed cost records for it, and saw vendor drawings for it. That is deeply
troublesome. Mr. Sansoucy’s statements cannot be reconciled with the fact that neither the asset
the documents he claimed to have laboriously for that asset reviewed exist. When one also
considers that nitrogen rejection units are: (1) rare in the gas processing industry, and non-existent
in Ohio; (2) that they are more than one hundred feet tall; and (3) that all ofthe treatise authority
Mr. Sansoucy claimed to have read (and even the chapter he attached to his report) tells him that
that a nitrogen rejection would not he necessary at Kensington, it is particularly troublesome to
excuse that testimony. The testimony is irrationally false because it is contradictedhy everything
available for him to review. Bare review ofan aerial photograph would show him that massive
nor
asset was not there.
The grossness of errors like these raises two questions:
How did Mr. Sansoucy offer such irrationally false testimony about giant non
existent assets in contradiction of all available evidence, evidence he claimed to
1.
have studied for hundreds ofhours (i.e., utter disregard for the truth); and
How could Mr. Sansoucy possibly have done the hundreds ofhours ofstudy and
work he claimed when he was so grossly ignorant ofwhat exists at the site?
2.
Where there are lots ofirrational “mistakes” like this, then there likely will be further Board
proceedings addressing the reliability ofthat witness whether it be a motion to exclude or a
15

sanctions. This sort ofwitness behavior is not easily or properly overlooked. It always will draw
adverse attention. Mr. Sansoucy argues that the iiTational nature ofhis false testimony should not
be considered by the Board. However, it is the irrational nature ofhis mistakes that is an
important part ofthe calculus the Board should employ in its analysis ofMr. Sansoucy’s intent. If
there were rational explanations for any ofthe false testimony questioned in the Motion,
Mr. Sansoucy failed to offer them at hearing. Likewise, counsel for Mr. Sansoucy has offered little
in the way ofsuch explanations. However, his premise that the lack ofrational explanations for his
testimony should be ignored is clearly wrong.
Outlandishly false testimony is not indicative of good faith.
The most novel and brazen defense Mr. Sansoucy offers is reserved for his most
outlandishly false testimony. We know he testified that giant non-existent assets (e.g., deethamzer,
nitrogen rejection unit) did exist and that he saw them. He also testified about several non-existent
products (ethane stored in non-existent tanks, propane pipelines etc.) for which no equipment
exists at the site to produce them (including the giant deethanizer). On those points, Mr. Sansoucy
that the not-possibly-true nature ofthis testimony proves he offered his testimony in good
faith. He argues that because these mistakes were sure to be caught, he must have had good
intentions and truly believed himself as he made up his testimony.^
For this argument to have any strained logic to support it, one must assume that
Mr. Sansoucy had integrity and actually cared about the truthfulness ofhis testimony. In that
regard, one must assume the very facts that such outlandishly false testimony tends to disprove.
Likewise, one must pretend that gross ignorance regarding what assets exist at the site does not
directly undermine the truthfulness ofclaims ofhundreds ofhours of study being performed on the
B.
argues
^ UEO does not share the opinion that such errors are all sure to be found out. Nevertheless, for the sake of
discussion that will be assumed in this section ofthe brief.
16

question ofwhat property exists at the site and its benefit to the site. Mr. Sansoucy was paid
hundreds ofthousands of dollars hy a rural Ohio school district to perform a “separation” ofreal
and personal property for all ofthe property at Kensington. He had a duty to know what was there
because he was paid a great deal ofmoney not only to know what exists, but also to have classified
such property as real or personal property. Note his OAvn statements offered under direct
examination:
very
Q. So when you discuss the “research required to understand the physical ^
interrelated characteristics ofthe property and improvements,” in your opinion if
you don’t do that research, could an
A. Ifyou don’t research it, it’s not going to be credible; starting with what
constitutes real andwhat constitutespersonal.
Q. Okay. You’d agree. Problem Identification, separation ofreal and personal
property is one ofthe realms to be tackled here, correct?
A. That is correct.
H.R. Vol. 1:192. Mr. Sansoucy himself stated that he had to have done the research to be credible.
UEO notes a similar description Mr. Sansoucy offered at deposition:
Q. So what characteristics ofthe property would interest you as a certified
appraiser?
A. Well, first characteristic is what is this thing? You know, we know it’s a
collection oftechnologies and pieces and parts to do a particular purpose and
function elected by the owners and, you know, they could have put any number of
different collection of assets, but they chose that collection at that site. You know,
myfirst objective was to understandwhat was there, what did they do.
Q. Were you able to observe what was there?
A. Yes. Yeah. I couldn’t see what was underground, you know, that’s obvious, but,
yeah, I was able to see. They didn’t withhold anything &om us to
Appellee Ex. 2 (Sansoucy Deposition): at 71. Thus, Mr. Sansoucy testified that his first objective
“was to understand what was there, and what did they do.” UEO agrees that this is a completely
appraisal of a property like this be credible?
see
17

rational explanation ofthe obvious first step to separate all real from personal property at
Kensington as he claimed he did.
Thus, a rural Ohio school district paid Mr. Sansoucy a king’s ransom to learn what assets
existed at Kensington and to classify all ofthem as real or personal property. It was done as
evidentiary support in a tax ease. However, Mr. Sansoucy repeatedly demonstrated that he lacked
even a basie knowledge ofthe assets at Kensington or the products made. Instead, he offered
testimony for non-existent assets and products that would require an extra square mile of spaee to
hold. Contrary to his deposition testimony, it does not appear he ever attempted to complete his
‘first objective.” He provided false testimony over and over again about many assets that did not
exist. The assumption he asks the Board to make that he truly cared about his testimony and the
quality ofhis work is contradicted starkly by the record. Indeed, the record screams to the
contrary.
The notion that his outlandishly false testimony was sure to be caught and therefore he
must have believed it because he cares so deeply about his testimony is absurd. What his
outlandishly false testimony reflects is that he had no respect for the Board, or the process and
proceedings before the Board. He had no respect for the taxpayer whose tax bill he sought to
increase by about 2400%. He had no respect for his own rural school district client or its counsel.
He was unconcerned about being caught. He simply did not eare enough to even make much ofan
effort to disguise his misconduct.
Mr. Sansoucy’s argument that the most bizarrely false ofhis made-up testimony proves his
good intentions may earn points for trying to turn lemons into lemonade. However, given how
much he was paid by a rural Ohio sehool district to know the basic things he did not know (but was
18

