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The Anatomy of an Anonymous

        Carolina Bozza
       Security Engineer

           May 2012
Imperva ?
    Who we are and what we do




2
Next Generation Threats Require New Approach




                        Tech. Attack                                                           Usage
                         Protection                                                            Audit
                        Logic Attack                                                         User Rights
                         Protection                                                          Management
                          Fraud                                                                Access
                        Prevention                                                             Control

      External                                                                                                Internal
       Customers                                                                                                Employees
      Staff, Partners                                                                                        Malicious Insiders
         Hackers                                                                                           Compromised Insiders



                                             Data Center
                                              Systems and Admins




        Imperva’s Mission is to Provide a Complete Solution
                                       © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  3
Hacktivism

        From Wikipedia:
      HACK + ACTIVISM - the use of
 computers and computer networks as a
  means of protest; (…) hacktivism could
  be defined as "the nonviolent use of
    legal and/or illegal digital tools in
  pursuit of political ends". These tools
include web site defacements, denial-of-
  service attacks, information theft, (…)
 Acts of hacktivism are carried out in the
  belief that proper use of code will be
 able to produce similar results to those
   produced by regular activism or civil
              disobedience.
   4
What is Anonymous?


                                                             Reality
     What they claim to be:
                                                 “Anonymous is an umbrella for
     Anonymous is an Internet meme (…),           anyone to hack anything for any
        representing the concept of many                     reason.”
       online and offline community users              —New York Times, 27 Feb 2012

            simultaneously existing as
       an anarchic, digitized global brain.     Targets include porn sites, Mexican
                                              drug lords, Sony, government agencies,
                                                banks, churches, law enforcement ,
     Hacktivists fighting for moral causes.
                                              airline, São Paulo’s Mayor and Vladimir
                                                                Putin.

                                                     Anyone can be a target.


 5
The Plot - The anatomy of an Anonymous Attack


                         Attack took place in 2011 over a 25
                         day period.
                         Anonymous was on a deadline to
                         breach and disrupt a website, a
                         proactive attempt at hacktivism.
                         10-15 skilled hackers or “geniuses.”
                         Several hundred to a thousand
                         supporters.




  6
On the Offense



                 Skilled hackers—This group, around 10
                 to 15 individuals per campaign, have
                 genuine hacking experience and are
                 quite savvy.


                 Nontechnical—This group can be quite
                 large, ranging from a few dozen to a few
                 hundred volunteers. Directed by the
                 skilled hackers, their role is primarily to
                 conduct DDoS attacks by either
                 downloading and using special software
                 or visiting websites designed to flood
                 victims with excessive traffic.

  7
On the Defense




     Deployment line was network firewall, WAF, web servers and anti-virus.
     Imperva WAF
      + SecureSphere WAF version 8.5 inline, high availability
      + ThreatRadar reputation
      + SSL wasn’t used, the whole website was in HTTP
     Unnamed network firewall and IDS
     Unnamed anti-virus

 8
Phase #1
    Recruiting and Communications

9
An “Inspirational” Videos




  10
Social Media Helps Recruit




  11
Phase #2
     Recon and Application Attack
     “Avoid strength, attack weakness: Striking where the enemy is
                            most vulnerable.”
                               —Sun Tzu




12
Finding Vulnerabilities



       Tool #1: Vulnerability Scanners
       Purpose: Rapidly find application vulnerabilities.
       Cost: $0-$1000 per license.
       The specific tools:
        + Acunetix (named a “Visionary” in a Gartner 2011 MQ)
        + Nikto (open source)




  13
Hacking Tools

       Tool #2: Havij
       Purpose:
        + Automated SQL injection
          and data harvesting tool.
        + Solely developed to take
          data transacted by
          applications
       Developed in Iran




  14
Phase #3
      DDoS

15
Hacking Tools

       Low-Orbit Ion Canon (LOIC)
       Purpose:
        + DDoS
        + Mobile and Javascript variations
        + Can create 200 requests per second per browser window




  16
Anonymous and LOIC in Action

                                700000



                                600000


                                                                                                        LOIC in Action
 Transactions per Second




                                500000



                                400000



                                300000



                                200000


                                                                                                                 Average Site Traffic
                                100000



                                     0
                                         Day 19   Day 20   Day 21   Day 22   Day 23   Day 24   Day 25   Day 26     Day 27   Day 28



                           17
LOIC Facts

       LOIC downloads
        + 2011: 381,976
        + 2012 (through March 19): 318,340
        + Jan 2012=83% of 2011’s downloads!


