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SPACE NEWS 19
...M111sMIA WWI!
May 8, 2006
A Rational Approach to Space Control
<WAYNEA.ELLIS>
T
here has not yet been a nuclear
war between nations on this
planet. However, nuclear
weapons have been employed: twice
and within a short time at the end of
World War II. Since that time, and par-
ticularly during the Cold War, the fur-
ther use of nuclear weapons has been
avoided primarily because of the ab-
solute fear of the horrible conse-
quences of their use.
Thus was born the dogmatic premise
of Mutually Assured Destruction, or
MAD, which effectively reined in the
imperialistic — economic or otherwise
— ambitions of both the then-Soviet
Union and the United States. MAD, as a
concept, was or has been successful due
to two main factors: the acknowledge-
ment of a situation in which no one had
absolute superiority, and the stability
that acknowledgement brought.
In the 21st century, space superiority
and stability are establishing themselves
as central issues for their possible effect
on space technology and policy.
While the role of space as a center of
gravity and its potential for enhancing
military power is still being debated, if
the trend is towards greater space ac-
cess internationally, how tenable is a
space superiority premise, and is it at
cross-purposes with stability?
It is arguable that there are some in-
teresting similarities between MAD-era
stability issues and the potential stability
that could be fostered by assured access
to space capabilities and information.
For instance, during the Cold War, it
was only when there were supposed
'gaps' in nuclear capabilities between
the superpowers that there was a feeling
of instability. In effect, the assumption
of superiority on one side elicited a re-
sponse from the other in an effort to re-
gain equilibrium.
We observe similar behavior and
counter-behavior today. For example, it
is arguable that one of the reasons
many nonproliferation policies have
failed is because developing nations are
looking towards riuelear weapons as a
means to counterbalance the instability
caused by external political pressures.
North Korea and Iran are two probable
examples. In response, the United
States has invested significant resources
in missile defense to negate the poten-
tial influence of the nuclear weapon
and move the country back to a position
of superiority (and the instability that
brings).
Today, space access, particularly ac-
cess to space-derived data and capabili-
ties that enhance 'lot only terrestrial
military operations but also interna-
tional situational awareness and eco-
nomic structures, .ire of growing im-
portance to many countries. There is no
doubt that the United States has superi-
ority in numbers of space assets, their
quality and their app . ications.
The United States Also acknowledges
that this superiority has become its
greatest potential Achilles' heel. First,
since its power is derived from space ac-
cess, any threat to ;his access is a direct
threat to its power. Further, its space
power can be eroded either by overt of-
fensive action to negate American space
capabilities, or through benign interna-
tional competition to develop similar
space systems that will negate U.S.
space superiority.
It has typically been the American
view that due to the enormous capabili-
ty gulf between the United States and its
potential enemies, the only recourse of
those enemies is to engage in asymmet-
rical warfare against U.S. space assets,
thereby negating the space superiority
advantage.
Herein lies the key to stability in the
era of Mutually Assured Access (MAA)
As nations observe their own depend-
ence upon space systems/capabilities,
the loss of this access would prohibit of-
fensive action, resulting in a stable situ-
ation. Space weapons would become
unnecessary because everyone stands to
lose from their application — an analo-
gous situation to MAD.
SEE ELLIS PAGE21
•
SPACE NEWS
May II, 2006
ELLIS FROMPAGE19
Unfortunately, we are not
currently in a MAA-era. This is
because the United States has
put the brakes on the ability of
many other countries to devel-
op space capabilities via tech-
nology controls such as the In-
ternational Traffic in Arms
Regulations.
This de-stabilizing action
has now forced other nations
to either develop key space
technologies themselves or to
obtain space-related services
elsewhere. Either way, U.S. ac-
tion, which is ostensibly for se-
curity purposes, has only
slowed international progress
towards greater space access,
not stopped it.
In order to provide the
needed assurances that all
space-based systems — includ-
ing U.S. systems — are threat-
free, there must be increased
vigilance.
Recently, the Russians re-
ported the loss of a geostation-
ary communications satellite,
possibly due to a collision
[Space News, April 3, p. 52]. Al-
though another cause may yet
be revealed, had the region
been under adequate surveil-
lance, at least a collision might
have been ruled out.
This signifies that it is time
to go beyond the current level
of space situational awareness
provided mainly by the Space
Surveillance Network. For one
thing, the Space Surveillance
Network has coverage gaps be-
cause it is insufficient to pro-
vide global, real-time space
surveillance. Secondly, the
Space Surveillance Network
needs to gain worldwide credi-
bility by becoming more inter-
national, and that entails certi-
fying and accepting data from
non-U.S. sources.
What the United States can do
Fire!, the linked ;states
needs to L.-flange its attitude
with respect to space control
and superiority. It needs to
recognize that other nations'
rights to the space regime al-
ready are espoused in the Out-
er Space Treaty of 1967, which
guarantees space access. This
access will afford strategic and
tactical advantages, both eco-
nomic and military, and it is
unrealistic to expect devel-
oped and developing nations
to not want these same advan-
tages. Any attempt to deny
space access, which is denying
access to the power of informa-
tion, will only create an unsta-
ble situation.
