Copyright 1999 by Rosemead School of Psychology Biola Univ.docx

Copyright 1999 by Rosemead School of Psychology
Biola University, 0091-6471/410-730
Journal o f Psychology and Theology
1999, Vol. 27, N o . 1, 20-32
A n t e c e d e n t s t o t h e C o n f l i c t
B e t w e e n P s y c h o l o g y a n d R e l i g i o n
i n A m e r i c a
than not, studies dealing with the conflict between psy-
chology and religion limit their analyses to 20th century
personages who symbolize antireligious bias, as in Sig-
mund Freud and Albert Ellis (Goering, 1982; Neele-
man & Persaud, 1995; Quackenbos, Privette, & Klentz,
1986). Although Freud and Ellis have certainly con-
tributed to the acrimonious character of the relation-
ship, their commentary—far from being an eccentric or
peculiar feature of modem life—has roots that stretch
back to the late 19th century “divorce” of science from
religion.1 The object of this article is to show that mod-
em expressions of discord between psychologists and
religionists are meaningfully related to this historic dis-
agreement. This thesis will be developed over three sec-
tions. Section one will entail a description of the sundry
factors contributing to the amiable character of antebel-
lum science and religion. The second section, by con-
trast, will highlight the dissolution of this relationship

by describing the many challenges to religion that
emerged during the 19th century. The third and final
section will examine the negative impact of the divorce
of science and religion upon certain psychological tra-
ditions, which have, in the 20th century, caricatured
religious belief and practice as either illusory, pathologi-
cal, or deleterious to health.
1It is important to understand the current discord between psy-
chology and religion in its historical context. Without denying
other (modern) sources for the conflict, an historical
understand-
ing of current antireligious psychologists enables us to properly
sit-
uate their rhetoric and better interpret their commentary. Other
historians, however, stress other factors. Vande Kemp (1996),
for
instance, argued that, following more general changes in society
and culture, the study of psychology, historically linked to the
liber-
al arts curriculum, shifted away from “the truths of revelation”
and
the person of Jesus Christ toward an empirical, rational, and
seien-
tifie basis. In the tradition of Averoes’s two-truths doctrine,
mod-
ern (secular) psychologists turned away from the integrationist
model, originated by Aquinas, and adopted a dichotomist under-
standing in which truth is self-refuting and knowledge
fragmented.
Á n g e l d e J e s ú s C o r t é s
R ed Rocks Community College

Conflict models persist in the modern study of psychol-
ogy and religion. The antireligious sentiments of Sig-
mund Freud and Albert Ellis symbolize this interpretive
tradition best. Yet few researchers concern themselves
with examining the historical and intellectual
antecedents to this development. In an attempt to help
fill the gap, this article begins with a description of the
amiable character of antebellum science and religion,
proceeds to chronicle the insubordination of science in
the 19th century, and concludes by identifying the mod-
em antireligious impulse in psychology as meaningfully
related to the “divorce” of science from religion.
istorically, theoretical, scientific, and clini-
cal psychologists have disparaged religious
expressions and beliefs (Bergin, 1980;
Henry, Sims, ÔC Spray, 1971; Larson & Larson, 1991;
Spilka, 1989; Stark, 1971). Indeed, the social sei-
enees have attracted professionals who have little or
no regard for the religious life (Gorsuch, 1986;
Leuba, 1934; McClintock, Spaulding, & Turner,
1965; Wuthnow, 1985). Therapists, too, represent a
more secular set of values than the majority of the

American public (Bergin, 1991; Galanter, Larson, &
Rubenstone, 1991; Ragan, Malony, & Beit-Hallah-
mi, 1980; Schfranske & Malony, 1990). And authors
of college textbooks give scant attention to religious
or spiritual topics (Allport, 1948; Lehr &: Spilka,
1989; Ruble, 1985; Spilka, Comp, & Goldsmith,
1981; Vande Kemp, 1976).
Yet, notwithstanding the fact that these observa-
tions have enjoyed wide circulation and documenta-
tion, the historical roots of psychology’s uncharitable
disposition have rarely been examined. More often
This article is an abbreviated version of a master’s thesis
entitled,
Psychology and Religion: A Legacy o f Discord. Requests for
reprints may be sent to Angel de Jesús Cortés, 3828 Tejón
Street,
Denver, Colorado 80211
20
21Á N G EL DE JESÚ S CORTÉS
o f this p hilosophical tra d itio n were scientists.
Spurred on by the legitimating rhetoric of many min-
isters and college presidents, scientists, such as John
Playfair (1748-1819) and Sir John F. W. Herschel
(1792-1871), approached the natural world with
great confidence (Bozeman, 1977; Conser, 1993;
Croce, 1995). The primary source of their confi-
dence, however, did not come from the college or
the church, but from an epistemology which assured

scientific realists, as it had assured medieval inter-
preters before them, that all truth is whole and har-
monious (Klein, 1970; Leahey, 1980; Watson, 1963).
What God revealed in the Scriptures, it was believed,
necessarily coincided with what he deposited in
n a tu re itse lf (B arbour, 1966; B ozem an, 1977;
Conser, 1993; Croce, 1995; Hovenkamp, 1978).
A point perhaps disguised by, but in fact crucial
to, the willingness of scientists to see these spheres
as congruent was the fact that a considerable num-
ber of them were religiously devout (Bozeman,
1977; Numbers, 1977; Roberts, 1988). Antebellum
divines not only cultivated a personal devotional
life, but in many instances boasted formal training
in theology (Brooke, 1991; Greene, 1974; Moore,
1979). Whether uninitiated amateurs or sophisticat-
ed professionals, these early thinkers saw no prob-
lem with allowing their religious commitments to
guide their professional careers (Bozeman, 1977).
History, in fact, was on the side of such arrange-
ments: The overarching pattern since the Middle
Ages showed scientists making use of grand philo-
sophical or religious ideas in order to better under-
stand particular aspects of the physical world (Bar-
bour, 1966; Brooke, 1991). Hence nothing seemed
odd with early 19th century attempts to read reli-
gious verities into the physical order.
Science and Inductivism
Abetting the congeniality of science and religion
was the admixture of Baconian philosophy with the
Enlightenment tenet that treated science as the vehi-
cle for the perfection of civilization (Bozeman, 1977;
Gay, 1969; Midgley, 1992). The importance of sei-

