2017: Challenges and opportunites

5 Foreword - Victor Andrusiv
7 Forecast
Limits to Sustainability: Scenarios for the World and Ukraine in 2017 – Yuriy Romanenko
Global Politics
39 Risk Scenarios for Russia – Pavlo Shchelin
46 Growing imbalances in the EU and consequences for Ukraine – Nadiya Koval
56 Destabilization of the Middle East – Abu Ali Hassen
65 Erdogan's Authoritarian Modernization and Turkey's Growing Regional Influence – Nadiya Koval
71 Ukraine and South Caucasus: New Realities – Karen Madoyan
Domestic Policy
78 Development Scenarios for Minsk-2 in 2017 – Igor Tyshkevish
88 Gas and Oil in 2017. Key Trends for Ukraine – Igor Tyshkevish
Economy
97 Economy of Ukraine: 2016 Overall Results and Forecast for 2017 – Anatoliy Amelin, Yana Lavryk
and Olga Khomenko
Law Enforcement and Judicial System
116 Development of the Ukrainian Judicial System in 2017 – Oleksandr Yevseyev
126 Challenges in Law Enforcement Area - 2017 – Denys Monastyrskyi
142 Memorandum of the UIF Founders
3

FOREWORD
Victor Andrusiv
Executive Director of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future
The year 2016 proved unpredictable and presented a series
of unexpected events that brought the world further into
turbulence. Brexit and Donald Trump’s victory were the
least predictable events and their effects have yet to be
fully analyzed and assessed. Looking back at the past year,
it is safe to state two new realities: global transformations
gained new speed and forecasting has become an even
more thankless task.
What will 2017 bring? We try to answer this question in the
publication you are holding in your hands. Considering the
unpredictability of the previous year, we abstained from
providing final conclusions in our forecast. Instead, we offer
key scenarios for what might happen in 2017. Scenario fo-
recasting allows readers to see the logic of behavior of po-
litical players according to their conditions. Over the next
year everyone will be able to understand which scenario
arises for the world overall and Ukraine in particular by the
results of specific events. For instance, the victory of a can-
didate with pro-Russian rhetoric in the presidential elec-
tions in France will lead to cancellation of sanctions against
Russia and reduced support for Ukraine, which in turn will
affect developments in our country.
The main message of our forecast is that 2017 will be a
stress test. This applies both to the world and Ukraine. It is
about the stability of the existing system of relationships
and approaches to solving issues such as Brexit, Donald
Trump, elections in France and Germany, conflict in Syria,
ISIS, and the aggressive behavior of Russia – these and
other developments pose a serious challenge to the fun-
ctioning of the EU and NATO. Some of these changes sug-
gest a transformation Euro-Atlantic relations, however, can
it be possible to preserve the unity of values that Europe
and the US have demonstrated for over 100 years?
For Ukraine, 2017 will be a real test of stability. Although, as
long as the war in Donbas and occupation of Crimea are ta-
king place, each new year is another challenge for us. Ho-
wever, the next year will become a real challenge to our
independence and sustainability. Since the Revolution of
Dignity we have managed to muddle through crises thanks
to significant support from the West, and without its help
it would be extremely difficult to maintain overall stability.
Our forecast shows that in 2017 the international situation
is extremely unfavorable for Ukraine. Therefore we will have
to rely mainly on our own strength in the face of a formi-
dable and insatiable enemy.
The stability of Ukraine in 2017 primarily depends on the
ability to overcome internal challenges. The world looks at
the ability of the Ukrainian government to carry out effec-
tive reforms and defeat corruption with increasing distrust,
and this only strengthens those voices calling to achieve a
quick compromise with Russia on the conflict in Donbas
and Crimea. Against this background external financial aid
can decline, which currently remains significant despite the
first shoots of economic growth. But the biggest challenge
of next year may be early parliamentary elections. Our fo-
recast shows that reformatting of the government is in line
not only with the interests of certain domestic political pla-
yers, but also with outside ones.
Overall, the forecast prepared by the Ukrainian Institute for
the Future (UIF) is a highly comprehensive work, which co-
vers a wide range of political and economic spheres glo-
bally. In this publication you will find a thorough analysis of
the situation in the Middle East, domestic political risks in
Russia, growing authoritarianism in Turkey, proliferation of
conflicts in the South Caucasus, scenarios for Minsk-2 im-
plementation, construction of gas pipelines bypassing
5

Ukraine, analysis and forecast of key economic indicators,
law enforcement and judiciary reforms. This will help you
capture the widest possible picture of the coming year and
to plan or make decisions in an appropriate manner.
In conclusion, I would like to thank those people without
whom our forecast had no chance to be born. First of all
these are UIF founders: Ihor Liski, Anatoly Amelin,
Oleksiy Skrypnyk, Anton Gerashchenko, Taras Berezovets,
and Yuri Romanenko. It is through their expertise and fina-
ncial support you have an opportunity to learn about the
challenges and aspirations of 2017. I also wish to thank
Denis Semenov and Andriy Zablocki, who reviewed the early
ideas of key scenarios and gave their critical comments
and remarks.
6

Considering the possible scenarios for Ukraine in 2017, we
need to determine the underlying factors that determine
the course of processes in the country and the world. It is
impossible to understand the prospects of Ukraine outside
the global context because our country is deeply integrated
into the global system. Moreover, the severe economic cri-
sis has dramatically increased Ukraine’s dependence on
foreign aid, which in turn enables external donors to dictate
terms of such aid, based on their own interests.
7
LIMITS TO SUSTAINABILITY: SCENARIOS FOR THE WORLD AND UKRAINE IN 2017
Yuriy Romanenko
Program Director: International and Domestic Policy, Ukrainian Institute for the Future
Factors determining the stability of the state system of Ukraine in 2017
1. Legitimacy
2. Resources
3. External support through various types of aid
Note: external legitimacy does not imply external support. For instance, falling legitimacy of the current political regime in 2016
in the US and Europe did not prevent providing external support, i.e. credits and technical assistance
External
Internal
USA
Europe
Russia
China
other players
Elites
Masses
Resources may be developed unequally, and lack of economic
resources can be compensated by organization or ideology,
increasing operational efficiency of what is available. Or vice
versa, poor organization may be offset by significant economic
resources spent on power block. Example of such a country
is Russia
Economic
Power
Organizational
Ideological
Therefore, in order to show the logic of certain scenarios in
Ukraine, we must first outline the key factors that deter-
mine the balance of the state system in Ukraine.
We identify three key factors setting the framework of sce-
narios for Ukraine:

1.Legitimacy // http://iphras.ru/elib/1641.html
2. Rapallo Treaty //
https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A0%D0%B0%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D0%B4%
D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%96%D1%80_(1922)
3. Economic resources // http://abc.informbureau.com/html/yeiiiiexaneea_danodnu.html
8
For Ukraine it is crucial to have external legitimacy from
the United States, Russia, Europe, China, and to a lesser ex-
tent from regional players such as Turkey, India, Japan and
others.
Second key factor: Resources.
We divide resources into several types: economic, power,
organizational, and ideological.
Economic resources are a set of tangible and intangible
factors and means to ensure the smooth functioning of
social production and reproduction. There are the following
types: natural (raw materials, geographic); labor (human
capital); capital (physical capital); working capital; financial
capital; entrepreneurial skills; intellectual potential, etc3
.
Power resources are a set of various tools that a political
regime can use to protect its interests.
Organizational resources are systems for reporting, plan-
ning, control, and informal relationships within a social or-
ganization, aimed at the most efficient use of economic
and other resources.
Ideological resources are a system of ideas that define the
relationships within a particular society and political regime
as well as its relations with the outside world.
These types of resources form a set of resources that de-
fine the internal stability of the political regime. One type
of resources can offset the other type.
First factor: Legitimacy.
The legitimacy (from the Latin: Legitimus – agreed with the
law, legal, lawful) – legitimacy of the regime, politicians and
leaders, reflecting features that derive not only from for-
mal laws and decrees, but from social consent and ac-
ceptance of them as legitimate, i.e., matching the values
of citizens. Legitimacy is a long-term agreement of the ma-
jority to accept the reign of a certain class, hierarchies, and
power as legitimate1
.
Legitimacy is divided into ‘internal’ and ‘external’.
In turn, internal legitimacy can be divided into the legiti-
macy of the political regime in terms of the masses and
legitimacy in terms of elites.
A political regime can be highly legitimate in the eyes of
the masses, but low in the eyes of the elites, and vice versa.
Simultaneously, high or low legitimacy in the eyes of the
elites and the masses is one of the criteria for high or low
stability of a political regime.
External legitimacy reflects the legitimacy of the political
regime in the eyes of foreign actors.
Example: The Soviet Union initially had low external but high
internal legitimacy. The Soviets were trying to constantly
expand external legitimacy, making deft diplomatic ma-
neuvers, as in the case of the Rapallo Treaty in 19222
, which
established diplomatic relations between the RSFSR and
Weimar Germany.

