1. SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN
SMALL STATES IN A TURBULENT
GLOBAL ECONOMY
6-7 July 2009
Marlborough House, London
Commonwealth Secretariat
Dr. Marielle GOTO, consultant

2. FISCAL POLICY AND CRISIS IN THE
CARIBBEAN

3. Contents
 Introduction: the crisis and the Caribbean
 I. The Bahamas fiscal policy response
 II. Jamaica fiscal policy response
 III. ECCU fiscal policy response
 IV. An example of external assistance
providing insurance: Petrocaribe
 Conclusions

4. Introduction: the crisis and the
Caribbean

5. • Caribbean countries are affected by the ongoing crisis but there is a difference
between oil importers and oil producers (Belize, Trinidad & Tobago).
• The results of the crisis are:
 Decrease of the export part of demand and as a consequence of foreign
exchange:
 Tourism arrivals from Europe and North America decrease
 Shrinking trade volumes
 Slump in workers remittances (important part for Jamaica or St-Lucia)
 Access restrained to international capital:
 concessional loans,
 commercial lending
 FDI
 Current account deficits rise
 Volatility of commodity price , food price and energy price
 Declining fiscal revenue
 Increase of unemployment

6. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
• Positive points
• Important domestic public debt for Jamaica and The Bahamas: less
exposure to external financial markets
• Financial markets with low exposure to international finance
• Weaknesses
• Important public debt levels for countries like Jamaica or St Kitts &
Nevis (debt sustainability problems)
• Vulnerability because of natural disasters
• Financial vulnerability for countries of the ECCU

7. FISCAL POLICY STABILIZATION IN THE
CARIBBEAN PRIOR TO THE CRISIS

8. Characteristics of Caribbean fiscal
system
• There are different taxation structure in the Caribbean countries
• Countries rely mostly on indirect taxes (taxes on international
trade) except for Trinidad & Tobago
Main source of Tax revenue in 2003 Countries
Indirect taxes Antigua & Barbuda, The Bahamas, Belize (2002),
Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St
Vincent & the Grenadines
Direct taxes Trinidad & Tobago,
Balanced taxation Guyana, Jamaica , Barbados
• The tax burden also varies from a third of GDP (Barbados, Guyana) to
17% for The Bahamas
• Countries with VAT in 2004: Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad &
Tobago.
• ECCU countries are joining the club

9. Tax burdens in the Caribbean
Countries Tax Burden (Tax Revenue as a
percent of GDP) in 2003
Antigua & Barbuda 17,9
The Bahamas 17, 2
Barbados 29,8
Belize (2002) 18,3
Dominica 24,0
Grenada 27,9
Guyana 29,1
Jamaica 26,8
St Kitts & Nevis 23,5
St Lucia 21,7
St Vincent & the Grenadines 26,9
Trinidad & Tobago 23,1

10. DEFINITION OF FISCAL STABILZATION
• Fiscal Policy has 3 objectives: allocation of resources,
distribution and stabilization
• Stabilization is about absorbing the impact of shocks on
disposable income (counter-cyclical action)
• Automatic stabilizers in developed countries are taxes on
income and transfers and subsidies
• Following an elasticity approach we calculate elasticity of
various fiscal item and we establish a degree of fiscal
stabilization
• Fiscal policy is often the most important tool of stabilization
in countries with fixed exchange regimes like the ECCU
• Remind what is fiscal space : availability of budgetary room
that allows a government to provide resources for a desired
purpose without any prejudice to the sustainability of a
government’s financial position.

