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Definition

Advantages & Disadvantages

Types

Level of interaction

Honeyd project: A Virtual honeypot framework

Honeynet project: An Actual honeypot framework

                                                  2 Of 25
Definition:

“A honeypot is an information system
resource whose value lies in
unauthorized or illicit use of that
resource.”
Unlike firewalls or IDS sensors,
honeypots are something you want the
bad guys to interact with.

                                       3 Of 25
 Simple concept


 A resource that expects no data, so any traffic to or
  from it is most likely unauthorized activity




                                                          4 Of 25
 Honeypots are unique, they don't solve a specific problem.

 Instead, they are a highly flexible tool with many different
  applications to security.

 It all depends on what you want to achieve.




                                                             5 Of 25
A physical honeypot is a real machine with its own IP
address.

A virtual honeypot is a simulated machine with modeled
behaviors, one of which is the ability to respond to network
traffic.

Multiple virtual honeypots can be simulated on a single
system.



                                                               6 Of 25
o Small data with plenty values

o New tools & tactics

o Minimum requirement

o Encode or IPv6

o Simplicity




                                  7 Of 25
Limited view :
Honeypots can only track and capture activity that directly
interacts with them. Therefore honeypots will not capture
attacks against other systems.


Risk :
Deploying a honeypot could create an additional risk and
eventually put a whole organizations’ IT security at risk.



                                                             8 Of 25
 Production Honeypot


 Research Honeypot




                        9 Of 25
 Prevention (sticky Honeypot)
 Detection
 Response




                                 10 Of 25
Provide simulated Services

No operating system for attacker to access.

Information limited to transactional     information
and attackers activities with simulated services.




                                                        11 Of 25
 Good starting point

 Easy to install, configure, deploy and maintain

 Introduce a low limited risk

 Logging and analyzing is simple
   - only transactional information are available, no information

     about the attacks themselves,(e.g. time and date of an attack,
     protocol, source and destination IP)

                                                                      12 Of 25
 No real interaction for an attacker possible

 Very limited logging abilities

 Can only capture known attacks

 Easily detectable by a skilled attacker




                                                 13 Of 25
 Honeyd written by Neils Provos in 2002
 Honeyd, a lightweight framework for
   creating virtual honeypots
 Low-interaction virtual honeypot
 Honeyd is most widely used prod. honeypot




                                              14 Of 25
 The framework allows us to
  instrument thousands of IP
  addresses with virtual machine
  and corresponding network
  services.

 Honeyd receives traffic for its
  virtual honeypots, via a router.

 For each honeypot, Honeyd
  can simulate the network
  stack behavior of a different
  operating system.



                                     15 Of 25
Medium-interaction honeypots generally offer
More ability to interact than a low interaction   honeypot
but less functionality than high-interaction solutions.


Used for production & Research honeypot goals




                                                          16 Of 25
Provide Actual Operating Systems

Extensive risk

Learn extensive amounts of information

Log every packet that enters and leave

 honeypot




                                          17 Of 25
• A honeynet is one type of high interaction honeypot


• Started in 2000 by a group of volunteer security
 professionals.

• Allows full access to OS of honeypot.




                                                        18 Of 25
19 Of 25
o Virtual honeynets are one type of honeynet,   specifically
  honeynets that run multiple operating systems on the same
  physical computer.

o This is done using virtualization software such as VMware
  or User-Mode Linux.




                                                           20 Of 25
Low Interaction
BackOfficer Friendly [5].

SPECTER [6].

Honeyd [2].

ManTrap [7].

Honeynets [1].

                            High Interaction

                                        21 Of 25
 None, they all have their advantages and
disadvantages. It depends on what you are attempting
to achieve.




                                                       22 Of 25
 Analyzing compromised honeypots supports you in getting a

 certain understanding of tools, methodologies and avenues

 used by attackers in the wild (may improve your own hacking

 skills as well as defence strategies!)



 Honeypots are a highly flexible security tool that can be used

 in a variety of different deployments.



 Honeypots are a quite new field of research, lot’s of work has

 still to be done .                                                23 Of 25
[1]. Niels Provos, “Honeynet project”, October 2007.
     http;//www.Honeynet.org/papers/honeynet/index.html

[2]. N. PROVOS, “Honeyd Project, A Virtual Honeypot Framework“, Proceedings of the
    13 th USENIX Security Symposium San Diego, CA, USA,Aug. 2004.
     http://www.honeyd.org

[3]. Honeypots: Tracking Hackers
    www.ip97.com/tracking-hackers.com/misc/faq.html

[4]. Lance Spitzner. Honeypots: Tracking Hackers. Addison Wesley Professional,
     september 2002. http://www.usenix.org

