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Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK ™
The Common Language
SANSFIRE 18 June 2019
2
Your Host for Today
Erik Van Buggenhout
SANS Certified Instructor
Co-Founder NVISO
@ErikVaBu
At SANS:
2009 -> 2012: Local Mentor (SEC560)
2012 -> 2016: Community Instructor (SEC560)
2016 -> Now: Certified Instructor & Author (SEC599)
Other:
2008 -> 2012: Penetration Testing & Big 4
2012 -> Now: NVISO (Adversary Emulation)
1. What is MITRE ATT&CK
Introduction
3
The Agenda for Today
WHAT WE’D LIKE TO DISCUSS
2. ATT&CK use cases
How can MITRE ATT&CK be used?
3. ATT&CK initiatives
Some interesting references
5. Q&A
Ask us your questions!
4. Demo - CALDERA
Demonstration of a tool
What is MITRE ATT&CK
Introduction
Kill Chain vs ATT&CK
Where does ATT&CK come from?
The Cyber Kill Chain provides a 30.000ft view of an attack
“Action on Objectives” covers a lot of stuff…
Good for a general overview, but how do you make this actionable? 5
MITRE ATT&CK?
What is MITRE ATT&CK
MITRE has
developed the
ATT&CK Matrix
as a central
repository for
adversary TTP’s.
It is used by red
teams and blue
teams alike. It is
rapidly gaining
traction as a de
facto standard!
6
7
MITRE ATT&CK?
Tactics vs Techniques
TACTICS
TECHNIQUES
MITRE ATT&CK?
Zooming in on a technique
As an example, let’s have a
look at one of Turla’s favorite
techniques: COM object
hijacking. In MITRE’s ATT&CK
framework, this technique is
known as T1122, and it’s part
of the “Defense Evasion” and
“Persistence” tactics for
Windows.
For every one of these
techniques, MITRE includes a
dedicated entry with amongst
others:
• Technique information
• Known adversaries that use
it
• Detection opportunities
• Prevention opportunities
8
ATT&CK Navigator
Operationalizing ATT&CK
9
ATT&CK Evaluations
Using ATT&CK as a framework to evaluate products
10
ATT&CK Use Cases
How can MITRE ATT&CK be used?
Key use cases for ATT&CK
ATT&CK as a common language!
Adversary emulation
Detection capability
Threat IntelligencePrioritize defenses
12
ATT&CK for adversary emulation
13
https://attack.mitre.org/resources/adversary-emulation-plans/
When developing scenarios
for red teaming / adversary
emulation, red teams should
use ATT&CK tactics and
techniques to describe how
the engagement will be
delivered.
This will tremendously
increase the value of the
engagement, as it helps
defenders map issues on a
structured framework
afterwards!
ATT&CK for threat intelligence
ATT&CK techniques can be
used to describe adversary
activities in an understandable,
structured, fashion.
The screenshot on the left
provides is an example of an
adversary report on APT-15
(by NCC Group), which is
annotated by Katie Nickels
(MITRE) and Brian Beyer (Red
Canary). It was presented at
SANS CTI Summit in January
2019!
Source: https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-archive-1548090281.pdf
14
ATT&CK for defense prioritization
15
https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/security-controls/mapping-the-attck-
framework-to-cis-controls/
https://github.com/TravisFSmith/mitre_attack
“What techniques can you block in your organisation?”
• What ATT&CK techniques are covered
by hardening guidelines (e.g. group
policies or Ansible playbooks)?
• Travis Smith mapped the ATT&CK
framework techniques to CIS
Controls, which provides an
interesting insight!
ATT&CK for detection coverage
16
https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/07/how-hot-is-your-hunt-team.html
https://github.com/olafhartong/ThreatHunting
“What techniques can you detect in your organisation?”
• What techniques are
covered by use cases in
security monitoring?
• Do you collect the right
log sources?
• What techniques can
you cover using threat
hunting efforts?
Key use cases for ATT&CK
ATT&CK as a common language!
Adversary emulation Detection capability
Define red team
scenarios using ATT&CK
Link vulnerabilities &
findings to ATT&CK
Assess detection
coverage using ATT&CK
Define hypotheses for
threat hunting using
ATT&CK
Threat Intelligence
Categorize / tag
indicators & techniques
with ATT&CK
Prioritize defenses
What ATT&CK techniques
are you blocking?