9
tem of Ukraine, let’s focus on defining scenarios at the
global level, as Ukraine’s dependence on external factors
makes it extremely sensitive to a particular configuration
that may arise in 2017.
First, we must consider the motivation of leading players
whose interests influence the Ukrainian processes or are
important in terms of impact on the motivation of other
geopolitical actors who have interests in Ukraine.
Motivations of key geopolitical actors
US: its motivation is of strategic defensive nature, but tac-
tically Washington’s steps might be offensive on a number
of regional geopolitical grounds. America is interested to
maintain its current status as the most powerful country in
the world that has a preferred position in the military, po-
litical, financial, economic and technological spheres. But
the recent presidential elections in the US have shown that
America is experiencing “imperial strain”, which is mostly
the fatigue from multiple costs for maintaining global
hegemony. This led to the American white middle class to
support Trump, who pointed to the need of returning to iso-
lationism.
What is the difference between the viewpoints on foreign
policy of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump?
Democrats in the US supported the need to preserve the
global infrastructure (US dominance) as a key element of
their power and wealth. From this point of view, Hillary Clin-
ton’s position can be described as global conservatism.
Donald Trump made a program of radical conservative iso-
lationism, aimed to solve the problems of restarting the US
economy and a sharp reduction of expenditures on foreign
policy by rearrangement of them to allies4
. This does not
mean that Trump’s foreign policy will be less active than
his predecessors. It is hardly possible, given the depend-
Example 1: The emergence of the state of Israel in 1948 was
characterized by the absence of strong economic and
power resources, which were offset by a strong presence
of social organization and ideology that helped to mobilize
the social power of the Jewish people and promptly turn
Israel into a powerful state in economic, military, and po-
litical terms.
Example 2: Modern Russia is an example of a combination
of vast economic and power resources with weak organi-
zational and powerful ideological resources. Although Rus-
sia is very inefficient in spending its economic resources
due to corruption and poor quality of public management,
but the huge amount of resources allows to compensate
for the lack of organization in order to maintain a high level
of military and political power and a sophisticated person-
alized propaganda machine (Ruskiy Mir, spiritual ties be-
tween Church and state, etc.)
Resources are dynamic, and the balance between them
can vary in one direction or another.
Third key factor: External Support.
External support for a political regime is a set of actions
aimed at ensuring its stability through economic, ideolog-
ical, organizational, and security resources.
External support is different than external legitimacy as a
political regime can have relatively low external legitimacy,
but receive external support. Ukraine is an example in 2016,
when the external support of the political regime of Petro
Poroshenko by the US and Europe continued despite a fall
of credibility.
Global Scenarios For 2017
Once we have described (albeit in a very simplified manner)
the key factors determining the balance of the state sys-

4. Trump’s program for the first 100 days of presidency
https://www.facenews.ua/columns/2016/310207/
10
calating a conflict with the West as its critically dependent
on access to the markets of the US, EU and Japan with a
trillion dollar turnover. In addition, China has no control over
global communications, so cannot enter conflict with the
US, as it will be immediately cut off from markets and raw
materials for its products. This threatens collapse of
China’s economy and internal shocks. Therefore China
keeps a conservative and restrained policy in the regions
where it has no basic interests.
Strategically Russia holds a defensive, but tactically very
aggressive policy. The Kremlin’s goals are in maintaining
control over its periphery, which includes Ukraine, to en-
sure security in case of a worsening of the global crisis and
internal turbulence. Russia considers the strengthening of
the US and Europe on its periphery as a potential threat.
This is some kind of psychological complex, resulting from
Russian history when an absence of external geographic
boundaries led to the appearance of conquerors. That is
why Russia feels permanently claustrophobic.
Now the logic of Putin’s actions is intended to conclude a
big deal with the West that would guarantee the division
of spheres of influence and restoring economic exchange.
The Kremlin must balance its relations with the West, as
Russia depends critically on access to European markets.
EU countries buy about 74% of Russian exports of oil. How-
ever the drop in oil prices has created a huge hole in the
Russian budget, which threatens to drive Russia into a debt
trap already in 2018-2019, if the situation does not change.
So this requires reconciliation with the United States and
Europe, which have sufficient tools to influence the price of
oil and gas. This is especially true in the context of Trump’s
promises to dramatically increase oil and gas production in
the US that can fix oil prices at the relatively low level of
about 40-60 dollars despite OPEC’s efforts to increase the
price by reducing production.
ence of the US on access to raw materials and markets for
its products, and simply for reasons of national security.
But Trump will drastically reduce expenditures in areas to
be selected as secondary.
The European Union takes a defensive position in both
strategy and tactics. The fiscal crisis weakens its economic
strength and unity, while the problem of migrants increases
pressure on political regimes in a number of key EU coun-
tries. The Brexit vote in July 2016 became a vivid expression
of this trend, which can be strengthened during the French
presidential elections and parliamentary elections in Ger-
many. Therefore Europe is afraid of new risks that might
lead to a loss of control and unity of the EU. So most EU
countries’ policies will be conservative and aimed at over-
coming the growing imbalances. Thus, Europe falls into it-
self, making its foreign policy more and more passive.
.
China: strategically its foreign policy has an offensive char-
acter, but tactically Beijing may take a pause in a number
of regions, not to get into conflicts in which it is not inter-
ested. There’s a clear understanding in China that if
processes develop by linear logic, then in 20-30 years it will
become too large for its interests to be ignored by the US
and Europe. So China avoids conflicts that can change its
model, which is also under increasing pressure because of
rising global turbulence and conflict in relations with the
US. It is known that Trump outlined China as one of the key
problems for the US, so the Washington-Beijing relation-
ship may be substantially revised after several decades of
improving cooperation, made possible after the historic
visit of Nixon and Kissinger in the 1970’s. By this logic, Bei-
jing occasionally supports Russia which it uses to intimi-
date the West with a possible alliance with Moscow.
However, at this stage China is not really interested in es-

11
We believe that in the following year there are three basic
global scenarios that provide a framework for maneuvers
by Kyiv, forming three basic conditions for internal scenar-
ios in Ukraine.
Let’s consider the global scenarios first:
Scenario G1 – «Peacemaker»
Scenario G2 – «Pragmatic»
Scenario G3 – «Confrontation»
If Putin manages to agree with the new US administration
on key issues (division of spheres of influence and with-
drawal of conflict issues from the agenda), it is possible
that the US and Europe may try to create a strategic al-
liance that will focus on Asia as the main competitor of the
three Christian key blocs, and restrain the Islamic bloc.
On the contrary, Russia is extremely interested in how to
break the Euro-Atlantic ties between Europe and the US, if
it fails to normalize relations with Washington. Then the
Kremlin will seek to strengthen relations with key European
states (Germany, France, and Italy) using their real internal
difficulties or engineering such issues through a combina-
tion of political, military-political, and economic instru-
ments.
In summary, it is easy to see that all the key global actors
aim to maintain their current against a backdrop of global
instability, trying to shift costs to others. Only China has a
strategic offensive position, but it is limited in its maneu-
vers because of dependence on the West.
Russia, as the weakest player in this global Quartet, is in-
clined to play the most risky game, especially in relations
with the US and Europe. After raising the stakes, Putin is
trying to strengthen his bargaining position, compensating
for a lack of other resources. Putin plays a joker, going to
bluff in order to enter the most profitable bargaining posi-
tion with the West and China, but they both are well aware
of Russian limitations. In this case it is hard to say that
today’s key global players are really interested in each
other’s collapse because they are afraid of the associated
risks.
The interests of other geopolitical actors are important for
Ukraine, but we will not consider them specifically in this
section for the sake of brevity and compactness of the re-
port.