11. I.THE BAHAMAS FISCAL POLICY
RESPONSE

12. •Tax revenue accounts for nearly 100% of fiscal revenue
•Taxes on international trade accounts for 65% of tax revenue
•Tax burden was of 17%

13. •Most the fiscal expenditure is about personal emoluments (50% in
average)
•Susbidies and transfers are increasing ( 24% between 1999 and 2005)
•Goods and services expenditures represent 21% of the fiscal expense

14. •The debt level is quite low : 34% of GDP in average
•The goal was to achieve a level of public debt of 30-35% of GDP by 2012

15. •Overall balances and primary balances are low as interest payment is
not an issue
•Overall balances present a deficit average of 1,4%

16. Fiscal policy response in The Bahamas

18. DEGREE OF FISCAL STABILISATION
REGRESSION TAXTRANS
Elasticity 0,2
Tax/GDP 0,1
Degree of stabilisation (%)
2,4
As the previous charts suggested fiscal stabilization is very low in
The Bahamas

19. Actions implemented by the
government
• The Bahamas had a sound situation before the crisis
• The crisis induced a contraction of GDP of 1.7% in 2008 compared to a 0.7% in
2007 and a contraction of 3,9% is forecast for 2009. The overall deficit reached
5.7% in 2008.
• The country has launched fiscal plans aiming at buffering the shocks with
maintaining expenditures:
 Development of E-government (teledeclaration forms)
 Decrease of arrears in real property estate
 Limiting overtime pay for civil servants
 Auditing transfers to regional entities
 Implementation of an unemployment insurance in 2008
For 2010:
 the government plans privatization of 51% of The Bahamas Telecommunications
Company
 Emission of sovereign external bond to refinance domestic bank

20. Conclusions
• Fiscal space is created trough a better tax
compliance
• Privatization allows to find new sources of
funding
• The fiscal situation is sustainable at the
moment due to good governance in
macroeconomic policies
• But fiscal stabilization seemed not to be very
important with the prior fiscal structure

21. II.JAMAICA FISCAL POLICY
RESPONSE

22. Importance of Tax on goods and services as they represent an average
of tax revenue of 42% for 2000-2006. Decrease of Taxation on income
that represents 26.3% for the period.

23. The most important part of current expenditure is interest payments:
they represent about 40% of current expenditure between 2000 and 2007.
Personal emoluments represent 34% of current expenditure for the period.

24. Average level of debt between 2000 and 2007: 136% of GDP

25. Average level of overall deficit between 2000 and 2007: -6.1% of GDP.
In 2007 the deficit reached -30.7% of the GDP

26. FISCAL POLICY RESPONSE IN JAMAICA

28. DEGREE OF FISCAL STABILISATION IN
JAMAICA
1993-2006 1993-2006 1998-2006 1993-2004 1998-2006 1993-2001 1998-2004
REGRESSION TAXREV TAXTRANS TAXGOOD CURREX PERSEM TRANSUB INT
Elasticity 0,5 0,1 0,7 0,2 0,0 0,3 0,1
Tax/GDP 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,1 0,0 0,0
Degree of
fiscal
stabilisation
(%) 11,2 0,3 8,7 5,0 -0,4 0,0 0,0

29. Fiscal actions regarding the crisis
• A stimulus package for tourism of $634 M was
implemented at the end of 2008 : concessionary loans to
the different sector hotels in order to create 'new tourism',
built on marketing, product development and investment
• Evaluation of public agencies of IT in order to cut costs
(there are many a lot off out budget entities in Jamaica)
• The government is discussing with the IMF in order to
benefit from additional financing through a IMF stand-by
facility in order to keep the country's medium-term
economic program on track

30. Conclusions
• Fiscal measures have been implemented
• The numerous tax holidays for sectors like tourism,
shipping or bauxite and alumina could be reduced in
order to gain fiscal space
• The stimulus package for tourism seems to be a
success , at the moment, as no hotel has been closed
• The room for manœuvre is not very important because
of the previous debt level and substainability questions
• Still, GDP seems to react more than in some other
Caribbean countries to fiscal variables: there is a
higher degree of stabilization for taxes on goods and
services

31. III.EASTERN CARIBBEAN CURRENCY
FISCAL POLICY RESPONSE

32. The average weight of some fiscal items in the ECCU for the period
1980-2001
Name of the fiscal Part of the current Part of the current
variables series fiscal revenue expenditure (%)
(%)
Taxes on Income and TAXINC 19,9
Profits
Taxes on International TAXTRANS 48,4
Trade and
Transactions
Taxes on Domestic TAXGOODS 12,7
Goods and Services
Grants GRANTS 6,2
Personal Emoluments PERSEM 52,3
Current Expenditure CUREX 28,6
Transfers and TRANSUB 11,8
Subsidies
Interest Payments INT 11,9