       Javascript LOIC:
        + Easy to create
        + Iterates up to 200 requests per minute
        + Can be used via mobile device.




  18
Anybody can be an anonymous!




                Let’s Demo!!
 19
I’ve spent a lot of money…
     And why I’m not Safe Yet?




20
I have IPS and NGFW, am I safe?

        IPS and NGFWs do not prevent web application attacks.
         + Don’t confuse “application aware marketing” with Web Application Security.


        WAFs at a minimum must include the following to protect
        web applications:


       • Web-App Profile
       • Web-App Signatures
       • Web-App Protocol Security
       • Web-App DDOS Security                   Security Policy Correlation
       • Web-App Cookie Protection
       • Anonymous Proxy/TOR IP Security
       • HTTPS (SSL) visibility


  21
I have IPS and NGFW, am I safe?

        IPS and NGFWs do not prevent web application attacks.
         + Don’t confuse “application aware marketing” with Web Application Security.


        However, IPS and NGFWs at best only partially support the
        items in Red:


       • Web-App Profile
       • Web-App Signatures
       • Web-App Protocol Security
       • Web-App DDOS Security                   Security Policy Correlation
       • Web-App Cookie Protection
       • Anonymous Proxy/TOR IP Security
       • HTTPS (SSL) visibility


  22
I have IPS and NGFW, am I safe?


  • IPS & NGFW Marketing – They have at least one web-app feature so
  they market themselves as a solution.

  • IPS & NGFW gaps to WAF – WAFs provide far more web-app features than
  IPS and NGFWs. IPS and NGFWs do not even meet the most minimal requirements of
  web application security.


  • False Sense of Security - IPS and NGFWs are creating a false sense of security
  with their claims and are leaving organizations like the ones we have previously
  mentioned susceptible to web application penetration.




  23
Anonymous targets that we know of, so far…
      US Department of Justice                 Polish Prime Minister              Muslim Brotherhood
         US Copyright Office            Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs                UMG
                  FBI                    Polish Internal Security Agency                 PayPal
                 MPAA                        French Presidential Site                 Mastercard
           Warner Brothers                  Austria Ministry of Justice                   Visa
                 RIAA                  Austria Ministry of Internal Affairs            US Senate
                HADOPI                    Austria Ministry of Economy                      CIA
                  BMI                       Austria Federal Chancellor                  Citibank
                 Sony                               Slovenia NLB                          Itau
                Amazon                      Mexican Interior Ministry               Banco do Brazil
        Church of Scientology                     Mexican Senate               Caixa Econômica Federal
                 SOHH                    Mexican Chamber of Deputies               Tim Celular Brasil
   Office of the AU Prime Minister         Irish Department of Justice         Presidência da República
       AU House of Parliament             Irish Department of Finance                  Petrobrás
 AU Department of Communications          Greek Department of Justice               Receita Federal
       Swiss bank PostFinance         Egyptian National Democratic Party        Ministério dos Esportes
               Fine Gael                          HBGary Federal                Rede Globo de Televisão
       New Zealand Parliament                      Spanish Police                     Cielo (Visa)
         Tunisia Government             Orlando Chamber of Commerce                  Banco Central
       Zimbabwe Government                Catholic Diocese of Orlando                 HSBC Brasil
        Egyptian Government                   Rotary Club or Orlando                    Bradesco
       Malaysian Government                   Bay Area Rapid Transit                  Itau (Brasil)
         Polish Government                   Syrian Defense Ministry               Dilma (President)
             Polish Police                      Syrian Central Bank            Kassab (São Paulo Mayor)
           Polish President          Syrian Ministry of Presidential Affairs
      Polish Ministry of Culture            Various Pornography sites

 24
5
     Mitigations




25
First, some interesting facts



          No bots;
          No Malwave;
          No Phishing;
          Public Recruitment.