Scenario G1 – «Peacemaker»
The “Peacemaker” scenario implies that the US and Europe
focus on domestic issues, reaching agreement with Russia
on key issues: the Middle East, Ukraine and Eastern Europe,
oil prices, sanctions, counter-terrorism, and the fight
against illegal migration. Finally, the parties can come to
agreement on strategic opposition to China.
12
"Peacemaker" scenario for 2017
Motives of players on Ukraine:
Russia: change balance in Ukraine
EU: change balance
US: change balance
!!!
А
Basic options for Ukraine
The threat
of conflict in
Ukraine because
of DPR/LPR
status, and
requirements
from other
regions on
the same rights
Sectoral and Donbas sanctions are cancelled.
Arrangements on oil prices.
Expansion of spheres of influence to the Middle East.
Ukraine in the Russia's sphere of influence. Possible
arrangements on China.
"The Hawks" from Trump's
surrounding are blocked
The weakening
of NATO, the EU is
beginning to create
Defense Forces
The weakening
of transatlantic
trade
Guarantees to Assad, Syria's
transformation into a federal or confederal
republic. Joint struggle against ISIS
Struggle against ISIS
together with Russia
and the US
Providing financial
aid for the reconstruction
of Iraq and Syria
No money
No lethal weapons
The joint struggle against the ISIS,
reformatting Syria and Iraq,
and distancing from Saudits
Israel is a key partner
in the Middle East
OSCE as a key element
of stabilization in the Donbas
Technical aid
for Donbas
of $0.5-1.5 billion,
visa-free regime,
credits
Russia opens the market,
reducing gas prices,
and freezes debts
Minsk-2 in
Moscow
interpretation
Package 1.
Predominate interests
of the US and Europe
Package 2.
Predominate interests
of Russia and Europe
Linking the economy to the political
forces in Ukraine that are loyal to Russia
De facto Crimea remains Russian, whereas de jure it is recognized
for Ukraine by the US.
Attempt to reload Russian economy in spirit of Perestroika 2.0
Strengthening of trade after the
cancellation of sanctions
!
!
Marine Le Pen
or Francois Fillon
winning French
presidency
SPD victory in Germany
state elections and
strengthening of the
"Alternative's" position
The strengthening of
Right Forces in Europe
Implementing
Minsk-2 in full
Constitutional
Reform
Parlamenarly
elections
if reform's failed
Reelection of
president whih
does not fit in
the new balance
of powers
UKRAINE
ЕС
MIDDLE
EAST
RUSSIAUSA
ISRAEL
Relationships on the security line
Relationships on the economy line
US Actions: Donald Trump directs his main vector of efforts
at domestic policy. With the Republican majority in the Sen-
ate and Congress, the White House launches large-scale
tax cuts, creates a legal framework for return of American
business to the US. Overall, Trump begins to implement key
provisions of his program.
Along with Putin, Trump achieves a number of strategic
agreements on the Middle East and Ukraine. For the US, the
main thing is the first package: on the Middle East, where
interests of Washington and its allies dominate (first of all,
Israel). For Russia, the second package Is crucial: on
Ukraine, where the interests of Russia and Europe will pre-
vail.

Agreements on the Middle East between the US and Rus-
sia would include the definition of the state system in Syria
after the war, which will turn into a federation or a con-
federation, where key players will fix control over their re-
sponsibilities. Key ethno-confessional groups Syria will
receive a particular type of autonomy. Turkey will control
the buffer area in northern Syria to prevent the expansion
of Kurdish influence. Assad receives guarantees of immu-
nity in exchange for joint action against the Islamic State.
Washington and Moscow also may agree to coordinate
counteracting ISIS. It is clear that in this case the role of Is-
rael will increase. Having a close relationship with Wash-
ington and Moscow, Israel will use new opportunities for
strengthening its security in the fight against terrorism and
Islamic radicals.
Most likely this scenario will cool down US relations with
Saudi Arabia. Trump is unlikely to follow the line of foreign
policy of Barack Obama, who blocked lawsuits by US citi-
zens against Saudi Arabia, whose citizens were involved in
the 9/11 attacks.
In this scenario, Trump will follow the logic he outlined dur-
ing the election campaign: optimization of foreign policy
expenditures supporting allies in the region5
. Therefore, the
new administration will pay less attention to NATO, pushing
Europe to spend more for security, or will try to keep NATO
demanding increased funding from European security pro-
grams. This process is already being seen6
.
The EU Actions: Europe remains in deep crisis, which is
linked to the strengthening of Eurosceptic position after
Brexit. In the presidential elections in France in April 2017
Francois Fillon or Marine Le Pen will win, which will
strengthen Russia’s position in the negotiations on Ukraine.
The Social Democratic Party of Germany will win the au-
tumn parliamentary elections in Germany under
strengthening position of pro-Russian ArD “Alternatives”,
which will also strengthen Russia’s positions. The weaken-
ing of the EU will be accompanied by the intensification of
dialogue between Moscow and national governments. Re-
sults of the December referendum in Italy show that the
probability of incoming political forces supporting cancel-
lation of sanctions against Russia is very high7
.
Europe will participate in the Trump’s deal with Putin as
one of the key players of package deals. The EU will support
granting financial aid to Syria for restoration after the war.
However, the position of Europe in this area will depend di-
rectly on what territory will remain under Assad, as well as
the issue of the postwar Syrian regime. Europeans have al-
ready warned that if Moscow keeps supporting Assad, then
restoration of Syria is to be at Russia’s cost8
.
13
5 Trump promises to stop the intervention policy //
http://www.dw.com/ru/%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BF-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B5%D1%89%D0%B0%D0%B5%D1%82-
%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%8C-
%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BA%D1%83-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%86
%D0%B8%D0%B9/a-36673698
6. The EU will dramatically increase defense spending //
http://ru.golos.ua/suspilstvo/evrosoyuz_rezko_uvelichit_rashodyi_na_oboronu__smi_
7. Battle for Europe. Referendum in Italy //
http://hvylya.net/analytics/geopolitics/bitva-za-yevropu-referendum-v-italiyi.html
8. Russia should foot Syria reconstruction bill, European leaders say // https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/29/russia-should-
foot-syria-reconstruction-bill-european-leaders-say

Europeans will also participate in an anti-ISIS coalition, as
it directly meets their interests to combat Islamist terror-
ism in Europe itself. This will require strengthening of the
EU defense structures. This trend will gain strength against
the backdrop of France and Germany’s attempts to create
self-defense forces that will satisfy Trump’s logic, who
would welcome more independent actions of European
partners in their area of responsibility, be it the Maghreb or
Eastern Europe. Besides, Trump’s protectionism may lead
to declining trade between the US and the EU. However,
this is unlikely to happen quickly (even during 2017) because
it takes time for business to respond to new conditions.
Such approaches in relations between the US and Europe
will determine the format of the agreement with Russia on
Ukraine. Putin will demand concessions on Ukraine after
his own concessions on the Middle East.
That is how US-European deals with Russia will seem in the
case of the “Peacemaker” scenario. The US and Europe will
agree to shift the Crimean issue beyond the conflict be-
tween Russia and Ukraine. De facto, Crimea will be recog-
nized as Russian, whereas de jure it remains Ukrainian.
Sanctions for the annexation of Crimea will remain, but
sectoral sanctions imposed after the Donbas conflict will
be canceled as soon as the Minsk agreement is imple-
mented.
Putin will try to promote Minsk-2 on his own terms, but may
soften his stance on secondary issues. In this format, Rus-
sia will promise the West to take part of the costs associ-
ated with the restoration of Donbas. In addition, Russia will
take on the commitment to open its market for Ukraine to
eliminate the threat of economic collapse in Ukraine. How-
ever, Russia will probably tie these steps to changing of po-
litical regime in Kyiv, so that political forces that would
support such a course could obtain carte blanche. In this
case Russia will probably agree to a number of economic
concessions for Ukraine (cancellation of sanctions on
Ukrainian products, reduced gas prices, deferred credit and
so on).
Withdrawal of most sanctions on Russia will help to inten-
sify its economic relations with Europe, which will help to
stabilize the economy of Russia, and that’s what Putin
seeks.
Basic options for Ukraine in case of this scenario:
First, Ukraine will not receive financial aid from the US. Un-
like the Democrats, Donald Trump will demand thorough
undertaking of obligations by Ukraine. The initiative to pro-
vide credit guarantees to Ukraine came personally from
Vice President Joseph Biden. In 2017 Ukraine will be deprived
of this resource that adversely affects the ability to main-
tain a positive trade balance in the following year9
. We re-
mind that in 2016 it remained positive due to support from
the US, which provided credit guarantees.
Second, Ukraine will not receive lethal weapons from the
United States, and financial aid in the amount of 350 million
dollars for the Armed Forces in 2017 may be reduced.
Third, Ukraine could receive technical assistance from the
EU to restore Donbas in the amount of 0.5-1.5 billion USD. In
addition, perhaps, a visa-free regime with the EU and As-
sociation Agreement will get started. Ukraine may count
on credit support from the European countries. It is un-
likely to be large, but it may be enough for the Ukrainian
economy to maintain a quasi-stable state of stagnation.
Fourth, the conditions for reformatting the post-Maidan
political regime emerge in Ukraine, because implementa-
14
9. http://ubr.ua/finances/macroeconomics-ukraine/platejnyi-bal-
ans-ukrainy-sveden-s-proficitom-452630

tion of agreements between the US, Europe and Russia to
resolve the crisis in the Donbas requires appropriate ac-
tions from the President, Government and Parliament. The
US, Europe and Russia demand the following steps to be
done by Ukraine:
1. To implement Minsk-2 in full.
2. Preliminarily to carry out constitutional reform.
3. To conduct parliamentary elections if reform is impossi-
ble within the existing parliament.
4. To conduct presidential elections if antagonistic relations
with the new Verkhovna Rada arise (we will consider this
scenario below).
5. The OSCE will play a key role in mediating de-escalation
of the situation in the Donbas.
This logic is directly tied to the motivation of the “big three”
key players in this scenario:
Russia is interested in the full reformatting of the post-
Maidan balance of power in Ukraine, stopping Ukraine from
implementing agreements with foreign partners.
Europe is interested in changing the balance of power in
Ukraine, if the agreement with Russia will not be executed.
For this it may limit the aid that could be very necessary for
Ukraine next year. That is why former US Ambassador to
Ukraine Steven Pifer called on Ukraine not to leave
the Minsk-210
.
The US will not interfere; especially not provide any sup-
port, if Russia and Europe will keep pressing on Ukraine for
meeting the conditions necessary for a “big deal”.
Thus, Ukraine will appear in circumstances where it would
be forced to fulfil an agreement which is not supported by
a significant part of the elite and the population. However,
Ukraine’s critical dependence on external support remains.
It follows that there are emerging conditions for a sharp
escalation of the conflict in Ukraine on the implementation
of Minsk-2 or the consequences of such implementation
when other regions may require extension of their powers
for the occupied territories of Donbas. We’ll consider vari-
ations of the situation within internal scenarios below.
15
10. Steven Pifer about Ukraine and Minsk-2//
https://politeka.net/375508-chto-budet-s-ukrainoy-v-sluchae-
otkaza-ot-minskikh-soglasheniy/