willing to make up), and how much damage and expense his false testimony caused UEO and the
Board, the argument is offensive.
Mr. Sansoucy did not appear at the Board’s sanction hearing. He failed to provide
any explanation or excuse for his false testimony. He now attempts to make his case
outside the record.
Mr. Sansoucy’s accusations against counsel for UEO and everyone else has no
bearing on the question ofwhether he intentionally provided false testimony.
Mr. Sansoucy suggests that there is a nationwide cabal of dishonest taxpayers,
unscrupulous taxing officials, vengeful attorneys, and apparently a reporter in Bow, New
Hampshire, that dislike him. Counsel for UEO apparently leads that cabal. On this claimed basis,
Mr. Sansoucy argues that the Board should decline to address the sanctions question ofwhether he
falsely testified with intent to mislead.
Lost in the self-pity is the very simple truth that the personal motivation (real or imagined)
behind pointing out false testimony is irrelevant. Even if everyone in the country disliked
Mr. Sansoucy, and even ifcounsel for UEO was driven by impure motives, that would not afford
2
him a legal excuse to provide false and misleading testimony to the Board. That would not serve
to be paid for work not performed. So far as counsel for UEO is aware, being disliked
is not an affirmative defense to lying under oath. It either happened or it did not. Likewise, there
is no evidence ofthese impure motives in the Board’s record. Thus, in addition to being logically
irrelevant, these claimed facts are also legally irrelevant. See, e.g., Middleton v. Cuyahoga County
Bd ofRevision, BTA Case No. 2012-W-l 149 (March 7,2013) (stating, “This board cannot rely
evidence submitted outside the hearing process.”). Without regard to the motives ofanyone
V.
A.
as an excuse
upon
' Counsel for UEO has noted the claim within Mr. Sansoucy’s briefthat somehow they would be benefited by having him excluded from the
Board To the contrary, it is self-evident that Mr. Sansoucy is good for the business oftax lawyers. He feeds and fliels ndicu ous and
unreasonable disputes. Those are precisely the sort ofclaims that end up in trial. Likewise, his propensity to provide high volume false
testimony makes the litigation labor intensive. Thus, he keeps tax attorneys well employed. Accordingly, it is ofno benefit to counsel for UEO
that Mr. Sansoucy be barred going forward. The opposite is true. But addressing his misconduct is the right thing to do for the taxpayer, the
Board, the school district before the Board, and for tax administration generally
19

inside or outside this case, the bare question raised by this motion remains the same, did
Mr. Sansoucy present false testimony to mislead the Board?
There is no secret pilot gas piping system at Kensington.
Mr. Sansoucy suggests in briefthat there is a secret or unstated pilot gas piping system at
the site. See Sansoucy Post Hearing Briefat 35. Indeed, Mr. Sansoucy claims in briefthat it is
“irresponsible” ofUEO to claim there are no pilot lights in the flares at Kensington. Ifthis “facf’
was true and as significant as he claims in brief, why did Mr. Sansoucy not reveal this grand
deception on record? The answer to that question is that Mr. Sansoucy’s argument is not
supportable by the record. It is an intended distraction. There is no secret pilot gas piping system
at Kensington.
B.
So far as counsel for UEO is aware, the question ofwhether there are pilot lights in the
flares at Kensington has never come up in this case. There probably are. Mr. Sansoucy himself
claimed in testimony that the existence ofpilot lights in the flares supported his testimony
“site-wide” pilot gas piping system exists in support ofhis 15/56 fi:action. Remember,
Mr. Sansoucy declared the flares and flare piping to be separate real property and he costed them i::
his Appendix F. Thus, the pilot gas piping system and flares would be distinct and separate assets
(ifthe pilot gas piping system actually existed). IfMr. Sansoucy believed that the existence of
individual pilot lights that are internal components ofthe flares meant there is a separate site-wide
pilot gas piping system despite its absence from all engineering drawings, and despite Mr.
Hammer’s confirmation that there is no such piping system at Kensington, he should have shown
at the Board’s sanction hearing to explain that oddity.
What is clear is that counsel for Mr. Sansoucy are not qualified to explain the drawings
they now claim to rely upon, and their suppositions offered in briefare not facts in the record. The
single word “pilot” standing alone in the notes of a drawing (which is now argued to be of great
never
that a
m
up
20

significance by Mr. Sansoucy) is not terribly enlightening. It provides no suggestion ofwhat it i;
its extent other than it being a part in the flare. In the same fashion, a pilot light in a gas water
heater does not imply the existence a separate “pilot gas” piping system in a residence.
Whether there are pilot lights in the flares at Kensington is completely irrelevant.
Mr. Sansoucy’s report and testimony addressed a site-wide pilot gas piping system. Indeed, his
was real property is as follows:
is
or
description ofthe pilot gas piping system he claimed
A. Pilot gas lines were in the same eategory that we felt fuel gas lines were,
which was site gas for serving the entire site for operation, whatever. It was
wanted for the real ofthe personal property as a site utility, and therefore an
improvement to the site.
H.R. Vol. IV 782-783. The potential for a pilot light within individual items of equipment, i.e., the
flares, hardly gibes with Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony regarding a separate asset, the “site-wide
Mr. Sansoucy declared the flares to be real
utility” piping system as an “improvement to the site.'
property as stand-alone pieces ofequipment. Whatever value a pilot light assembly has within the
flare, Mr. Sansoucy would aheady have included in the value ofthe flare ofwhich it was a part.
See Appellant’s Exhibit 1 (Sansoucy Report) Appendix F Bates #5, at line 2.1.1 (“John Zink” eost
ofthe flare included as a separate real property asset).^
In the first week ofhearing, Mr. Sansoucy very elearly claimed there was a site-wide pilot
gas piping system at Kensington that he was very familiar with, and he had studied it in the
engineering drawings. He did not describe it as a pilot light within a flare because it would have
been eompletely illogieal to deem a piping system into existence inside another piece ofequipment
that he had already claimed to be real property. After the first week, he admitted there was no such
site-wide piping system because he could not find it in the drawings.
^ John Zink was the vendor that sold the flares.
21