  26
Mitigation

 Monitor social media
       Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, blogspot, pastebin etc.
       Use Google alerts

 Protect applications
       Web application firewalls, VA and code reviews

 Analyze the alert messages generated by your security devices
       The DDoS attack was preceded by a few-days-long phase of reconnaissance.
       Daily analysis of alert information may help better prepare for tomorrow’s
       attack.

 IP reputation is very valuable
       Most of the reconnaissance traffic could have been blocked
       Threat Radar
  27
Anonymous Attack on Customer Site
      Web Application Protection Use Case

                                                                   PHASE I
SecureSphere stopped all
phases of attack                                            Technical Attack



                                                                                     Scanners such
                                                                                        as Nikto

 Phase III
Business Logic                                                                      PHASE II
    Attack
                                                                                Technical Attack

                                                                                     Havij SQL
                                                                                     injection tool



  LOIC application

                          © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
 28
Web Application Security Use Cases


                Compliance
                                                              Web Application Protection
                 and Legal



                   IT                                         Application Virtual Patching
                Operations                                    DDoS Protection



                                                              Site Scraping Prevention
                  Line of                                     Fraud Prevention
                 Business                                     Legacy Application Security
                                                              Hosted Application Protection

                     © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  29
The Defenses Required to Protect Web Apps

                                   Dynamic Profiling

                                   Attack Signatures
 Correlated Attack Validation




                                                                                                           Technical Attack
                                HTTP Protocol Validation
                                                                                                              Protection
                                   Cookie Protection

                                     IP Reputation

                                 Anti-Scraping Policies                                                     Business Logic
                                                                                                           Attack Protection
                                 Bot Mitigation Policies

                                    IP Geolocation
                                                                                                           Fraud Prevention
                                Malware Fraud Detection
                                                     © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
30
IPS & NG Firewall Web Security Features

                                            Dynamic Profiling
 Correlation (Web Profile Correlation)




                                            Attack Signatures                                                       Technical Attack
                                         HTTP Protocol Validation                                                      Protection
                                           High rate of false positives and negatives
                                            Cookie Protection
                                           because of lack of app awareness
                                              IP Reputation
                                           Easy for hackers to evade via encoding,
                                          Anti-Scraping Policies           Business Logic
                                           custom app vulnerabilities     Attack Protection
                                          Bot Mitigation Policies

                                             IP Geolocation
                                                                                                                    Fraud Prevention
                                         Malware Fraud Detection
                                                              © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
31
Virtual Patching Use Case

                                                                                           Vulnerabilities
       Challenges for payment                                                            imported into WAF
       processor:
        Costly, time-consuming
        vulnerability fix cycles
        Target of Web attacks




                                                             SecureSphere:
                                                                   Reduces window of exposure,
                                                                   cost of manual app fixes
                                                                   Offers visibility for developers
          Company scans site
           with app scanner
                                   © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  32
Virtual Patching Through Scanner Integration


      SecureSphere can import scan results and instantly
      create mitigation policies
      Eliminated payment processors’ emergency fix and
      test cycles




                                    Scanner finds
                                    vulnerabilities
          Customer
          Site

                        SecureSphere imports
     Web applications
                            scan results
      are protected



                           © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
33
Improve Application Development Processes

                    Software Development Lifecycle


        DESIGN                                               TEST                       DEPLOY
        & CODE                                       Test for                         Block attacks
                                                     vulnerabilities
       Architect and                                                                  Monitor and report
       implement code                                                                 exploits
                                                    Virtually patch
       Fix errors and                                                                 Detect leaks, errors
                                                    vulnerabilities
       vulnerabilities




     Imperva SecureSphere

     Manual processes or third party tools

                                © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
34
Legacy Application Security Use Case

     A bank inherited a treasury app
       App had 50+ vulnerabilities,
       would cost $ millions to fix
       Wouldn’ t allow vulnerable
       app into new data center
       Paying $1M a month to keep
       legacy app in old data center