Scenario G2 – «Pragmatic»
This scenario follows logically from the Scenario G1 in
case the original agreement between the US and Russia
has not worked for months because they cannot be im-
plemented at lower levels.
16
Scenario "Pragmatic" 2017
EU: wait / change
US: wait / act carefully
!!!
В
Military coup
attept in the
form of martial
law
Return to
Scenario A
Confrontation
under Scenario C
Sanctions remain in its current form. Increased oil
and gas production in the US makes the price
pressure on Russia.
After successful negotiations at the primary level,
the parties may not proceed to implement because
of the conflict of interest of 2-3 level players.
Stalemates as a result.
"The Hawks" from Trump's
surrounding are gaining power
Negotiations on the
relations format
Washington reinforces its
European allies in NATO,
while France and Germany
are stagnating
Further support of Assad, expanding
Russian military contingent in Syria,
attempts to strengthen relations with Iraq,
periodic aggravation with the US and other
enemies of Assad
Supporting insurgents
and Iraqi Kurds, attempt
to negotiate with Turkey
on refugees
No money
Lethal weapon for Ukraine
before the year's end.
Arming the opponents of Assad and ISIS,
support for Israel and other allies
in the Middle East
OSCE acts as a weak observer,
as it is now
Minimal aid. Visa-free
regime is delayed,
and the Association
with the EU goes bad
Market is closed
for Ukraine
Periodic escalation
in the Donbas as on fall'16
and even more
Time is a key factor: the longer is the uncertainty for Russia,
the less resources for its economy. So Putin'd rush in order
to enter the negotiations with the most powerful position.
Russia's stake will be on rolling the situation in Ukraine
combined with the escalation in the Donbass, and support any
forces playing for destabilization
Alain Juppe or Francois
Fillon winning French
presidency
Merkel's possible
winning of the elections
in Germany with
a slight advantage
The deepening crisis
in the EU, strengthen-
ing of the right forces
and populists
Lack of resources
Parlamentarly
elections as
a way to let off
the steam
Inability to
reform because
of parliament
conflicts
"Neither war, nor peace"
situation as in 2016
UKRAINE
EU
MIDDLE
EARTH
RUSSIAUSA
This primarily relates to the situation in the Middle East,
where huge numbers of people and social groups are in-
volved in the war in Syria and Iraq. And also it’s very often
that interests of a regional or global player stand behind a
particular group. By this logic, agreements between the US,
Europe and Russia on the Middle East will not result in
Saudi Arabia or Qatar stopping support for rebels in Syria,
based on their concerns about the growing influence of
Iran in the region. Moreover, if under the Trump adminis-
tration relations between the US and Saudis will become
cooler, their motivation to support anti-Assad groups might
even increase.
Basically, it would be the same situation as agreements be-
tween the US and Russia on Aleppo in 2016. As everyone
could see, agreements were quickly violated by both sides
in Syria and the war continued with renewed vigor.

Exactly the same situation emerges in Ukraine, where any
attempts to push Minsk-2 in the new edition of a “Munich
conspiracy”, would lead to polarization of Ukrainian society
and influence groups among the elite, as we can conclude
considering Scenario G1.
There will be a stalemate on both sites (the Middle East and
Ukraine), which can be overcome with a limited escalation
by Russia.
The factor of time becomes crucial for Russia because sta-
bilization funds are exhausted and the search for resources
for saving the stability of the regime in Russia becomes
vital. Russia has already made doubled cuts in funding of
defense within its three-year budget until 202011
. That is
why Putin should hurry up to make an agreement with the
West, such as considered in the Scenario G1. For this pur-
pose, he will use the context of parliamentary elections in
Germany (elections in France have already been completed
before the G2 scenario starts), so to force Europe to agree-
ment through pressure on its weak. We cannot exclude a
possibility of new wave of refugees from Syria to Europe,
which weakened the position of Angela Merkel in the con-
text of parliamentary elections in Germany. Obviously, this
will be preceded by heavy clashes in Syria that will provoke
this wave of refugees. However Turkey, pursuing their in-
terests in the negotiations with the European Union, can
contribute to the displacement of another wave of the
refugees to southern Europe.
But a key role in achieving Putin’s goals is still to be played
by Ukraine, where he will apply the tools of destabilization
of the political system together with escalation of the sit-
uation in the Donbas. Russia will also maintain its economic
blockade of Ukraine and perhaps even expand it.
Before the Kremlin achieves the goal of reformatting the
post-Maidan balance of power in Ukrainian politics, the re-
alization of its plans for a big deal with the West will be dif-
ficult. Thus, the situation will remain as “neither war nor
peace”, as in the years of 2015-2016. But, provoking an es-
calation in the Middle East and Ukraine, Putin risks
strengthening the position of “Hawks” in Donald Trump’s
administration as well as in the Senate and the US Con-
gress. “Hawks” will stand aside at the first stage, when
Trump will enter the Oval Office and try to implement plans
on improving relations with Russia. However, with delay in
implementation of scenario G1, their influence will increase
and the US stance will be strengthened.
US actions: By this logic, US actions under Scenario G2 will
look like the following. Sanctions on Russia will remain. Eu-
rope will also keep theirs in summer 2017. Trump will boost
production of oil and gas or keep prices at current levels,
or not allow them to rise too high after OPEC decided to
reduce oil production on 30 November 201612
.
In relations with Europe the US will strengthen the security
of its allies in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, with Ger-
many and France stagnating against the backdrop of nu-
merous challenges. Poland, Romania, and the Baltic
countries may receive additional assistance from the US
e.g. loans for upgrading their armies, and redeployment of
additional small contingents of the US Army in these coun-
tries. There is no doubt that the UK will actively support
such steps.
17
11. Demilitarization of the budget http://www.ng.ru/economics/2016-10-31/4_6848_budget.html
12. OPEC decided to cut oil production. //

In the Middle East the US will contribute to initiatives of its
allies, especially Israel. Washington may also renew arms
supplies to the rebels in Syria, and continue air strikes on
ISIS, helping to strengthen the multifarious anti-ISIS coali-
tion in Iraq.
At the same time the US will not support Ukraine financially,
but by the end of 2017 Ukraine can get lethal weapons. This
likelihood will increase as far as Russia amplifies efforts to
undermine the situation in Donbas, which will strengthen
the positions and arguments of Republican “Hawks”.
The EU Actions: G2 scenario in Europe will be enabled by
Alain Juppe’s win in elections in France; Juppe holds a much
tougher stance than Francois Fillon, not to mention na-
tionalist Marine Le Pen.
In Germany under this scenario an uncertain victory of An-
gela Merkel is possible, however with little advantage.
Merkel will not have a stable position forcing her to com-
promise with other political forces in Germany. The irony is
the fact that Merkel will actually become a key player of
the Euro-Atlantic camp in Europe in conditions when it’s
rather instable after Trump has won. Europe’s relations
with Russia in the G2 scenario will be unstable. Sanctions
against Russia, as we have already mentioned above, will
remain at least before early 2017. However, some European
countries begin to restore economic relations with Russia
bypassing sanctions.
In the Middle East, Europe will try to negotiate with Turkey
to prevent a new destabilizing wave of refugees. Support
for the rebels will be renewed in case of further escalation
in Syria. Europe will also support efforts to neutralize ISIS.
Europe will provide minimal aid to Ukraine. The visa-free
regime with the EU will be delayed until the determination
of the political architecture in France and Germany after
the elections. Association with the EU will also work
intermittently.
Motivations of key players regarding Ukraine will look like
as follows:
Russia: change the balance of power in Ukraine as soon as
possible by instruments of destabilization of the political
situation. Large-scale conflict is unlikely.
Europe: will wait until the situation changes for the better.
Support for Ukraine is minimal.
USA: will wait, keeping an eye on situation, however provid-
ing limited assistance in case of escalation in the Donbas.
Hence the basic options for Ukraine under G2 scenario for
2017 are as follows:
First, the lack of resources to cover all the payments. This
will contribute to undermining the state in the face of ris-
ing mass discontent and conflict of interest between dif-
ferent groups of elites.
Second, this implies the need for early elections to the
Verkhovna Rada to release accumulated “social pressure”.
But this is a risky step that may weaken the position of
President Poroshenko and start the process of redistribu-
tion of spheres of influence by a new parliamentary coali-
tion. As a result, the inability to conduct any reforms will
remain until the conflict is resolved. This is a stalemate.
Third, understanding that the elections to the Verkhovna
Rada lead to stalemate therefore deepens the crisis and
creates the motivation to try new tactics by the President,
through the introduction of martial law against the back-
ground of escalation in the Donbas, and for his opponents
through organizing street protests or a coup using the se-
curity forces. These options we will consider further into
the interior scenarios.
18

