2018 jPrime Deconstructing and Evolving REST Security

#RESTSecurity @dblevins @tomitribetribestream.io/jprime2018
jPrimeConf
Deconstructing REST
Security
David Blevins
Tomitribe

jPrimeConf
“The nice thing about standards is
you have so many to choose from.”
- Andrew S. Tanenbaum

@dblevins @tomitribe#RESTSecurity @dblevins @tomitribetribestream.io/jprime2018
jPrimeConf Focus Areas
• Beyond Basic Auth
• Theory of OAuth 2.0
• Introduction of JWT
• Google/Facebook style API security
• Stateless vs Stateful Architecture
• HTTP Signatures
• Amazon EC2 style API security

jPrimeConf Baseline
1000 users
x 3 TPS
4 hops
3000 TPS
frontend
12000 TPS
backend

jPrimeConf
Basic Auth
(and its problems)

jPrimeConf Basic Auth Message
POST /painter/color/object HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8443
Authorization: Basic c25vb3B5OnBhc3M=
User-Agent: curl/7.43.0
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 45
{"color":{"b":255,"g":0,"name":"blue","r":0}}

jPrimeConf Basic Auth
Password Sent
3000 TPS
(HTTP+SSL)
username+password
Base64
(no auth)
3000 TPS
(LDAP)
12000 TPS
(HTTP)

Password Sent
3000 TPS
(HTTP+SSL)
username+password
Base64
username+password
Base64
15000 TPS
(LDAP)
Password Sent
12000 TPS
(HTTP)

Password Sent
3000 TPS
(HTTP+SSL)
username+password
Base64
IP
whitelisting
3000 TPS
(LDAP)
12000 TPS
(HTTP)

jPrimeConf
“Hey, give me all
of Joe’s salary
information.”
“I don’t know
who you are,
…
but sure!”

jPrimeConf
Latveria Attacks

jPrimeConf Basic Auth - Attacks
Valid
Password Sent
3000 TPS
(HTTP+SSL) IP
whitelisting
9000 TPS
(LDAP)
12000 TPS
(HTTP)
Invalid
Password Sent
6000 TPS
(HTTP+SSL)

jPrimeConf
OAuth 2.0
(and its problems)

jPrimeConf

jPrimeConf OAuth 2 - Password Grant
(LDAP)
(Token Store)
POST /oauth2/token
Host: api.superbiz.io
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 54
grant_type=password&username=snoopy&password=woodstock
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
{
"access_token":"2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
"expires_in":3600,
"refresh_token":"tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",
}
Verify
Password
Generate
Token

jPrimeConf OAuth 2.0 Message
POST /painter/color/object HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer 2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA
Accept: */*
Content-Length: 45
{"color":{"r":0,"g":0,"b":255,"name":"blue"}}

POST /painter/color/palette HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Length: 45
{"color":{"r":0,"g":255,"b":0,"name":"green"}}

POST /painter/color/select HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Length: 44
{"color":{"r":255,"g":0,"b":0,"name":"red"}}

POST /painter/color/fill HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Length: 49
{"color":{"r":0,"g":255,"b":255,"name":"yellow"}}

POST /painter/color/stroke HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Length: 49
{"color":{"r":255,"g":200,"b":255,"name":"orange"}}

jPrimeConf
401

jPrimeConf OAuth 2 - Refresh Grant
(LDAP)
(Token Store)
Verify
Password
Generate
Token
POST /oauth2/token
Accept: */*
Content-Length: 54
grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Pragma: no-cache
{
"access_token":"6Fe4jd7TmdE5yW2q0y6W2w",
"expires_in":3600,
"refresh_token":"hyT5rw1QNh5Ttg2hdtR54e",
}

jPrimeConf
Old pair
• Access Token 2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA
• Refresh Token tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA
New pair
• Access Token 6Fe4jd7TmdE5yW2q0y6W2w
• Refresh Token hyT5rw1QNh5Ttg2hdtR54e

POST /painter/color/palette HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer 6Fe4jd7TmdE5yW2q0y6W2w
Accept: */*
Content-Length: 46
{"color":{"r":0,"g":255,"b":0,"name":"green"}}

