Building the Dreadnought (£41bn - formally Successor - submarine class) Adrian Ellis APM Programme Management SIG Conference 2017, 02 March 17, Rolls-Royce Learning and Development Centre Derby

1. Dreadnought
• Continuous at Sea Deterrence
• 4 Submarines
• New Design
• New Reactor
• New Common Missile Compartment
• New Facilities- Barrow, Derby
• New tools- IT systems
• Support Infrastructure- Faslane,
Devonport
• Trainers- Faslane, USA
• National Endeavour

2. Programme Context: Megaprojects (£ Billions)
2

3. The Challenge
Trident debate: MPs vote to renew UK's nuclear deterrent system
• “It will be managed by a new delivery body for the procurement
and in-service support of all nuclear submarines. That will ensure
that, unlike in previous warship programmes, the submarines are
delivered on time and on budget.”
Michael Fallon MP, House of Commons, 18 July 2016 (Hansard)

4. Risk Context
•Dreadnought programme has considerable risk characterised by;
• Novelty: the design incorporates a new reactor, Common Missile Compartment, secondary
propulsion, hull design and weapon handling system.
• New Technology: With only limited prototyping opportunity, new technology will only be
proven on the first of class.
• Complexity: Delivery and operation of Dreadnought will be dependent on the integration of
the many different systems on the platform, and of the platform with the support
infrastructure at Clyde and Devonport and the firing chain.
• Pace: Dreadnought has to relieve the Vanguard Class on time to maintain Continuous At Sea
Deterrence - the pace is high.
• Programme management arrangements need to be designed to manage the risks inherent in
such a novel and complex submarine.
4

5. The Problem- Avoid this report by NAO/PAC
“Management of the … programme has been extraordinarily poor.
Oversight has been characterised by a failure to understand properly the
nature and enormity of the task, a failure to monitor and challenge
progress regularly and a failure to intervene when problems arose.
Senior managers only became aware of problems through ad hoc
reviews mostly conducted by external reviewers, as inadequate
management information and reporting arrangements had not alerted
them that things were amiss.” King (2013).
King, A., Crewe, I. The Blunders of Our Governments, One World, 2013.

6. Reality of Major Programmes
• “managers must work at the edge of chaos, where linear
systems begin to fail and non-linear systems begin to
dominate. It is at this edge that managers can continue to
exercise basic controls while hunting for new ideas and
systems to change the way projects are constructed”.
Singh and Singh (2002)

7. Resilient Themes
Robust
Requirements
Pragmatic
Processes
Adaptive
Organisations
Relational
Contracts
Care of the programme
community
Training and
Learning
Contingent
Approvals
Respect for
Quality
Mindful
Leadership

8. Relational Contracting
“...of significant duration….. Many individuals with individual
and collective poles of interest are involved in the relations.
Future cooperative behaviour is anticipated. The benefits of
the relation are to be shared rather than divided and
allocated….. Trouble is expected as a matter of course…. It
is an ongoing integration of behaviour in a largely
unforeseeable future.”
Macneill (2001)
The need for Collaboration in addition
to managing the transactions.

9. Design the Programme=Design the Submarine
• “The lesson is that we have to ensure that we give as much
attention to the design of the programme as we do to the
design of the artefact. We have to give as much attention to
the development of the programme plans as we do to the
working drawings and we have to have the power of
assessing the extent to which the.…facilities are likely to be
sufficient, and we have to ensure quality at every stage.”
Brown, 1983 quoting Sir Rowland Baker RCNC reflecting on
delivering the Dreadnought and Resolution Nuclear Submarine
Programmes in the 1960s

10. Resilient Organisations Act Mindfully
• Mindfulness - a rich awareness of discriminatory detail and the ability to organise to notice the unexpected, halt it, or
contain it or, if it breaks through containment, focus on resilience to restore system functioning
• Anticipation:
- Preoccupation with failure. They encourage reporting of errors when more options exist for rectifying them.
- Reluctance to simplify. They resist oversimplification by carefully categorising errors and encouraging dialogue
between teams with diverse backgrounds so errors are better understood.
- Sensitivity to operations. They record what is actually happening and not what is supposed to be happening.
• Containment:
- Maintaining capabilities for resilience. This includes the use of expert networks, an extensive action repertoire and
improvisation.
- Deferring to expertise. In response to unexpected events, the organisation can take advantage of shifting locations of
expertise within the organisation for easy access to expert resources.
• Culture:
- Reporting culture where people are prepared to report their errors and near misses which requires care in handling
blame.
- Just culture where people are encouraged to provide information but there is a clear boundary between acceptable
and unacceptable behaviour.
- Sources:
- Weick K., Sutcliffe, K., (2007), Managing the Unexpected. Resilient Performance in an Age of Uncertainty, John
Wiley and Sons, San Francisco, CA.
- Reason, J., (1997), Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, Ashgate, Aldershot, Hants, pp. 195.

11. Coping with Uncertainty
• Processes including project controls are essential but
insufficient.
• “Something one cannot understand constitutes a painful
void, a puncture, a permanent stimulus that insists on being
satisfied.” Primo Levi (1987)
• Truth emerges from arguments between friends- David
Hume
• Relationships to allow questioning, discussion, challenge
and support.

12. Use of Imperfect Data - Maieutic Machine
Macintosh and Quattrone (2010, pp. 330-334) define a maieutic
machine as a
machine “for producing knowledge by asking questions rather than
giving answers”.

