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Lithuania and Belarus: Neighboring States Comparative Study
By: Zuzanna Gos
Both Lithuania and Belarus are neighboring countries that had been members of the
USSR until they gained independence in the 1990s. According to Freedom House and Polity
scores Lithuania had immediately democratized and has continued to be a democratic state to
present day. Belarus, however, transitioned in 1992, but the attempt failed after a few years.
What factors during their movement toward independence affected their level of democracy
today? Can Lithuania’s success be attributed to the fact that it had prior experience as an
independent state before it was annexed by the USSR in 1940, or could Belarus’ choice of
executive and their incredibly strong economic relations with Russia be to blame? My paper will
compare Lithuania’s and Belarus’ decisions regarding government and leaders, international
economic ties, and Russia’s overall influence on both states.

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Currently, it is simple to see the stark difference in levels of democracy. However, when looking
upon Polity scores that have recorded both Lithuania’s and Belarus’ levels of democracy during
their break from the Soviet Union, one can see that both of the two states began democratic.
However, a drastic drop had occurred in Belarus during the mid-1990s.
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Lithuania Belarus
Freedom House Scores 2015
FH Score

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When analyzing a state and its transition to democracy, factors for and against
successful democratic transition can be determined by several structural factors. As argued by
Barbara Geddes, these structural factors may include the type of authoritarian regime it is,
whether it is a personalistic, military, or single-party regime. “These regimes are supposed to be
vulnerable to different degrees of democratizing forces (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 86).
Other structural factors that can help a state transition into democracy include: modernization,
income equality, and geography (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 128). However, even if the
resources and opportunities for democracy are present, democracy cannot emerge if the
people do not mobilize and push for a democratic transition. The structural approach cannot
successfully explain the actual transition that must take place from an authoritarian regime to a
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2014
Polity Score
Belarus Lithuania

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democracy. Agency must also be taken into consideration to transform “structure into action”
(Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 128). Actual human beings, their beliefs, and their actions are
required to make any change. “Peoples beliefs are the intervening variable between social
structure and collective action” (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 128). Without mass beliefs and
action, transitions into democracy cannot be sufficiently explained, for it is well understood
that the elites do not wish to strip themselves of power unless dissatisfaction among the people
is strongly visible.
Although many will agree that democracy is the best possible method to govern, it is not
sufficient for the people to merely have this preference. When many define democracy, they
associate it with superficial qualities, such as wealth and “socially desirable” items and
freedoms (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 129). Although most people would very much want
these qualities in their lives, they would never risk their lives, or even the chance of living less
comfortably, for this idea of democracy. In order for people to legitimately want the actual
freedoms that democracy can offer, emancipitative values must be strongly present. These
values include equality, tolerance, liberty, and the empowerment of people to self-govern
(Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 129). If one has strong belief that these values are very
important and necessary for a decent quality of life, they will be motivated enough to risk their
lives to achieve this. However, if the people have weak emancipitative values, they will resolve
to giving their leaders all authority to decide whether these values will be implemented. People
with weak democratic values tend to prefer centralized authority to make such decisions
(Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 131).

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In order for the people to successfully demand and receive democratic reforms,
“material” and “mental” empowerment must emerge. Modernization is the material
empowerment that supplies the civilians with more access to resources to not only be exposed
to freer states and other democracies, but also to push for similar freedoms for all people, not
just the elites (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 86). As a result, an increase in emancipitative
values emerges, fostering the “mental” empowerment that encourages and motivates the
people to further demand freedom (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 87). When people are
inspired enough to fight for democracy, oppression by the government or elites will not be able
to control the people forever. They will eventually have to give in and work out negotiations. As
a result democracy may emerge, empowering the people legally.
Geddes also acknowledges that each state has opportunities for antidemocratic factors.
For example, presidential systems are typically “most vulnerable to antidemocratic challenge”
(Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 86). There are some democratic transitions that centralize
power and resist demands and pressure from the people, such as the “enlightened
democratizations” and “opportunistic democratizations”. Of all methods of democratization,
the only type of democratization where actual democratic values are not only accepted by
elites, but also implemented, is responsive democracy (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 88).
In “enlightened democracies”, the elites may overcome the mass pressures by
demonizing alternate forms of government, particularly democracy, by giving bad examples of
failed democracies and using the example of post-World War II democratic failures (Christian
W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 88). Other times, elites may pursue what is called the “opportunistic