POST /painter/color/select HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Length: 44
{"color":{"r":255,"g":0,"b":0,"name":"red"}}

POST /painter/color/fill HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Length: 49
{"color":{"r":0,"g":255,"b":255,"name":"yellow"}}

jPrimeConf
What have we achieved?

jPrimeConf
You have more passwords
(at least your devices do)

jPrimeConf Term Alert
• Password Grant???
• Logging in
• Token?
• Slightly less crappy password
• Equally crappy HTTP Session ID

jPrimeConf OAuth 2
Tokens Sent
3000 TPS
(HTTP+SSL)
IP
whitelisting
3000 TPS
(token checks)
Password Sent
1000/daily
(HTTP+SSL)
OAuth 2
(LDAP)
4 hops
12000 TPS
backend

jPrimeConf
“Who the heck
is
6Fe4jd7TmdE5y
W2q0y6W2w
???????”
“No idea, dude.
Ask the token
server.”

jPrimeConf OAuth 2
Tokens Sent
3000 TPS
(HTTP+SSL)
IP
whitelisting
3000 TPS
(token checks)
Password Sent
1000/daily
(HTTP+SSL)
OAuth 2
(LDAP)
12000 TPS
(token checks)
8 hops
24000 TPS
backend

jPrimeConf OAuth 2
Tokens Sent
3000 TPS
(HTTP+SSL)
IP
whitelisting
3000 TPS
(token checks)
Password Sent
1000/daily
(HTTP+SSL)
OAuth 2
(LDAP)
12000 TPS
(token checks)
8 hops
24000 TPS
backend
55% of all trafﬁc

jPrimeConf OAuth 2
Tokens Sent
3000 TPS
(HTTP+SSL)
IP
whitelisting
0 TPS
(token checks)
Password Sent
1000/daily
(HTTP+SSL)
OAuth 2
(LDAP)
0 TPS
(token checks)
0 hops
0 TPS
backend

jPrimeConf OAuth 2
Pointer Pointer
State

jPrimeConf
Access Token
Access Pointer?
Access Primary Key?

jPrimeConf
OAuth 2.0
High Frequency Password
Exchange Algorithm?

jPrimeConf
Problem: how to detect if a ﬁle's
contents have changed?

jPrimeConf
Hashing and Signing
Symmetric and Asymmetric

jPrimeConf Hashing Data

jPrimeConf
01010000010001000011011011101000110101001001100001010011110000
00111010101111111111111111000101111101001110111000100010000000000
111111101011100001001100100000101011111001101111111100111011000011
111011001101100100000101011110011001100001011011110101110110001

jPrimeConf More Bits the Better

jPrimeConf Bears beat Vikings 33 to 10

jPrimeConf Bears beat Vikings 33 to 30

jPrimeConf Protecting the Hash
HMAC (Symmetric)
RSA (Asymmetric)
abc123 abc123
private
public

jPrimeConf HMAC (Symmetric)
Read &
Write
Read

& Write
Shared and equal relationship

jPrimeConf RSA (Asymmetric)
Write
Read
Read
Read
One side has more authority
* the reverse is possible

jPrimeConf Distributed Read-Only Data
Can Write
Read
Read
Read
Data
Encrypted
Hash of Data

jPrimeConf
How many RSA keys does
Susan need to sign
1,000,000
documents?

jPrimeConf
one

jPrimeConf
OAuth 2.0
+
JSon Web Tokens (JWT)

jPrimeConf JSon Web Token
• Pronounced “JOT”
• Fancy JSON map
• Base64 URL Encoded
• Digitally Signed (RSA-SHA256, HMAC-SHA512, etc)
• Built-in expiration

jPrimeConf • { "alg": “RS256", "typ": “JWT" }
• {
"token-type": "access-token",
"username": "snoopy",
"animal": "beagle",
"iss": "https://demo.superbiz.com/oauth2/token",
"scopes": [
“twitter”, "mans-best-friend"
],
"exp": 1474280963,
"iat": 1474279163,
"jti": "66881b068b249ad9"
}
• DTfSdMzIIsC0j8z3icRdYO1GaMGl6j1I_2DBjiiHW9vmDz8OAw8Jh8DpO32fv
0vICc0hb4F0QCD3KQnv8GVM73kSYaOEUwlW0k1TaElxc43_Ocxm1F5IUNZvzl
LJ_ksFXGDL_cuadhVDaiqmhct098ocefuv08TdzRxqYoEqYNo