17
Common pitfalls
How to not use ATT&CK
Good read: https://www.redcanary.com/blog/avoiding-common-attack-pitfalls/
Pitfall 1
Consider all techniques equal
Pitfall 2
Try to do everything at once
Pitfall 3
Misunderstand your coverage rating (it’s usually not binary)
18
All techniques are equal…
But some techniques are more equal than others
In January 2019, MITRE (Katie Nickels) & Red Canary (Brian Beyer) combined
efforts and presented a joint view on ATT&CK at the SANS CTI Summit:
19
400 threat intel
reports over a
span of 5 years
200 IR
engagements + 5
years of SOC
monitoring
Source: https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-archive-1548090281.pdf
All techniques are equal…
But some techniques are more equal than others
20
Source: https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-archive-1548090281.pdf
All techniques are equal…
But some techniques are more equal than others
21
Crowdstrike released the “Global
Threat Report” in February 2019
and added a “heat map” of
MITRE ATT&CK, which can again
be used to prioritize your efforts
and attention!
The results are in line with the
MITRE & Red Canary data
previously seen!
https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2019-
crowdstrike-global-threat-report/
All techniques are equal…
But some techniques are more equal than others
22
Next to the “technique
popularity contest”, there is
also the question of what
techniques are most important
TO YOUR ORGANZIATION:
1. Know what threat actors
are relevant to you
2. Know what techniques
these threat actors are
known to use
3. Prioritize accordingly!
ATT&CK initiatives
Here’s some concrete ideas!
24
ATT&CK Initiatives - Detection
Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK
Olaf Hartong Sysmon
Olaf Hartong has been doing some amazing
work mapping Sysmon configurations to the
MITRE ATT&CK framework. He strongly
leverages the “tagging” feature that was
added in Sysmon 8. Olaf based himself on
work that was already performed by
SwiftOnSecurity, as he uses that
file as a starting point! He also wrote a blog
post series called “Endpoint detection
Superpowers on the cheap”!
Malware archaeology
The folks over at Malware Archaeology made a
mapping of Windows event IDs to the MITRE ATT&CK
framework. It includes a coding scheme for most
relevant event identifiers as well!
It’s updated regularly and can be found at
https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets.
25
ATT&CK Initiatives - Detection
Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK
https://github.com/rabobank-cdc/DeTTACT
DeTT&CT aims to assist blue
teams using ATT&CK to score and
compare data log source quality,
visibility coverage, detection
coverage and threat actor
behaviours. All of which can help,
in different ways, to get more
resilient against attacks targeting
your organization. The DeTT&CT
framework consists of a Python
tool, YAML administration files and
scoring tables for the different
aspects.
26
ATT&CK Initiatives - Detection
Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK
https://github.com/teoseller/osquery-attck
osquery (by Facebook) allows you to
easily ask questions about your Linux,
Windows, and macOS infrastructure.
A GitHub repository was created by
“teoseller” that maps queries to the
MITRE ATT&CK framework!
ATT&CK Initiatives - Detection
Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK
27
SIGMA
Sigma is a project by Florian Roth
which tries to provide a generic,
vendor-neutral, rule format that can
used to describe suspicious or
malicious behavior. Most SIGMA rules
are also mapped to MITRE’s ATT&CK
framework.
ATT&CK Initiatives - Detection
Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK
28
TaHiTi Threat Hunting Methodology
Targeted Hunting integrating Threat Intelligence
(TaHiTI) methodology was built by the Dutch
financial sector and aims to provide a standard
methodology for threat hunting.
https://www.betaalvereniging.nl/wp
-content/uploads/DEF-TaHiTI-Threat-
Hunting-Methodology.pdf
ATT&CK Initiatives - Detection
Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK
29
ATT&CK Initiatives - Emulation
Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK
30
Red Canary developed
“Atomic Red Team”,
which is a series of
“simple” tests that can
be used to emulate the
behavior of adversaries
in the environment.
The tests are linked to
MITRE ATT&CK!
31
ATT&CK Initiatives - Emulation
Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK
CALDERA is a tool built by MITRE, with the express purpose of doing adversary emulation. It requires a
bit of setup (as a server needs to be installed) and it will actively “attack” target systems by deploying
custom backdoors. CALDERA’s attack steps are fully linked to the ATT&CK framework techniques!