The point counsel works hard to distract the Board from is that Mr. Sansoucy should have
been very knowledgeable about any piping system he marked as real property on Appendix L 383.
Instead, he failed to ascertain that the pilot gas piping system does not exist. He claimed all 56 of
the piping systems at Appendix L 383 existed and that he had carefully reviewed drawings to study
them, especially the 15 he marked as real property. Yet he did not realize the pilot gas piping
system (and 28 others) did not exist at Kensington. Worse, he testified that it did exist, that it was
in the racks, that he counted it in the racks and that he had seen it in the drawings. Contrast that
with his about-face statement after his weekend of discovery: “we didn’t find any pilot gas as a
separate system built on-site. H.R.V0I.VI: 1156-1157.
There is no significance in counsel for Mr. Sansoucy finding a reference to a potential pilot
light in drawings for the gas flares. Ifthis was actually a fact that Mr. Sansoucy believed to be
important, he would have said so at hearing when did his about face on day six, or he would have
taken the stand at the sanctions hearing to talk about it. He did neither because the claim has no
substance. It is an after the fact excuse concocted by Mr. Sansoucy or his counsel that cannot be
reconciled with statements made in the Board’s record. Factual claims of counsel made outside the
Board’s record are immune to cross examination and impeachment. Mr. Sansoucy has already
shown himselfto have problems in the made-up facts department. It would be particularly
troublesome for the Board to rely on new factual claims made in briefthat are outside its record.
especially when those claims contradict Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony at hearing (“we didn’t find any
pilot gas as a separate system built on-site.”).
To the extent that Mr. Sansoucy attempts to offer other unsubstantiated claims outside the
Board’s record as excuses for his false testimony (e.g., blaming his employees for misleading him
etc.), that claimed evidence should have been adduced and admitted into the Board’s record. The
22

tactic chosen however, was to present no evidence at all. The fact that no evidence ofthese
submitted is all the Board needs to determine that they are not valid. They
extraneous excuses was
are nothing more than speculation offered in briefby Mr. Sansoucy’s counsel.
Newman v. Wilkins, BTA Case No. 170,171,172 (May 18,2007) does not
support Mr. Sansoucy.
Mr. Sansoucy draws upon the Board’s refusal to sanction him for alleged false testimony in
Newman v. Wilkins. He crows that the Board found him to be a credible witness. He stops there.
He declines to discuss that the Board fully rejected the opinions and evidence he offered. He
ignores that his own counsel expressly disclaimed Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony on appeal and did not
present his expert report to the Court."* Indeed, the appellate briefs were written by counsel for the
county auditor as though Mr. Sansoucy, his only witness in the case, had provided no report and no
testimony at all in an 11-day hearing.^ Aceordingly, Mr. Sansoucy argues that the Board found
him “credible” while failing to disclose that counsel for his client had to abandon on appeal all of
his own evidence to support his direct case because Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony was so problematic.
The county auditor in that case ultimately received a 100% loss for his investment. Undoubtedly,
counsel for the county auditor in that case was not as thrilled by the quality ofMr. Sansoucy’s
testimony as Mr. Sansoucy seems to be.
The Board no doubt has institutional memory ofNewman. The Board knows its own
hearing examiner spent hours questioning Mr. Sansoucy because he felt the testimony offered was
not honest. The Board understands that in Newman there were poliey reasons weighing against
sanction including: (1) the impact of such a decision on the still live tax merit case; (2) potential
C.
''httn://www.ohiochannel.org/video/canoll-e-newma!i-adams-county-auditor-v-william-w-wilkins-richard-a-leviti-tax-commissioner-of-ohio-et-
al-case-no-2007-1054 at 13:54 therein. (Justice Pfeiffer expressiy asking counsei for the Adams County Auditor at orai argument ifhe reiies
upon his own witness or his report at aii and the answer given was that he reiied entirety on cross examination ofthe taxpayers experts).
’ The Board can review the briefs fiied with the Court in the Newman case at the Supreme Court ofOhio’s website.
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gOv/Clerk/ecms/#/caseinfo/2007/1054.
23

embarrassment ofthe publie officials who hired him; (3) a party in that case objecting to the
sanction; and (4) giving the witness the benefit ofthe doubt in the first instance he was accused.
Here, those considerations do not exist. The tax merit case is resolved. The school district that
objection to sanctioning Mr. Sansoucy. He already
employed him has publicly indicated no
received extraordinary benefit ofthe doubt mNewman. Extension of grace by the Board in that
case was not a license to continue.
UEO believes it is justified in pointing to Newman simply
testimony Eom Mr. Sansoucy. Instead ofbeing concerned about the damage his testimony caused,
Mr. Sansoucy seems to view the “benefit ofthe doubt” he received mNewman as license to do
more ofthe same. The Board should not allow itselfto be converted into Mr. Sansoucy’s
accomplice ifit believes the record today establishes his intent to mislead. It should stand for such
misconduct.
more ofthe same” regarding
as
Accusations against Grant Hammer, witness for UEO are irrelevant to the
question ofwhether Mr. Sansoucy intentionally provided false testimony.
Another briefing strategy used by Mr. Sansoucy is to point out a few irrelevant errors made
by Grant Hammer (the witness for UEO that appeared at the Board’s sanctions hearing), and then
suggest that his mistakes could also be subject to accusations ofbeing intentionally misleading.
The intention is to show how easily groundless accusations can be made and then to suggest by
comparison that this is what is happening to Mr. Sansoucy. Once again, this comparison is faulty.
Mr. Hammer’s mistakes are not ofthe same nature and character ofthose by Mr. Sansoucy. The
number pales in comparison to the sheer volume ofmistakes made by Mr. Sansoucy. Even ifthey
were similar, that would provide no defense to Mr. Sansoucy. The question would remain, did
Mr. Sansoucy falsely testify to mislead the Board?
D.
24

None ofMr. Hammer’s errors tended to contradict (or render impossible) the factual claims
he made. That is a key difference between Mr. Hammer’s few errors and the many made by
Mr. Sansoucy. Mr. Sansoucy suggests in briefthat Mr. Hammer’s mistake in remembering how
many piping systems Mr. Sansoucy had declared to be real property was ofthe same nature and
character as Mr. Sansoucy’s own mistakes. Yet, that particular fact has no bearing on anything
was not necessary as support for any of
Mr. Hammer said. Knowledge ofthat single, isolated fact
Mr. Hammer’s statements offact. It is simply a statement seized upon by Mr. Sansoucy that bears
on nothing.
Mr. Sansoucy’s false testimony was repeatedly used to support
conclusions that were also false.
By contrast, let us consider Mr. Sansoucy’s failure to find even one ofthe 29 missing
piping systems and his voluminous false testimony regarding piping systems at Kensington.
Mr. Sansoucy testified that he marked and classified as real property 15 piping systems
Kensington. The corresponding proportion ofthose real property piping systems as a percentage
ofall piping systems (15/56) was directly utilized by him to classify as realty and assigntaxable
value to millions ofdollars’ worth ofpipe racks and helical piles. Indeed, that was the only
1.
at
property classification “analysis” he did for pipe racks and helical piles. Likewise, Mr. Sansoucy
did not classifyjust the helical piles underpinning pipe racks with that analysis. He utilized that
that basis. In other words, helical piles supporting
declared taxable real property by
fraction to classify all helical piles at the site
equipment that had nothing to do with piping systems
Mr. Sansoucy on the basis ofhis 15/56 piping systems fraction. This amounted to millions of
on
were
dollars in taxable value. Thus, the number ofpiping systems (both real and personal) at
offthe piping racks was elevated to critical importance by
Kensington and their position on or
25