jPrimeConf Access Token Now
• header (JSON > Base64 URL Encoded)
• describes how the token signature can be checked
• payload (JSON > Base64 URL Encoded)
• Basically a map of whatever you want to put in it
• Some standard entries such as expiration
• signature (Binary > Base64 URL Encoded
• The actual digital signature
• made exclusively by the /oauth2/token endpoint
• If RSA, can be checked by anyone

jPrimeConf Access Token Previously
• 6Fe4jd7TmdE5yW2q0y6W2w

jPrimeConf Access Token Now
• eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ0b2tlbi
10eXBlIjoiYWNjZXNzLXRva2VuIiwidXNlcm5hbWUiOiJzb
m9vcHkiLCJhbmltYWwiOiJiZWFnbGUiLCJpc3MiOiJodHRw
czovL2RlbW8uc3VwZXJiaXouY29tL29hdXRoMi90b2tlbiI
sInNjb3BlcyI6WyJ0d2l0dGVyIiwibWFucy1iZXN0LWZyaW
VuZCJdLCJleHAiOjE0NzQyODA5NjMsImlhdCI6MTQ3NDI3O
TE2MywianRpIjoiNjY4ODFiMDY4YjI0OWFkOSJ9.DTfSdMz
IIsC0j8z3icRdYO1GaMGl6j1I_2DBjiiHW9vmDz8OAw8Jh8
DpO32fv0vICc0hb4F0QCD3KQnv8GVM73kSYaOEUwlW0k1Ta
Elxc43_Ocxm1F5IUNZvzlLJ_ksFXGDL_cuadhVDaiqmhct0
98ocefuv08TdzRxqYoEqYNo

jPrimeConf
Subtle But High Impact
Architectural Change

jPrimeConf
What we had
(quick recap)

jPrimeConf
(LDAP)
Pull User Info
From IDP

jPrimeConf
(LDAP)
Generate an
Access Token
(pointer)

jPrimeConf
(LDAP)
Insert both
into DB

jPrimeConf
(LDAP)
Send Access Token (pointer)
to client

jPrimeConf
Results
Client Holds Pointer Server Holds State

jPrimeConf
What we can do now
(Hello JWT!)

jPrimeConf
(LDAP)
Format the data
as JSON

jPrimeConf
(LDAP)
RSA-SHA 256
sign JSON private

jPrimeConf
(LDAP)
Insert only
pointer
into DB
(for revocation)

jPrimeConf
(LDAP)
Send Access Token (state)
to client

jPrimeConf
Client Holds State Server Holds Pointer
Desired
Results

(LDAP)
(Token ID Store)
POST /oauth2/token
Accept: */*
Content-Length: 54
Verify
Password
Generate
Signed
Token
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Pragma: no-cache
{
"access_token":"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.
eyJ0b2tlbi10eXBlIjoiYWNjZXNzLXRva2VuIiwidXNlcm5hb
WUiOiJzbm9vcHkiLCJhbmltYWwiOiJiZWFnbGUiLCJpc3M
iOiJodHRwczovL2RlbW8uc3VwZXJiaXouY29tL29hdXRoM
i90b2tlbiIsInNjb3BlcyI6WyJ0d2l0dGVyIiwibWFucy1iZXN0
LWZyaWVuZCJdLCJleHAiOjE0NzQyODA5NjMsImlhdCI6M
TQ3NDI3OTE2MywianRpIjoiNjY4ODFiMDY4YjI0OWFkOSJ
9.DTfSdMzIIsC0j8z3icRdYO1GaMGl6j1I_2DBjiiHW9vmDz8
OAw8Jh8DpO32fv0vICc0hb4F0QCD3KQnv8GVM73kSYaO
EUwlW0k1TaElxc43_Ocxm1F5IUNZvzlLJ_ksFXGDL_cuadh
VDaiqmhct098ocefuv08TdzRxqYoEqYNo",
"expires_in":3600,
"refresh_token":"eyJhbGctGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIAkF0X.
eyJ0b2tlbi10eXBlIjoiYWNjZXNzLXRva2VuIiwidXNlcm5hb
WUiOiJzbm9vcHkiLCJhbmltYWwiOiJiZWFnbGUiLCJpc3M
iOiJodHRwczovL",
}