Second, the United States
needs to significantly modify,
if not drop, its export controls
— something that even U.S.
leaders are beginning to advo-
cate. This by no means re-
quires the United States to for-
go competition; if anything, it
encourages it. Nor does it im-
ply the United States simply
give its technology away.
By loosening technology
controls, the United States
stands to gain in two ways: the
economic benefits of selling
the technology, and the in-
creased assurance from the fact
that as more nations espouse
and benefit from space tech-
nologies, the more dependent
they become on them. There-
fore, any actions against space
assets would be the equivalent
of 'shooting oneself in the
foot.' MAA supports the notion
of access to space technolo-
gies/capabilities.
Third, the United States
should encourage and support
the integration of more inter-
national space surveillance
sensors, both surface- and
space-based. There are a num-
ber of ground-based telescopes
worldwide that could be coor-
dinated to provide more obser-
vations. Countries such as
Canada are even exploring the
possibility of providing a space-
based sensor, Sapphire, that
would provide such observa-
tions to the Space Surveillance
Network. Under U.S. leader-
ship, an improved Space Sur-
veillance Network would pro-
vide both more coverage that is
global and increased interna-
tional partnership for space
control and assured access.
With such a global space traf-
fic-control system, it will in-
creasingly be difficult for na-
tions to disguise or hide their
space activities. This improved
space situational awareness
would reduce tensions and
thus increase stability — a key
goal of MAA.
The era of U.S. leadership
in space is not over. Neverthe-
less, the scope of that leader-
ship, as other nations venture
into space, must adapt to
emerging realities. For one
thing, while spacefaring na-
tions will continue to observe
and in some cases emulate U.S.
conduct in space, they will in-
creasingly expect mutual re-
spect and consideration. This
will come in part due to their
acceptance of the reality that
space is a center of gravity, and
as such, access to it must be
mutually protected. Just as in
the Cold War era where the re-
lease of a single nuclear
weapon had the potential to
bring about global destruc-
tion, so will the application of
space weapons possibly threat-
en a world incredibly depend-
ent upon space access. This is
a chance for the United States
to demonstrate true leadership
in which it pledges to forgo of-
fensive action in space, thereby
reducing the anxiety created
by its current space control
doctrine. It is time to accept,
and advocate, that this special
region is for the peaceful use
by all and as such, is a sanctu-
ary that must be preserved and
shared.
Wayne Ellis provides space awareness/inte-
gration training for the Canadian military.
The above article is based on his opinion and
does not necessarily represent the Canadian
government's nor th, rAlsdian military's
views on space contre

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RationalApproachtoSpaceControl

  • 1. SPACE NEWS 19 ...M111sMIA WWI! May 8, 2006 A Rational Approach to Space Control <WAYNEA.ELLIS> T here has not yet been a nuclear war between nations on this planet. However, nuclear weapons have been employed: twice and within a short time at the end of World War II. Since that time, and par- ticularly during the Cold War, the fur- ther use of nuclear weapons has been avoided primarily because of the ab- solute fear of the horrible conse- quences of their use. Thus was born the dogmatic premise of Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD, which effectively reined in the imperialistic — economic or otherwise — ambitions of both the then-Soviet Union and the United States. MAD, as a concept, was or has been successful due to two main factors: the acknowledge- ment of a situation in which no one had absolute superiority, and the stability that acknowledgement brought. In the 21st century, space superiority and stability are establishing themselves as central issues for their possible effect on space technology and policy. While the role of space as a center of gravity and its potential for enhancing military power is still being debated, if the trend is towards greater space ac- cess internationally, how tenable is a space superiority premise, and is it at cross-purposes with stability? It is arguable that there are some in- teresting similarities between MAD-era stability issues and the potential stability that could be fostered by assured access to space capabilities and information. For instance, during the Cold War, it was only when there were supposed 'gaps' in nuclear capabilities between the superpowers that there was a feeling of instability. In effect, the assumption of superiority on one side elicited a re- sponse from the other in an effort to re- gain equilibrium. We observe similar behavior and counter-behavior today. For example, it is arguable that one of the reasons many nonproliferation policies have failed is because developing nations are looking towards riuelear weapons as a means to counterbalance the instability caused by external political pressures. North Korea and Iran are two probable examples. In response, the United States has invested significant resources in missile defense to negate the poten- tial influence of the nuclear weapon and move the country back to a position of superiority (and the instability that brings). Today, space access, particularly ac- cess to space-derived data and capabili- ties that enhance 'lot only terrestrial military operations but also interna- tional situational awareness and eco- nomic structures, .ire of growing im- portance to many countries. There is no doubt that the United States has superi- ority in numbers of space assets, their quality and their app . ications. The United States Also acknowledges that this superiority has become its greatest potential Achilles' heel. First, since its power is derived from space ac- cess, any threat to ;his access is a direct