ATT&CK Initiatives – Atomic Threat Coverage
Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK
32
In February 2019, Atomic Threat Coverage
was released by:
• Daniil Yugoslavskiy (@yugoslavskiy)
• Jakob Weinzettl (@mrblacyk)
• Mateusz Wydra (@sn0w0tter)
• Mikhail Aksenov (@AverageS)
Their goal is to have an “all-in-one” solution
for detection, response, mitigation and
simulation using MITRE ATT&CK!
https://github.com/krakow2600/atomic-
threat-coverage
ATT&CK Initiatives – Atomic Threat Coverage
Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK
33
https://github.com/krakow2600/atomic-threat-coverage
ATT&CK Initiatives – Atomic Threat Coverage
Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK
34
Demo
Demonstrating Caldera & ATT&CK Navigator
36
Demo
ATT&CK Navigator and CALDERA in action
37
Conclusions
• ATT&CK should be used as a “common language” by a variety of security functions
in the organisation (adversary emulation, security monitoring, threat hunting,…)
• ATT&CK is huge and covering all techniques from the start is not feasible,
prioritize according to popularity of techniques (general) and your own
organization (based on relevant threat actors)!
• Don’t reinvent the wheel: Leverage and contribute to existing projects to hit the
ground running!
38
Want more?
Some additional links & references
• ATT&CKCon 2018 presentations
https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/presentations
• ATT&CK™ Your CTI with Lessons Learned from Four Years in the Trenches -
Katie Nickels (MITRE) & Bryan Beyer (Red Canary)
https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-archive-
1548090281.pdf
• ATT&CK™ Is Only as Good as Its Implementation: Avoiding Five Common
Pitfalls (Kyle Rainey - Red Canary)
https://www.redcanary.com/blog/avoiding-common-attack-pitfalls/
Q&AAny questions?

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Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK - Speaking the Common Language

  • 1. Leveraging MITRE ATT&CK ™ The Common Language SANSFIRE 18 June 2019
  • 2. 2 Your Host for Today Erik Van Buggenhout SANS Certified Instructor Co-Founder NVISO @ErikVaBu At SANS: 2009 -> 2012: Local Mentor (SEC560) 2012 -> 2016: Community Instructor (SEC560) 2016 -> Now: Certified Instructor & Author (SEC599) Other: 2008 -> 2012: Penetration Testing & Big 4 2012 -> Now: NVISO (Adversary Emulation)
  • 3. 1. What is MITRE ATT&CK Introduction 3 The Agenda for Today WHAT WE’D LIKE TO DISCUSS 2. ATT&CK use cases How can MITRE ATT&CK be used? 3. ATT&CK initiatives Some interesting references 5. Q&A Ask us your questions! 4. Demo - CALDERA Demonstration of a tool
  • 4. What is MITRE ATT&CK Introduction
  • 5. Kill Chain vs ATT&CK Where does ATT&CK come from? The Cyber Kill Chain provides a 30.000ft view of an attack “Action on Objectives” covers a lot of stuff… Good for a general overview, but how do you make this actionable? 5
  • 6. MITRE ATT&CK? What is MITRE ATT&CK MITRE has developed the ATT&CK Matrix as a central repository for adversary TTP’s. It is used by red teams and blue teams alike. It is rapidly gaining traction as a de facto standard! 6
  • 7. 7 MITRE ATT&CK? Tactics vs Techniques TACTICS TECHNIQUES
  • 8. MITRE ATT&CK? Zooming in on a technique As an example, let’s have a look at one of Turla’s favorite techniques: COM object hijacking. In MITRE’s ATT&CK framework, this technique is known as T1122, and it’s part of the “Defense Evasion” and “Persistence” tactics for Windows. For every one of these techniques, MITRE includes a dedicated entry with amongst others: • Technique information • Known adversaries that use it • Detection opportunities • Prevention opportunities 8
  • 10. ATT&CK Evaluations Using ATT&CK as a framework to evaluate products 10
  • 11. ATT&CK Use Cases How can MITRE ATT&CK be used?