ence—not only as a narrow and specified discipline
but as a world-picture or ideology—is difficult to
overstate. N o t only was science considered the
quintessential arena for the effective employment of
rational skills, but it also claimed the laudable task of
making known the hidden mysteries of creation—a
task whose reputation approximated “divinity” itself
There is, of course, a certain danger involved in
attempting to highlight a dimension of so broad and
vast a topic as that involving entire systems of knowl-
edge. Indeed, the task of identifying and following this
historical relationship, through its many nuanced mod-
ifications and subtle alterations, over as lengthy a peri-
od as we shall cover here, is both precarious and com-
plicated. Precarious because there is enough diversity
within scientific approaches, religious movements, and
psychological traditions as to make the use of these
categories risky. For this reason the use of science,
psychology, and religion will be applied to a limited
range of phenomena.2 The task of pursuing this inter-
action is also complicated because each of these disci-
plines intersects with and is shaped by a variety of
external forces. These external elements, such as philo-
sophical commitments or political sensibilities, make
the discernm ent of any causal interaction nearly
impossible. With these considerations in mind, this
article should be read as historically based commen-
tary, helpful in the creation of critical perspectives, and
not as a conventional historical narrative, with the
attendant task of trying to describe a continuous series
of seemingly decisive transformations.
The Concordance o f Science and Religion,
1800-1860

The amity that broadly characterizes the relation-
ship between science and religion in antebellum
America can be chiefly attributed to the dominance
of common-sense realism (Bozeman, 1977; Hov-
enkamp, 1978). This Scottish philosophy maintained
that the senses were the only reliable medium for
true knowledge, fostered a trust in the ability of
human beings to organize and classify the natural
world according to preestablished conceptions of
divine order, and encouraged a stout dependence on
induction as the only legitimate interpretive tool of
science (B ozem an, 1977; D aniels, 1968; Hov-
enkamp, 1978). Among the most ardent supporters
2The p s y c h o lo g ic a l traditions with which I am here con-
cerned-namely, experimentalist psychology, Watsonian
behavior-
ism, Skinnerian behaviorism, Freudian psychoanalysis, and cer-
tain expressions of humanistic clinical psychology—
demonstrate
an aversion toward those elements or aspects of reality that defy
experimental means of verification. Religion denotes an orienta-
tion to the world that posits the existence of God, and that of an
entire supernatural realm, as an ontological reality. Initially,
sei-
ence will signify a metaphysically-guided exploration of the
physi-
cal world; eventually, it will be used to describe a physicalist or
materialist orientation to the world and human experience.

A N T E C E D E N T S TO CONFLICT: PSYCHOLOGY A N D
RELIGION22
distinguishable, the reality is that they were conglom-
erated with the values of progress, freedom, ortho-
dox religion, morals, and individualism (Daniels,
1968; Martin, 1961). Together these ideals formed
the conceptual background for what many Ameri-
cans considered to be the essentials of a free demo-
cratic country. Hence when Americans supported a
scientific project, such as the creation of a learned
journal or periodical, they were also indirectly sup-
porting a melange of ideas crucial to their religious
identity and national purpose (Cotkin, 1992). To
oppose science on the basis of its dependence on reli-
gion was also to criticize a cluster of ideals that
enjoyed broad support in the new republic. As it was,
the near absence of dissent signals that the union of
science and religion symbolically functioned as an
intricate part of American democratic life (Bozeman,
1977; Cotkin, 1992; Hooykaas, 1972; Martin, 1961).
Yet another reason for the amiable character of
antebellum science and religion was the need to pro-
vide an alternative between the enthusiasm of evangel-
icals and the descendants of the Enlightenment, who
maintained that true scientific inquiry was inherently
at variance with Christian piety (Bozeman, 1977; Mar-
tin, 1961; Roberts, 1988). In response to the latter,
churchmen labored with angry energy to suppress [the notion
that science and religion were at odds].‫״‬ . An analysis o f the
basic approaches to the natural world, knowledge, and meth-

ods o f scientific inquiry ... reveals their firm conviction that
modern science, correctly conceived, was directly correlated
with Christian belief. Viewing nature as a divine creation, they
assessed scientific investigation as a potent aid to biblical
piety. (Bozeman, 1977, p. 44)
Refusing to concentrate solely on the more aesthetic or
emotional elements of evangelicals and repelled by the
subversive attempt of materialists to claim the scientific
enterprise for themselves, scientific realists set out to
show the correspondence between the doctrines of rev-
elation and the dictates of reason (Martin, 1961;
Roberts, 1988). In this way common-sense philosophy
provided the intellectual rationale for an earnest investi-
gation of the natural world—one that would neither
gloss over the physical intricacies in favor of personal
experience nor conclude that an honest appraisal of the
“facts” left great doubt in the reality of the supernatural.
It was indeed the perfect compromise.
T h e I n s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f S c i e n c e ,
1865-1900
With the conclusion of the American Civil War
there is a temptation to conceive of the relationship
(Bozeman, 1977; C onser, 1993; D aniels, 1968;
Greene, 1974). Added to this was the growing con-
viction among many Americans that a country devot-
ed to scientific principles would achieve a higher
state of perfection—one characterized by a sustain-
able peace, a productive industry, and fulfilled citi-
zens (Boiler, 1969; Daniels, 1968).