threat to its power. Further, its space power can be eroded either by overt of- fensive action to negate American space capabilities, or through benign interna- tional competition to develop similar space systems that will negate U.S. space superiority. It has typically been the American view that due to the enormous capabili- ty gulf between the United States and its potential enemies, the only recourse of those enemies is to engage in asymmet- rical warfare against U.S. space assets, thereby negating the space superiority advantage. Herein lies the key to stability in the era of Mutually Assured Access (MAA) As nations observe their own depend- ence upon space systems/capabilities, the loss of this access would prohibit of- fensive action, resulting in a stable situ- ation. Space weapons would become unnecessary because everyone stands to lose from their application — an analo- gous situation to MAD. SEE ELLIS PAGE21
  • 2. • SPACE NEWS May II, 2006 ELLIS FROMPAGE19 Unfortunately, we are not currently in a MAA-era. This is because the United States has put the brakes on the ability of many other countries to devel- op space capabilities via tech- nology controls such as the In- ternational Traffic in Arms Regulations. This de-stabilizing action has now forced other nations to either develop key space technologies themselves or to obtain space-related services elsewhere. Either way, U.S. ac- tion, which is ostensibly for se- curity purposes, has only slowed international progress towards greater space access, not stopped it. In order to provide the needed assurances that all space-based systems — includ- ing U.S. systems — are threat- free, there must be increased vigilance. Recently, the Russians re- ported the loss of a geostation- ary communications satellite, possibly due to a collision [Space News, April 3, p. 52]. Al- though another cause may yet be revealed, had the region been under adequate surveil- lance, at least a collision might have been ruled out. This signifies that it is time to go beyond the current level of space situational awareness provided mainly by the Space Surveillance Network. For one thing, the Space Surveillance Network has coverage gaps be- cause it is insufficient to pro- vide global, real-time space surveillance. Secondly, the Space Surveillance Network needs to gain worldwide credi- bility by becoming more inter- national, and that entails certi- fying and accepting data from non-U.S. sources. What the United States can do Fire!, the linked ;states needs to L.-flange its attitude with respect to space control and superiority. It needs to recognize that other nations' rights to the space regime al- ready are espoused in the Out- er Space Treaty of 1967, which guarantees space access. This access will afford strategic and tactical advantages, both eco- nomic and military, and it is unrealistic to expect devel- oped and developing nations to not want these same advan- tages. Any attempt to deny space access, which is denying access to the power of informa- tion, will only create an unsta- ble situation. Second, the United States needs to significantly modify, if not drop, its export controls — something that even U.S. leaders are beginning to advo- cate. This by no means re- quires the United States to for- go competition; if anything, it encourages it. Nor does it im- ply the United States simply give its technology away. By loosening technology controls, the United States stands to gain in two ways: the economic benefits of selling the technology, and the in- creased assurance from the fact that as more nations espouse and benefit from space tech- nologies, the more dependent they become on them. There- fore, any actions against space assets would be the equivalent of 'shooting oneself in the foot.' MAA supports the notion of access to space technolo- gies/capabilities. Third, the United States should encourage and support the integration of more inter- national space surveillance sensors, both surface- and space-based. There are a num- ber of ground-based telescopes worldwide that could be coor- dinated to provide more obser- vations. Countries such as Canada are even exploring the possibility of providing a space- based sensor, Sapphire, that would provide such observa- tions to the Space Surveillance Network. Under U.S. leader- ship, an improved Space Sur- veillance Network would pro- vide both more coverage that is global and increased interna- tional partnership for space control and assured access. With such a global space traf- fic-control system, it will in- creasingly be difficult for na- tions to disguise or hide their space activities. This improved space situational awareness would reduce tensions and thus increase stability — a key goal of MAA. The era of U.S. leadership in space is not over. Neverthe- less, the scope of that leader- ship, as other nations venture into space, must adapt to emerging realities. For one thing, while spacefaring na- tions will continue to observe and in some cases emulate U.S. conduct in space, they will in- creasingly expect mutual re- spect and consideration. This will come in part due to their acceptance of the reality that space is a center of gravity, and as such, access to it must be mutually protected. Just as in the Cold War era where the re- lease of a single nuclear weapon had the potential to bring about global destruc- tion, so will the application of space weapons possibly threat- en a world incredibly depend- ent upon space access. This is a chance for the United States to demonstrate true leadership in which it pledges to forgo of- fensive action in space, thereby reducing the anxiety created by its current space control doctrine. It is time to accept, and advocate, that this special region is for the peaceful use by all and as such, is a sanctu- ary that must be preserved and shared. Wayne Ellis provides space awareness/inte- gration training for the Canadian military. The above article is based on his opinion and does not necessarily represent the Canadian government's nor th, rAlsdian military's views on space contre