  • 12. Key use cases for ATT&CK ATT&CK as a common language! Adversary emulation Detection capability Threat IntelligencePrioritize defenses 12
  • 13. ATT&CK for adversary emulation 13 https://attack.mitre.org/resources/adversary-emulation-plans/ When developing scenarios for red teaming / adversary emulation, red teams should use ATT&CK tactics and techniques to describe how the engagement will be delivered. This will tremendously increase the value of the engagement, as it helps defenders map issues on a structured framework afterwards!
  • 14. ATT&CK for threat intelligence ATT&CK techniques can be used to describe adversary activities in an understandable, structured, fashion. The screenshot on the left provides is an example of an adversary report on APT-15 (by NCC Group), which is annotated by Katie Nickels (MITRE) and Brian Beyer (Red Canary). It was presented at SANS CTI Summit in January 2019! Source: https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-archive-1548090281.pdf 14
  • 15. ATT&CK for defense prioritization 15 https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/security-controls/mapping-the-attck- framework-to-cis-controls/ https://github.com/TravisFSmith/mitre_attack “What techniques can you block in your organisation?” • What ATT&CK techniques are covered by hardening guidelines (e.g. group policies or Ansible playbooks)? • Travis Smith mapped the ATT&CK framework techniques to CIS Controls, which provides an interesting insight!
  • 16. ATT&CK for detection coverage 16 https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/07/how-hot-is-your-hunt-team.html https://github.com/olafhartong/ThreatHunting “What techniques can you detect in your organisation?” • What techniques are covered by use cases in security monitoring? • Do you collect the right log sources? • What techniques can you cover using threat hunting efforts?
  • 17. Key use cases for ATT&CK ATT&CK as a common language! Adversary emulation Detection capability Define red team scenarios using ATT&CK Link vulnerabilities & findings to ATT&CK Assess detection coverage using ATT&CK Define hypotheses for threat hunting using ATT&CK Threat Intelligence Categorize / tag indicators & techniques with ATT&CK Prioritize defenses What ATT&CK techniques are you blocking? 17
  • 18. Common pitfalls How to not use ATT&CK Good read: https://www.redcanary.com/blog/avoiding-common-attack-pitfalls/ Pitfall 1 Consider all techniques equal Pitfall 2 Try to do everything at once Pitfall 3 Misunderstand your coverage rating (it’s usually not binary) 18
  • 19. All techniques are equal… But some techniques are more equal than others In January 2019, MITRE (Katie Nickels) & Red Canary (Brian Beyer) combined efforts and presented a joint view on ATT&CK at the SANS CTI Summit: 19 400 threat intel reports over a span of 5 years 200 IR engagements + 5 years of SOC monitoring Source: https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-archive-1548090281.pdf
  • 20. All techniques are equal… But some techniques are more equal than others 20 Source: https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-archive-1548090281.pdf
  • 21. All techniques are equal… But some techniques are more equal than others 21 Crowdstrike released the “Global Threat Report” in February 2019 and added a “heat map” of MITRE ATT&CK, which can again be used to prioritize your efforts and attention! The results are in line with the MITRE & Red Canary data previously seen! https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2019- crowdstrike-global-threat-report/
  • 22. All techniques are equal… But some techniques are more equal than others 22 Next to the “technique popularity contest”, there is also the question of what techniques are most important TO YOUR ORGANZIATION: 1. Know what threat actors are relevant to you 2. Know what techniques these threat actors are known to use 3. Prioritize accordingly!
  • 24. 24 ATT&CK Initiatives - Detection Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK Olaf Hartong Sysmon Olaf Hartong has been doing some amazing work mapping Sysmon configurations to the MITRE ATT&CK framework. He strongly leverages the “tagging” feature that was added in Sysmon 8. Olaf based himself on work that was already performed by SwiftOnSecurity, as he uses that file as a starting point! He also wrote a blog post series called “Endpoint detection Superpowers on the cheap”! Malware archaeology The folks over at Malware Archaeology made a mapping of Windows event IDs to the MITRE ATT&CK framework. It includes a coding scheme for most relevant event identifiers as well! It’s updated regularly and can be found at https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets.
  • 25. 25 ATT&CK Initiatives - Detection Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK https://github.com/rabobank-cdc/DeTTACT DeTT&CT aims to assist blue teams using ATT&CK to score and compare data log source quality, visibility coverage, detection coverage and threat actor behaviours. All of which can help, in different ways, to get more resilient against attacks targeting your organization. The DeTT&CT framework consists of a Python tool, YAML administration files and scoring tables for the different aspects.