13. Megaprojects and Wicked Problems
• Heifetz and Linsky “Leadership on the Line” (2002) emphasise the need to stand
back and reflect on the whole problem to develop the next action. They use the
metaphor of moving between the dance floor and the balcony. They also emphasis
the need to think politically and build relationships but regulate the tension to
maintain progress.
• Grint(2005) which shows that as the solutions to problems become less certain the
need forcollaborative compliance increases. The leader needs to enable more
questions through effective relationships.
Wicked Problems- No obvious solution.
• Stand Back,
• Reflect,
• Build Effective Relationships,
• Ask Questions

14. Problems don’t come with
labels. Problems often
contain elements that are
critical, tame and wicked.
Problem Solving

15. Learning
Black Box Thinking by
M Syed.
• Failing Fast to
Learn Fast
• Just Culture
• Humility
• Perseverance

16. Trusted to deliver excellence
© 2017 Rolls-Royce plc and/or its subsidiaries
The information in this document is the property of Rolls-Royce plc and/or its subsidiaries and may not be copied or communicated to a third party, or
used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied without the express written consent of Rolls-Royce plc and/or its subsidiaries.
This information is given in good faith based upon the latest information available to Rolls-Royce plc and/or its subsidiaries, no warranty or representation
is given concerning such information, which must not be taken as establishing any contractual or other commitment binding upon Rolls-Royce plc and/or
its subsidiaries.
Dreadnought
Programme Management of a New Reactor Plant
• Complexity and Uncertainty
• In a Collaborative Environment

17. Trusted to deliver excellence
Rolls-Royce Proprietary Information
Rolls-Royce Submarines
Reactor Compartment –
RR is TA and sole supplier
Key Facts
• A naval reactor core is the size of a TRENT XWB engine, has
greater maximum power and does not need refuelling.
• The sound energy transmitted into the water is equivalent to a
modern car engine at idle.
• The plant has a similar rate of change of power to a gas turbine.
• Naval reactor plant must operate safely and meet naval shock
criteria whilst in a highly manoeuvrable submarine.
Propulsion system –
RR supplies key equipment as
OEM

18. The Challenge …..
18
RISK FACTORS
NOVELTY, NEW TECHNOLOGY,
COMPLEXITY & PACE
+ first all new project in a
generation and critical path activity
All new design of plant
New ways of working
New people & bigger team and
inexperienced leaders

19. Re-Capitalisation & Capability Development
Raynesway Engineering Labs
Atlantic House
Factory
Factory

20. Managing the Uncertainty
20
• Get Help and Value the Views of Others
• Set Out Our Way & Identity
• Focus on Project Framework and Stick to it

21. Project Framework
21
BAE Systems – Shipyard Whole Boat Design Framework
MoD Customer Governance and Approval
Agree the
Collaboration
Fundamentals
Division of
Responsibilities
Design management
Arrangements
Integrated Project
Teams - managing
master schedules
MoD Phase contracting with developing maturity
Rolls-Royce accept contracts
as uncertainty reduces
contract phased release

22. Trusted to deliver excellence
The Integrated Programme Management Team (IPMT)
Successor
IPMT
MoD
BAE
Systems
Rolls
Royce
Babcock
Marine
Electric
Boat
•Client
•Design Authority
•Supplier of GF*
•Submarine
•Design
•Build
•Commission
•WBTA
•Design the
support
•Support the
design
•CMC
•NSRP
•Design
•Make
•Commission
•NSRP TA

23. Enduring Collaboration from Sustained Focus

24. Key lessons Learnt – no surprise and no
magic
• SECURING AND KEEPING TO KEY DECISIONS & DO IT
COLLABORATIVELY
• BUILD A STABLE AND COMMITTED TEAM – KEY PEOPLE STAYED IN
KEY POSTS
• HEARTBEAT OF STRUCTURED REVIEWS + LEADERSHIP ‘IRON WILL’
• FOCUS ON THE WAR NOT THE BATTLES letting stuff go
• ORGANISATIONAL HUMILITY - KEEP LISTENING AND ACTING ON
EXPERT ADVICE … always seek and face up to the facts, be aware of your
weaknesses and act on these things
24

25. People and the whole enterprise matters
• A programme team needs the support of the whole business
and surrounding enterprise and mobilising that energy was
key in the latter stages of detailed design
• ENGAGEMENT KEY – working with unions and operations
management
• Do lots of little things that enable staff focus eg deferring non
critical activities identified by them, flex the holiday rules +
many late night whole team sessions fuelled by pizzas
25

26. Challenge Now – Design to Production
APQP framework
– Integrated Product and Production Readiness at Rolls- Royce
Long lead buys and
supply chain mobilisation
Develop the Integrated
project team to the next
stage for build

27. Achievements to Date – on time to the day (5yrs and £3bn+)
• Design Maturity
• Supply Chain
- Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE)
- Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)
• Enablers
- Facilities
- IPDE
- Build processes
• Construction
• Programme Management
• Training solution
• In-service
- Support solution

28. Conclusion
• Project Controls are necessary but
insufficient
• Mindful Leadership
• Effective Relationships- high challenge
and support
• Questions to inform discussions
• Solutions emerge
• Culture - just and reporting and learning
• Planned uncertainty remains high
• Phased release of build will manage this
• The Project Organisation & Frameworks
will continue to evolve ….
Larciani Giovanni di Lorenzo
Allegoria della fortuna
Described as the allegory of
uncertainty in Uffizi Museum
Florence.

29. “It is what you don’t think about that gets
you”
• TV signals 'being blocked' by huge new BAE submarine
complex for building Trident replacement
• Defence contractors BAE are building the 135 foot high
extension at their Barrow shipyard, in Cumbria. Daily Mirror
Dec.2015.

30. This presentation was delivered
at an APM event
To find out more about
upcoming events please visit our
website www.apm.org.uk/events