Mr. Sansoucy within his own report. His false testimony on the subject carried similar critical
importance.
UEO described in its post hearing briefthat Mr. Sansoucy claimed among others to have:
(1) studied non-existent drawings ofnon-existent piping systems; (2) physically seen non-existent
piping systems at Kensington; (3) “counted” non-existent piping systems on the racks; (4) traced in
the drawings those assets he determined were personal property (even though many ofthose assets
necessarily were non-existent) to see ifthey intersected with real property; (5) made his real versus
personal property classification determinations based upon the drawings (even though many ofthe
non-existent); (6) spent hundreds ofhours
assets and drawings he claimed to have reviewed
studying the drawings on the classification question alone (never mind the time spent on the
quantity survey method valuation); (7) mastered the physical interrelationship ofall ofthe assets at
Kensington (apparently without realizing that many ofthe assets were non-existent and
“interrelated” with nothing); and (8) had dealt with all ofthe assets at Kensington many times
were
before so that everything he saw at Kensington was familiar to him (including giant non-existent
assets).
The nature ofMr. Sansoucy’s failure to identify as missing even a single piping system of
the 56 he testified existed at Kensington after all ofhis claimed study, sight confirmation, debate
with his employees, and the critical importance his own report placed upon the number and
different kind of“error” than
location (on or offthe racks) ofpiping systems, is a very
Mr. Hammer’s failure to have memorized Mr. Sansoucy’s report. Likewise, Mr. Sansoucy s
failure to determine that even three ofthe fifteen piping systems he claimed at Appendix L 383 and
in testimony were taxable real property (i.e., pilot gas, fire water and sanitary drain) also did not
exist cannot be rationally explained.
26

Mr. Sansoucy’s voluminous false testimony on piping systems supported his false 15/56
ratio which in turn he used to falsely classify and value millions of dollars’ worth ofhelical piles
and pipe racks as real property, i.e., he made up facts and work done to support the correctness of
that fraction. Mr. Hammer’s few mistakes are ofvery different nature and quality compared to
Mr. Sansoucy’s rampant false testimony regarding matters that were integral to his report and
conclusions. Counsel’s strained comparison falls apart when viewed in proper context.
Mr. Sansoucy’s own testimony shows that it was not possible for him to
have performed the work he said he did to support his report.
Another glaring difference between mistakes made by Mr. Hammer versus those of
Mr. Sansoucy are that Grant Hammer’s errors do not indicate (or even suggest) that it was
impossible for him to have done the work he claimed to have done. Mr. Sansoucy very clearly did
2.
not make any study ofthepiping systems at allprior to hearing or he would unfailingly have
known at least one ofthem did not exist After all. 29 ofthe 56piping systems do not existl Only
complete failure to study the piping systems at all can explain such a hopeless lack ofknowledge
even ofwhat exists. However, he claimed hundreds ofhours ofreview ofthe drawings with much
ifthey “intersected” with real
^study and debate,” and tracing ofpersonal property systems to see
property systems.
It would be impossible to do the study of engineering drawings that he said he did and not
find a single missing piping system. He conclusively demonstrated that fact himself When he did
finally review his own Appendix L between the 5* and 6^'' days ofthe hearing, he quickly
missing. The actual real number missing
concluded that approximately 30 piping systems
was 29. However, he easily and quickly got very close to the correct number with a cursory search
were
weekend doing nothing more than reviewing drawings in his own Appendix L. Contrast
that with his complete and total failure to find any missing piping systems during his claimed
over a
27

hundreds ofhours ofreview ofdrawings in preparation ofhis report and in preparation for trial.
So committed was he to supporting his 15/56 fraction that even claimed to have “counted” piping
systems on the racks and that he had seen non-existent piping systems.
What should be very clear is that ifone actually looked for any single one ofthe missing
piping systems in the drawings to classify it as real or personal property, one would quickly
ascertain there is no such drawing and no such system. Once one determined that even one piping
system was missing, one would understand that the list ofpotential piping systems appearing at the
Appendix L 383 legend was not an inventory ofpiping at the plant. Then, one would inexorably
determine that there were only 27 piping systems at the plant, not 56.
Mr. Sansoucy did not discover that his own real property piping system candidates such as
the sanitary drain system, did not exist. Underground systems such as sanitary drain or firewater
very likely candidates to be real property. Mr. Sansoucy certainly marked and classified them
real property at his Appendix L 383. He claimed he definitely reviewed the drawings for all of
the piping systems he marked as real property at Appendix L 383. He claimed he “tested” those
systems. Ifthis was true, how then could Mr. Sansoucy fail to determine the sanitary drain piping
system did not exist? Worse, Mr. Sansoucy made up specific and detailed testimony about the
sanitary drain piping system and how it drained into the waste drain tank, an actual existing asset
he classified and costed as real property that has nothing to do with sewage treatment. See UEO
Post Hearing Brief at 48 et seq. This was made-up testimony to try to support his claimed
opinions. There is no other rational explanation for it.
Mr. Sansoucy’s late-breaking excuse for his false testimony (that he only analyzed the
real property in separating real property from personal property) is specious.
Mr. Sansoucy first must have analyzed all property to know which property to later
separate and why, unless he did not perform the work he claims.
The argument that Mr. Sansoucy did not perform a costing of non-existent
assets and therefore his false testimony on those assets is not material ignores
are
as
VI.
A.
28

that the principal subject ofthe case was property classification, not real
property valuation.
During the first week oftrial, Mr. Sansoucy offered volumes offalse testimony about non
existent piping systems and non-existent assets producing non-existent products. He falsely
claimed to have seen some assets that do not exist, to have studied non-existent engineering
drawings, to have reviewed non-existent cost records of some ofthese assets, and even to have
counted non-existent piping systems on the racks. He argues in briefthat all ofthis testimony is
not important because he did not perform a costing ofnon-existent property.
Mr. Sansoucy attempts to categorize this case
dispute focusing on real property listed on the property record card. He acts confused that UEO
about his lack ofknowledge regarding the benefit and existence (or non-existence) of
personal property that had nothing to do with his valuation ofreal property, although he claimed to
have classified all ofit. This is specious.
The principal issue in this case and in Mr. Sansoucy’s report was property classification.
With regard to the question ofwork done in performing that classification, the analysis ofpersonal
property is equally relevant to the analysis ofreal property. After all, “separation” ofproperty real
from personal necessarily involves analysis of all ofit, notjust the real property. In other words,
until the work is performed to separate and classify it. Ifhe lied about the
a plain vanilla real property tax valuation
as
cares
it’s alljust “property
work he claimed to have done classifying personal property, why should he be believed on the
claims with regard to classification ofthe real property? Thus, Mr. Sansoucy’s claims that in
the end he did not “value” non-existent assets flatly ignores his testimonial claims that he classified
same
everything at Kensington.
Similarly, this sidestep attempts to misdirect the Board away &om the fact that he applied
numerous non-existent piping systems in his 15/56 fraction for purposes ofclassifying and valuing
29