Crucial to the elevation of science was the role of
inductivist reason. Having associated the use of
deduction with the superstition of the Scholastics,
and anxious to distance themselves from anything
that was connected to the Old World, scientific real-
ists hoisted inductivist reason as the instrument best
suited for the discovery and organization of truth.3
Original to Aristotle, inductivism4—formulated by
Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in the 17th century and
later resuscitated by the 18th century Scottish philoso-
phers Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and Dugald Stewart
(1753-1828)-depicted an inquirer as simply focusing
on empirical “facts” and then generalizing the knowl-
edge attained in strict accordance with their observa-
tion and experience (Bozeman, 1977). Using indue-
tivism (as an epistemology) to answer questions about
God (which are partly ontological) afforded devout
scientists the luxury of applying the same conceptual
map to both physical and spiritual truths. However, in
applying this method to matters spiritual and material,
realists committed a grave error: They treated tradi-
tional metaphysical problems, such as the existence of
God or human immortality, identified by Kant as per-
taining to the noumenal realm, as phenomena5 (Kant,
1781/1993). It is no wonder then that early 19th cen-
tury realists averred that the realm of the transcendent
was as real as that of the material, and that both
spheres were amenable to “scientific” verification
(Bozeman, 1977; Hovenkamp, 1978).
While a modern treatment of 19th century natural
science and inductivist reasoning may convey the
impression that they were clearly separable or easily
3Inductivism is an epistemological system wherein the

conclusion
of any form of reasoning, though supported by the premises,
does not necessarily follow from them.
4See Hall (1966; part 2, sections 1 & 2) for a discussion on the
deductive dimension of common-sense philosophy.
5 Synthesizing Leibniz-Wolffian rationalism and Humean
skepti-
cism, Kant argued that “objective reality” is known only insofar
as
it conforms to the “essential structure of the knowing mind.” He
maintained that objects of experience-phenom ena-m ay be
known, but that things lying beyond the realm of possible
experi-
ence—noumena-are unknowable. Our field of knowledge, then,
is limited to the world of phenomena. For elaboration of this
point, see the “Transcendental Dialectic” in The Philosophy o f
Kant (Kant, 1781/1993).
Christianity imagined the earth to be 6 thousand
years old, Lyell understood it to be more like several
million years; and where the former conceived of the
original creation as taking place over a period of 6
days, the latter substituted an indefinite period of
time (Dillenberger, 1960; Haber, 1959; Millhauser,
1959). To be sure, this shift points to a significant dif-
ference in outlook between those modern men of sei-

ence, known for their sedulous preoccupation for
natural processes, and their devout predecessors,
who, like Adam Sedgwick (1785-1873) and Benjamin
Silliman (1779-1864), traditionally gave the transcen-
dent the determining role in their interpretations
(Gillispie, 1951; Millhauser, 1959; Wright, 1941). But
though it would be inaccurate to depict uniformitari-
anism as singly responsible for the decline in the plau-
sibility of a Mosaic geology, it is clear that, despite
attempts by conservatives to preserve a literal reading
of Genesis, and notwithstanding the efforts of pro-
gressivists to accommodate a naturalistic interpreta-
tion with divine superintendence, the general thrust
of Lyell’s theory attenuated a traditional religious cos-
mology (Brooke, 1991; Conser, 1993; Gillispie, 1951;
Greene, 1974; Millhauser, 1959).
Laplacian Astronomy
W ithin a decade of the com pletion of Lyell’s
Principles, the nebular hypothesis7 of the French
astronomer Pierre Simon Laplace (1749-1827) cap-
tured the attention, if not the imagination, of the
American people. Equally influenced by the rational-
ism8 of René Descartes (1596-1650), the naturalism9
of Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707-
1788), as well as the materialism10 of Democritus
(460-370 B.C.), Laplace described the solar system as
a self-sustaining machine whose existence is governed
by the inexorable laws of cause-and-effect (Barbour,
1966; Brooke, 1991; Greene, 1959; Haber, 1959;
M acLeod, 1975; Num bers, 1977). Although the
invention of such a universe cannot be ascribed to
Laplace himself, his interpretation is significant for its
omission of a “Supreme Contriver” (Hahn, 1981).

7Stated simply, the nebular hypothesis is a theory maintaining
that the solar system evolved from a mass of nebular matter.
8As a theory, rationalism maintains that reason alone, unaided
by
experience, can arrive at basic truth regarding the world.
9Naturalism is a philosophical posture that attempts to explain
all
phenomena and account for all values by means of strictly
natural
(as opposed to supernatural) categories.
10Materialism is a theory that considers matter and its motions
as
constituting the universe.
between science and religion as unstable. Although a
general shift in temper can be substantiated, nothing
like a wholesale disintegration occurred (Roberts,
1988). Thus the popular depiction of science and
religion as existing in perfect harmony before the
war (only to fall into strife afterw ards) must be
rejected for its simplicity and unidimensional charac-
ter (H ahn, 1986; M oore, 1979; Rudwick, 1981).
Instead, it is helpful to think of these two spheres as
multilayered and complex, constituted by a variety of
individuals and communities interacting within an
equally diverse set of social and historical contexts
(B rooke, 1991; C a rte r, 1971; M o o re , 1979).
However, since the primary aim of this article is to
highlight the historical roots of the modern tension
between psychology and religion, it is important to
give ample attention to the alteration of mood char-
acteristic of this period.

