Zane Preciado's Essay On Russia (1)

The E.U.’s Security Dilemma
Why the E.U. is Not A Stabilizing Force
Zane Thomas Preciado
4/24/2015

1
For over half a century, the European Union has been bringing together various states on
the European continent. The E.U. is seen as a force that has been creating peace and stability
within the continent, however, internal tensions have been rapidly increasing as the E.U expands
and adds more members under its jurisdiction the E.U. has been creating lots of international
tension as it adds more and more countries under its jurisdiction. This rapid eastern expansion of
both the E.U. and N.A.T.O, (the multinational military pact that acts as the military arm of the
E.U.)1
has brought tension with Russia. This raises the question: is the E.U. actually the
stabilizing force? I will argue that the E.U. is not a stabilizing force, but a creator of a security
dilemma seen through Russia’s aggressive expansion into Crimea and the E.U.s creating of new
N.A.T.O. military forces in response to Russia’s expansion.
What is the Security Dilemma?
Before discussing how the E.U. is creating a security dilemma, the question must be
asked: what is the security dilemma? The security dilemma is the concept in realist theory that is
made to describe and discuss potential conflict between two international actors2
. According to
the political scientist Robert Jervis, a security dilemma is the idea of when a state tries to ensure
its own safety by increasing its power or increasing its defensive capabilities in response to
another actor (reduces other nation’s security).3
This concept is not a peaceful or stable resolution
to problems. It can create lots of tension between states until finally there is a strong or inevitable
case for war4
, and because of this any nation involved or causing a security dilemma is not a
stabilizing force.
Rapid Expansion
Jervis describes that borders are a main factor in creating or lessening a security dilemma
between states5
. The harder it is to invade, whether that be through difficulty of terrain, space

2
between states, or strategic location of certain borders , the difficulty to reach/ cross another’s
borders lessens the security dilemma by easing the defending state and making it feel safer6
.
However, the lack of these defenses and protection causes there to more of a security dilemma7
.
Because of this I will argue that the E.U. is creating a security dilemma with Russia by breaking
these buffer zones and geographic defenses through its and N.A.T.O’s rapid eastward expansion
that has brought it close and directly next to the borders of Russia.
The E.U. began as a Union of six European states8
. Over the past half century, this Union
has grown to 28 members all over the European continent. However this expansion has brought
the E.U. close to Russia’s borders9
. In 2004, the E.U. added 10 new countries to its roster10
. Not
only were many of these countries former Soviet Satellite states and in Russia’s sphere of
influence, many of these countries are geographically close to Russia’s borders. Some of these
countries such as Estonia , Lithuania and Latvia share a direct land border with Russia. This
expansion continued in 2007 with the additions of Bulgaria and Romania, and in 2013 with
Croatia11
. According to Kaplan, these states, since World War I, have always been used as buffer
zones, territory in between states made to create space and peace between two sides, for both the
Europe and Russia.12
This expansion gives evidence of a security dilemma because the E.U. is
lessening Russian security by encroaching on its borders.
Expansion onto one’s borders is always a potential, no matter how long it takes13
.
However, not only did the E.U. and NATO expand on the borders of Russia, they did it in a rapid
manner. What makes the expansion rapid is the amount of territory added at one time. In 2004
ten countries were added, adding 729,600km2
to the E.U overnight with a total of 1,125,000km2
added by 201314
.The E.U. is roughly 4 million km2
, meaning less than 10 years a quarter of the
Union’s land mass was added and right on Russia s border15
. From this it can be argued that

3
there was a large E.U. Expansion on Russia’s borders and that it was a rapid acquisition of that
land.
Russia’s Response
Security dilemmas occur when an international actor feels its security has been threatened
or reduced16
. In the case of the E.U. and Russia this has to do with the eastward expansion of the
E.U. 17
(as mentioned above). Jervis claims a security dilemma can be seen through a state’s
expansion to create buffer zones. Russia’s response to the E.U. expansion mirrors this idea,
showing how the E.U. is not a stabilizing force because it scared Russia into a response.
The response taken by Russia that shows its involvement in a security dilemma is
Russia’s expansion into Crimea. According to Jervis, a response that many states take when
feeling they are being threatened is to expand18
. As mentioned earlier, geography has a large
impact on the degree to which a security dilemma can exist by making it more or less difficult
for a country to invade or defend19
. When states feel as if they are threatened they want to create
buffer zones, which is territory that makes it more difficult( whether because of distance between
borders or rough terrain) to invade a country20
. When in a security dilemma, states will tend to
expand outward to create these buffer zones and ensure their security. This idea of ensuring that
buffer zones are created for space and resources in case a defensive response is needed can be
seen in Russia’s response to the E.U.21
before 2004 the E.U. and N.A.T.O. did not have any
direct borders with each other22
. However, in 2004 that changed with several Eastern countries
joining both the E.U. and N.A.T.O., three of which (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) directly
border Russia23
.Not only this, but since the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (which is a state
bordered and heavily influenced by Russia), there have been talks of the state joining N.A.T.O.
and possibly the E.U.24
This made Russia feel boxed in and as a result caused Russia to invade