  • 26. 26 ATT&CK Initiatives - Detection Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK https://github.com/teoseller/osquery-attck osquery (by Facebook) allows you to easily ask questions about your Linux, Windows, and macOS infrastructure. A GitHub repository was created by “teoseller” that maps queries to the MITRE ATT&CK framework!
  • 27. ATT&CK Initiatives - Detection Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK 27 SIGMA Sigma is a project by Florian Roth which tries to provide a generic, vendor-neutral, rule format that can used to describe suspicious or malicious behavior. Most SIGMA rules are also mapped to MITRE’s ATT&CK framework.
  • 28. ATT&CK Initiatives - Detection Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK 28 TaHiTi Threat Hunting Methodology Targeted Hunting integrating Threat Intelligence (TaHiTI) methodology was built by the Dutch financial sector and aims to provide a standard methodology for threat hunting. https://www.betaalvereniging.nl/wp -content/uploads/DEF-TaHiTI-Threat- Hunting-Methodology.pdf
  • 29. ATT&CK Initiatives - Detection Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK 29
  • 30. ATT&CK Initiatives - Emulation Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK 30 Red Canary developed “Atomic Red Team”, which is a series of “simple” tests that can be used to emulate the behavior of adversaries in the environment. The tests are linked to MITRE ATT&CK!
  • 31. 31 ATT&CK Initiatives - Emulation Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK CALDERA is a tool built by MITRE, with the express purpose of doing adversary emulation. It requires a bit of setup (as a server needs to be installed) and it will actively “attack” target systems by deploying custom backdoors. CALDERA’s attack steps are fully linked to the ATT&CK framework techniques!
  • 32. ATT&CK Initiatives – Atomic Threat Coverage Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK 32 In February 2019, Atomic Threat Coverage was released by: • Daniil Yugoslavskiy (@yugoslavskiy) • Jakob Weinzettl (@mrblacyk) • Mateusz Wydra (@sn0w0tter) • Mikhail Aksenov (@AverageS) Their goal is to have an “all-in-one” solution for detection, response, mitigation and simulation using MITRE ATT&CK! https://github.com/krakow2600/atomic- threat-coverage
  • 33. ATT&CK Initiatives – Atomic Threat Coverage Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK 33 https://github.com/krakow2600/atomic-threat-coverage
  • 34. ATT&CK Initiatives – Atomic Threat Coverage Many open-source tools align with ATT&CK 34
  • 35. Demo Demonstrating Caldera & ATT&CK Navigator
  • 36. 36 Demo ATT&CK Navigator and CALDERA in action
  • 37. 37 Conclusions • ATT&CK should be used as a “common language” by a variety of security functions in the organisation (adversary emulation, security monitoring, threat hunting,…) • ATT&CK is huge and covering all techniques from the start is not feasible, prioritize according to popularity of techniques (general) and your own organization (based on relevant threat actors)! • Don’t reinvent the wheel: Leverage and contribute to existing projects to hit the ground running!
  • 38. 38 Want more? Some additional links & references • ATT&CKCon 2018 presentations https://www.slideshare.net/attackcon2018/presentations • ATT&CK™ Your CTI with Lessons Learned from Four Years in the Trenches - Katie Nickels (MITRE) & Bryan Beyer (Red Canary) https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-archive- 1548090281.pdf • ATT&CK™ Is Only as Good as Its Implementation: Avoiding Five Common Pitfalls (Kyle Rainey - Red Canary) https://www.redcanary.com/blog/avoiding-common-attack-pitfalls/

Notas do Editor

  1. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  2. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  3. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  4. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  5. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  6. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  7. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  8. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  9. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  10. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  11. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  12. Drag Picture and Send to Back
  13. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  14. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  15. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  16. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  17. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  18. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  19. Experience needed: students of courses such as 401, 501, 503, 504, even 560. Include what kind of actual experience. Hand on learning: tons of labs and CTF! Don’t spend too long on LODS but talk about why it’s great. Offense vs Defense Something Else – you can put something here or delete it 
  20. Drag Picture and Send to Back
  21. Drag Picture and Send to Back