[5]. http://www.nfr.com/products/bof/

[6]. http://www.specter.com

[7]. http://www.recourse.com


                                                                                 24 Of 25
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Virtual honeypot

  • 2. Definition Advantages & Disadvantages Types Level of interaction Honeyd project: A Virtual honeypot framework Honeynet project: An Actual honeypot framework 2 Of 25
  • 3. Definition: “A honeypot is an information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource.” Unlike firewalls or IDS sensors, honeypots are something you want the bad guys to interact with. 3 Of 25
  • 4.  Simple concept  A resource that expects no data, so any traffic to or from it is most likely unauthorized activity 4 Of 25
  • 5.  Honeypots are unique, they don't solve a specific problem.  Instead, they are a highly flexible tool with many different applications to security.  It all depends on what you want to achieve. 5 Of 25
  • 6. A physical honeypot is a real machine with its own IP address. A virtual honeypot is a simulated machine with modeled behaviors, one of which is the ability to respond to network traffic. Multiple virtual honeypots can be simulated on a single system. 6 Of 25
  • 7. o Small data with plenty values o New tools & tactics o Minimum requirement o Encode or IPv6 o Simplicity 7 Of 25
  • 8. Limited view : Honeypots can only track and capture activity that directly interacts with them. Therefore honeypots will not capture attacks against other systems. Risk : Deploying a honeypot could create an additional risk and eventually put a whole organizations’ IT security at risk. 8 Of 25
  • 9.  Production Honeypot  Research Honeypot 9 Of 25
  • 10.  Prevention (sticky Honeypot)  Detection  Response 10 Of 25
  • 11. Provide simulated Services No operating system for attacker to access. Information limited to transactional information and attackers activities with simulated services. 11 Of 25
  • 12.  Good starting point  Easy to install, configure, deploy and maintain  Introduce a low limited risk  Logging and analyzing is simple - only transactional information are available, no information about the attacks themselves,(e.g. time and date of an attack, protocol, source and destination IP) 12 Of 25
  • 13.  No real interaction for an attacker possible  Very limited logging abilities  Can only capture known attacks  Easily detectable by a skilled attacker 13 Of 25
  • 14.  Honeyd written by Neils Provos in 2002  Honeyd, a lightweight framework for creating virtual honeypots  Low-interaction virtual honeypot  Honeyd is most widely used prod. honeypot 14 Of 25
  • 15.  The framework allows us to instrument thousands of IP addresses with virtual machine and corresponding network services.  Honeyd receives traffic for its virtual honeypots, via a router.  For each honeypot, Honeyd can simulate the network stack behavior of a different operating system. 15 Of 25
  • 16. Medium-interaction honeypots generally offer More ability to interact than a low interaction honeypot but less functionality than high-interaction solutions. Used for production & Research honeypot goals 16 Of 25
  • 17. Provide Actual Operating Systems Extensive risk Learn extensive amounts of information Log every packet that enters and leave honeypot 17 Of 25
  • 18. • A honeynet is one type of high interaction honeypot • Started in 2000 by a group of volunteer security professionals. • Allows full access to OS of honeypot. 18 Of 25
  • 20. o Virtual honeynets are one type of honeynet, specifically honeynets that run multiple operating systems on the same physical computer. o This is done using virtualization software such as VMware or User-Mode Linux. 20 Of 25
  • 21. Low Interaction BackOfficer Friendly [5]. SPECTER [6]. Honeyd [2]. ManTrap [7]. Honeynets [1]. High Interaction 21 Of 25
  • 22.  None, they all have their advantages and disadvantages. It depends on what you are attempting to achieve. 22 Of 25
  • 23.  Analyzing compromised honeypots supports you in getting a certain understanding of tools, methodologies and avenues used by attackers in the wild (may improve your own hacking skills as well as defence strategies!)  Honeypots are a highly flexible security tool that can be used in a variety of different deployments.  Honeypots are a quite new field of research, lot’s of work has still to be done . 23 Of 25
  • 24. [1]. Niels Provos, “Honeynet project”, October 2007. http;//www.Honeynet.org/papers/honeynet/index.html [2]. N. PROVOS, “Honeyd Project, A Virtual Honeypot Framework“, Proceedings of the 13 th USENIX Security Symposium San Diego, CA, USA,Aug. 2004. http://www.honeyd.org [3]. Honeypots: Tracking Hackers www.ip97.com/tracking-hackers.com/misc/faq.html [4]. Lance Spitzner. Honeypots: Tracking Hackers. Addison Wesley Professional, september 2002. http://www.usenix.org [5]. http://www.nfr.com/products/bof/ [6]. http://www.specter.com [7]. http://www.recourse.com 24 Of 25