                                                                                     Imperva SecureSphere WAF:
                                                                                       Mitigated vulnerabilities
                                                                                       Periodic scans confirm app
                                                                                       is secure
        Vulnerable Legacy Application
                               © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
35
Fraud Prevention Use Case

     A bank needed to:
      Stop Man-in-the-Browser
      attacks
                                                                                    SecureSphere tracks
      Address FFIEC compliance                                                         fraud details




                         SecureSphere


             Client                                        SecureSphere & ThreatRadar Fraud:
            Devices
                                                                Detects devices with fraud malware
                                                                Requires no changes to apps for
                                                                initial rollout or policy changes

                         © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
36
ThreatRadar Fraud Prevention

     SecureSphere integrates with Trusteer to detect users
     infected with malware like SpyEye, Zeus, Gozi, & Silon
     1. User accesses Website
     2. SecureSphere redirects browser to Trusteer
     3. Browser downloads, runs malware check
     4. Result sent to WAF



                                             Is this endpoint safe?




                                                         Pass / Block
                             © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
37
DDoS Protection Use Case

 RV Manufacturer:
                                                                                               Websites
     Received DDoS that took
     down Website for 3 days



                                                Websites
                                                                                         DDoS attack traffic
                                                                                            is blocked
           20 Mbps



                                                                        Cloud DDoS Protection:
                                                                                Stopped SYN Flood in less
                 2 Gbps                                                         than 2 hours from phone call
                                                                                Stopped follow-on attack

                          © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
38
Full Web-based DDoS Protection


     Stops all DDoS threats
      + Application & network attacks                                                      Attacker Malicious   Search
                                                                                                      Bot       Engine
      + Proprietary technology differentiates humans from bots
         – Analyzes HTTP redirect, cookie, and JavaScript execution capabilities

     Scales beyond your Internet
     connection limit
      + Support DDoS attacks that
        burst to 2 Gbps or 4 Gbps

                                                                                    Cloud DDoS Protection dashboard


                              © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
39
Hosted Application Protection Use Case

     Retailer:                                                            Hackers
       Had upcoming PCI audit
                                                                               Bots
       Needed to protect
       Website & meet PCI 6.6                             Legitimate
       Hosted apps in the cloud                                Users


                                                                     Scrapers                           Company’s
                                                                                                        Website
                                                                      Comment
                                                                     Spammers


                                                                          Imperva Cloud WAF:
                                                                                   Helped retailer meet PCI
                                                                                   Fast, easy deployment
      Imperva Cloud WAF Dashboard
                             © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
40
Web Application Firewall in the Cloud

      Full, PCI-Certified Web application firewall
        + Leverages years of Imperva security expertise

      Stops SQL injection, XSS, OWASP Top 10, bots
      Protects both on-premise and hosted Websites
      Cost-effective managed WAF service
      Satisfies PCI DSS #6.6
                                                                                      Globally Distributed,
                                                                                      High-Performance
                                                                                      Proxy Network


     360° Global Threat Detection:
     Early detection of threats based on
     attacks to other protected sites
                                © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
41
Complete Protection Against Web Threats


                       Bots                                                    Scrapers


        Web Attacks                            SecureSphere
                                                                                          App DDoS


     Known Attackers
                                                   Web Apps

                                                                                    Phishing Sites
         Undesirable
          Countries
                                                                               Comment
                                                                               Spammers
                   Vulnerabilities
                                                  Malware-based Fraud
                         © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
42
The Anatomy of an Anonymous Operation

