Prunus africana “No chop um, no kill um, but keep um”: From an endangered species to an everyday tree?
•Transferir como PPT, PDF•
1 gostou•596 visualizações
How governance makes a difference in the sustainability and livelihood impacts of international trade of a medicinal bark of a tree found in African mountains. this case study from Cameroon illustrates the many governance arrangements exsisting and thier mixed impacts.
Recomendados
Recomendados
Mais conteúdo relacionado
Destaque
Destaque (20)
Semelhante a Prunus africana “No chop um, no kill um, but keep um”: From an endangered species to an everyday tree?
Semelhante a Prunus africana “No chop um, no kill um, but keep um”: From an endangered species to an everyday tree? (20)
Mais de Verina Ingram
Mais de Verina Ingram (20)
Último
Último (20)
Prunus africana “No chop um, no kill um, but keep um”: From an endangered species to an everyday tree?
- 1. IUFRO Session 101a Transitions to sustainable forest management: Economic, social and cultural parameters 10 October 2014 Prunus africana “No chop um, no kill um, but keep um”: From an endangered species to an everyday tree? THINKING THINKING be yboenydo nthde t hcea ncoapnyopy Verina Ingram
- 2. Introduction PPrruunnuuss aaffrriiccaannaa • Afromontane, evergreen tree • Key species in Cameroon montane forests • Fruit eaten and dispersed by >20 species, 50% endangered &/or endemic • High degradation & deforestation rates in main harvest areas • Local use and trade in timber and bark • Estimated 60,000 people dependent on the international trade in 2007 • Principal ingredient in prostatic hyperplasia pharmaceuticals and health supplements THINKING beyond the canopy
- 3. Prunus africana range and trade = national management plan = exporters & % world exports 1995-2013 = border trade = traditional medicinal use & trade = main importers & % world imports 1995-2013 Source: Cunningham 2008, Hall et al .2000, CITES WCMC Trade database 2014 THINKING beyond the canopy 22% 5522%% 50% 4% 8% 28% >1% 12% 1% >1% 2% 1% 5% 1% 0.1% 13% 2% 5% >1% Main harvest zzoonneess
- 4. Background International trade, apparent over-exploitation, respite & action THINKING beyond the canopy Photo: K Stewart • Regulated since 1974 : arbitrary, poor enforcement and monitoring, counterproductive to sustainable trade. • Cameroon worlds’ largest exporter origin of 51% of all exports since 1995, with increasing volumes harvested. • Sources unknown. In 2007 wild P. africana un-quantified , inventories only in SW. • This raised concerns about overexploitation of wild stocks, leading to : • IUCN Red List (Vulnerable) in 1998 – but “needs updating” • Trade restrictions (CITES Appendix II listed ) in 2005 • ‘Special Forestry Product’ in Cameroon in 2006 • EU suspension international trade from Cameroon November 2007 • Cameroon self-imposed moratorium 2007-2010. • Lobbies: African exporters, European importers, governments and conservation organisations. Conflicting conservation vs. livelihood and business interests • Participatory developed national management plan in response to concerns by organisations in Cameroonian value chain • Exports resumed 2010 with new statutory rules i.e. inventories and management plans. Inventories now near completion: approx. 60% wild in forest, 40% cultivated.