Lyellelian Geology
In an era in which a sizable number of the Ameri-
can people still believed that the biblical flood had
actually transpired and th at the earth itself was
between 4 to 6 thousand years old, Charles Lyell
(1797-1875) completed his Principles o f Geology
(Lyell, 1830-1833/1990). Within this massive three-
volume work, Lyell insisted that whatever geologic
forces were operative in the past also had to be recog-
nizable in the present (Gillispie, 1951; Greene, 1974;
Livingston, 1992; Millhauser, 1959). This actualism, a
m ain d o ctrin e o f u n ifo rm itarian ism ,6 n o t only
restricted geology’s scope to that which could be rati-
fied by the sense, but it effectively altered the very
foundation of natural history (Millhauser, 1959).
Whereas past geologic theories were judged more for
their congruence with a traditional religious world
view than for th e ir in d e p e n d e n t co h eren ce or
explanatory strength, the structural relationship
between modern geology and religion was such that
the validity of the latter’s doctrines depended on
their scientific plausibility rather than on their intrin-
sic merit as religious ideas (Carter, 1971). Geology,
once conceived as the most effective tool for the dis-
closure of divine purposes in the natural order, was
now challenging religion on several fronts: Whereas
6Originally proposed by James Hutton (1726-1797),
uniformitari-
anism claims that changes in the earth’s surface that occurred in
past geologic time are referable to the same causes as changes
actually being produced upon the earth’s surface. (Actualism

derives from the contextual meaning of the term actually. )
RELIGION24
notion of a direct and unmediated lineage connect-
ing the entire human race to the Edenic couple (Turn-
er, 1985). Scientists, such as Samuel G. M o rto n
(1799-1851), Josiah N o tt (1804-1873), and the
renowned Louis Agassiz (1807-1873), maintained
that the extraordinary differences of the human race,
most clearly testified to in their various cranial sizes
and shapes, were not the result of a single environ-
ment, such as the Garden of Eden, nor of a connate
condition, such as human nature, but of a series of
separate creations (Roberts, 1988; Turner, 1985).
Though seemingly innocuous, this theory of multiple
creations struck at the heart of another cherished
belief: the unity of humankind (Bozeman, 1977).
An ancient doctrine that enjoyed the imprimatur
of the powerful ecclesiastical establishment through-
out the Middle Ages, the idea of an unbroken human
genealogy arrived in the Gilded Age so intertwined to
the Christian faith as to be inseparable (see Nisbet,
1980). Viewing monogenism as an article of faith,
many 19th century Christians understood the new
science of anthropology, with its penchant for pre-
and non-Adamic peoples, as attempting to sever the
link between the human race and the One who was
the fulfillment of the redemptive historical drama
(Roberts, 1988). The first step in this subversive cam-
paign, so they thought, was the displacem ent of

Adam from his privileged place as forefather of the
human race. Indeed, a history without Adam—the
c o n d u it th ro u g h w hich sin e n te re d the
world—seemed to make Christ’s redemption otiose.
Despite stern opposition, the movement toward a
theory of multiple creations was far too potent a
force to be resisted successfully. As cause and conse-
quence of the shift away from the collection of data
and the explanation of individual facts to questions
to origins, relationships, and changes, the progress of
anthropology during the second half of the 19th cen-
tury rendered the account of the biblical primogeni-
tors dubious (Conser, 1993; Daniels, 1968; Liv-
ingston, 1992).
Chambers 5 N aturalism
America was still recuperating from the shock sus-
tained at the hands of the sciences when Robert
Chambers (1802-1871) released The Vestiges o f the
N atu ra l H istory o f Creation (Chambers, 1844).
W ithin this p se u d o sc ie n tific w ork, C ham bers
described the entire universe as one grand experi-
ment whose perpetual state of change and develop-
In positing matter in motion as the sole factor in
the emergence and m aintenance of the physical
world, Laplace signaled a definitive break with past
cosmologists who sought to understand the world in
light of a first cause. But if there was a measure of
innovation in Laplace’s thought, there was also some
continuity. In defining astronom y as a field con-
cerned with the discovery of invariable laws, Laplace
actually followed, n ot departed from, N ew ton.11
Laplace’s disregard for a first cause, therefore, is not
so much a sign of digressive metaphysics as it is the

maturation of ideas long in gestation (Brooke, 1991;
Cotkin, 1992; Greene, 1959). The irony in this trans-
formation consists in the fact that the eventual dis-
placem ent of God from the cosmos was in part
brought about by those who, like Newton, desired to
preserve, if not expand, the notion of a “superintend-
ing Deity” (Brooke, 1991; Greene, 1961). But as with
Lyellelian geology, the replacem ent of the Aris-
totelian paradigm12 in astronomy with the Newtoni-
an one—that is to say, with a mechanistic one—was
less an act of overt conquest than simply the gradual
recognition that the former failed to provide the
needed sophistication in the face of increasingly tech-
nical data (Brooke, 1991). Yet, despite the fact that
the excision of supernatural explanations was driven
chiefly by the desire for a more penetrating instru-
ment, and not necessarily from a wish to see religious
belief enfeebled, their displacement was still devastat-
ing. Over the long stretch, Laplace’s nebular hypothe-
sis lessened the public’s confidence in the role of
Providence while increasing their regard for natural
agencies (Dillenberger, 1960; Numbers, 1977).
Polygenism
Concurrent with developments in geology and
astronomy, a group of anthropologists challenged the
11The notion of a mechanized cosm os, though original to
Descartes (and subsequently carried to completion by Boyle and
Leibniz), was not radically reinterpreted by Newton. This is
seen
clearly in Alexander’s (1956) The Leibniz-Clarke Correspon-

dence, wherein Samuel Clarke, the defender of Newtonian
physics, argued time and again for an integrationist understand-
ing of cosmological mechanism and divine administration (see
especially pp. 12-14). In so doing, Clarke provided ample proof
that Newton (unwittingly) furthered the notion of a cosmos gov-
erned by secondary processes.
12Although Aristotle did n ot provide a single, m onolithic
paradigm, historians of science use Aristotelian astronomy
(espe-
dally when contrasted with Newtonian astronomy) to signify a
scheme characterized by the existence of souls, the agency of an
“unmoved mover,” and the reality of metaphysics.
M adure and Thomas Cooper in order to appreciate
the iconoclastic character of certain antebellum men
of science (Bozeman, 1977). However, the postbel-
lum period in America was peculiar in that it wit-
nessed the convergence—and therefore the intensifi-
cation—of several powerful forces that together
militated against belief in an intangible reality: These
included the rise of industrialization, the efflores-
cence of Darwinian theory, the exposure to other
cultures and traditions via massive immigration, and
the emergence of a sustained interest in comparative
religion and biblical criticism (Carter, 1971; Cotkin,
1992; Russett, 1976; Turner, 1985).