            Carolina Bozza
           Security Engineer

               May 2012

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Apresentação Allen ES

  • 1. The Anatomy of an Anonymous Carolina Bozza Security Engineer May 2012
  • 2. Imperva ? Who we are and what we do 2
  • 3. Next Generation Threats Require New Approach Tech. Attack Usage Protection Audit Logic Attack User Rights Protection Management Fraud Access Prevention Control External Internal Customers Employees Staff, Partners Malicious Insiders Hackers Compromised Insiders Data Center Systems and Admins Imperva’s Mission is to Provide a Complete Solution © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 3
  • 4. Hacktivism From Wikipedia: HACK + ACTIVISM - the use of computers and computer networks as a means of protest; (…) hacktivism could be defined as "the nonviolent use of legal and/or illegal digital tools in pursuit of political ends". These tools include web site defacements, denial-of- service attacks, information theft, (…) Acts of hacktivism are carried out in the belief that proper use of code will be able to produce similar results to those produced by regular activism or civil disobedience. 4
  • 5. What is Anonymous? Reality What they claim to be: “Anonymous is an umbrella for Anonymous is an Internet meme (…), anyone to hack anything for any representing the concept of many reason.” online and offline community users —New York Times, 27 Feb 2012 simultaneously existing as an anarchic, digitized global brain. Targets include porn sites, Mexican drug lords, Sony, government agencies, banks, churches, law enforcement , Hacktivists fighting for moral causes. airline, São Paulo’s Mayor and Vladimir Putin. Anyone can be a target. 5
  • 6. The Plot - The anatomy of an Anonymous Attack Attack took place in 2011 over a 25 day period. Anonymous was on a deadline to breach and disrupt a website, a proactive attempt at hacktivism. 10-15 skilled hackers or “geniuses.” Several hundred to a thousand supporters. 6
  • 7. On the Offense Skilled hackers—This group, around 10 to 15 individuals per campaign, have genuine hacking experience and are quite savvy. Nontechnical—This group can be quite large, ranging from a few dozen to a few hundred volunteers. Directed by the skilled hackers, their role is primarily to conduct DDoS attacks by either downloading and using special software or visiting websites designed to flood victims with excessive traffic. 7
  • 8. On the Defense Deployment line was network firewall, WAF, web servers and anti-virus. Imperva WAF + SecureSphere WAF version 8.5 inline, high availability + ThreatRadar reputation + SSL wasn’t used, the whole website was in HTTP Unnamed network firewall and IDS Unnamed anti-virus 8
  • 9. Phase #1 Recruiting and Communications 9
  • 11. Social Media Helps Recruit 11
  • 12. Phase #2 Recon and Application Attack “Avoid strength, attack weakness: Striking where the enemy is most vulnerable.” —Sun Tzu 12
  • 13. Finding Vulnerabilities Tool #1: Vulnerability Scanners Purpose: Rapidly find application vulnerabilities. Cost: $0-$1000 per license. The specific tools: + Acunetix (named a “Visionary” in a Gartner 2011 MQ) + Nikto (open source) 13
  • 14. Hacking Tools Tool #2: Havij Purpose: + Automated SQL injection and data harvesting tool. + Solely developed to take data transacted by applications Developed in Iran 14
  • 15. Phase #3 DDoS 15
  • 16. Hacking Tools Low-Orbit Ion Canon (LOIC) Purpose: + DDoS + Mobile and Javascript variations + Can create 200 requests per second per browser window 16
  • 17. Anonymous and LOIC in Action 700000 600000 LOIC in Action Transactions per Second 500000 400000 300000 200000 Average Site Traffic 100000 0 Day 19 Day 20 Day 21 Day 22 Day 23 Day 24 Day 25 Day 26 Day 27 Day 28 17
  • 18. LOIC Facts LOIC downloads + 2011: 381,976 + 2012 (through March 19): 318,340 + Jan 2012=83% of 2011’s downloads! Javascript LOIC: + Easy to create + Iterates up to 200 requests per minute + Can be used via mobile device. 18
  • 19. Anybody can be an anonymous! Let’s Demo!! 19
  • 20. I’ve spent a lot of money… And why I’m not Safe Yet? 20
  • 21. I have IPS and NGFW, am I safe? IPS and NGFWs do not prevent web application attacks. + Don’t confuse “application aware marketing” with Web Application Security. WAFs at a minimum must include the following to protect web applications: • Web-App Profile • Web-App Signatures • Web-App Protocol Security • Web-App DDOS Security Security Policy Correlation • Web-App Cookie Protection • Anonymous Proxy/TOR IP Security • HTTPS (SSL) visibility 21