- 5. Harvester Processor Wholesaler Exporter Retailer Consumer THINKING beyond the canopy Value Chain Access to resources for production Access to markets
- 6. Research questions 1. What arrangements are used to govern Prunus africana chains in Cameroon? 2. How do these governance arrangements impact the livelihoods of actors along the chain? 3. How do these governance arrangements impact chain and product sustainability? THINKING beyond the canopy Kongo CF, Illegal harvesting, Kilum Community forest, December 2008
- 7. THINKING beyond the canopy Methodology see Ingram 2014
- 8. Methodology: Assessing governance arrangements Indicators Score THINKING beyond the canopy Strong 10 Clear 8 Moderate 5 Weak 2 Non-existent 0 Existence of an institution and rules/norms known and named Well known by all actors; clearly stated Stated by majority of actors Named, some rules known Not clear, few rules discernible Not stated or known Boundaries of rights known by chain actors Well known & stated by all actors Known by most Known to some Little known Not known Monitoring and compliance with rules Frequent Occasional Infrequent Low None Frequency of use of sanctions and enforcement Frequent Occasional Infrequent Low None Use of conflict resolution mechanisms Well used Occasional Infrequent Little used Not used Use of individual & collective action to develop and modify rules Well used Occasional Infrequent Little used Not used Nesting horizontally (within particular scale) and vertically (value chain) Well-nested, both horizontally & vertically Partially horizontal & vertical Some horizontal/ and/or vertical Low horizontal or vertical None Level of accountability and dependence on actors High level Moderate Low Minimal None Moral grounding & (democratic) legitimacy of power High level Moderate Weak Very weak No Location of decision making clear High level, clear to Known Uncertain Vague/unclear No to actors actors Longevity of institution Long lived Long to medium term Medium to short term Temporal None Participation of actors Frequent Occasional Infrequent Low None Literature review of governance indicators (Graham, Amos, and Plumptre 2003; Hyden et al. 2008; Ibrahim Foundation 2013; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007; Ribot, Chhatreb, and Lankinad 2008; World Bank 2010) and institutional design principles (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006; Cox, Arnold, and Tomás 2010; Ostrom 1990; Scott 2001) yielded eleven indicators.
- 9. Q1. Arrangements governing Prunus africana chains in Cameroon Voluntary, Customary Corruption Projects market regulations based ••Permitting Differ harvester by region, process collective action ••Transport preceded community-regulatory based companies framework, •and Illegal community harvesting forests ••Access used, frequently adapted, in CFs overrun collaborated by projects with, and new occasionally forest management subjugated and models- often CFs challenged traditional •and block regulatory and contradict authority statutory •rights. Alienated and disabled customary •Focus on ownership institutions and as access commodification to resource, increased. in some areas •community on sustainable based action harvesting. resulted in both forest management and unsustainable exploitation •Grown in coverage •internationally influenced by ‘’involuntary’’ international standards •Enforcement arbitrary and ineffective , varies by region •Regulates wild harvest only 5 long term projects Introduced CBOs and CFs, protected areas Introduced harvesting rules, monitoring , controls “Super regulated” chain and products Statutory regulation 2007 EU CITES trade suspension → crisis and review of arrangements THINKING beyond the canopy
- 10. Stakeholders Traditional & customary laws Statutory law THINKING beyond the canopy ‘bricolage’ Regulatory authorities national and provincial ministries, local councils, implementing agencies Traditional authorities Chiefs, customary councils, courts Community forests ‘Project’ rules NGOs & donors Collective ‘Voluntary’ and ‘supplier’ rules AFRIMED Prunus Platform International organizations Standards international agreements Conventions Companies Corruption Private owners
- 11. THINKING beyond the canopy Laurel & Hardy Silver screen stars c.1920-1940 • Harvesters & tree owners: silent chain “actors”, little voice & power in regulatory arrangements, act to create their own ‘’messy’’ arrangements • Actors become bricoleurs – make best of arrangements they are in • Creatively using and making new arrangements & remoulding existing ones to reduce vulnerabilities, cope with risks, take control, reduce hassle and make money. Moses & Pa Pygeum hoe handle traders, c.1990-2009