D a rw in s Challenge
Although each of these developments made an
important contribution, only Charles Darwin (1809‫־‬
1882) and the release of The Origin o f the Species
by N atural Selection (Darwin, 1859/1994) remain
the primary symbols of the intellectual and spiritual
restlessness of the Gilded Age (Himmelfarb, 1959).
The most salient component of Darwin’s theory, and
for this reason the element most vigorously contest-
ed, is the concept of natural selection. A combination
of domestic breeding techniques, the Malthusian
principle of population, and Lyell’s uniformitarian-
ism, natural selection meant that “in the universal
struggle for life, those varieties which were better suit-
ed to the struggle survived and reproduced while the
less favored die” (Himmelfarb, 1959, p. 313). At once
the means and end of evolution, natural selection was
quickly identified as potentially problematic for the
doctrine of special creation (Gillespie, 1979). Where-
as the older formulation viewed every organism as
uniquely created by a beneficent Deity, the Darwinian
interpretation saw the natural world as an accidental
p ro d u c t of eons of random physical variations
(Moore, 1979; Quillian, 1945; Roberts, 1988; Turner,
1985). Restricted to the doctrine of special creation,
natural selection was benign; however, in challenging
this religious dogma, Darwin also (unwittingly) con-
tested an intricately woven mosaic of theological
truths, philosophical insights, and cosmological theo-
ries (Boiler, 1969; G reene, 1961; M oore, 1979;
Roberts, 1988; Russett, 1976).
Among the most important doctrines implicated
by natural selection was the dignity of humankind
(see Darwin, 1871/1997). This ancient theological

maxim maintained that humankind’s nobility—evi-
denced by its superior powers of judgment, reason,
m en t was te n u o u sly p reserv ed by n atu ral law
(Greene, 1974; Himmelfarb, 1959; Millhauser, 1959).
Applying this dialectical model of the cosmos to the
organic world, Chambers claimed that the evolution
of the human race was intimately related to that of its
“brutish cousins,” and that all organisms, regardless
of their place in the “hierarchy of beings,” were prod-
ucts of a dynamic environm ent (Brooke, 1991;
Gillispie, 1951; Ruse, 1979). Such developmental
themes were not, of course, absolutely novel. The
notion that species’ development and transition was
guided by ineluctable laws stretched back to the time
of ancient Greece (Himmelfarb, 1959; Ruse, 1979;
Russett, 1976). What was more or less original with
Chambers was the extent to which his developmen-
talism depended on naturalistic categories. In con-
trast to earlier investigators, whose commitment to
certain metaphysical concepts framed and gave spe-
cial meaning to the particulars of nature, Chambers’s
examination seemed to denude the cosmos of all
metaphysical content:
The world o f Vestiges was one in which man was an animal
and an animal a machine—a world in which statistics took the
place o f miracle, and probability o f an immortal soul. It chal-
lenged not only hallowed single opinions but the whole habit
o f thought.... To the imagination o f the period, formed and
nurtured by traditional religion, hungering after its own cer-
tainties, it must have seemed to include everything—except the
All. (Millhauser, 1959, p. 164)
As the preceding section makes clear, the Gilded

Age witnessed the decline of traditional religious cat-
egories and a corresponding increase in the authori-
ty of science.13 The nature of this transformation,
however, was neither abrupt nor unexpected. In fact,
many of the scientific theories causing the most con-
cern at the time—the uniformitarianism of Lyell, the
nebular hypothesis of Laplace, even the organic
developmentalism of Chambers—had existed in one
form or another for many years. But while the late
19th century did not witness a violent revolution, it
did undergo a shift of mood. Evidence of this change
came when American scientists exercised their new
freedom by expressing doubt in God and resent-
ment toward established religion (Chadwick, 1975;
Turner, 1985). It was not, of course, as though doubt
had never been entertained or that contem pt for
organized religion was making a debut. One need
only recall the ath eistic ten d en cies of W illiam
13Although science is not an inherently progressive enterprise
whose advance necessarily erodes religious sensibilities, it
gained
crucial leverage in the 19th century.
RELIGION26
from the invisible, the former was considered to be
mired in subjectivism,14 hopelessly lost in intuition-
ism15 and metaphysics16 (Russett, 1976; Smith, 1961;
Turner, 1985). The latter, by contrast, was deemed
objective because it accepted no influence that could
not be verified by empirical facts (Turner, 1974).
Impelled by this positive epistem e,17 science took

the form of a unique and prescriptive approach to
knowledge, superior to all others, thoroughly com-
mitted to naturalistic explanations based on material
causes and the uniformity of physical laws (Gillespie,
1979). In subtle yet effective fash io n , science
changed from being a religiously controlled method
of investigation to a secular organizing principle. It
was now more than a method: It was the embodi-
ment of Truth.18
The B irth o f a Secular Psychology
When Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) established
the first psychological laboratory at the University of
Leipzig in 1879, he was doing more than evincing the
German predilection for experimental studies. He
was responding to the Zeitgeist by bringing “the
empirical methods of physiology to the questions of
philosophical psychology]” (Leahey, 1980, p. 188).
Although Wundt only intended to provide psycholo-
gy with an experimental basis, his work (especially in
the hands of Edward B. Titchener, 1867-1927) adum-
brated the eventual “divorce” of psychology and phi-
losophy (Danziger, 1979; Sexton, 1978). Since 1800,
psychology had been prim arily concerned with
human conduct, a sensibility that it learned from its
close association with theology and moral philoso-
phy (Sexton, 1978). But in the naturalistic climate of
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this preoccu-
14Subjectivism is a philosophical view that attempts to under-
stand in a subjective manner what initially appears to be a class
of
judgments that are objectively either true or false.

