Semelhante a A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
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Semelhante a A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon (20)
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A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
1. A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and
policy instrument governing non timber forest
products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
Divine Foundjem Tita
June 18, 2013 ICRAF Yaounde, Cameroon
1
2. Outline
1. Introduction: problem &
research question
2. Theoretical lens and study
objectives
3. Method : choice of study
sites & products
4. Results
5. Conclusions & policy
implications
2
4. 1.Introduction
1. Longer time lags for trees to
reach maturity
2. Appropriate technologies are
poorly known
3.. Adverse or no national
policies
4. Legal constraints from sister
government sectors
Globally, and for Cameroon
potential of NTFP and AFTP to
livelihoods and sustainable
development are yet to be
exploited
3.. Adverse or no national
policies
4. Legal constraints from sister
government sectors
Globally, and for Cameroon
potential of NTFP and AFTP to
livelihoods and sustainable
development are yet to be
exploited
What is the problem?
4
2. Appropriate technologies are
poorly known
1. Longer time lags for trees to reach
maturity
Call on national governments to device appropriate
policies and institutions
5. Main research question
1.Introduction
What formal policies/strategies and regulations currently
exist to address NTFP in Cameroon and how do they
influence agroforestry development ?
5
6. Theoretical lens
Neo-institutional economics: multi disciplinary
economics, history, sociology, law, business org and political science
2.Theoreticallens&studyobjectives
Economic
performance
Formal:
policies, strategies, regulati
ons, legislation
Institutions = rules of the game
Informal:
norms, culture, values, et
hics
6
7. Theoretical lens operationalised
2.Theoreticallens&studyobjectives
7
1994 Forestry Law
and 1995 Decree
of application
PolicyInstruments
Customary
laws, norms
,values
, culture
Access to
Trees, Land , NTFP, AFTP
Producers perception
• secured property rights
• incentives to invest in AFTP
•increased revenue
Traders access to permits
•reduced TCs
•reduced corruption,/rent seeking
•profits/net margins
•self compliance with permits
1974 Land
Ordinance /land
titles
Government policy on poverty reduction and sustainable exploitation of natural resources including
NTFP
National and International
Research
NationalandInternationalNGOs
Interaction of formal &
informal institutions
Chapter 6
Outcomes
8. Research objectives
Four main themes:
(i) Appraise existing policies governing AFTP/NTFP
sectors
(ii) Assess the effect of existing policy on
agroforestry development- farmer perspectives
(iii) Analyse interaction between formal and
informal rules regulating land and trees
2.Theoreticallens&studyobjectives
8
9. Choice of products
3.Methodology
9
Gnetum spp: 3518 tons (10.5 m $) sold to
Nigeria annually by sea
Ricinodendron heudelotii: annual trade
within Cameroon ~ 750,000 $
Irvingia spp: 8.5 m $ annually from one
comm forest
Cola spp: annual export estimated at
165,000 $
12. • Qualitative content analysis
12
4.Results
Results objective 1:
analysis of existing policies
2
3
3
6
6
7
0 5 10
NTFP
Agriculture
PRSP
GESP
RDSP
PSFE
Forest
Number
Policydocuments
6
5
4 4 4
3
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Partial conclusion: Government of Cameroon is committed to include NTFP and AFTP in
its economic and sustainable development policy
• Number of policy documents
addressing the issue
13. Analysis of policy instruments - legislation
4.Results
13
• Clear definition of AFTP/NTFP
• Ownership and access to resources
• Economic and usufruct rights
Analysis focused on
• No distinction between NTFP and AFTP
• Permits are required to sell NTFP &
indirectly AFTP
What did we find
• Disincentive to agroforestry development
• Conclusions are based on theory
• Farmers’ opinion required
Partial conclusion
14. Results objective 2:
effect of existing policies on agroforestry
• Farmers perceptions
4.Results
14
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Permits
(AFTP =
NTFP)
WTA
Certficates
of origin for
AFTP
Intentions
to plant
trees if
AFTP=NTFP
76%
39% 41%
Yes No
AFTP=
NTFP
(Yes )
Accept
certificate
of origin
(Yes )
Will not
plant trees
if AFTP =
NTFP
Group (yes ) ns ns +ve (**)
Education -ve(**) ns +ve(**)
No of trees
planted
ns ns +ve (**)
Experience ns ns -ve (**)
Region of
origin
(savannah)
-ve(**) -ve(**) ns
15. Partial conclusions
• Low level of awareness and enforcement of law at
producers levels – what is its relevance?
• Despite negative attitudes towards policy
instruments, a majority will continue to plant trees
• Number that may not plant trees is too large to be
neglected
4.Results
15
16. Results objective 3:
land and tree tenure security
4.Results
16
• Village resident : this is my land sir what are you doing here?
• City man: I am developing the land. Who are you and who says it is your land?
• Village resident: I am the owner of this land, i have been farming the land
• for the past 30 years
• City man: how did you get the land?
• Village resident: My father gave it to me
• City man: And how did your father get the land?
• Village resident: I don’t know, what I know is that he planted that tree and he owns this land unfortunately
Mr. Tom who could testify died last year
• City man: Sorry my friend, this land was given to me by father who got it from his father who fought the
Meta people and seized the land from them during the German colonial period
• City man continues: I am now on retirement and have come to the village to develop my land.
