Early installation of detonators at 11:30 on 22 August 2003, put the lives of workers in imminent danger with changing the SECURITY condition in which the VLS-1 V03 was, for the intermediate stage called ARMAMENT PROCEDURE until reaching the condition ARMED after the completion of the load capacitor formed by detonators, and their respective 40 m long floating wires, which equaled their electrostatic potentials to the electrostatic potential of the air located at 13.7 m high, acquiring a voltage of about 3 kV electrostatically induced in the wire pairs of detonators by the action of Vertical Atmospheric Electric Field and the friction of wind, sand and soil particles with the existing insulating material on the covers of the wires detonators. Without the presence of a spark gap in the detonators to create an alternative path of least electrical resistance allowing electrostatic discharge outside the region containing explosive, pins, the primary explosive in existing "primer" and carcasses of detonators automatically became the single spark gap available, whereby the electrostatic discharge could be discharged to ground the vehicle, considering that also there were no resistors between the wires shorted of the detonators and ground vehicle in order to promote the dissipation of static electricity generated in the wire detonators and create an alternative path for electrostatic discharge incidents directly on the wires or induced in them. The principle of redundancy required by the standards, focused only increasing the reliability of initiation of the detonators placing two detonators for each rocket engine and was not applied for the protection of the firing line and the VLS-1 V03 fail, given that there was no: Mechanical Security Devices in propellants; spark gap in detonators; resistors dissipating static electricity between the wires and detonators grounding Vehicle; Devices Surge Protection; relays positioned as close as possible of detonators; isolation resistor between the end of the firing line and the grounding of the bunker and nor shielded wires to detonators, all correctly specified, designed, tested in accordance with standards relevant techniques. The doctrine of security and the compatibility of risk between activities that were running simultaneously were also not observed. The electrical interference and the electrostatic discharge that occurred within one of the four detonators happened simultaneously. Análise Técnica do Relatório da Investigação do Acidente Ocorrido com o VLS-1 V03, em 22 de agosto de 2003, em Alcântara, Maranhão. URL: < http://dallapiazza.wordpress.com >.

1. “Technical Analysis of the Catastrophic Accident with the Satellite
Launch Vehicle VLS-1 V03 on August 22, 2003 in AlcântaraMaranhão, Brazil.”
ABSTRACT
“Early installation of detonators at 11:30 on 22 August 2003, put the lives of
workers in imminent danger with changing the SECURITY condition in which
the VLS-1 V03 was, for the intermediate stage called ARMAMENT
PROCEDURE until reaching the condition ARMED after the completion of the
load capacitor formed by detonators, and their respective 40 m long floating
wires, which equaled their electrostatic potentials to the electrostatic potential
of the air located at 13.7 m high, acquiring a voltage of about 3 kV
electrostatically induced in the wire pairs of detonators by the action of Vertical
Atmospheric Electric Field and the friction of wind, sand and soil particles with
the existing insulating material on the covers of the wires detonators.
Without the presence of a spark gap in the detonators to create an alternative
path of least electrical resistance allowing electrostatic discharge outside the
region containing explosive, pins, the primary explosive in existing "primer" and
carcasses of detonators automatically became the single spark gap available,
whereby the electrostatic discharge could be discharged to ground the vehicle,
considering that also there were no resistors between the wires shorted of the
detonators and ground vehicle in order to promote the dissipation of static
electricity generated in the wire detonators and create an alternative path for
electrostatic discharge incidents directly on the wires or induced in them.
The ignition of only one detonator which offered less resistance to electrostatic
discharge, which occurred at 13:26:05 between frames 26 and 27 was facilitated
by the action of the source of alternating current in the grounding of the vehicle
which generated an AC voltage between the pins and the bodies of the
detonators thus reducing the dielectric breakdown voltage in detonator primer
submitted to existing 3 kV between the pins and the housing.
The AC source that generated this difference in electrical potential between the
pins and the bodies of the detonators also caused interference on the images
obtained at 13:26:00 in frame 01 (without causing ignition), at 13:26:05 in
frame 27 (with the ignition already initiated between frames 26 and 27) and at
13:26:05 in frame 28 (with the combustion of the propellant in progress)
resulting in an increase in the clarity of their images.
The principle of redundancy required by the standards, focused only increasing
the reliability of initiation of the detonators placing two detonators for each
rocket engine and was not applied for the protection of the firing line and the
VLS-1 V03 fail, given that there was no: Mechanical Security Devices in
propellants; spark gap in detonators; resistors dissipating static electricity
between the wires and detonators grounding Vehicle; Devices Surge Protection;
relays positioned as close as possible of detonators; isolation resistor between
the end of the firing line and the grounding of the bunker and nor shielded wires

2. to detonators, all correctly specified, designed, tested in accordance with
standards relevant techniques.
The doctrine of security and the compatibility of risk between activities that
were running simultaneously were also not observed.
The electrical interference and the electrostatic discharge that occurred within
one of the four detonators happened simultaneously.”
Análise Técnica do Relatório da Investigação do
Acidente Ocorrido com o VLS-1 V03, em 22 de agosto
de 2003, em Alcântara, Maranhão.
Índice dos assuntos tratados nesta pesquisa sobre o
acidente ocorrido com o Veículo Lançador de Satélites
VLS-1 V03, em 22 de agosto de 2003, em Alcântara,
Maranhão, e orientações para o lançamento seguro do
VLS-1 V04.