15Intuitionism is the doctrine that knowledge rests upon
axiomat-
ic truths discerned directly.
16Metaphysics is identified in this article as an abstruse branch
of
philosophy.
17Episteme signifies the collective assumptions regarding
knowl-
edge, its essence, as well as its limits. For an elaboration of this
term, see chapter one of Gillespie’s (1979) Charles D arwin and
the Problem o f Creation: “Positivism and Creationism: Two
Epistemes.”
18One of the consequences of the emergence of a positivistic
sei-
ence was the estrangement of psychologists and philosophers.
Though the focus of this article is clearly on the former, it is
important to remember that philosophers also called for the sep-
aration of their discipline. See Toulmin and Leary (1992): “The
Cult of Empiricism in Psychology, and Beyond,” pp. 599-600.
and spirituality-rested on being made in the image of
God. But this nobility depended in part on there
being a clear distinction between the human race and
the animal kingdom. The arrival of Darwinian evolu-
tion shattered this neat division, replacing the fixed
boundary between animal, vegetable, and human
types with an elastic and permeable membrane (Him-
melfarb, 1959): “No sharp line separated human and
animal life, either in historical development or in pre-
sent circumstances” (Barbour, 1990, p. 155). Human
beings, once thought too sublime to share any resem-

blance with the beasts, were now incapable of com-
prehension apart from their more lowly cousins. But
if Darwin helped reacquaint humans with their feral
kin, he also alienated them from God and estranged
them from their own divinity (Boiler, 1969). Central
to this disaffection was the secularization of morals.
Historical Judaism and Christianity posited God as
the ultimate source for ethics; Darwinism, however,
implied that conscience or moral sensibility resulted
from human evolution (Brooke, 1991; Quillian, 1945;
Roberts, 1988). Formulations of right and wrong,
therefore, were the consequence of human negotia-
tion and experience, not the result of divine decree.
In sum, this humanistic view of morality, together
with the apotheosis of natural selection and the weak-
ening of the d istin c tio n b etw een anim als and
humans, added its weight to the disintegration of a
traditional religious world view.
When com pared to the previous century, the
American ethos in the early 1900s revealed dramat-
ic changes. The old union between science and reli-
gion was, to a large extent, nonexistent (James,
1902/1994). Released from its obligation to theolo-
gy, science asserted itself as an autonomous field of
study, indifferent to, if not antagonistic towards,
traditional religion (Bozeman, 1977; Turner, 1985).
N o longer an enterprise given to the discovery of
absolute truth, the new science, though still regard-
ed with supreme deference, became a methodology
concerned with unearthing probable and piecemeal
truths (Croce, 1995; H ahn, 1981; M oore, 1979;
Russett, 1976). Scientists themselves, once noted
for their religious devotion, were now generally dis-
interested in religious m atters (Gillespie, 1979;
Leuba, 1934).

Underlying this intricate transformation was a
subtle shift in philosophy from an orientation that
saw the supernatural as an active force in the natural
world to one that explained all things in purely physi-
cal terms. Because it attempted to explain the visible
ism” (Roback, 1964, p. 276). Hillner added that “all
behavior ultimately is assumed to be reducible to
molecular ones” (Hillner, 1984, p. 117). This physi-
calist orientation allowed behaviorists to dismiss
internal sources of behavior while concentrating on
external manifestations—such as limbs, muscles, and
glands (Hillner, 1984). The reason for such a prefer-
ence is clear: Behaviorists wanted their data to be
observable, testable, and predictable. Thus an exter-
nal and environmental focus—which allows for the
prediction and control of behavior—also provided
researchers with data that was objective and verifi-
able, attributes that put behaviorism on the par with
physics, physiology, and chemistry (Hillner, 1984;
Roback, 1964).
From this narrow methodological scheme, it was
a short distance to an ideological behaviorism. This
last step was taken w hen (radical) behaviorists
claimed that, as an exhaustive explanatory system,
their approach was capable of accounting for the
totality of human behavior—a claim that also implied
the entire range of hum an experience (Sexton,
1978). Roback has captured the breadth of the
behaviorist program:

The clean-up’ season started with the conversion o f sensa-
tions and percep tion s into discrim inatory resp onses, the
reduction o f all imagery to kinaesthetic reactions, the ‘discov-
ery’ o f the basis o f the feelin gs w ith the tun escen ce and
detumescence of the genitalia, the referral o f association and
ence. Tolman’s unwillingness to limit psychology to stimuli and
responses—which are, at bottom, chemical processes-reflect the
influence of thinkers like Mead, whose approach to human psy-
chology was sufficiently broad as to include the contributions of
“nature” and “nurture.” This pluralistic approach was also
present
in the work of the American philosopher and psychologist E. B.
Holt (1873-1946). Holt, who oscillated between objectivism and
subjectivism, saw that an extreme behaviorism would make the
materialist’s mistake of denying the facts, as well as the theory,
of
consciousness. Though he described his own behaviorism as
part
of the objective tendency to abolish the subjective, he
consciously
sought to avoid repudiating the “facts” of consciousness.
Despite
Holt’s desire to navigate between both extremes, his final work,
“Materialism and the Criterion of the Psychic” (Holt, 1937)
reveals his materialist loyalty. Therein he argued that mind and
cognition are neither mental nor cognitive, but physical—a
matter
of nerves and muscles. The active self is the physical body, that
and nothing else. Anything other than that, whether a self, ego,