And then the conflict begins, who owns the land based on formal law and by custom?
(adopted from Bromely 1989. P 220)
17. Farmers perception of land and tenure security as
factors of agroforestry development
4.Results
17
Formal rules
• Ownership of land
is sanctioned by a
title deed
• Land with no deed =
National land
• Trees on land with
no title deed
belongs to the state
Informal rules
• First occupant owns
the land
• Tree planting
symbolises ownership
Which of the two
• Guarantee security
over land and trees ?
• Favours
agroforestry?
• Role of cultural
differences?
18. 4.Results
18
16%
84%
Farmers’ attitudes towards
land titles
No ( Negative )
Yes ( Positive)
29% 27%
6%
17% 21%
%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
North
West
West Centre South East
Preferences for formal or customary
systems
Formal system Customary system
41% 59%
Belief of
ownership
(Individual)
Positive
attitude
towards
land titles
Preference
for
customary
systems
Land conflict
(yes )
+ve(*) +ve(***) -ve(*)
Form of
leadership
(forest)
+ve(**) ns -ve(**)
Population
density
+ve(**) ns ns
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
NorthWest
West
Centre
South
East
Total
Region of orgin of
village
Government
Community/chiefs
Individuals
Farmer’s perception of ownership
19. Tenure security & tree planting
4.Results
19
45
4
55
96
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Tenure security based
on fear of eviction
No
yes
Disincentive to agroforestry ?
Fear of eviction: yes = 3%
Land availability: yes = 23%
20. Partial conclusions
• Farmers have positive attitude towards land titles however,
• Where customs are intact = customary tenure is more
preferred
• Where there have been cases of land conflict = title deed is
preferred
• Fear of eviction not a threat to tree planting, land
availability may be the problem
• Current customary systems guarantees security and favours
tree planting
• Study supports evolutionary land rights theory
• The state needs to protect existing customary ownership
and rights with simplified procedures to obtain land titles
4.Results
20
21. General conclusions and policy implications
• Specific strategy/ program are needed to
develop, guide and implement agroforestry
strategies
• Subsequent policies, regulations/legislation
should make the distinction between AFTP and
NTFP e.g certificates of origin
• Customary rights to land needs to be protected
e.g by simplifying access to land titles
5.Conclusions&policyimplications
21
22. Further research: getting the institutions right
How do we design optimal and efficient formal
institutions and institutional arrangements to:
- manage land and trees,
- that will also protect, consolidate
- and correct existing customary systems?
5.Conclusions&policyimplications
22
24. Results objective 4:
market access
• Traders’ possession of permits & informal taxes
– 70 traders operate illegally
4.Results
24
Prefer to rent permit (illegal) and pay informal
taxes
If
Perceived
TCs
Bribe = No
permit+Rents>
25. Estimated costs borne by farmer groups
4.Results
25
Process assessed Case study group
Number of steps to compile files 10
Time to process file (days ) About 98
Amount of money to process file About 1.3 million FCFA
(1$= 500FCFA)
Duration to monitor files in the capital city 4 years
Cost to monitor files 12, 130,000 FCFA
26. 4.Results
26
1.7%
annual turn
over
9%
37%
54%
0% 20% 40% 60%
Government
Economic
operators
Police and
Forestry
Partial conclusions
• Permit system :
characterised by high TCs
encourage rent seeking
and unofficial taxes (bribes)
• Decision not to comply is a
rational choice by traders to
overcome TCs
27. Options to motivate compliance based on
choice experiment
Attributes Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 None
Decentralised
/centralised
simplified/
complicated
Joint or
individual
Transferability
of permit
Duration of
permit
1 year 3 years 1 year 3 years
Regeneration
tax
20 FCFA 5 FCFA 10 FCFA 20 FCFA
Choose one □ □ □ □ □X
4.Results
27
28. Results from choice experiment
4.Results
28
Attribute Change Implicit willingness
to pay
Complicated to simplified 22.00
Single to joint 9.80
No transfer to traders based transfer 8.80
No transfer to government based
transfer
6.80
Increase in duration of permit by one
year
5.60
29. General conclusions and policy implications
• Specific strategy/ program are needed to develop, guide and
implement agroforestry strategies
• Subsequent policies, regulations/legislation should make the
distinction between AFTP and NTFP e.g certificates of origin
• Customary rights to land needs to be protected e.g by
simplifying access to land titles
• Reduce TCs e.g simplify access to NTFP permits
• Reduce rent seeking and unofficial taxes in the governance of
permits
5.Conclusions&policyimplications
29
30. Further research: getting the institutions right
• Producers level:
– How do we design optimal and efficient formal
institutions and institutional arrangements to
manage land and trees, that will also consolidate
and correct existing customary systems?
• Traders level:
– What are the most appropriate reforms to improve
the regulatory mechanisms governing permits and
to reduce corruption and rent seeking
5.Conclusions&policyimplications
30
We had earlier announced that if farmers don’t plant trees it is because they do not have security over their land. But what is tenure security. Some scientists argue that fear of eviction is a more important concept to use rathar than breadth of rights which takes into consideration breadth of rights.
Context and content of policy and policy instruments have been analyzed and they have been described to be flawed.
Context and content of policy and policy instruments have been analyzed and they have been described to be flawed.