millions ofdollars ofhelical piles and pipe racks (i.e., the non-existent piping systems did find
their way into taxable real property valuation in his report). So much for the claim that his non
existent property errors had no effect on classification and valuation ofreal property in his report.
Apparently, these millions are not “convenienf’ to his excuse and, thus, are not material.
UEO does not question here Mr. Sansoucy’s failure to properly describe function of
personal property assets (although many ofhis descriptions are outlandish as a matter ofscience).
It does take issue with far more basic and macroscopic failures such as his failure to know what
exists at the site, his failure to know what products are made at the site, and worst of all,
voluminous testimony that was clearly made up about non-existent assets making non-existent
products to be carried in non-existent piping systems. All ofthese failures strongly indicate that
he did not separate and classify property at Kensington through hundreds ofhours of study and
analysis; it establishes that he failed to perform the work he claimed on classification.
In the words ofthe Court in Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283 (1822), Mr. Sansoucy made
error after error regarding “a fact in respect to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake.” If
he did the huge amount ofstudy and analysis ofthe drawings that he claimed, he would not falsely
testify on fiindamental matters so uniformly and so repeatedly. It should be self-evident that the
root ofthe problem with Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony is that he did not possibly do the work he
claimed to have done.
There are many instances ofimpossibility in his testimony as detailed in UEO’s post
hearing brief UEO explained how the record shows Mr. Sansoucy’s gross failure to find any of
the non-existent piping systems during his real versus personal classification during his preparation
ofhis report and during his preparation for trial. He claimed to perform much work to bolster the
reliability ofhis expert opinion that we now know is false. When caught, his immediate response
30

was not to admit mistake. He doubled-down by providing an irrational and flawed excuse. He
claim that he studied and reviewed only the
changed his testimony from the first five days to now
systems he classified as real.
Iftaken as true, Mr. Sansoucy’s day six excuse for his prior false testimony
(that he only studied drawings for real property and not those for personal
property), indicates he perjured himselfwith prior claims ofwork done m
classifying personal property.
Ironically, the testimony Mr. Sansoucy offered as
knowledge about the assets at Kensington, i.e., his day sixjustification for previous false testimony
existent assets, non-existent drawings, non-existent cost records, and non-existent
admission that he previously perjured himself Mr. Sansoucy necessarily
ofthe hearing ofthe precise tasks and study he actually had done. If
B.
an “excuse” for his gross lack of
describing non
products, is false or an
was fully aware at all stages
in fact he classified personal property based upon its name alone with no study at all ofthe actual
determining ifthe property existed, then why did he
property at Kensington and without
make statements like the one below/ordays before he was caught:
A. Iwent through the drawings andwe did the site tour, we saw them. Went
through the drawings. We researched as much ofthepublic record as we ^
could. So for example, this particular Figure 12 comes out ofthe company s
records and they are public records, and it outlines, for example, the primary
components ofthe site to help me identify what all ofthese various components
were. And in identify those I then immediately made a decision -1 say
“immediately” - / made a decision ifthey were, without a doubt to me,
personalproperty, and moved them aside. Then Iwent to the drawings to look
at the flow charts in those drawings, theprocessflow diagrams, to see if
number one, any ofthose might have intersected their operation with the real
property, per se, or did1 infact make reasonable decisions on moving them out
ofthe realproperty category and intro thepersonalproperty in thefirst
instance by virtue of w
hat they are. So Iwent back through, looked at the
processflow diagrams, and especially on, you know, beginning theprocess oj
identifying what's out and what’s in the gray.
H R Vol. 4: 714-715. Ifwe take Mr. Sansoucy’s day six testimony change as true that he did not
analyze the personal property (to see ifit was personal property), did he repeatedly “misremember
even
31

in his previous detailed testimony that he did not actually go through the drawings to see ifthe
personal property systems intersected with real property systems, or that his classification analysis
was based upon review of drawings? Did he have a false memory ofdoing hundreds ofhours of
analysis and study ofdrawings that did not actually occur?
There is no suggestion in his statements (like the foregoing) made in the first five days of
the hearing that he was making classification conclusions based upon the name alone of an asset
without studying the site drawings and without determining whether it even existed at the site
(which is his current position). To the contrary, he claimed he made such determinations from the
drawings and repeatedly stressed the time volume and depth ofthat work. He never claimed, from
his deposition all the way to day six ofthe hearing, that he had performed site-wide classification
analysis without determining ifthe assets existed at the site. Such an admission probably would
have been fatal to his admissibility, much less his credibility.
For example, how did he construct a fraction (15/56) ofpiping systems at the site to apply
to other property for the purpose ofdetermining the taxable classification and value ofthat other
property when he now admits he did not have any idea whether the systems (in both the numerator
and denominator ofthe fraction) even existed? Not surprisingly, Mr. Sansoucy did not testily
when he presented his fraction “I don’t know for sure what is in the fraction because I did not
actually confirm what assets are at the site through my study.” No, Mr. Sansoucy made up quite a
bit oftestimony to support the correctness ofhis fraction, e.g., he “counted them on the racks”; he
saw them with his own eyes. He never indicated he classified both personal and real property
assets without knowing ifthe assets existed. Incredibly, Mr. Sansoucy’s current excuse for
previous false testimony, is an admission that the previous testimony was offered to mislead.
32