Based on the above, the conclusion is that after escala-
tions in Ukraine and the Middle East within the G2 scenario,
the “big three”, i.e. US, Europe, Russia, will reach a cross-
roads where they would either have to return to the sce-
nario G1, or move to the scenario G3, which is the scenario
of confrontation.
Scenario G3 – «Confrontation»
The “big three” entering in the scenario of confrontation is
unlikely in 2017, since its deployment takes time, but it log-
ically follows the scenarios G1 and G2, so the probability of
its realization in late 2017 with the transfer in 2018.
19
Scenario "Confrontation" 2017
EU: save current regime
US: save current regime
!!!
Alternative:
return to scenarios 1 and 2
Deployment of LNG
terminals,
decreasing
dependence
on Russian gas
Reformatting of NATO,
transition to flexible
alliances with the Eastern
Europe countries
Confrontation, increasing
military presence in Syria,
repetition of incidents as in Turkey
in November 2016
Confrontation <-> refugees
Financial and other aid
Lethal weapons
Confrontation, support for allies
with weapons and finance
Lethal weapons from
Britain, Poland
and Romania
Technical and, possibly,
financial support
Blocking the economic
relations
Aggravation that goes into
a new wave of invading Ukraine
Russia's stake on the collapse of the political
regime in Ukraine under the sharp increase
of the pressure (power, economic)
EU disintegration
Dividing into the
"healthy core”
(Germany + Benelux) +
crisis South + crisis
East looking for
support from the US
and UK
The collapse of the existing model due
to lack of resources
Transition to the authoritarian regime.
Martial law
С
Support with weapons <->
the threat of war
Russian invasion to the Baltic
States in the format of "little green
men" to demonstrate NATO's
inability to perform paragraph 5
of the Agreement. Conflict
between the US and old Europe Sanctions
Fixing a new status quo after
escalation - as Korea in 1953
Return to scenarios A and B
Consolidation of the EU
to external challenges
Strengthening
Euro-Atlantic polictics.
Merkel stays
UKRAINE
EU
MIDDLE
EAST
RUSSIAUSA
1.
2.
BALTICS

Implementation of this scenario is possible, if all the par-
ties cannot come to a major agreement in terms of lim-
ited escalation in areas №1 (Middle East) and №2 (Ukraine).
As we have already mentioned, limited resources make
Vladimir Putin raise the stakes against the United States
and Europe, while possessing the initiative. Trump’s course
for isolation and criticism of NATO could push Putin to make
a symbolic strike on NATO, particularly, on the Alliance’s
ability to fulfill Article 5 on providing assistance to its mem-
bers.
This means that Russia will go for provocation in the Baltics
with invasion using “little green men” (Russian unmarked
troops). This option does not include the seizure of the
Baltic by the Russian army, but the main goal is to show
NATO’s organizational failure in terms of responding to the
call. Appearance of “little green men” in Latvia, Lithuania or
Estonia in a “popular uprising” or “mass riots” would
threaten state control in these countries, and put NATO to-
gether with the EU and the United States before a prob-
lem of how to react. It is important for Vladimir Putin to
provoke a conflict between the US and Europe for reaction
to the situation. There is no doubt that many European
countries will try to find exactly the same arguments for
the invasion of Baltic States, as in the case of Ukraine. “Give
us the arguments”, “it’s not the Russian army invading, but
the rebellion of the local Russian-speaking population”,
“let’s try to negotiate with Russia, it is entitled to represent
its interest in the region” – these and other similar reasons
in Berlin, Rome, Paris, Madrid, and other European capitals
would waste time when a decision must be made very
quickly.
An important element of this scenario is that the invasion
of Baltic countries will be accompanied by increasing es-
calation in Donbas and the Middle East.
In Donbas, Russia may try to organize an attack on Ukraine
from occupied territories using heavy weapons to reach
the administrative borders of Luhansk and Donetsk regions,
and possibly more.
Nor can we exclude that Putin can preliminarily redeploy
additional troops to Syria, for another aggravation that
could lead to a repetition of dangerous incidents such as
the destruction of a Russian Su-24 by the Turkish Air Force.
For Putin the Baltics are not as important as the Middle
East, so the logic of a strike is to offer exchange two sites
(the Baltic and ME) which are more important for the US
and Europe, for one – Ukraine and then return to scenario
G1.
In this situation the reaction of the US and Donald Trump is
crucial.
The US response to this challenge will determine the fate
of the entire global infrastructure of America, which is
based on its strength. Trump may not respond to calls for
help from NATO, as Barack Obama did, when Turkey shot
down the Russian Su-24 in November 2015, and the result-
ing conflict with Russia further prompted Recep Erdogan
into tactical rapprochement with Russia. If this situation is
repeated on a larger scale in the Baltic countries, this
would break trust in Washington and NATO may simply fall
apart. The US will lose its status of “first among equals” and
the world will slide to multi-state conflict, as in the Con-
gress of Vienna in the XIX century, after the Napoleonic
wars.
There will be a very dangerous situation, because the same
logic led the German strategists in 1914 and Adolf Hitler in
1939.
In 1914, Germany believed that Britain would not support
Belgium following the German invasion. But Britain did.
20

In 1939, Hitler thought that France and Britain will refrain
from declaring war on the Third Reich after the invasion of
Poland, hoping to repeat the Czechoslovak scenario. These
hopes also fell apart, and Germany lost.
Therefore, logic will push the US government to respond to
the challenge. But, due to the presence of nuclear weapons
on both sides, the tactic is to localize the conflict before
full-frontal collision.
US Actions: increased sanctions with a possible shutdown
of the SWIFT system, as well as the introduction of an oil
embargo against Russia. By the way, it could play very much
in favor of the United States because rising oil prices may
help the United States to make sales due to the disap-
pearance of supplies from Russia.
“Hawks” will get the top positions in the United States. The
US will reformat NATO, with a significant expansion of mil-
itary assistance to Eastern Europe, to where additional
contingents of troops are to be redeployed (primarily
Poland and Romania). Special Forces from the United
States and Britain are likely to be deployed in the Baltic
States to counter the “green men”.
In the economic sphere, the United States will accelerate
the construction of LNG-terminals network in Europe to re-
duce its dependence on gas supplies from the east, and
increase the role of US energy companies in the EU.
Washington would also support its allies in the Middle East
and will introduce additional restrictions against Bashar
Assad’s regime in Syria, not excluding sea and air block-
ades. The situation will encourage the US to ensure the rap-
prochement with Turkey so to stop Ankara’s drift towards
rapprochement with Russia, which became noticeable in
summer 2016.
It is important that in this case Ukraine has good chances
to get both lethal weapons and financial aid from the US.
EU Actions: In confrontation with Russia, the implications
for Europe can develop in two ways.
First: Europe is consolidated against an external threat. In-
creased defense expenditures reinvigorate NATO. The Euro-
Atlantic camp would strengthen its positions in the political
arena of Europe. The EU supports tough economic sanc-
tions against Russia. Also the EU provides financial and pos-
sibly even military and political support to Ukraine and EU
allies in the Middle East.
The second means actually disintegration of the EU into a
“healthy core” (Germany + Benelux + possibly, France +
some Nordic countries) + “Eastern Europe in security crisis”
supported by the US and UK + economically failed South of
“credit lovers” (Greece Italy, Spain, and Portugal)). In this
case, Europe will be a case of “integration at different
speeds”. Each country will determine its stance towards
Russia, because some countries will support tough sanc-
tions, but others will avoid harsh maneuvers.
Motives of players on Ukraine in the G3 scenario:
Russia: elimination of existing political regime in Ukraine
through a massive escalation.
Europe: full or partial support for current regime in Ukraine
(Poland, UK, Sweden, etc.) or non-intervention policy (Italy,
Greece, France and possibly Germany).
US: support for existing regime in Ukraine as an element of
containment for Russia.
For Ukraine, the G3 scenario will have the most serious con-
sequences, because Russia actually will not bet on sup-
21

