1. UN Sanctions
ON Iran and DPRK:
Implementation
Manual
Sponsored by:
The Government of Canada
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Global Peace and Security Fund
Coordination:
Developed by:
2. PURPOSE
DPRK Sanctions Regime
Iran Sanctions Regime
intended
for free
distribution to
representatives of
UN Member States
International organizations
Companies and corporations
3. Searchable reference data
Layperson’s language
Annexed material
Manual
is intended
to
Political language of sanctions resolutions
Technical language of list of prohibited
commodities
Raise awareness
Inform and educate
Offer on-line sanctions
implementation-assistance tools
And offers
to close the gap
Between
4. UN non-proliferation sanctions
Case studies of DPRK and Iran proliferation methodologies
Compliance obligations
Catch-all provision
Best sanctions compliance practices for:
Member State reporting
Border Control practitioners
Transport industry regulators and practitioners
Finance industry regulators and practitioners
Content
Of
Manual
5. Sanctions on Iran – UNSC resolution provisions and
exemption procedures
Sanctions on the DPRK – UNSC resolution provisions and
exemption procedures
Prohibited nuclear components identification guide
Prohibited nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material,
software and related technology
Prohibited ballistic missile technologies identification guide
Prohibited chemical and biological weapons
components identification guide
Content
Of
Annexes
6. Biological weapons use pathogens (diseases) to
attack the cells and organs of humans, animals or
plants (crops), while toxic weapons use poisons to
kill living organisms
Chemical weapons attack
the nervous system and lungs
of humans, and are usually
dispersed by gas, but also
may be transmitted through
liquids or solids
Manual explains three categories
of WMD …
Nuclear weapons are
explosive devices, which
deliver high intensity
heat, blast, radiation and
radioactive fallout
7. Range of at least 300 km
Payload of at least 500 kg
…Plus
WMD Delivery Systems
Typically ballistic
missiles are the
primary means of
delivery of
nuclear weapons
and sometime
are also
employed to
transport other
categories of
WMD.
9. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
Beyond Sanctions:
Containing WMD proliferation
Through multilateral treaties
One UN priority: global WMD disarmament
No Treaty but support mechanisms to contain spread of ballistic missiles
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
10. Supporting
WMD Disarmament
and
Non-proliferation
agenda
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
Implementation Support Unit (ISU) for the Biological Weapons
Convention
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
AG Australia Group
WA Wassenaar Arrangement
1540 Resolution
1540 Panel of Experts
12. Iran ratified the NPT in 1970
DPRK ratified the NPT in 1985.
the DPRK withdrew from
the NPT in 2003
conducted three nuclear tests in
2006, 2009 and 2013 at the
Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site
frequent test firings of ballistic missiles
Why
Iran has not cooperated
with IAEA,
at times has denied
access to inspection
teams
frequent test firings of
ballistic missile
13. coercing the DPRK to change its WMD-proliferation policies
coercing Iran to change its suspected proliferation of
nuclear and ballistic missile technology
deny and constrain the DPRK in the acquisition of
non-conventional and conventional arms
deny and constrain
financing and transportation
in support of WMD proliferation and
embargoed conventional arms.