Whether or not Mr. Sansoucy could remember what existed at the site, he surely must have
known at all times what work he actually did. He very clearly indicated at H.R. Vol. 4: 714-715
that he confirmed his personal property determinations by reviewing those assets m the Kensington
engineering drawings. Ifhe knew that never happened, then the statement he made at H.R. Vol.
714-715 regarding his review of drawings for classification ofpersonal property was false, and he
false when he made the statement. It is not an error subject to mistake because it is
based on personal experience in tasks performed (or not performed).
As detailed inUEO’s post-hearing brief, this was not a one-off occurrence.
knew it was
Mr. Sansouey’s statements regarding the work he did throughout the first five days was consistent
with this example from H.R. Vol 714-715. He repeatedly claimed he studied the drawings to
classifieations. Recall his claims that the drawings were essential
perform all ofhis property
because they show you the “intent ofthe owner,” how he and his colleagues “studied and we
debated, studied the drawings again, and then made a decision” etc. See UEO’s Post-Hearing Brief
to how he determined ifproperty was real or
at 26 to 34 (describing Mr. Sansoucy’s claims
personal from review ofthe drawings). Ifhe now admits this analysis and study ofthe drawings
for personal property did not occur, then he admits he lied repeatedly about his own work and his
own experiences during the first five days ofhearing. UEO again invites the Board to read the
as
hearing transcript and decide for itself
failed to determine that any piping systems on the Appendix L 383 list were
Mr. Sansouey
missing. The only way that could occur is ifhe did not do any review ofthose systems in the
could fail to discover that obvious real property
drawings. Likewise, the only way an engineer
piping systems such as sanitary drain and firewater systems did not exist (and then falsely claim
33

that they do exist) was ifin addition to not reviewing the piping systems he thought were
personalty, he did not review the drawings for the real property piping systems either.
There is no rational reading ofthe transeript that leads to any eonclusion other than that
Mr. Sansouey lied about the work he said he performed. It strongly appears that he did no work at
all elassifying piping systems, and lied when he said he did. He then tried to cover up that false
testimony about his work by making up more testimony about non-existent systems. He made up
testimony ofhaving physically seen non-existent assets at the site, having reviewed them in
drawings, having seen cost records for them and even made up testimony as to how a non-existent
asset (sanitary drain system) functioned in harmony with an existing asset (waste drain tank) such
that both were properly classified as real property. All ofthis detailed testimony in support ofhis
conclusions in his report was completely made up.
Mr. Sansoucy’s “excuse” also does not provide rational explanation for how he
failed to know the functional benefit of property he classified and costed as
real property.
Mr. Sansoucy’s current excuse for being ignorant about the site and providing false
testimony regarding the existence ofpersonal property assets and systems fails to address his false
testimony about his claimed real property assets. Those failures extended to real property assets he
costed and valued such as the waste drain tank (falsely claimed it accepted sewage from the non
existent sanitary drain system), NGL tanks (erroneously referred to them as “butane bullets” when
there is no butane at the site), and the propane tank (falsely testified that it held propane as a non
existent product ofthe site).
At Appendix L 383, Mr. Sansouey marked as realproperty three different non-existent
piping systems. He failed to ascertain their non-existence and testified that all ofthem existed. He
testified that he had seen them in the drawings and/or actually physically seen them in person. If
he actually had reviewed the real property systems as claimed, he would have realized those three
C.
34

piping systems do not exist. Mr. Sansoucy was completely maware they did not exist. He
compounded the seriousness ofthis error hy offering false testimony about those non-existent
systems as set forth in UEO’s brief See UEO Post Hearing Briefat 43-48. Again, he simply made
up that testimony. It now appears that his excuse for having provided the false testimony was also
made up. The excuse does not offer any hint ofexplanation for (1) his failures to ascertain the
existence ofreal or potentially real property and (2) his add-on false testimony regarding function
and sight confirmation on that non-existent property he marked as realty at Appendix L 383.
Mr. Sansoucy’s “I only studied the real property” excuse for his false
testimony is irrational and not believable. An experienced expert witness does
not try to analyze and classify theoretical assets that do not exist.
UEO has addressed Mr. Sansoucy’s day six excuse ofconvenience as ifit was true (in
which case it is simply an admission that he repeatedly perjured himself on days one through five
regarding the work he said he did). However, the excuse itselfis not rational and not believable.
Consider the import ofMr. Sansoucy’s current claim that he can (and did) do real versus
D.
personal property classification analysis without determining whether the property exists
Kensington. This invites the Board to believe that his approach to conducting the real
personal property analysis at Kensington was to perform an irrational and theoretical real versus
personal property analysis ofthe universe of all possible natural gas processing equipment
everywhere. It seems self-evident that the rational approach would be to ascertain what assets
actually existed at Kensington first and then analyzing the affixation, function and benefit ofthose
non-existent
at
versus
actually existing assets. Why would his client pay for him to determine whether
assets were real or personal property? Why would he undertake that analysis at all? That story is
not rational.
Thus, we are invited to believe that he analyzed and elassified even unusual non-existent
a theoretical basis without determining if
gas processing assets such as nitrogen rejection units on
35

they existed at Kensington. In other words, “ifit existed,” at Kensington it would be personal
property. And yet, Mr. Sansoucy never explained any ofthis unusual theoretical classification
analysis through day five ofthe hearing. When he knew he was caught on day six, his story
conveniently shifted and his claims ofwork changed too.
When Mr. Sansoucy described his personal property classification ofthe nitrogen rejection
unit, he did not explain his analysis as having been done on a theoretical asset that may or may not
exist at Kensington. His explanation ofhow he approached the analysis ofthat asset was far more
rational (although admittedly false). His claimed analysis was ofan actual asset that he had seen at
the site and for which he had reviewed actual vendor drawings and actual cost records. His
testimony was that he studied a real asset at Kensington using real documents and records. He did
not disclose or explain that he was unsure whether the asset existed. Instead, he provided concrete
testimony and reasons why he knew that it absolutely existed. The vendor drawings existed. The
cost records existed. How do we justify this false testimony (and similar testimony for other
existent assets) with his day six claims that he only analyzed theoretical assets? Ifthe analysis
done on theoretical assets that may or may not exist, why did he not say that instead ofrepeatedly
describing a more rational (but false) approach of analyzing actual assets via review ofactual
documents and sight inspection?
The answer is that at the inception ofthe hearing and through day five he was trying to
appear to have done a credible report. His false testimony was intended to support that report and
his own credibility. At day six he realized he was eaught, his credibility was irreparably damaged
and his report was suffering the same fate. At that point his priorities changed ftom falsely
supporting his conclusions to making up testimony to avoid serious trouble for himself At that
point, Mr. Sansoucy ginned up the new claim that he had classified large amounts ofpersonal
non-
was
36