pression, but on the collapse of the political regime as soon
as possible.
Therefore, there is a risk that the combination of three
basic factors: fiscal crisis, geopolitical pressure, and social
discontent could destroy the Ukrainian state at an early
stage when Western aid has not yet to come up in the re-
quired amount.
Basic options for Ukraine under this scenario:
1. The collapse of existing model due to lack of resources
to maintain sustainability - Poland 1939 version
2. Transition to a more authoritarian regime in terms of ex-
ternal aggression, when the country will be able to survive
through the mobilization of domestic resources and strong
external support. This is a version of South Korea in 1950-
1953.
The scenario of confrontation has two possible endings:
1. Upgrade the new status quo in the region and in the
world, due to the fact that Russia is rapidly weakened
through tough economic sanctions and will be forced to
make concessions.
2. Return to scenarios G1, G2 after a brief confrontation.
Scenarios for Ukraine in 2017
As we have mentioned above, external factors will have a
decisive influence on the situation in Ukraine in 2017. The
critical dependence of Ukraine on external aid and the
threat of escalation by Russia make our country a hostage
to the actions of other players. But this does not mean that
Ukraine should obediently do what Washington and
Moscow order. You will find this from our further consid-
erations.
We believe that there are three basic scenarios for Ukraine
in 2017:
1. Stability.
2. Controlled destabilization.
3. Uncontrollable destabilization.
Before we begin to describe them, we should get back to
the three factors determining balance in the state system,
which we covered at the beginning of the report. Those
three factors are legitimacy, resources, external support.
Now we will organize them into a chart for ease of under-
standing which configuration is crucial for a particular sce-
nario.
Scenarios definition
Stability: Scenario is possible if the internal and external
legitimacy is positive or negative. Resources are plenty or
little. External support is present.
Political regime is very persistent if all indicators are pos-
itive in all factors in the table above (1.1 + 1.2 + 2 + 3 +). An
example of this is the political regime is Norway or Switzer-
land.
The second version of a stable regime is when it has a neg-
ative internal but positive external legitimacy, also with
powerful mechanisms of compensation such as significant
resources and external support. An example of this politi-
cal regime is Ukraine in times of Yushchenko from 2006 to
2008.
The third version of a stable regime is when it has high in-
ternal legitimacy but low external, with the presence of sig-
nificant resources base and lack of external support. This
is the Soviet Union in the 20’s of the last century or today’s
Russia under Putin.
22

23
Factors Stability Controlled
destabilization
Uncontrolled
destabilization
1а Internal legitimacy
1в External legitimacy
Positive +
or negative –
Positive
or negative
Negative, low
Positive
or negative, low
Negative, low
Negative, low
2 Resources Present + Not enough +
or absent +
Absent
3 External support Present + Minimal +
or –
Absent
Very stable regime 1а+ 1в+ 2+ 3+
Stable 1а – 1в+ 2+3+ 1а + 1в- 2+3- 1а + 1в+ 2-3+
Scenarios of the situation in Ukraine in 2017
The fourth version of a stable regime is under the pres-
ence of positive internal and external legitimacy with a lack
of resources but with strong external support. This is South
Korea during the war in 1950-1953 or Singapore after gain-
ing independence.
Controlled destabilization: Internal legitimacy is low. Exter-
nal legitimacy is slightly positive with a tendency to decline
or be even negative with a number of geopolitical partners.
Resources are not enough so dependence on external sup-
port increases greatly. Therefore, foreign players are able
to dictate the terms of obtaining aid. The absence of ex-
ternal support or lack of it leads to the collapse of the state
and transition to scenario 3 (uncontrolled destabilization).
This was a path of the Tsarist Russia in 1917. However, with
external support domestic players from ruling class retain
room for maneuver and impose their will on weaker social
groups. Such a political regime is beneficial for foreign
players only, because it has to take into account their in-
terests to the detriment of the national ones. Examples are
the Latin American regimes in 60-80s.
Domestic players can reduce external dependence through
reforms to enhance the legitimacy and internal resource
base. It makes a political regime more stable and creates
conditions for transition to scenario 1.
Uncontrollable destabilization: All the factors are negative.
Such a political regime is illegitimate in the eyes of the peo-
ple and foreign players; it has exhausted resource capa-
bilities and has no external support. In fact a collapse of
the state undergoes because of internal or external con-
flict, or because of their combination. American macro-so-
ciologist Randall Collins describes the collapse as a result

14. Sergiy Datsyuk. "The essence of the current political crisis" http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/datsuk/56b9c58c2ec90/
15. Vitaly Kulik “Oligarchic Consensus and Cartel Party” http://glavred.info/avtorskie_kolonki/oligarhicheskiy-konsensus-i-kartelnaya-
partiya-373091.html
of a combination of fiscal crisis, when the state is unable
to perform basic functions. It coincides with the geopo-
litical complications followed by uprisings. This is Austria-
Hungary in 1918, the modern Somalia, Ottoman Empire in
1918, Hetmanat of Pavlo Skoropadsky in Ukraine in 1918,
Directorate of Ukraine in 1919.
Now, having given the scenarios description, let’s get to
consideration of their probability in 2017 in Ukraine.
Scenario 1. Stability
To implement a scenario of stability in 2017, Ukraine lacks
several key factors.
First, we see the low credibility of the key state institutions,
which keeps declining. None of the political players have
ratings above 12-15%, and most fluctuate around 4-7%.
Ratings of ruling parties either already have fallen to zero
(Narodnyi Front), or decreased to 10% (Petro Poroshenko
Bloc).
Secondly, we see a decrease in the legitimacy of the ruling
coalition in the face of Ukraine’s Western partners who are
tired of corruption scandals and minor successes in re-
forming the state system. Now it is approaching a critical
point and can be shaken by a new wave of corruption scan-
dals and economic problems in Ukraine.
Third, there is exhaustion of the resource base of the
Ukrainian Second Republic, when after three years of ob-
jective factors Ukraine has lost half of export earnings
(falling commodity prices of Ukrainian exports) and sub-
jective factors (war with Russia, which caused a collapse in
trade and rising costs for defense that reached 5% of GDP)
costs only increased instability of the economy. It deepens
with populism which resulted in adoption of doubled mini-
mum wages however it does not meet the real possibili-
ties of the economy. In 2016, Ukraine managed to achieve
a positive trade balance only through IMF credits and credit
guarantees from the US. However, in 2017 the possibility of
obtaining credits is yet smaller because of the election re-
sults in the US, France, and Germany.
Fourth: as we said above, the probability of external support
from the US and Europe will decrease due to the changes
in key administrations of the Western countries. However,
this support is directly tied to the ability of Ukraine to re-
main relevant in the wake of agreements between the new
US president Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. However,
the attempt to implement the Minsk-2 in line with Putin’s
proposals will result in problems for Petro Poroshenko in
domestic politics, so he will try to delay a decision. This calls
the international aid into question reducing the stability of
the Ukrainian economy. The President of Ukraine can bet on
an attempt to conduct the liquidation of one or two busi-
ness groups to gain access to their resources under the
banner of justice. No doubt, this can lead to increased in-
ternal legitimacy in the eyes of the masses, but can ruin a
wobbly post-Maidan oligarchic consensus14
, which brought
Petro Poroshenko to the presidency15
. Oligarchs will receive
the motivation to fight the president, which can quickly
throw the country into chaos of destabilization in the ab-
sence of external support for Poroshenko.
Therefore, a stabilization scenario seems unlikely in 2017.
There are no internal or external conditions for it. So we
estimate its probability at 5-10%.
24

25
Scenario 2. Controlled Destabilization
This scenario implies an active search by external and in-
ternal players of such a configuration that will protect their
interests to greatest extent. In this case, entering this sce-
nario, most players believe that they will have control over
the situation or will receive it on exit. This scenario implies
a motivation for change in the conditions of resource base
exhaustion. So this scenario has the greatest chance to be
implemented in 2017.
First we need to look at the motivation of political forces.
We took all parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties
that have hypothetical chances to get into Parliament in
case of possible re-election.
Political forces Motivation for maintenance or change the balance of powers
Petro Poroshenko Bloc
People’s Front
Fatherland
Self-Reliance
Opposition Bloc
Radical Party
Freedom
Mikheil Saakashvili Party
UKROP
Democratic Alliance
Revival
People’s Will Parliamentary Group
Rabinovich and Murayev Party
“Civic Position” of Anatoliy Grytsenko
Maintenance
Maintenance
Change
Maintenance
Partly change (Lyovochkin, Firtash),
partly maintenance (Akhmetov)
Rather maintenance
Change
Change
Rather change
Change
Maintenance
Maintenance
Change
Change
These political forces can be easily divided by two key fea-
tures: representation in Parliament and risen / fallen rat-
ing, and immediately it becomes clear why they have such
motivation.