soul, or knower, does not exist. Clearly these remarks place
Holt
in a long philosophical tradition which, at least in America,
extends back to the pragmatism of C. S. Peirce and William
James. Thus the neobehaviorist preoccupation with measuring
and controlling an organism’s behavior—whether in the narrow
Watsonian sense or in the broader Tolmian sense—must be con-
sidered the intellectual progeny of logical positivism, American
pragmatism, and neorealism.
p atio n seem ed anachronistic. The tem per now
enshrined the scientific values of measurement, pre-
dictability, practicality, experimentalism,19 and neu-
trality (Robinson, 1995). In the place of the old spec-
ulative concerns, such as the nature of the soul or the
quality of truth, the new psychology concerned itself
with an experimental approach to consciousness
(Sexton, 1978). This “aphilosophical orientation,”
wrote psychologist Virginia Staudt Sexton, “led ulti-
mately to what became known as the science of
behavior, a strictly objective psychology” (Sexton,
1978, p. 7).
Behaviorism
“Founded” by John B. Watson (1878-1958) in
1913, behaviorism carried W undt’s preference for
facts to yet another level.20 Where earlier experimen-
talists tolerated such things as hypotheses, behavior-
ists after Watson maintained that the “true” disci-
pline of psychology could have nothing to do with
“consciousness, mental states, introspection, uncon-
scious processes, and other ‘ghosts’” (Robinson,
1995, p. 405). According to these thinkers, psycholo-

gy should restrict its attention to the peripheral ner-
vous system and to specific muscular and glandular
responses21 (Hillner, 1984; Roback, 1964). Roback
described this form of psychology as “hinging upon
the musculature and motor expression of the organ-
19Experimentalism is the doctrine or practice relying on experi-
mentation as the sole means of verification.
20Watson’s continuation of Wundtian experimentalism (as well
as his innovation therefrom) is best represented in Watson’s
(1925) Behaviorism.
21In general, neobehaviorists maintained that what an organism
does is the (only) source of legitimate data. However,
researchers
like E. C. Tolman (1886-1959) departed from this strict form of
behaviorism and included a wide range of purposeful or goal-
directed outcomes into their behavioral scheme. Historically
regarded, the inclusion of such nonbehavioral processes is a sig-
nificant reinterpretation of Watsonian behaviorism. Thus where-
as Tolman’s commitment to the study of human behavior consti-
tuted a continuation of the behaviorist tradition, his inclusion of
previously neglected elements, such as cognition, represented a
substantial innovation. Such a pluralistic approach is also
evident
in the work of George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), American
philosopher and psychologist. In studying the development of
the minds, for example, Mead saw it as the natural emergent
from the interaction of the human organism and its social envi-
ronment. Within this bio-social structure, the gap between
impulse and reason is bridged by the use of language. By
master-

ing language, humankind is able to make assumptions about the
self, which give intelligence an historical development that is
nat-
ural and moral. Mead called this social behaviorism, using con-
duct—both social and biological-as an approach to all experi-
RELIGION28
Freudian Psychoanalysis
Following the traditional interpretation, recent
commentators indicate that Freud was generally nega-
tive in his estimation of the transcendent, God, and
organized religion (Batson, Schoenrade, &: Ventis,
1993; Wallace, 1984; Wulff, 1991). Indeed, Freud’s own
writing testifies to an antipathy for things religious. In
an article entitled “Obsessive Actions and Religious
Practices,” Freud (1907/1961) tied religious rituals to
the repression of unconscious sexual energy. In Totem
and Taboo, Freud (1913) claimed that modem social
organizations, moral restrictions, and religious institu-
tions were the product of an ancient Totemic ceremo-
ny. And in his most polemical work, The Future o f an
Illusion, Freud (1928/1961) argued that belief in a
“fatherly Deity” derives solely from a need for physical
and emotional protection. Though each of these con-
elusions sounds like a proper psychoanalytic interpreta-
tion of the religious life, Freud actually used psycho-
analysis with a polemical in ten t—as a m ethod of
explaining away the phenomenon under observation
(Paloutzian, 1996; Westphal, 1993): “[Freud’s] psycho-
analysis was an exegetical discipline that reduced all

religious phenomena to its own categories of conceptu-
alization. God is projection, prayer is omnipotence of
thoughts and wish-fulfillment, [and] ritual is obsession-
ality” (Wallace, 1984, p. 147).
With the reduction of religion to psychoanalytic
categories, Freud crossed the line between the inves-
tigation of psychological meaning and the establish-
m ent of ontological veracity (W estphal, 1993).
Almost imperceptibly, Freud shifted from being a
therapist dedicated to the alleviation of mental and
emotional disorders to being a philosopher autho-
rized in the area of determining the ultimate justifica-
tion of religious beliefs (Wallace, 1984). In so doing,
Freud equated religious commitment with intellectu-
al weakness and emotional disturbance (see Freud,
1907/1961,1928/1961). This last step had important
ramifications for the way psychologists approached
religious phenom ena: Where early psychologists
silently tolerated the presence of theologians and
ecclesiastics, and countenanced the inclusion of cer-
tain religious material into the curriculum, after
Freud, psychologists either paid little attention to
religion or identified it as deleterious to health.24
24Of course, not all of Freud’s successors have taken an
antireli-
gious posture. Here I am only concerned with that (small) group
of psychologists that continued the antimetaphysical legacy
inherited from the 19th century sciences.
memory to conditioned reflexes and habits, the casting out of
instincts and all congenital tendencies ... and the transforma-
tion o f attention to a matter o f selective response. (Roback,