4
Crimea to create a buffer zone and ensure security. This fits in with the logic of the security
dilemma causing a threatened state to expand into new territory for its geographical location and
terrain25
. According to Kaplan, Ukraine, (and especially Crimea, which is a part of Ukraine) has
always been seen as buffer zone to Russia). Due to its location on the Black Sea and its rough
terrain, it makes Russia’s fleets better able to respond to foreign threats, making it difficult for
foreign aggressors to threaten Russia.26
. Furthermore, the port of Sevastopol in Crimea provides
Russia’s Black Sea fleet with access to the Mediterranean Sea, the Pacific Ocean, and Indian
Ocean, making it easier for Russia to secure power and resources for its defense27
. Some may
claim that this may be a coincidence; that Russia is actually being an aggressor for whatever
reason, but Russia’s rhetoric also matches its response. In April of 2014, Putin stated that the
invasion of Crimea was a response to N.A.T.O. and the E.U. threating Russian security by
moving closer and closer to its borders, preventing Russian tactical missile strikes with attempts
to install missile defense systems, and continuing talks with Ukraine that would push Russian
influence and security even farther back28
. While it could be seen as something else, the evidence
is overwhelming. States feel like their security is threatened when states encroach upon their
borders, which can be seen with the E.U. expansion towards Russian borders29
. Due to a massive
encroachment on their borders and potential threats of taking an already established buffer zone,
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, both through action and rhetoric, shows a response that is trying
to create space and defense to protect and heighten its own security, showing Jervis’ idea of a
security dilemma through expansion30
.
The aggression and actions taken by the Russian’s in Crimea shows the idea of a security
dilemma via expansion31
. This expansion shows that the E.U. can no longer be seen as a
stabilizing force because, while Russia’s actions may have broken international law32
it was the

5
fault of the E.U. .This response occurred because of their eastward expansion. The violence seen
from Russia in Crimea was a response to a change in the E.U.’s security which caused Russia to
be afraid, causing there to be tension and now violence within the region33
. Because Russia’s
invasion of Crimea was a strategic decision made by Russia to protect itself34
and create a buffer
zone35
between itself and the E.U., due to their expansion it shows the E.U. irresponsibility for
not considering Russia’s fears and their responsibility for Russia acting on those fears. This
responsibility for creating tension and chaos in the region by forcing Russia’s hand shows that
the E.U. cannot be seen as a stabilizing force.
The E.U.’s Response
While Russia has been contributing to the security dilemma in response to the E.U.’s
expansion, the E.U. has been responding to the Russia’s response. Besides its rapid expansion
that helped create Russia’s fears, the E.U. has been discussing responses that match‘s another
cause of the security dilemma, a concept that Jervis calls the arms race.36
Jervis describes the
idea of an arms race as when one player begins building up its arms in response to a change in
another nation’s increase in security37
. This can happen in loops with Jervis explaining that when
one nation builds up arms, the other feels threatened, the nations to continuously respond until
one of them attacks. While assaults on either side have not occurred yet, the idea of an arms race
is evident in the E.U.’s response to Russia’s aggressive expansion and its new ability to quickly
mobilize38
. The E.U. has tried to create sanctions and other peaceful method of coercion39
, but an
arms race has still started in the form of the E.U. and N.A.T.O creating new rapid response
forces and military bases in the countries bordering Russia.40
The E.U. exemplifies the idea of the security dilemma in the form of an arms race
because it and N.A.T.O. have begun building new battle groups and mobilizing them41
. E.U.