33. Degree of fiscal stabilization in the Eastern
Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) between
1983-2001
St Kitts & Nevis Grenada St-Lucia St Vincent & the
Grenadines
Taxes on 0,84 0,84 0,84 0,84
international and
transactions
Elasticity
Personal Non significant Non significant Non significant Non significant
Emoluments
Elasticity
Taxes/GDP 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.12
Expenditures/GDP 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13
Degree of 9.24 10,92 11,76 10,08
stabilisation
(%)

34. Fiscal Policy actions
• The overall deficit should reach for the region 6.8% of GDP in 2009 compared to
4,7% in 2008
• Debt-level as an average was of 91% in 2008
• St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Dominica and St. Lucia have requested financing
under the Exogenous Shocks Facility of the IMF
• Grenada has requested an augmentation under its PRGF (Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility) Arrangement of the IMF
• St. Kitts &Nevis has requested a purchase under the Emergency Assistance for
Natural Disasters Facility.
• Taxation system structure: implementation of VAT in Dominica (2006), Antigua &
Barbuda (2007), and St. Vincent & the Grenadines (2007)
• Grenada, St Kitts & Nevis and St Lucia are to introduce them in 2010
• Introduction of unemployment insurance in Antigua & Barbuda, higher public
assistance payments in Grenada, and increases in conditional cash transfer
programs in St. Lucia.

35. Conclusions
• These states are still highly vulnerable because of
natural disasters and financial sectors weaknesses
• It is necessary to resort to external funding because of
the initial bad fiscal situation and because of the
unstainability of debt
• St Lucia has one of the best responsive fiscal
stabilization in the Caribbean even if it remains low
• The ECCU is trying to resort to mechanism insurance in
order to absorb shocks (pooling of resources) creating
a new form of fiscal space

36. IV. Example of external
assistance: Petrocaribe

37. External assistance :Petrocaribe
• Concessional financing on petroleum imports from
Venezuela, an oil producer
• The terms of this financing are common across countries :
• 25-year maturity, with a 2-year grace period, at an interest
rate of 2 percent
• The amount of available financing varies, being governed
by an import quota negotiated bilaterally with Venezuela in
thousands of barrels per day
• The share of imports that can be financed, as well as the
grant element of the loan, fluctuate with the world price of
oil.
• It can be considered as an insurance mechanism from oil
shocks among an oil producer and oil importers

38. • Oil Bill and Expected FinancingUnder Petrocaribe,
2008
Oil bill Financing Financing (%
(% of GDP) (US$ bn) of GDP)
Dominica 9.9 0.0 0.0
Grenada 10.5 0.0 1.2
Guyana 30.9 0.1 6.2
Jamaica 15.5 0.8 6.2

39. CONCLUSIONS
• Fiscal stabilization seems not to be very important in the Caribbean
• The better the situation before the crisis the leeway available (The Bahamas, Trinidad &
Tobago)
• It remains an inherent need for foreign financing for the smaller states
• In other countries like oil producers with a stabilization fund (like Trinidad & Tobago with the
Heritage and Stabilization Fund), a last resort source of domestic funding exists
• Alternative sources of funding to have some fiscal space with kind of insurance
mechanisms: for non oil producers insurance mechanisms to absorb oil shocks exist like
Petrocaribe (implemented in 2005) or natural disasters shocks like the Caribbean
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) established in 2007
• The need for foreign financing will depends of the duration and the magnitude of the crisis
• Fiscal space can be created with an improvement in tax collection, the development of E-
government or the decrease of tax holidays, holidays, tax exemptions, tax credit, tax break,
duty concessions and other waivers and different tax relief. Indeed, it is inefficient in
stimulate the sectors concerned (tourism, shipping…).
• More than ever there is a need for close monitoring of public finances
• Assessment of the firms and sectors the more at risk is essential
• Regulation and monitoring should be implemented keeping in mind that the firms and
sectors helped will use the money to restructure and reinforce their best practices