jPrimeConf OAuth 2.0 Message with JWT
POST /painter/color/palette HTTP/1.1 
Host: api.superbiz.io 
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ0b2tlbi10eXBlIjoiYWNjZXNzLXR
va2VuIiwidXNlcm5hbWUiOiJzbm9vcHkiLCJhbmltYWwiOiJiZWFnbGUiLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2RlbW8uc3VwZXJ
iaXouY29tL29hdXRoMi90b2tlbiIsInNjb3BlcyI6WyJ0d2l0dGVyIiwibWFucy1iZXN0LWZyaWVuZCJdLCJleHAiOjE0NzQy
ODA5NjMsImlhdCI6MTQ3NDI3OTE2MywianRpIjoiNjY4ODFiMDY4YjI0OWFkOSJ9.DTfSdMzIIsC0j8z3icRdYO1GaMGl
6j1I_2DBjiiHW9vmDz8OAw8Jh8DpO32fv0vICc0hb4F0QCD3KQnv8GVM73kSYaOEUwlW0k1TaElxc43_Ocxm1F5IUNZ
vzlLJ_ksFXGDL_cuadhVDaiqmhct098ocefuv08TdzRxqYoEqYNo
User-Agent: curl/7.43.0 
Accept: */* 
Content-Type: application/json 
Content-Length: 46 
 
{"color":{"b":0,"g":255,"r":0,"name":"green"}}

jPrimeConf OAuth 2 + JWT
Tokens Sent
3000 TPS
(HTTP+SSL)
0.55 TPS
(refresh token checks)
(30 minute expiration)
Password Sent
1000/daily
(HTTP+SSL)
OAuth 2
(LDAP)
4 hops
12000 TPS
backend
3000 TPS
(signature veriﬁcation)
12000 TPS
(signature veriﬁcation)(private key)
(public key)

jPrimeConf
"We need to check every
request"
(having *that* conversation)

jPrimeConf Revocation Cost
Having the conversation

jPrimeConf
Impact on the Backend

jPrimeConf
“Hey, give me all
of Joe’s salary
information.”
“Not a chance!”

jPrimeConf
“Hey, give me all
of Joe’s salary
information.”
“Sure thing!”
Every Microservice Has the Gateway's Public Key

jPrimeConf
Latveria Attacks
(again)

jPrimeConf OAuth 2 + JWT
Valid
Tokens Sent
3000 TPS
(HTTP+SSL)
0.55 TPS
Password Sent
1000/daily
(HTTP+SSL)
(LDAP)
4 hops
12000 TPS
backend
9000 TPS
12000 TPS
Invalid
Tokens Sent
6000 TPS
(HTTP+SSL)
(private key)
(public key)

jPrimeConf
HTTP Signatures
(Amazon EC2 style API Security)

jPrimeConf HTTP Signatures
• No “secret” ever hits the wire
• Signs the message itself
• Proves identity
• Prevents message tampering
• Symmetric or Asymmetric signatures
• IETF Draft
• https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cavage-http-signatures
• Extremely simple
• Does NOT eliminate beneﬁts of JWT

jPrimeConf Signing a Message
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 16:51:35 PDT
Accept: */* 
 
Take the full http
message

Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 16:51:35 PDT
Accept: */* 
 
Select the parts

you want to protect

(request-target): POST /painter/color/palette 
host: api.superbiz.io 
date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 16:51:35 PDT
content-length: 46
Create a

Signing String

(request-target): POST /painter/color/palette 
host: api.superbiz.io 
date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 16:51:35 PDT
content-length: 46
Aj2FGgCdGhIp6LFXjxSxBsSwTp9i
C7t7nmRZs-hrYcQ
Hash the string

(sha256 shown)