- 12. Q2. How do these arrangements impact THINKING beyond the canopy livelihoods? • Trade suspension negative economic impact on harvester incomes • Harvester incomes decreased with regulation and influence of projects • Few exporters & importers profited for decades, two dominate • Liberalisation increased prices and competition, decreased information. • PAUs decrease competition, increased prices & scope for corruption • Competitive PAUs form entry barrier for small operators and CBOs • State officials and customary elites access revenues from corruption. • Collective action aided CF & CBOs to increase revenue, secure rights • Projects and CBOs explored possibilities for adding value • Private owners no statutory provision to access markets or arrangements 50-59% market volume 50 to 600%
- 13. Q3 How do these governance arrangements impact chain & product sustainability Negative •Pre-2007 government ignored own rules, now introduced but methods questionable •Statutory arrangements continue to be ineffective •Regeneration tax barely invested in regeneration •Projects promoting CFs & CBO facilitated ‘mining’ •Regulations, and project-based based upon a presumption of wild sourcing and threatened status, conventions created dominant, but mistaken perception •Farmed trees unquantified, “invisible”, source undistinguished, inventories only now occurring. •Community collective action, promoted by statutory and project-based arrangements, failed to control access or over-extraction •Customary rules negated even by some traditional chiefs •Corruption increased illegal harvesting THINKING beyond the canopy Positive •Research indicates techniques for sustainable harvest, •Projects stimulated collective and individual planting •Projects brought customary harvest rules into formal sphere •Trade suspension provided respite and led to quantification. •Concessions easier to control and monitor, increased rates sustainable harvesting when combined with project support. •Collaborations between research, development and conservation led to policies and institutions focus on product and livelihood sustainability. Multiple, incongruent arrangements had mixed, but overall negative impacts
- 14. THINKING beyond the canopy Conclusions Overlapping and often incongruent governance arrangements •Conventions ripe for rationalisation, statutory needs tweaking, implementation and customary arrangements and projects to be incorporated Impact of arrangements on livelihoods, mixed but generally negative •Access, employment and profitability decreased by increased regulations •Importance of business, infrastructure & technical support •Power critical in determining access to resource, markets and revenues •Processing & storage offer local value adding •Harvest techniques & domestication technologies potential to increase profits – but needs dissemination and enforcement Impact of arrangements on the sustainability of Prunus africana also mixed but generally negative •Recognising tree and land tenure critical for sustainable exploitation •Selective cultivation with appropriate market access key to sustainable supply and livelihoods Recognize often clashing livelihood and sustainability impacts for different actors due to overlaps of traditional, regulatory, CBOs, projects with regulatory arrangements
- 15. Role of research To address a range of issues simultaneously1 √ To link to development & government institutions for impact1 √ •Bearing in mind different/conflicts of interest To inform policymakers & practionnners via evidence based science1 √ •When evidence is incomplete? •When “they’’ don’t listen ? •Are scientists independent ? To evaluate impacts of policy and governance actions √ •Who pays? •How to access data for all actors, particularly in competitive chains? 1 CGIAR Consortium Research Program 6 Forests, Trees and Agroforestry 2010 THINKING beyond the canopy
- 16. THINKING THINKING be yboenydo nthde t hcea ncoapnyopy Thank you! The Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) is one of the 15 centres supported by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) www.cifor.cgiar.org v.ingram@cgiar.org
Notas do Editor
- IUFRO
- -Afromontane, evergreen tree, patchy distribution, 600-3000 m a.s.l. -Montane forests scarce (1.4% of all African forest cover,1 % in Cameroon) -Cherry like fruit eaten & dispersed by >20 species, 50% are Afromontane endangered &/or endemic P. Africana one of 13 key species in Cameroon montane forests -high degradation & deforestation rates in main harvest areas -Local use and trade: timber for fuel, tools and carving and bark for human and veterinary medicine -Principal ingredient in prostatic hyperplasia pharmaceuticals (Europe) and health supplements (US, Europe & China) Kilum Ijim has higher deforestation rates than Cameroon 0.14 % deforest and 0.1 degrade de Wassiege 2009 Cameroon montane forest (Kilum Ijim) high degradation since and deforestation rates 0.37% pa = 0.0017 ha/pa 1978-2001 Solefack 2009 Montane forest 1% (GFW 2000) and (de Wasseige 2008) Afromontane forests references: de wassige 2008, Bubb et al. cloud forests 2004
- grows in rainy, montane forest regions of 22 African countries
- Long lived = (>100 years) Demand increased by 600 % at its peak in 2005 (Source WCMC database 2008)
- What's a value chain?