  • 22. I have IPS and NGFW, am I safe? IPS and NGFWs do not prevent web application attacks. + Don’t confuse “application aware marketing” with Web Application Security. However, IPS and NGFWs at best only partially support the items in Red: • Web-App Profile • Web-App Signatures • Web-App Protocol Security • Web-App DDOS Security Security Policy Correlation • Web-App Cookie Protection • Anonymous Proxy/TOR IP Security • HTTPS (SSL) visibility 22
  • 23. I have IPS and NGFW, am I safe? • IPS & NGFW Marketing – They have at least one web-app feature so they market themselves as a solution. • IPS & NGFW gaps to WAF – WAFs provide far more web-app features than IPS and NGFWs. IPS and NGFWs do not even meet the most minimal requirements of web application security. • False Sense of Security - IPS and NGFWs are creating a false sense of security with their claims and are leaving organizations like the ones we have previously mentioned susceptible to web application penetration. 23
  • 24. Anonymous targets that we know of, so far… US Department of Justice Polish Prime Minister Muslim Brotherhood US Copyright Office Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs UMG FBI Polish Internal Security Agency PayPal MPAA French Presidential Site Mastercard Warner Brothers Austria Ministry of Justice Visa RIAA Austria Ministry of Internal Affairs US Senate HADOPI Austria Ministry of Economy CIA BMI Austria Federal Chancellor Citibank Sony Slovenia NLB Itau Amazon Mexican Interior Ministry Banco do Brazil Church of Scientology Mexican Senate Caixa Econômica Federal SOHH Mexican Chamber of Deputies Tim Celular Brasil Office of the AU Prime Minister Irish Department of Justice Presidência da República AU House of Parliament Irish Department of Finance Petrobrás AU Department of Communications Greek Department of Justice Receita Federal Swiss bank PostFinance Egyptian National Democratic Party Ministério dos Esportes Fine Gael HBGary Federal Rede Globo de Televisão New Zealand Parliament Spanish Police Cielo (Visa) Tunisia Government Orlando Chamber of Commerce Banco Central Zimbabwe Government Catholic Diocese of Orlando HSBC Brasil Egyptian Government Rotary Club or Orlando Bradesco Malaysian Government Bay Area Rapid Transit Itau (Brasil) Polish Government Syrian Defense Ministry Dilma (President) Polish Police Syrian Central Bank Kassab (São Paulo Mayor) Polish President Syrian Ministry of Presidential Affairs Polish Ministry of Culture Various Pornography sites 24
  • 25. 5 Mitigations 25
  • 26. First, some interesting facts No bots; No Malwave; No Phishing; Public Recruitment. 26
  • 27. Mitigation Monitor social media Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, blogspot, pastebin etc. Use Google alerts Protect applications Web application firewalls, VA and code reviews Analyze the alert messages generated by your security devices The DDoS attack was preceded by a few-days-long phase of reconnaissance. Daily analysis of alert information may help better prepare for tomorrow’s attack. IP reputation is very valuable Most of the reconnaissance traffic could have been blocked Threat Radar 27
  • 28. Anonymous Attack on Customer Site Web Application Protection Use Case PHASE I SecureSphere stopped all phases of attack Technical Attack Scanners such as Nikto Phase III Business Logic PHASE II Attack Technical Attack Havij SQL injection tool LOIC application © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 28
  • 29. Web Application Security Use Cases Compliance Web Application Protection and Legal IT Application Virtual Patching Operations DDoS Protection Site Scraping Prevention Line of Fraud Prevention Business Legacy Application Security Hosted Application Protection © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 29
  • 30. The Defenses Required to Protect Web Apps Dynamic Profiling Attack Signatures Correlated Attack Validation Technical Attack HTTP Protocol Validation Protection Cookie Protection IP Reputation Anti-Scraping Policies Business Logic Attack Protection Bot Mitigation Policies IP Geolocation Fraud Prevention Malware Fraud Detection © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 30
  • 31. IPS & NG Firewall Web Security Features Dynamic Profiling Correlation (Web Profile Correlation) Attack Signatures Technical Attack HTTP Protocol Validation Protection High rate of false positives and negatives Cookie Protection because of lack of app awareness IP Reputation Easy for hackers to evade via encoding, Anti-Scraping Policies Business Logic custom app vulnerabilities Attack Protection Bot Mitigation Policies IP Geolocation Fraud Prevention Malware Fraud Detection © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 31