Aj2FGgCdGhIp6LFXjxSxBsSwTp9i
C7t7nmRZs-hrYcQ
Encrypt the hash

(hmac shown)
j050ZC4iWDW40nVx2oVwBEymX
zwvsgm+hKBkuw04b+w=

Signature
keyId=“orange-1234",
algorithm="hmac-sha256",
headers="(request-target) host date content-length”,
signature="j050ZC4iWDW40nVx2oVwBEymXzwvsgm+hKBkuw04b+w=" 
Put it all together

jPrimeConf Signed Message
Authorization: Signature keyId=“orange-1234",
algorithm="hmac-sha256",
headers="(request-target) host date content-length”,
signature="j050ZC4iWDW40nVx2oVwBEymXzwvsgm+hKBkuw04b+w=" 
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 16:51:35 PDT
Accept: */* 
 

jPrimeConf Signature Auth
Password Sent
0 TPS
(HTTP)
Signature (no auth)
3000 TPS
(LDAP or Keystore)
12000 TPS
(HTTP)

jPrimeConf Signature Auth
Password Sent
0 TPS
(HTTP)
Signature Signature
3000 TPS
(LDAP or Keystore)
12000 TPS
(HTTP)

jPrimeConf
“Hey, give me all
of Joe’s salary
information.”
“Hey, Larry!
Sure!”
Issue Returns
(bad)

jPrimeConf
OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession
(JWT + HTTP Signatures)

jPrimeConf
Key Value
Identity Information
(JWT)
Key ID
Proof Of Identity
(HTTP Signature)

jPrimeConf
{ "alg": “RS256", "typ": “JWT" }
{ "token-type": "access-token",
"scopes": ["twitter”, "mans-best-friend"],
"exp": 1474280963,
"iat": 1474279163,
"jti": "66881b068b249ad9"
}
DTfSdMzIIsC0j8z3icRdYO1GaMGl6j1I_2DBjiiHW9vmDz8OAw8Jh8DpO32fv0vICc
0hb4F0QCD3KQnv8GVM73kSYaOEUwlW0k1TaElxc43_Ocxm1F5IUNZvzlLJ_ksF
XGDL_cuadhVDaiqmhct098ocefuv08TdzRxqYoEqYNo
Access Token

jPrimeConf
{ "alg": “RS256", "typ": “JWT" }
{ "token-type": "pop",
"cnf":{ "kid": "green-1234" }
"scopes": ["twitter”, "mans-best-friend"],
"exp": 1474280963,
"iat": 1474279163,
"jti": "66881b068b249ad9"
}
DTfSdMzIIsC0j8z3icRdYO1GaMGl6j1I_2DBjiiHW9vmDz8OAw8Jh8DpO32fv0vICc
0hb4F0QCD3KQnv8GVM73kSYaOEUwlW0k1TaElxc43_Ocxm1F5IUNZvzlLJ_ksF
XGDL_cuadhVDaiqmhct098ocefuv08TdzRxqYoEqYNo
Access Token

(LDAP)
(Token ID Store)
POST /oauth2/token
Accept: */*
Content-Length: 54
Verify
Password
Generate
Signed
Token
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Pragma: no-cache
{
"access_token":"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc
3MiOiJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsImV4cCI6M
TMxMTI4MTk3MCwiaWF0IjoxMzExMjgwOTcwLCJjbmYiOnsia2",
"token_type":"pop",
"expires_in":3600,
"refresh_token":"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc
3MiOiJodHRwczovL2FzZGZhc2RzZGZzZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5
jb20iLCJleHAiOjEzMTEyODE5NzAsImlhdCI6MTMxMTI4MDk3M",
"key":"eyJrdHkiOiJvY3QiLCJ1c2UiOiJzaWciLCJraWQiOiJvcmFuZ
2UteXlqOUQwZWgiLCJrIjoiVlotMFFHTFoyUF9SUFVTVzEwQ0l1
MFdNeVhxLU5EMnBtRFl6QTBPVEtXVEhscDVpYWM1SzRWZWlS
ci1fQk9vWEo0WDJmU1R0NG5Id29fcXV0YTdqSkpLVDRQRVd5W
WFuQlNGc2kwRFc3b3dULUhFeEFHRHlKdEhVdE53NXhzczhOajZ
PeE5QdjZyUk9FLWtldmhMMndCOWNxZ2RJc2NidkRocmFzMzljd
2ZzIiwiYWxnIjoiSFMyNTYifQ"
}
Generate
HMAC
Key
(Key Store)