Political forces in the left column have falling ratings and
are thus afraid of losing, but have control over the govern-
ment institutions or are satisfied with the current position
because of a fear that a change in balance would be not in
their favor.
Political forces in the right column are gaining ratings or
hope that rebalancing expands their influence.
So situational alliances are formed arising from the moti-
vation to keep / change balance.
Thus the political forces in the left column can change their
position and flow to the right. For example, if in 2017 Petro
Poroshenko under pressure from the US, Europe and Rus-
sia will try to make changes to the Constitution of Ukraine
regarding Minsk-2, “Self-Reliance” can move into tougher
opposition. The Radical Party will also carefully monitor the
changing balance, to avoid being in the camp of losers.
Today the Radical Party plays in conjunction with the Petro
Poroshenko Bloc against Tymoshenko, but tomorrow the
situation may change to the opposite.
Thus, the political processes are affected by three groups
of subjects with their own motivations: external, internal
and masses. Masses are influenced by political organiza-
tions, but in times of crisis, when we see the fall of the le-
gitimacy of state institutions and political parties, the
masses can act spontaneously and bring additional chaos
to the game of political players.
Motivation for maintenance Motivation for change
Faction in the Parliament
(number of representatives)
Rating
Petro Poroshenko Bloc: 143
People’s Front: 81
Self-Reliance: 26
Radical Party: 21
People’s Will
Parliamentary Group: 19
Revival: 24
RatingFaction in the Parliament
(number of representatives)
10-12% decreasing
2% absent
6-7% stable
6-7% stable
majoritarian conglomerate
Ratnig absent, majoritarian
positions
Opposition Bloc: 43
Fatherland: 21
Freedom: 4-5
UKROP: 15-20 people i
n the influence area
but no fraction
Democratic Alliance,
no fraction
Mikheil Saakashvili Party,
no fraction
Rabinovich and Murayev
Party: 2
“Civic Position” of
Anatoliy Grytsenko,
no fraction
7-10% increasing
10-14% increasing
3-4% varies
Minimal
0,6 to 1%
6 to 7%
3 to 7%
2% to 4%
26

nounced the availability of recordings of conversations with
President Poroshenko, which allegedly contain the facts of
corruption, de facto there is a “Black Swan” which later can
match the Kuchma tape scandal in 2000-2001. We do not
know what information these records contain and whether
they exist at all, but Onishcenko has said that he passed
the records to US law enforcement agencies. In addition,
we cannot exclude that the records also have been passed
to the Russian security services, given the fact that On-
ishchenko visited Moscow recently. In any case, if On-
ishchenko really passed any records to a third party, then
Poroshenko could be blackmailed to perform the global
agreement between the US and Russia within the G1 sce-
nario.
But the President is well aware that if he fulfils Minsk-2,
then he’d face strong criticism from his opponents inside
the country, and this situation may lead to loss of control.
He can appeal to Washington and Berlin that Minsk-2 can-
not be fulfilled because of lack of configuration in Parlia-
ment for changing the Constitution. But then external
partners may force Poroshenko go for early parliamentary
elections so to create a new parliamentary coalition that
will take responsibility for Minsk-2.
Chances for early elections to the Verkhovna Rada are in-
creasing against the emerging “black swans” like the tragic
incident in Knjazhichi on December 4, when five policemen
were killed in a shootout between police units caused by an
error. Immediately the opposition demand to dismiss Arsen
Avakov, Head of the Interior Ministry. But it is difficult for the
President to make such a step because Avakov’s resigna-
tion may lead to the collapse of coalition. Poroshenko can-
not replace Avakov with an equivalent player from the
“People’s Front”. Furthermore, even if the decision was
taken, it would be extremely difficult to push it through Par-
liament, as other factions and deputy groups will start bar-
gaining on preferences for themselves. If this crisis is
superimposed on the tape scandal with Onishchenko or
Therefore, within a controlled destabilization scenario we
see three basic variants which, in turn, include sub-vari-
ants:
Variant А: Early parliamentary elections
Variant B: Mass protests
Variant С: Military coup
Variant А: Early Parliamentary Elections
The survey made by the Ukrainian Institute for the Future
in 21-28 November, 2016, shows that 23.9% of Ukrainians be-
lieve that 2017 will be marked with early parliamentary elec-
tions. 17.2% of respondents are confident about an early
presidential election in Ukraine. However, only 7.2% of
Ukrainians believe in the possibility of forced removal of
President Poroshenko.
An interesting fact is that only 37.7% of Ukrainians believe
that Ukraine needs early parliamentary elections, while
45.4% consider them unnecessary. Another 16.9% have not
decided.
Early parliamentary elections are not favorable for the cur-
rent President Petro Poroshenko as well as for the ruling
coalition. The President understands that he will not have
the same controlled Parliament reelected, as it is today. All
the opinion polls show that only 7-9 political parties can get
seats in the Parliament after early parliamentary elections.
The President understands that the new Parliament is likely
to be more antagonistic to him. So he will delay approval of
a decision on fresh elections to Parliament as much as
possible.
However, Petro Poroshenko, who is currently the strongest
player in Ukrainian politics, begins to feel more and more
pressure from internal and external players. Ratings of
Poroshenko and his party are gradually reduced, and after
fugitive MP and gas oligarch Oleksandr Onishchenko an-
27

ble government, not able to make quick strategic and tac-
tical decisions. As a result, we observe constant bargaining
that enhances stalemate.
After 3-4 months it will be obvious for internal and exter-
nal players that the system does not work and in the sec-
ond half of 2017 we come to a new round of political crisis,
not only on the issue of parliament’s incapacity, but also of
the President’s “toxicity”. This situation will resemble events
in Ukraine in 1993-1994. Then there will be another bifurca-
tion:
1. To carry out early parliamentary and (or) presidential
elections in early 2018.
2. Military coup attempt from the either side. For example,
the President may introduce martial law, using the escala-
tion in the East as a reason. More details in the variants C1
and C2.
3. There will conditions for the conclusion of a new social
contract through a pact between elites, as happened in
Tunisia 2013. In this case, the Constitutional Assembly (Con-
stitutional Convention) is announced and a technocratic
government is established for the transition period.
А2. Parliament & Government against
the President
As a result of early elections to the Verkhovna Rada, an
anti-presidential majority is formed, creating their own
government. So it may become a repetition of the situa-
tion in 2007, when Tymoshenko headed the government. In
this case, there is a possibility that she will do it again.
However, it is unlikely that this coalition will be very stable
because it is doubtful that two political forces could gain
more than 20% of votes. If this miracle happens, then the
Prime Minister and the government will feel more confi-
dent. But if not, it will be difficult for them to push through
other corruption-scandal story, then the President is in a
very weak position. If he will bend once on Avakov, he will
be forced to concede on other issues and, as a result, lose
control in the Parliament. This, again, makes the prospect
of early elections to the Verkhovna Rada more and more
possible.
This example demonstrates that in conditions when the
state system of Ukraine is extremely unbalanced, one un-
predictable event may ruin the delicate balance between
key political groups, so the power struggle escalates.
Therefore, in a situation of growing pressure from internal
and external players and dissatisfied masses (let’s not for-
get of the people), Poroshenko can come to the conclusion
that parliamentary elections are a lesser evil than further
delaying the situation.
This option is already possible in the spring of 2017. Early
parliamentary elections may lead to two results of elec-
tions to the Verkhovna Rada. Let’s designate them as vari-
ants A1 and A2.
А1. Going Short
Understanding how difficult it would be to get a majority in
the new Parliament, Petro Poroshenko goes short on posi-
tions of all the key opponents. An example is the situation
with a rating of Lviv mayor Andriy Sadovyi, which turned
critically low due to the garbage scandal in summer 2016.
In this scenario, the President will try to reduce the rating
of Yulia Tymoshenko and other antagonists, using spoiler
parties. By this logic Poroshenko, for example, will benefit
if Mikheil Saakashvili goes into opposition and takes seg-
ments of the protest electorate that could vote for Ty-
moshenko and other players who are trying to mobilize this
group. And it does not matter whether Saakashvili plays
alone or together with Poroshenko.
If this strategy works, then Ukraine will get a feeble parlia-
ment with lots of small factions. It’s going to be an unsta-
28

Thus, the number of Ukrainians who see the threat of a so-
cial explosion in the country almost doubled.
Therefore, the conditions for social protests do really exist.
This variant can be realized if:
1. Poroshenko will not allow early elections to the Verkhovna
Rada in the face of the deteriorating political situation and
growing external pressure within global scenarios G1 or G2.
2. The stalemate in variants A1-A2 occurs, when the Presi-
dent will block the actions of the opposition or antagonis-
tic coalition. Within this scenario repetition of the winter
2013-2014 situation is possible, when street protests on
Maidan led to the overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych
regime.
Although the government successfully localized the
protests launched by Tymoshenko, Rabinovich and Murayev
Party and other political forces whose interests coincide
on the third anniversary of Maidan, conditions for street
protests in Ukraine still have not disappeared.
And given the “black swans” (accidents, corruption scan-
dals, Russian subversive activities, etc.), which we have de-
scribed above, the probability that motivated players like
“Fatherland” and “Opposition Bloc” would try to use social
discontent, begins to increase dramatically.
The algorithm of actions within this scenario looks some-
thing like the following.
After some Event (public figure murder, brutal violence
against innocent, corruption scandal, infrastructure col-
lapse, or defeat in the east resulted from aggravation of
the situation within the global scenario G2 and G3) street
protests begin, and turning into a tough confrontation with
their decisions. Since Tymoshenko or another figure will at-
tract smaller partners with consequences for stability aris-
ing from such a construction.
For example, if Tymoshenko heads the government, then
she would probably try to implement Minsk-2 because of
the need for external support. However, she would imme-
diately face the position of the President, who will insist on
the fact that Ukraine should not follow the conditions of-
fered by the West and Russia. And this is only one of the key
issues.
Therefore, we can confidently say that in the A2 variant we’ll
see a hard conflict between the Cabinet of Ministers, Pres-
ident, and the Parliament. The result would be a final drop
in rating of the President, as happened to Yushchenko in
2007-2009. The stalemate will lead to the same bifurcation
as the variant A1.
Variant В. Mass Protests
The survey made by the Ukrainian Institute for the Future
on 21-28 November, 2016, shows that the country is experi-
encing social tension that threatens a social explosion.
Thus, 39.2% of Ukrainians believe that there is a high prob-
ability for a social explosion in Ukraine. Another 29.1% of re-
spondents said that they see a low probability of such a
scenario. 21.0% of respondents believe that this version is
impossible today, and 10.1% are undecided.
It should be noted that there was a significant increase in
the number of those who believe that there is a high prob-
ability of a social explosion in Ukraine, compared with the
survey of November 2016. In late May, 2016 only 22.4% of re-
spondents saw a great threat of social explosion, and 41.5%
were confident that it has a low probability. 30% have been
convinced that there’s a zero threat of a social explosion in
Ukraine, and only 5.9% were undecided.
29