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democratization.” “They believe they can easily corrupt democratic standards in practice when
pretense of democracy is perceived as a useful means to open the doors to the international
community” (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 88). They are elected democratically by posing
false support for democratic reforms. Once they are elected, they remain corrupt, slowly revert
back to their true corrupt and elitist ways, and lose fear of exposure.
Belarus appears to have a past of an opportunistic democratization. This state was a
part of the USSR for 70 years before it gained independence in 1991 (CIA World Factbook). It
has closer ties with Russia than any other post-soviet state, where over 40% of exports and over
50% of imports are through Russia (CIA World Factbook). Belarus is a “puzzle” because it was
economically more successful in the USSR than other states (Fritz, 2007), and the state became
among the poorest once the Soviet Union had fallen apart (Potocki, 2002). External
involvement/assistance during regime change affected relations with Russia (Vanderhill, 2014).
Russia and Belarus had signed the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 1995 (Silitski, BELARUS
AND RUSSIA: COMRADESHIP-IN-ARMS, 2007). This allowed Russia into Belarus’ territory to use
it as a transit quarter for imports and exports with the West, while Belarus manufactures
tractors and other machines in Russia (Silitski, BELARUS AND RUSSIA: COMRADESHIP-IN-ARMS,
2007). The current level of democracy of Belarus, however, can only be explained through
examination of its past, when the Soviet Union had first fallen and Belarus had the chance to
determine which kind of regime it will adopt.
The people of Belarus had always practiced very little nationalism, especially after the
countless tragedies during not only Stalin’s but also Hitler’s reign during the 1930s and 1940s

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(Potocki, 2002). After the “invasions, occupations, and purges”, Belarus had a very poor
economy, ranking lowest among all post-Soviet states, whereas the state was among the most
prosperous under the Soviet regime. Consequently, the people believed, “that only
strengthened and centralized rule will make acceleration of progressive reforms possible”
(Shushkevich, 2003), despite the bad examples given by both Stalin and Hitler. Many
Belarussians, particularly the elites, strongly opposed weak governments and democracy.
Veterans from former USSR even openly voiced that they would do whatever possible to
prevent democracy from occurring (Silitski, Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus, 2005).
They merely remembered the success and peace that was present while under the USSR.
As a result, Aleksandr Lukashenko was able to win the support of the people and come
into power by mirroring the Soviet regime. Lukashenko first gained political power as chairman
of a committee in parliament that investigated corruption once Belarus gained independence in
1993 (Potocki, 2002). He gained popularity through his charisma, appearing relatable to the
common people and presented himself as an outcast on a mission to “tame an unruly
parliament” (Potocki, 2002). Once he attained this position, he publicly criticized and
demonized the communist nomenklatura and any push for privatization (Potocki, 2002).
However, Lukashenko lost much support one year later, and only a few months after his
inauguration, once the economy began to decline and his administration was unable to conceal
the mass inflation rate (Silitski, Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus, 2005). As a result,
he took control of most of the state institutions and enforced a high level of censorship on
media, in order to combat the opposition and to silence the accusations of his corruption
(Silitski, Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus, 2005). Additionally, he strongly pushed to

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deepen ties with Russia and even issued a dialect blending Belarussian and Russian (Potocki,
2002). As a result, Belarus has become viewed as a miniature replica of Russia.
As he gained power after achieved presidency in 1994, Lukashenka became more and
more controlling and paranoid of opposition. He evicted 22 ambassadors in 1998 due to
paranoia that they were spying on his home, but claimed there were plumbing issues in the
building (Potocki, 2002). Lukashenka has also even encouraged other states to gain strength. He
thought highly of Hitler and his strong leadership in Germany, offered weapons to Syria to use
against NATO, and criticized Russia for taking its nuclear weapons away (Potocki, 2002). Shortly
after his inauguration as president, Lukashenka started to enforce legislation that strengthened
his powers, while weakening all other branches of government.
Although Lukashenka was elected president democratically, the referendum that gave
him legitimacy has been criticized as fraudulent. “Through a series of edicts and directives
premised on the results of a bogus 1996 referendum, he has abolished the separation of
powers and local self-government and instituted direct rule by the presidential
administration—the infamous vertical” (Potocki, 2002). Lukashenka replaced the highest
legislative body, the Supreme Soviet, with the National Assembly with members he personally
chose. Additionally, all independent strands of media, such as newspapers and radio stations,
were shut down, and any signs of opposition were either intimidated, immediately forced to
back down, or jailed (Potocki, 2002). To this day, Lukashenko has control over everything in the
state, including administration, economy, and media (Silitski, Preempting Democracy: The Case
of Belarus, 2005). Although there had been some visible opposition through civil society, it had

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always struggled gaining strength and support due to its inability to “agreeing on a political
strategy” and organize. The people within the civil society were also unable to pose a good
alternative to Lukashenka and his neo-Soviet regime. As a result, Lukashenko had little trouble
silencing them as well.
Once the economy began to recover, people began to become more accepting of
Lukashenka. Western diplomats had even tried advising the Belarusians to push for a change in
regime, but they voiced their preference for the “old communist nomenklatura of both Belarus
and Russia” (Shushkevich, 2003). They had become accustomed to having one executive make
all decisions for them through communist methods and even believed it to be most lucrative
this way, adhering to their motto: “You are the boss, and I am the fool” (Shushkevich, 2003).
In addition to his push to reenact Soviet history within Belarus, Lukashenka became
quickly known for his peculiar behavior and appearance. He combs his hair in a particular
fashion, grooms his mustache in a “Stalinesque” way, often appears on television in a track suit,
has closed down streets to roller blade, and even plays hockey with the national team to this
day. He even tried seeming more personal with his people by insisting on being called “Batka”,
which means “Daddy” in Russian (Potocki, 2002).
In contrast to Belarus, Lithuania had a much more successful transition to democracy.
However, looking onto its history, it can be debated whether the state transitioned, or whether
it merely returned to its previous methods of democratic governance that were already
implemented before it had been taken over by the Soviet Union. Currently, Lithuania’s largest
import and export provider is also Russia, but no more than 22%. It also has more import and