1964, p. 277)
The shift from a methodological behaviorism, con-
cerned with stimuli and responses, oriented toward
the physical, material aspects of an organism, to an
ideological one, intent on restricting the world of
experience to the parameters of experimental sei-
ence, meant that an antimetaphysical psychology
was not far away (Leahey, 1980; Robinson, 1995;
Toulmin & Leary, 1992).
Although Watsonian behaviorism did not survive
past the 1940s, the logical positivism that it depend-
ed on found expression in the work of B. F. Skinner
(1904-1990). Skinner had little patience for anything
that was incompatible with the principles of behav-
ioral science (see Skinner, 1948, 1972), including
religion, which he saw as preoccupied with “the suf-
fering of martyrs, the torments of the damned, [and]
the tender emotions of the family” (Skinner, 1953,
pp. 352-353). According to Skinner, these “contin-
gencies” were “used by the [religious] agency for
purposes of control” (Skinner, 1953, p. 355). And
“religious agencies,” insisted Skinner,“... have some-
times used their power for personal or institutional
advantages—to build organizations, to accumulate
wealth, to punish those who do not come under
control easily, and so on” (Skinner, 1953, p. 358).
Rather than a singular instance of antireligious bias,
however, these remarks must be understood within
the broader context of an increasingly narrow epis-
temology-one which delimited human experience
to the experim entally verifiable (Roback, 1964;
Toulm in & Leary, 1992). S kinner’s com m ents,
therefore, give particular expression to a growing

antimetaphysical impulse that denies vast tracks of
human experience while simultaneously enshrining
the experimental m ethod as its own metaphysic
(McKeown, 1981; R obinson, 1995; T oulm in &
Leary, 1992; Turner, 1974). In a parallel sense,22 this
tendency to reject certain ontological categories,
unwittingly broached by Wundt, shaped by Watson
and Skinner, found its most formidable proponent
in Sigmund Freud (1856-1939).23
22I thank Dr. Bernard Spilka for this point.
23Freud’s rejection of certain metaphysical phenomena is
indeed
curious considering that psychoanalysis was, until the 1950s,
deemed suspect because it defied scientific means of
verification.
See Hornstein (1992) for elaboration of “psychology’s problem-
atic relations with psychoanalysis.”
29ÁN G EL DE JESÚ S CORTÉS
gence of an autonomous science-exemplified in the
works of Lyell, Laplace, Chambers, and Darwin—
resulted in the belief that “the corporeal or the mate-
rial is the fundamental fact—the mental or the spiritu-
al only its effect” (Maudsley, 1918, p. 17). Encircled
by this philosophical materialism, and desirous of
attaining scientific status, psychology jettisoned its
theological and philosophical identity and replaced
it with an empirical and experimental one. The con-
sequent emergence of certain behavioral, psychoana-
lytic, and humanistic traditions have been modern
vehicles for the expression of this preference.25 Final-

ly, though the current relationship between psychol-
ogy and religion cannot be solely described in terms
of conflict, tension, and discord (there is, in fact, evi-
dence to suggest that a kind of conciliation is under
way), the impulse to remove or reject the metaphysi-
cal dimension of life has been a constant thread in
psychology ever since science and religion went their
separate ways.
R e f e r e n c e s
Alexander, H. G. (1956). The Leihniz-Clarke correspondence.
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25Of the many humanist traditions since the 14th century
Renais-
sanee, (at least) three stand out as “empiricist.” The
philosophies
of the 18th century Enlightenment, the pragmatic humanists of
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20th
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as the supreme source of human knowledge.
Clinical-theoretical Psychology
Nowhere is this shift of orientation more evident
than in the work of Albert Ellis (1913-), founder of
Rational Emotive Therapy (RET) and the author of
scores of books and articles. After 40 years of writing
and lecturing as an RET clinician, Ellis is perhaps the
most vocal antireligious psychologist since Sigmund
Freud (see Ellis, 1980, 1986a, 1986b). In a famous
article entitled “A Case Against R eligion,” Ellis

(1966) concluded that religious devotion induces
pathology. Within approximately 10 years of this arti-
cle, he wrote that personal religious belief or com-
mitment signaled “profound and pervasive gullibili-
ty” (Ellis, 1977, p. 38). And in an article on the
relationship between nuclear destruction and eccen-
trie forms of religiosity, he averred: “Belief in [the]
afterlife and commitment to a religious group neces-
sarily leads to an irrational and murderous desire to
exterminate all those who do not hold the same con-
victions” (Ellis, 1986b, p. 148).
Despite his extreme and tendentious orientation,
Ellis is not without supporters. Wendell W. Watters, a
Canadian psychiatrist, author of Deadly Doctrine:
Health, Illness, and Christian God-Talk (Watters,
1992), recently aligned himself with Ellis by identify-
ing religion as the sole perpetrator of a host of human
ills. Among them are sexual dysfunctions, an inability
to communicate openly, an incapacity to express
anger and resentment in a normal and adaptive way,
an incompetence relative to dealing with people of
different races, and an increase in the likelihood of
suffering from a m ental illness (W atters, 1992).
According to Watters, such a catalogue of ills stems
from the fact that Christianity is “incompatible with
the principles of sound mental health and contributes
more to the genesis of human suffering that to its alle-
viation” (Watters, 1987, p. 5). Although recent scholar-
ship on religion and mental and physical health
refutes such vitriolic expressions (see Gartner, Larson,
& Allen, 1991; Larson & Larson, 1991; Levin & Van-
derpool, 1991; Payne, Bergin, Bielema, &C Jenkins,
1991), Ellis and Watters nevertheless symbolize the
nadir of the relationship between psychology and reli-
gion.

Conclusion
In surveying the history of psychology, it is clear
that the bitter commentary of Freud, Ellis, and Wat-
ters is part of a legacy that has roots in the divorce of
science from religion, I have shown how the emer-
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