- Rasies questions about how trade is governed
- “Super regulated” chain and products 2007 EU CITES trade suspension precipitated a crisis and review of arrangements Formal regulation grown, internationally influenced. Enforcement arbitrary and ineffective – varies by region. Regulates wild harvest- not cultivated Market based, harvester collective action, community-based companies and community forests used, adapted, collaborated with, occasionally subjugated and often challenged traditional and regulatory authority. Alienated and disabled customary institutions as commodification increased. Customary regulations differ by region, preceded regulatory framework, frequently overrun by projects, block regulatory.
- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LZLMc8eLgG8 From 36 onwards
- The impact of these governance arrangements on livelihoods has been considerable. A handful of processing, exporting and importing companies have benefited enormously for decades, gaining global competitive strategic advantage. Liberalisation to a market-based network had dramatic impacts: increasing prices and competition, retaining low flows of information between buyers and sellers. state treasury from exports. Some state officials have gained from corruption. Conservation-minded projects and NGOs promoting alternative and decentralised governance arrangements seeking to improve harvesters and/or the species’ environmental status prompted large-scale resource ‘mining’. However the government’s under-estimation and/or ignorance of the impact of the international conventions and agreements contributed to the EU CITES suspension. This had an immediate and direct negative economic impact. This was a ‘lose’ for the livelihoods of all actors involved. The new rules may have negative implications for equity of access to resources and markets, as the smaller, weaker and, until recently, unorganised actors struggle to make their voice heard against the larger, dominant traders and exporters. Collective action allowed community-based, collective action, often project supported, to gain or maintain a share of the economic value, increasing selling prices by 50 to 600%. However, attempts at value adding have been hindered by the low level of vertical integration. harvesters from different regions in contact and govern access to the Prunus Allocation Units, they expect their power to increase. A sobering note is that collective arrangements also contributed to over-extraction and ultimately the trade suspension.
- Positive Research indicates techniques for sustainable harvest is possible, Projects stimulated collective and individual planting, leading to a hitherto unrecognised cultivation. Projects helped bring customary harvest rules into formal sphere Trade suspension provided respite sand led to quantification. Concessions increase resource sustainability, easier control & monitoring Negative re-2007 government ignored own rules for inventories and harvest standards, when conducted, didnt use them for permitting. Statutory arrangements ineffective in countering unsustainable harvests Prevoiusly multiple resource users in one geographical space, with no sanctions, monitoring or conflict resolution arenas,. Projects promoting CFs & CBO facilitated large-scale resource ‘mining’ Regeneration tax barely invested in regeneration farmed trees unquantified, invisible to policymakers, no distinction between wild and farmed origins. regulatory frameworks taking account of the species’ ecological characteristics await implementation. But also introduced controls and inventories Collaborations between research, development and conservation led to policies and institutions focus on product and livelihood sustainability. Regulations, conventions and project-based arrangements however have been based upon a presumption of wild sourcing and the species’ threatened status. Thus perceptions of sustainability by the CITES and IUCN red data listings have played a dominant, but mistaken, role in its governance and consequent sustainability. The bark’s high value encouraged actors to negate customary rules, illustrated by unsustainable harvests by traditional authorities. Community collective action, promoted by statutory and project-based arrangements, has been directly responsible for illegal and unsustainable harvests and has largely failed to control access or over-extraction. Community-based institutions defied institutional design principles, insufficiently powerful to exclude others.
- scale, values, uses, circuits costs and benefits revealed Lack of knowledge prices, actors, transformation, sustainability) Market information influences vertical integration, prices and value adding