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export partners than Belarus, dividing dependence a little better (CIA World Factbook). To this
day, Lithuania has been able to keep farming in its economy (Fritz, 2007). In contrast, Belarus
has become predominantly industrialized, partially due to the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 in
Ukraine (Potocki, 2002). Additionally, Lithuania has been described as similar to the Western
states and modernized. It has little to no ethnic issues, is predominantly Catholic, and its culture
is strongly influenced by Poland (Fritz, 2007).
Previous independence from 1918 until 1940 enabled Lithuania to not only develop a
strong sense of nationalism, but also allowed for the state to more quickly and smoothly
transition back as an independent state once the USSR had collapsed, while other states had to
start from scratch. Lithuania had even already elected a parliament before being taking under
USSR (Silitski, BELARUS AND RUSSIA: COMRADESHIP-IN-ARMS, 2007). Because the state had
experience as modern and independent, “it also [meant] a shorter period under communist
rule. By the mid-1990s, such historic differences vis-à-vis other post-Soviet states were
reinforced when the EU decided to accept the Baltic states’ applications for membership” (Fritz,
2007). Lithuania’s experience as not only a state, but also democracy, gave the state a secure
“jump start” back into the Westernized world and an overall democratic regime.
Among the Soviet states, Lithuania was able to reform with the highest speed and
success (Fritz, 2007). This could possibly be due to the fact that it was the most Westernized of
the region (Fritz, 2007). While under the Soviet Union, several movements began to develop
throughout the Baltic States (Fritz, 2007). Among those movements strengthened the Sajüdis
movement in Lithuania. By 1989, members of this movement had gained 36 out of 48 seats in

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the All-Union Congress of People’s Deputies. One year later, the party won 91 out of 141 seats
in the Lithuanian Supreme Court, where Sajüdis leader Vytautas Landsbergis was elected
primary chairman (Fritz, 2007). This enabled the Sajudis movement to strengthen, enforce
democratic change into the government, and even push for independence. However, the
“radical” demands for independence did not go unpunished. 13 people were killed due to
street fights after Soviet troops entered Vilnus (Fritz, 2007). The element of nationalism
through the Sajüdis movement strongly motivated and united the Lithuanians. In contrast, the
people of Belarus had “very little to no nationalism” (Fritz, 2007). The state’s history had always
been a part of the USSR and was never exposed to anything different until the fall of the Soviet
Union.
The current situations of both states ensure that neither will be making any transitions,
unless a crisis emerges. In order to better examine why two states that had both been under
Soviet Union rule during the 1990s had taken two completely different paths, one must
examine that time frame. When analyzing both Lithuania and Belarus during this time, their
current levels of democracy appear to be due to one factor that caused a number of factors,
both for and against democracy, to emerge within the states, including: whether or not the
state had existed prior to the affiliation with the Soviet Union, support from the West, and,
possibly the strongest factor, “people power”. These elements enabled the sense of
nationalism to develop and strengthen in Lithuania with fewer repercussions. As a result, the
people also practiced higher democratic values, causing them to push for a leader and
administration that were obliged to pursue democratic legislation. These elements were not
found in Belarus, primarily because the state had never existed independently before the

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emergence of the Soviet Union. Traumatic events caused the people to long for the Soviet
Union and choose a strong leader who mirrored their beloved past when they were successful.
Once Lukashenka was democratically elected, he was able to silence most opposition. Even
though civil societies had emerged, they had never been able to organize and centralize their
fight toward a common goal, giving Lukashenka more legitimacy, which encouraged the people
in Belarus to support his ways and communism. As a result, this leader was able to take
advantage of the desperation of the people while using his appearance and charisma to woo
the public. He removed all opposition and created a very oppressive regime in a short period of
time. Consequently, Lithuania and Belarus are complete opposites of each other during present
day, despite their similar history.

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Bibliography
CIA World Factbook. (n.d.). Retrieved from cia.gov.
Fritz, V. (2007). A comparative study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia. Central European
University Press.
Potocki, R. (2002). Dark Days in Belarus. Journal of Democracy, 142-156.
Shushkevich, S. (2003). Belarus: To Democracy through Neo-Communism. Demokratizatsiya, 55-62.
Silitski, V. (2005). Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus. Journal of Democracy, 83-97.
Silitski, V. (2007). BELARUS AND RUSSIA: COMRADESHIP-IN-ARMS. POLITICAL TRENDS IN THE NEW
EASTERN EUROPE: UKRAINE AND BELARUS, 1-15.
Vanderhill, R. (2014). Promoting Democracy and Promoting Authoritarianism: Comparing the Cases of
Belarus and Slovakia. Europe-Asia studies, 255-283.