  • 32. Virtual Patching Use Case Vulnerabilities Challenges for payment imported into WAF processor: Costly, time-consuming vulnerability fix cycles Target of Web attacks SecureSphere: Reduces window of exposure, cost of manual app fixes Offers visibility for developers Company scans site with app scanner © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 32
  • 33. Virtual Patching Through Scanner Integration SecureSphere can import scan results and instantly create mitigation policies Eliminated payment processors’ emergency fix and test cycles Scanner finds vulnerabilities Customer Site SecureSphere imports Web applications scan results are protected © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 33
  • 34. Improve Application Development Processes Software Development Lifecycle DESIGN TEST DEPLOY & CODE Test for Block attacks vulnerabilities Architect and Monitor and report implement code exploits Virtually patch Fix errors and Detect leaks, errors vulnerabilities vulnerabilities Imperva SecureSphere Manual processes or third party tools © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 34
  • 35. Legacy Application Security Use Case A bank inherited a treasury app App had 50+ vulnerabilities, would cost $ millions to fix Wouldn’ t allow vulnerable app into new data center Paying $1M a month to keep legacy app in old data center Imperva SecureSphere WAF: Mitigated vulnerabilities Periodic scans confirm app is secure Vulnerable Legacy Application © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 35
  • 36. Fraud Prevention Use Case A bank needed to: Stop Man-in-the-Browser attacks SecureSphere tracks Address FFIEC compliance fraud details SecureSphere Client SecureSphere & ThreatRadar Fraud: Devices Detects devices with fraud malware Requires no changes to apps for initial rollout or policy changes © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 36
  • 37. ThreatRadar Fraud Prevention SecureSphere integrates with Trusteer to detect users infected with malware like SpyEye, Zeus, Gozi, & Silon 1. User accesses Website 2. SecureSphere redirects browser to Trusteer 3. Browser downloads, runs malware check 4. Result sent to WAF Is this endpoint safe? Pass / Block © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 37
  • 38. DDoS Protection Use Case RV Manufacturer: Websites Received DDoS that took down Website for 3 days Websites DDoS attack traffic is blocked 20 Mbps Cloud DDoS Protection: Stopped SYN Flood in less 2 Gbps than 2 hours from phone call Stopped follow-on attack © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 38
  • 39. Full Web-based DDoS Protection Stops all DDoS threats + Application & network attacks Attacker Malicious Search Bot Engine + Proprietary technology differentiates humans from bots – Analyzes HTTP redirect, cookie, and JavaScript execution capabilities Scales beyond your Internet connection limit + Support DDoS attacks that burst to 2 Gbps or 4 Gbps Cloud DDoS Protection dashboard © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 39
  • 40. Hosted Application Protection Use Case Retailer: Hackers Had upcoming PCI audit Bots Needed to protect Website & meet PCI 6.6 Legitimate Hosted apps in the cloud Users Scrapers Company’s Website Comment Spammers Imperva Cloud WAF: Helped retailer meet PCI Fast, easy deployment Imperva Cloud WAF Dashboard © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 40
  • 41. Web Application Firewall in the Cloud Full, PCI-Certified Web application firewall + Leverages years of Imperva security expertise Stops SQL injection, XSS, OWASP Top 10, bots Protects both on-premise and hosted Websites Cost-effective managed WAF service Satisfies PCI DSS #6.6 Globally Distributed, High-Performance Proxy Network 360° Global Threat Detection: Early detection of threats based on attacks to other protected sites © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 41
  • 42. Complete Protection Against Web Threats Bots Scrapers Web Attacks SecureSphere App DDoS Known Attackers Web Apps Phishing Sites Undesirable Countries Comment Spammers Vulnerabilities Malware-based Fraud © Copyright 2012 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 42
  • 43. The Anatomy of an Anonymous Operation Carolina Bozza Security Engineer May 2012