jPrimeConf JSON Web Key (encoded)
eyJrdHkiOiJvY3QiLCJ1c2UiOiJzaWciLCJraWQiOiJvcmFuZ2Ut
eXlqOUQwZWgiLCJrIjoiVlotMFFHTFoyUF9SUFVTVzEwQ0l1M
FdNeVhxLU5EMnBtRFl6QTBPVEtXVEhscDVpYWM1SzRWZ
WlSci1fQk9vWEo0WDJmU1R0NG5Id29fcXV0YTdqSkpLVDRQ
RVd5WWFuQlNGc2kwRFc3b3dULUhFeEFHRHlKdEhVdE53N
XhzczhOajZPeE5QdjZyUk9FLWtldmhMMndCOWNxZ2RJc2Nid
kRocmFzMzljd2ZzIiwiYWxnIjoiSFMyNTYifQ

jPrimeConf JSON Web Key (decoded)
{ "kty": "oct",
"use": "sig",
"kid": "orange-1234",
"k": "VZ-0QGLZ2P_RPUSW10CIu0WMyXq-ND2pmDYzA0OTKW
THlp5iac5K4VeiRr-_BOoXJ4X2fSTt4nHwo_quta7j
JJKT4PEWyYanBSFsi0DW7owT-HExAGDyJtHUtNw5xs
s8Nj6OxNPv6rROE-kevhL2wB9cqgdIscbvDhras39c
wfs",
"alg": "HS256"
}

jPrimeConf Signed OAuth 2.0 Message
Authorization: Signature keyId=“orange-1234", algorithm="hmac-sha256",
headers="content-length host date (request-target)”,
signature="j050ZC4iWDW40nVx2oVwBEymXzwvsgm+hKBkuw04b+w="
Bearer:
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ0b2tlbi10eXBlIjoiYWNjZXNzLXRva2VuIiwidXNlcm5h
bWUiOiJzbm9vcHkiLCJhbmltYWwiOiJiZWFnbGUiLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2RlbW8uc3VwZXJiaXouY29t
L2
9hdXRoMi90b2tlbiIsInNjb3BlcyI6WyJ0d2l0dGVyIiwibWFucy1iZXN0LWZyaWVuZCJdLCJleHAiOjE0NzQyO
DA5NjMsImlhdCI6MTQ3NDI3OTE2MywianRpIjoiNjY4ODFiMDY4YjI0OWFkOSJ9.DTfSdMzIIsC0j8z3icRdY
O1GMGl6j1I_2DBjiiHW9vmDz8OAw8Jh8DpO32fv0vICc0hb4F0QCD3KQnv8GVM73kSYaOEUwlW0k1TaEl
xc43_Ocxm1F5IUNZvzlLJ_ksFXGDL_cuadhVDaiqmhct098ocefuv08TdzRxqYoEqYNo 
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 16:51:35 PDT
Accept: */* 
 

jPrimeConf OAuth 2 + JWT + Signatures
Tokens+Signatures Sent
3000 TPS
(HTTP safe)
0.55 TPS
Password Sent
1000/daily
(HTTP+TLS)
OAuth 2
(LDAP)
4 hops
12000 TPS
backend
3000 TPS
12000 TPS

jPrimeConf
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution
Speciﬁcation Reference

jPrimeConf Observations
• HTTP Signatures the only HTTP friendly approach
• Signatures does not solve the “Identity Load” problem
• OAuth 2 with JWT signiﬁcantly improves IDP load
• Plain OAuth 2
• HTTP Session-like implications
• OAuth 2 with JWT
• Signed cookie
• Signing key to the future

Thank You
Slides and Resources
https://tribestream.io/jprime2018
#RESTSecurity
jPrime

2018 jPrime Deconstructing and Evolving REST Security

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