6
officials have stated that these new battle groups consist of over 30,000 troops and were
extended from a group that originally consisted of 13,000 troops42
. Along with its large size, it
can mobilize within days if needed to respond to a threat43
. The E.U. and N.A.T.O. also plan on
creating six N.A.T.O. bases in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania44
. This move
made by the E.U. and N.A.T.O exemplifies an arms race because it was a move made out of fear.
Again, Jervis states that arms races are done in response to another’s growing security.45
After
the Crimean annexation in 2014, Russia has gained a great amount of security due to its new
buffer zone in Crimea and its ability to easily position its defenses in the Black Sea46
. The new
troops are able to quickly respond to threats and the new bases are being placed in areas that
directly border Russia, showing that the E.U. and N.A.T.O. are more fearful than ever of an
attack by Russia. This response also matches the rhetoric given by the E.U. and N.A.T.O. In
2015, stating, “ [we are expanding our forces] as a response to the aggressive actions we've seen
from Russia, violating international law and annexing Crimea. We have to adapt our forces when
we see the world is changing”47
. The statement given by N.A.T.O. shows the fear that the E.U.
and N.A.T.O. have of Russia’s response, by letting the world know this force was built to
respond to Russia. Because they forced Russia’s hand, they too feel as if they have no option but
to build up their arms and defend themselves to match Russia’s security. The response and
matching rhetoric given by the E.U. shows that this is indeed a response created out of a fear of
increased Russian security48
(security dilemma) and are therefore trying to respond by building
up a military to match it (arms race)49
.
The E.U.’s creation/ participation in an arms race illustrates how the E.U. can no longer
be considered a stabilizing force. Not only are they not a stabilizing force because they have
created the security dilemma by expanding so close to Russia, they are increasing the tension by

7
building up their military and being the “creator “of an arms race. Again, Jervis describes the
arms race as a circular phenomenon50
. Once one actor begins it, another actor (Russia) is going
to feel threatened and build up their arms until once side attacks. The fact that the E.U. has
created a potential threat for the future shows that instead of creating peace stability in the region,
the E.U. is causing tension and distrust. Real world evinced can be seen of this from Russia’s
first response. Russia responded aggressively to the expansion on the E.U., when their intentions
were not aggressive51
, and now they are placing military forces even closer to Russia’s borders.
It now is almost inevitable that there will be further conflict, or at least tension for some time to
come. This was because of the E.U.’s response in creating an arms race and showing how they
cannot be considered a stabilizing force because of the tension caused from it.
Counter Argument
One could argue the E.U. is a stabilizing force because they do not see the conflict
between Russia and the E.U., as a security dilemma, but as an attempt for Russia to gain territory
that is inhabited by Russian nationals and protect its citizens52
. Crimea, while a part of Ukraine,
used to be a part of Russia (and the Soviet Union) before it was part of the state of the Ukraine.
During the era of the Soviets and Russians in the past, Russia would place its Russian speaking
citizens in these territories, but when the maps were drawn, these Russians were left in this new
territory.53
Based on data, there are roughly 55% of people who identify as Russian n Crimea,
and 77% who speak the Russian language rather than Ukrainian in Crimea. Even more, a large
part of Eastern Ukraine (including Crimea) are in support of Russian influence54
. Therefore,
people see the idea of Russia as being an aggressor trying to reunify its people rather than trying
to defend it, and would therefore still see the E.U. as a stabilizing force.

8
I argue this is false. These ethnic Russians have always been in Crimea after the fall of
the Soviet Union, this is not a new development. However, tensions between the E.U. and Russia
have been occurring since the E.U.’s eastward expansion. In an article by James Greene, Greene
states that in 1990s, the E.U. was actually seen as a potential economic partner and not a threat to
Russia because it was a counter to N.A.T.O. However, after Eastward Expansion (with many of
these states joined N.A.T.O) and continued talks with Ukraine(which Crimea was a part of),
Putin became distrustful towards the E.U..55
Furthermore, after the E.U.’s expansion, Russia
began acting even more aggressive, an example being their engagement in a war with Georgia in
2008 to try and gain strategic territory56
. This conflict not only matches the idea of a security
dilemma via expansion, but also shows that Russia has been fearful of E.U. expansion much
longer than just the Crimean annexation. Had this occurred immediately after the fall of Soviet
Union and borders new were borders were drawn, this may have gained more weight. Russia
wasn’t being aggressive to gain reunification of its people; it was being aggressive, because it
was fearful of the E.U. and N.A.T.O’s expansion because it chows to do this after a security
dilemma had formed. The E.U. can be seen as starting the fears of Russia which led to this chain
of conflicts and because the E.U. is responsible for the conflict, Russia is not the destabilizing
force that is trying to get back Russian citizens. As a result it shows the E.U. actually is a
destabilizing force.
While many claim that the E.U. is a stabilizing force in our world and that Russia is
acting like a bully this is not the case. Due to the rhetoric and responses that have been seen on
both sides after the eastern expansion of the E.U., the E.U has created a security dilemma with
Russia and therefore cannot be seen as a stabilizing force.