Purposes of
DPRK and
Iran
Sanctions
14. Two-way embargo of conventional arms
DPRK: Two-way embargo of WMD
Iran: Two-way embargo of nuclear and ballistic missile
technology
Travel ban against listed individuals
Financial sanctions against listed individuals and entities
Ban on financial services, transfer of assets or insurances
services that could help to support the prohibited
WMD-program
or the evasion of sanctions
Ban on luxury goods
Specific
Sanctions
Measures
On DPRK
And Iran
DPRK
currently listed:
12 individuals
19 entities
Iran
currently listed:
35 individuals
73 entities
15. P5+1
Joint Plan of Action
Terms of 6-month agreement
Implementation obligation on UN Member States remains in
place
So far - no impact on the implementation of
UN 1737 sanctions regime
So far - no new sanctions language to ease or lift
measures in force
17. See Annex III See Annex IV
UN document
INFCIRC254Rev.11Part1
covers nuclear
equipment, materials,
technologies
UN document
INFCIRC254/Rev. 8/ Part 2
covers
the transfer of nuclear-
related dual-use
equipment, materials,
software, and related
technology
Sanctions against nuclear weapons
proliferation
supply of
these
restricted
items to and
from Iran and
DPRK violate
UN
Sanctions
19. Missile Technology
Control Regime
Annex Handbook
of 2010 serves as
the basis for the
UN list of restricted
items, the
S/2012/947
No international
treaty exists
regulating ballistic
missiles
Sanctions against Proliferation of
ballistic Missiles technology
See Annex V
Prohibited items, materials,
equipment, goods, and
technology related to ballistic
missile weapons and drone
programs
supply
of these
restricted
items to and from
Iran and DPRK
violate
UN-Sanctions
21. The UN list, document S/2006/853 covers
Chemical Weapons Precursors
Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment and
related technology and software
Dual-use biological equipment / related technology and software
Human and Animal Pathogens and Toxins
Plant pathogens
supply
Of these
restricted
items to the
DPRK violates
UN Sanctions
See Annex VI
Sanctions against the proliferation
of chemical and biological
weapons
22. Widely available
lower-level technology
such as unrestricted
components,
technology,
software,
proliferation-relevant
information….
The
“Catch-all”
Provision
….that could meaningfully contribute to the
research, development, construction,
use, and maintenance of
a WMD program…
…imposes under the
“catch-all” provision
on the
supplier a regulatory and
legal requirement
to obtain
an export license from
his government
23. If answer to any one question is yes = obtain an export license …
Three criteria to “Catch-all”
…will enable unsafeguarded
nuclear activities and explosives,
design, development,
production, stockpiling
use of ballistic missiles, drones,
chemical biological weapon…
Do inquiries with the recipient,
in the public and confidential
records, or past conduct of
the recipient of the item give
reasons to believe
that an export….
…end-use
in Iran
or the
DPRK?
… may create
an
unacceptable
risk of an
WMD-embargo
violation…
…or risk that supply
Of Unlicensed
items to the
DPRK
or Iran violates
UN Sanctions
27. One third of the DRPK’s foreign sales of WMD
technologies appears to go to the Syrian
Arab Republic
Identification of government agencies, military units,
auxiliary and parastatal organizations,
front-companies, airline and shipping companies,
diplomatic communities and expat networks
Bilateral
Memorandum of
Understanding
to facilitate
scientific and
technological
assistance
between the
DPRK
and the
Islamic Republic of
Iran
Characteristics of
DPRK and Iran Procurement
efforts
28. High quality valves
high-strength carbon fibers
Process control equipment
Stainless steel components and cables
Stainless steel bellows
Programmable logic controller
Process control equipment and software
And
Iran
Computer numerically controlled
technology
Horizontal machining center
Ballistic missile design data
Liquid propellant engines
Cylindrical grinding machines
Automatic direct current magnetization
characteristics recorder
items of
particular
interest
to the
DPRK
29. Best WMD-Sanctions
Implementation
Practices
Indicators for suspicious activities
Best Practices State Implementation Reporting
Customs and border control practitioners:
Recognized Diversion Strategies
Financial Sector, Intermediaries, Insurances and Broker
and Regulators
Air and Maritime Transportation industry
30. Researchers:
Diane Barkley,
Aleandro Carisch,
William J. Haynes, III,
Bryan Knouse,
Shawna Meister,
Niall P. Murphy
Lindsey G. Zeichner
Peer
Reviewers:
Christine Lee
George Lopez
Peter Scott
Christine Wing
Acknowledgments
Government of Canada
International Peace Institute
Security Council Report
Notas do Editor
Delete ‘is’ in first line of ‘Purpose’ box and capitalize ‘Intended’
Delete ‘and is intended to’ (repetition)
Should read ‘Member State reporting’ (remove s)
Change ‘versus’ to ‘and’ ?
Remove arrow no. 7 and combine
Red text on left should read ‘to and from Iran and DPRK’
This is also two-way. Should we say ‘supply of or purchase from’ ?
First line, comma after listBox on far right, should read ‘violates’