property sight unseen as a his poor excuse for previous false testimony. But, his “excuse” does
not explain or excuse the volumes oftestimony offered regarding having seen, counted and studied
non-existent assets. It was the best he could come up with over a weekend to explain the
unexplainable and defend the indefensible.
How does one reconcile the Appendix F quantity survey method costing and voluminous
compilation of company drawings appearing in his report with his gross lack ofknowledge even as
to what exists at Kensington? It is fairly clear that someone other than Mr. Sansoucy prepared
most ofthe report. Most likely it was his son Austin (the plumber) who did most ofthe technical
work on the report. Mr. Sansoucy admitted that Austin did the quantity survey method costing
firom Kensington drawings. It appears now that Mr. Sansoucy did nothing more than skim the
report and try to present it as his own. It is evident that he had little to do with its preparation or he
would not have been so grossly ignorant ofwhat it contained and the conclusions reached. That is
the most reasonable explanation for his gross ignorance. His made up testimony was his effort to
cover up this problem.
There are two competing classifications of real property piping systems in the
Sansoucy report. Mr. Sansoucy applied both to add millions of dollars oftaxable real
property cost to his conclusion ofvalue. Mr. Sansoucy’s attempt to claim in brief that
there is only one is false.
At page 32 ofhis brief, Mr. Sansoucy attempts to create a different record than the one
before the Board. He argues that UEO is misleading the Board by asserting that he studied in the
drawings and had even seen non-existent real property piping systems as part ofhis Appendix L
383 where he marked and treated those systems as real property. The record however, is clear.
Appendix L 383 ofMr. Sansoucy’s report contained the marked list of 15 “real property”
piping systems that Mr. Sansoucy repeatedly testified both at hearing and deposition existed and
real property. Likewise, he utilized those Appendix L 383 piping systems to build his 15/56
VII.
were
37

fi-action which he used both to proportionally classify and value helical piles and piping racks as
real property. Pipe racks and helical piles assets appear in his Appendix F and comprise several
million dollars ofhis real property cost. See Sansoucy Report Appendix F Bates #7-10. Thus,
those Appendix L 383 real property piping systems were applied in his report and had millions of
dollars ofimpact.
There also is a different set ofpiping systems directly costed in his Appendix F Table F-6
as real property piping systems. The two lists are different. Appendix L 383 contains non
existent piping systems. It is as ifthe person who did the Appendix F classification ofreal
property piping systems and the person who did the Appendix L 383 list ofreal property piping
systems for purpose of classifying helical piles and pipe racks were different people who reached
different conelusions on which piping systems were real property. However, both competing lists
appear in the same report, and both have millions ofdollars ofimpact in their respective
applications.
Given his ignorance (until day six) that those lists were different, and given that he
enthusiastieally testified as to having reviewed and classified all ofthe systems in both lists (even
the non-existent ones) while also demonstrating his complete ignorance ofthe content ofhis own
report, one can infer that Mr. Sansoucy did not do the work on either list and did not review and
confirm the work before finalizing the report and testifying at trial. Someone else at his firm
prepared the lists before he showed up to present the report.
There is no rational explanation for how Mr. Sansoucy himself could have prepared two
different competing lists ofreal property piping systems, and applied both in the same appraisal
without realizing he did. Even more strange, he testified with certainty for both lists including
offering his made-up testimony about seeing, counting and analyzing non-existent systems in the
38

drawings. Such errors indicate that someone else did the work of classifying the piping systems
and preparing the lists.
The record stands clear. Mr. Sansouey testified that all fifteen ofthe marked piping
systems on Appendix L 383 both existed and were analyzed and elassified as real property. He
stated this over and over again. He testified repeatedly for days that all 56 ofthe piping systems
listed at App. L 383 existed. He offered false testimony in support such as having “counted them
on the racks” or studied them in drawings. Likewise, the Appendix L 383 list and fi-action he
created had millions ofdollars ofimpact in the report. The 15/56 fraetion ftom Appendix L 383
and all ofthe false testimony to support it eannot be ignored as ifit never oecurred.
UEO recognizes that Mr. Sansouey finally determined what existed at Kensington after day
five ofthe hearing. On day six ofthe trial, he conveniently tried to elaim that Appendix F was the
“real” list ofreal property piping systems he analyzed for classification purposes. The problem is
that he already had demonstrated utter ignorance as to what piping systems existed at Kensington,
and presented false testimony on the topic by testifying that there were 56 instead of27 (once
again from Appendix L 383). He had not found even a single missing piping system until day six
ofthe hearing. At that point, Mr. Sansouey was clever enough to realize that Appendix F systems
must exist because they were costed by Austin using quantity survey method ftom drawings, and
thus his logical retreat needed to land him there. Still, he cannot possibly have actually done the
classification work to create either ofthe lists in his report. Ifhe had, he would not have thought
both lists were the same list, and would not have repeatedly testified falsely about 29 non-existent
piping systems and various supporting drawings. Ifhe performed the elassifieation work for either
list he would not have been so ignorant regarding assets that existed and those that did not.
Mr. Sansoucy’s explanation for his claim that he used the term “affixed” under a
personal, subjective legal definition meaning “heavy” instead of a factual engineering
VIII.
39

definition of that word is more after-the-fact excuse making that fails to provide an
actual excuse.
In his pretrial statement, Mr. Sansoucy claimed that piping systems were the only
problematic part ofhis testimony, that piping systems were but a few million dollars ofvalue, and
that he was being unfairly attacked for false testimony regarding a minor part ofhis testimony.^
He declared that his testimony on electrical systems, which was tens ofmillions ofdollars, was
unassailable as evidenced by UEO’s failure to question it. To address that point, UEO pointed out
in its post hearing briefthat Mr. Sansoucy had falsely claimed that the transformers were “affixed”
to the real property without providing any supporting evidence. This one fatal flaw would render
every single one ofthem personal property. American National Can Co. v. Tracy, 72 Ohio St.3d
150,153 (1995)(addressing transformers and so holding). Mr. Hammer testified that none ofthe
transformers were attached to the real property. He explained that they simply sat on concrete pads
with nothing attaching them to those pads. This is the common installation ofthis type ofasset.
Mr. Sansoucy now argues in briefthat when he testified that the transformers were
“affixed” he was not using that term as an engineer addressing an objective fact, (i.e., was it bolted
to the slab or otherwise physically attached as an engineering matter, and if so, how?). Instead, he
was speaking as an advocate reaching a legal conclusion using a narrow vein oflegal authority to
support the proposition that the word “affixed” to real estate can mean “very heavy” and by force
of gravity. Ofcourse, he never indicated in his report that he was employing a purported legal
meaning ofthe word “affixed” that he had not defined. He did not explain at hearing how heavy
something had to be before its weight was legally significant for purposes ofdetermining
“affixation” under Ohio law. Most significantly, he did not offer any ofthe actual weights ofthe
‘ The argument that several million dollars ofpiping systems value was a minor tax issue raises the eyebrows as a praetical matter. Presumably if
Mr. Sansoucy was paying the annual tax bill he would have a different opinion. Likewise, ifone considers helical piles and piping racks that
classified and valued by correspondence to those piping systems, the multiple million dollar error is much greater than portrayed by
were
Mr. Sansoucy.
40