9
NOTES
1
N.A.T.O,. "NATO-EU: A Strategic Partner." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 4 Dec 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/eu/natohq/topics_49217.htm (accessed Apr 21,
2015).
2
Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." World Politics 30, no.2 (1978):169-170. JSTOR, JSTOR (Apr 20, 2015).
3
4
5
Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security." 30, no. 2 (1978): 194-195. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2009958.pdf (accessed Apr 20)
6
7
8
E.U.,. "European Union: Countries." European Union. http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (accessed Apr 23, 2015).
9
10
11
12
Kaplan, Robert D.. "Europe's New Map." The American Interest, 13 Apr 2012, sec. Volume 8, Number 5 http://www.the-american-intere.
13
Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security." 30, no. 2 (1978): 194-195. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2009958.pdf (accessed Apr 20).
14
15
16
Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." World Politics 30, no.2 (1978):(169-170)-. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958 (Apr 20, 2015).
17
18
19
20
21
22
Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." World Politics 30, no.2 (1978):(169-170)-. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958 (Apr 20, 2015)
23
24
25
Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." World Politics 30, no.2 (1978):(169-170)-. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958 (Apr 20, 2015
26
27
Schwartz, Paul N. "Crimea's Strategic Value to Russia." CSIS: Center For Strategic & International Studies. 18 Mar 2014. http://csis.org/blog/crimeas-strategic-
value-russi (accessed Apr 21, 2015).
28
Mearsheimer, John J.. "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the." Foreign Affairs, 18 Aug 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ (accessed Apr 20, 2015).
29
30
31
32
En, Elta. "NATO rapid response force to e." DELFI by the Lithuanian Tribune, Feb 2015, http://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/d.
33
34
35
36
Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." World Politics 30, no.2 (1978):189-191. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2009958.pdf (Apr 20,
2015).
37
2015).
38
2015).
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
2015).
46
Schwartz, Paul N. "Crimea's Strategic Value to Russia." CSIS: Center For Strategic & International Studies. 18 Mar 2014. http://csis.org/blog/crimeas-strategic-
value-russi (accessed Apr 21, 2015).
47
48
2015).
49
2015).
50
2015).
51
Greene, James. "Russian Responses to NATO and EU Enlargement and Outreach." Chatham House. Jun 2012.
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhou (accessed Apr 22, 2015).
52
Cecire, Michael. "The Russian Invasion of Ukraine." Foreign policy Research Institute. Mar 2014. http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/03/russian-invas (accessed Apr
21, 2015).
53
Conant, Eve. "Ethnic Russians: Pretext for P." National Geographic, 2 May 2014, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/05/140502-russia-putin-ukraine-
geography-crimea-language/ (accessed Apr 22, 2015).
54
op Eleches- Grigore, Robertson, Graeme. "Do Crimeans Actually Want To J." The Washington Post, 6 Mar 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ (accessed Mar
21, 2015)
55
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhou (accessed Apr 22, 2015)
56
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhou (accessed Apr 22, 2015)

10
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Conant, Eve. "Ethnic Russians: Pretext for P." National Geographic, 2 May 2014,
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(Apr 20, 2015).
Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." World Politics 30, no.2 (1978):189-191. JSTOR,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2009958.pdf (Apr 20, 2015).
Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security." 30, no. 2 (1978): 194-195.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2009958.pdf (accessed Apr 20).
Kaplan, Robert D.. "Europe's New Map." The American Interest, 13 Apr 2012, sec. Volume 8, Number 5
http://www.the-american-intere.
Mearsheimer, John J.. "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the." Foreign Affairs, 18 Aug 2014,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ (accessed Apr 20, 2015).
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