items he believed were so heavy that they had become “affixed.” Apparently, not only were the
large substation transformers at Kensington “very heavy,” but even the small transformers at the
site were so heavy that they were all “affixed.
Ironically, the Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled on the classification ofvery large
industrial electrical transformers that were so heavy they had to be moved with a crane. In that
the transformers were classified as personal property because they were neither “bolted nor
case
otherwise affixedto the concrete slab” on which they were placed. American National Can Co. v.
Tracy, supra. Thus, the great weight oftransformers standing alone cannot qualify as “affixation”
under Ohio tax law. Mr. Sansoucy’s claimed substitution of a personal and undisclosed definition
for the term “affixed” is strained at best. It is not a definition one would expect for an engineer to
in an appraisal. But on top ofthat, he was using an undisclosed substituted legal definition that
has been expressly rejected in Ohio for decades for even the largest oftransformers.
Assuming for a moment that in Mr. Sansoucy’s mind anything he subjectively thought was
heavy could be termed “affixed” to the real estate as a legal matter, and assuming that it was not
misleading for him to fail to disclose his private subjective determination of asset weight governed
his use ofthat term in his report, why would he think the transformers in this case were so terribly
heavy? They are not that large in comparison to other assets that can be attached to real estate. See
Appellant’s Exhibit 3, photo 38 (a picture ofone ofthe four largest transformers onsite). This is
not a giant tank constructed in place that can never be moved.
He asks us to believe further that he thought even much smaller transformers sitting on
concrete pads inside of cabinets were so “very heavy” they also were “affixed.” See Appellant’s
Exhibit 3, Photo# 49 and H.R. Vol. 2:410 lines 16-18 (describing photo #49 stating, “there are
three green transformers in the front”); See also Appellant’s Ex. 3, Photo #16 and Vol. 2: 454-455
use
41

(describing a PDC building with the “three transformers in front”). As the Board will see in photos
#49 and #16, the smaller transformers described are sheltered inside cabinets about the size oftwo
refrigerators back to back. That is hardly a giant asset of enormous weight. Ifthat is real property
by virtue ofits great weight, then wooden pallets ofmerchandise sitting in a warehouse on a
concrete floor also are real property.
The Board can make its own decision as to whether Mr. Sansoucy intended to mislead
when he claimed the transformers at Kensington all were “affixed” when he really meant that he
subjectively thought they were heavy and that means the same thing. Regardless, the claim that
UEO’s initial failure to address electrical transformers in its Motion means that it must have
accepted his classification is demonstrably false. None ofthat tens ofmillions ofdollars of
electrical property is possibly real property. American National Can, supra.
UEO has not tried to extend its motion to all ofMr. Sansoucy’s errors. It confined its
motion to the most egregious ofMr. Sansoucy’ misconduct that appeared to be either intentionally
false, or at best consciously disregarding the truth. The request before the Board only relates to
deliberately misleading conduct. There were plenty ofbizarre things in Mr. Sansoucy’s report that
at best would be defined as horrible appraisal practice (e.g., including costs for clearing acres of
non-existent trees from bare farmland, costing 700% too much grass seed, costing more expensive
concrete culvert instead ofplastic contrary to the drawings, quantifying thousands oftons ofsoil to
be moved for costing purposes taken from documents that indicate in bold letters not to use the
documents for that purpose, assigning nearly $200,000 in cost to a single flight of outdoor steel
steps and then multiplying that errors by six, etc.). Those other errors also involved many millions
ofdollars ofcost. However, those errors are more properly termed gross negligence.
Counsel’s claim that Mr. Sansoucy can read piping drawings contradiets
Mr. Sansoucy’s own admissions in the record.
IX.
42

Counsel states in briefthat it is “preposterous” for anyone to state that Mr. Sansouey cannot
read piping drawings. However, it was Mr. Sansouey who made very clear at the trial that he
could not discern the type ofpiping specified in the drawings, its quality or any ofthe
characteristics that would be required to determine cost. Those failings were fully addressed in
UEO’s post hearing brief Likewise, the Board’s record reflects that Mr. Sansouey did not know
where to look in the drawings to determine those specifications about the piping he claimed to be
valuing via the quantity survey method. That issue also was addressed in UEO’s brief
At the sanctions hearing, UEO established that the nomenclature used in the piping
drawings to provide those specifications was American National Standard. That nomenclature has
been standardized nationwide for nearly a century. Any experienced quantity survey method cost
estimator ofpiping systems, or someone who had prepared bids to construct piping systems would
certainly recognize that nomenclature (and yet Mr. Sansouey did not recognize it).
Counsel’s claim that it is preposterous to accuse him ofnot being able to read a piping
drawing is puzzling. The record could not be much clearer. He was unable to read any piping
specifications at all. Thus, UEO addresses counsel’s denial simply by pointing to UEO’s own post
hearing briefand references to the record therein.
It seems apparent that Mr. Sansoucy’s defense ofhis inability to read piping specifications
again is meant to distract. He accuses Mr. Hammer ofbeing similarly flawed. He points out that
Mr. Hammer had not memorized all symbols in the piping drawings. Of course, Mr. Hammer
indicated at the Board’s sanction hearing that ifhe needed to know something in the drawings, he
would simply look in the legend. However, Mr. Hammer had no need to have memorized the few
symbols (not American National Standard pipe specs) that he was asked about. There also was no
evidence that the symbolized property he was asked about even existed at Kensington.
43

Therein lies the glaring differenee between Mr. Sansouey and Mr. Hammer. Mr. Sansoucy
elaimed to have performed a quantity survey method to eost piping systems at Kensington, indeed,
millions of dollars’ worth ofsueh piping. His report elaimed that he eonsidered both “quality and
quantity” ofthe items eosted. His report elaimed he eosted “pieees and parts.” Mr. Sansoucy did
need to know how to ascertain the quality and type ofpiping he was costing to be able to assign a
proper unit cost. He could not do the work he claimed to have done without being able to read
piping specifications.
Yet, Mr. Sansoucy did not disclose at deposition that he could not read piping
specifications. He covered up that failing at his deposition (i.e., “it’s all medium pressure”) and
pretended tarred and wrapped natural gas distribution piping was functionally appropriate for the
entire Kensington plant.
The truth was that he could not have any idea how far offhis costing ofpiping was because
he had no idea what kind ofpiping he was addressing. When caught, he offered the irrational
claim that the type ofpiping to be costed was “not germane” to determining its cost under the
quantity survey method. This statement is absurd on its face and contradicts how his own report
described his use ofthe quantity survey method.
All ofthis testimony to conceal his lack ofpiping competence was simply misleading. It
should have been disclosed from the inception. Likewise, it should have been disclosed that he
ignored the type and quality ofpiping when he costed it. His inability to determine what kind of
piping he was dealing with should have been disclosed. Ifhe could not read American National
Standard piping specifications, he could not possibly meet USPAP competency requirements to
perform a quantity survey method of costing piping systems. This is not a close call. As set forth
44

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