in the scheme that Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and Party of Re-
gions were trying to implement in the spring and summer
of 2009, when they agreed on a broad coalition and divided
zones of influence for 25 years ahead. In this scheme, the
Prime Minister’s post could be given to Serhiy Lyovochkin or
Serhiy Taruta (as a compromise), and Tymoshenko would
claim the presidency, or vice versa.
In addition to considerable anxiety of the elite, Ty-
moshenko’s problem is in her low legitimacy (and other key
Ukrainian politicians) in the eyes of the people. For exam-
ple, our survey of 21-28 November shows that she is now
supported by only 8.4% of Ukrainians, while Poroshenko gets
9.4%, i.e. they are almost equal. If you consider the per-
centage of respondents ready to come to the elections, Ty-
moshenko and Poroshenko could gain around 15-17%. Along
with 23% undecided of respondents, 34.2% of respondents
said they would not actually come to the presidential elec-
tions! Another interesting point from the UIF November sur-
vey: 84.9% of Ukrainians do not believe that Tymoshenko
lives on deputy’s salary, as she stated in her e-declaration.
So overcoming the distrust of masses and elites may be-
come the “Achilles heel” for Yulia Tymoshenko.
However, if the Ukrainian stakeholders could not reach con-
sensus on Tymoshenko and ways for overcoming the crisis
about her even under the pressure of external players, then
a bet on another figure can be played.
This NoName figure is currently unknown to the general
public, and will pop up like a Jack-in-the-box. It will be re-
quired to have charisma and a high potential for the legit-
imacy during elections under the tacit support of elites and
external players or part them. If you look at recent history,
this is the scheme played by Leonid Kuchma, who has
turned himself from hardly known director of “Pivdenmash”
factory into a figure of the first order in 1992-1993. In our
opinion, this option would be the most logical in this situa-
tion, both in terms of external and internal players.
MIA and SSU. If the situation does not turn directly into the
military scenario C1-C2, which we’ll consider further on,
then the President loses control because protesters seize
the capital, and the Parliament is to reformat the parlia-
mentary majority which selects a new government and de-
prives the President of control over the military bloc. This
would be possible if the current President of Ukraine leaves
or is arrested, or resigns under pressure from external
players. The last option is a repetition of the situation in
Ukraine in 2004 during the first Maidan when Leonid
Kuchma refused to continue the struggle for power under
pressure from the West, after receiving guarantees of im-
munity for himself and his family. Another example is the
resignation of Boris Yeltsin on 31 December 1999 under the
pressure of inner circle due to his health problems.
Then the presidential elections take place, which are
greatly influenced by external players - the US, Russia, Eu-
rope (especially Germany). Their interference can dramat-
ically exacerbate the situation in the context of the
presidential election against the backdrop of global sce-
narios G2 and G3. Growing tension can lead to variants C1
and C2, i.e. attempts of a military coup against the back-
ground of a new wave of social protests or escalation in
eastern Ukraine.
On the other hand, if they reach a consensus on the status
of Ukraine in geopolitical scenario G1, then they can support
a consolidated candidate.
The key question in this situation: which candidate will re-
ceive support from both external players and the domes-
tic elite.
At first glance, Yulia Tymoshenko has a good chance and
probably will receive support from Russia and Germany for
nonresistance to US. But Tymoshenko causes huge fear in
Ukrainian elites which know her indomitable character. She
may appear in a large conspiracy of the elite, for example
30

Specifically, only 17.9% of Ukrainians believe that the ma-
jority of the population would support a military coup, and
another 22.6% believe that such an option would receive
support of a half the population. 36.5% of respondents be-
lieve that a military coup would be supported only by a mi-
nority of Ukrainians; 8.6% - no one would support the coup,
and 14.4% did not decide.
These figures correlate with responses to another ques-
tion: Whether you agree that today Ukraine needs a dicta-
torship with a tough leader as a head of the state. This idea
is supported by 34.5% of respondents, whereas 48.8% of re-
spondents are against this, and 16.6% hesitated to answer.
No less interesting is that Ukrainians do not change their
position, even with the caveat that dictatorship can bring
prosperity. In particular, they were asked the following
question: “Do you support a military dictatorship if it will
provide real growth of living standards, fight corruption,
and stability?” An affirmative answer was given by only
32.4% of Ukrainians, and negative – by 50.7%, 16.9% unde-
cided.
These results may cause cautious optimism, despite the
fact that over one third of Ukrainians would support a dic-
tatorship, but a majority still supports the democratic de-
velopment of the country.
However, if we take a look at the dynamics, we see dis-
turbing trends. In the May survey of the Ukrainian Institute
for the Future the number of respondents believing that
majority of Ukrainians would support a military coup was
almost twice lower – 9.8%. In spring another 19.4% (22.6% in
November 2016) of Ukrainians were sure that a military
coup would be supported by half of the population, 39.1%
believed that the coup would be supported by minority
(36.5% in November). Finally, in May 21.5% were sure that no
one would support a coup, (8.6% in November). 10.2% in May
and 14.4% in November were undecided.
Finally, the third alternative to early presidential elections
is variant B, where a well-known figure serves as a com-
promise within an unstable balance of power. This is the
version of Yuriy Yekhanurov as Prime Minister in 2005-2006.
In this case the president has no support in Parliament,
and therefore much depends on the balance of power in it.
However, this does not mean that the presidency would be
given to a weak figure because, having gained real power,
the new president can reveal his ambitions. In the words of
political scientist Dmitro Vydrin, the presidency is a boxing
glove, which can be stretched by the hand which puts it on.
By this logic, no matter who gets the presidency, he (or she,
in the case of Tymoshenko) will try to conduct parliamen-
tary elections (demanded by external players in order to
complete an agreement on Ukraine within the scenario G1),
as Petro Poroshenko did in autumn 2014. Thus a strong
president may still try to conduct a referendum on the new
Constitution of Ukraine during parliamentary re-elections.
However, the order of amendments to the Constitution of
Ukraine will be prescribed in accordance with the agree-
ments reached between the US, Russia and Europe, if by
the time relations between the major players will remain
within the scenario G1.
Thus, this variant comes in close connection with scenar-
ios G1 (Peacemaker) or G2 (Pragmatic).
Variant С. Military Coup
Today, there is much talk about feelings that public order
could be demolished by force and dictatorship be estab-
lished. The radicalization of moods leads to demand for au-
thoritarian action.
Our survey of 21-28 November 2016 showed that a desire
for dictatorship does exist, but the majority of Ukrainians
still believe that Ukraine should develop as a democratic
state.
31

long conflict in Donbas and skepticism about the central
power but that clashes with rebels and the Russian army
remains the one factor that keeps the AFU in focus.
Volunteer Battalions as a possible military destabilizing fac-
tor was largely reduced by their inclusion into the Armed
Forces or National Guard. So today they are at a much
greater level of controllability than in 2014. Charismatic
commanders of volunteer battalions such as former com-
mander of “Right Sector” Dmitry Yarosh and commander of
the “Azov” regiment Andriy Biletsky made it clear that they
have chosen the political path for changing the state, not
violence. The rhetoric of both indicates that in the current
environment they consider an attempted coup as a threat
to national security.
This raises the question: who then has the real possibility
to undertake a military-driven version of destabilization?
In our opinion, there are not so many such players:
1. First, it’s the President of Ukraine, which has the consti-
tutional authority for the imposition of martial law. In par-
ticular, Article 10 of the Law on the Martial Law Legal
Regime, adopted by the Parliament on 12 May 2015, provides
that during a period of martial law the powers of the Pres-
ident of Ukraine cannot be stopped or even limited. In par-
ticular, according to the new law, military and civil
authorities are entrusted to prohibit peaceful gatherings,
to introduce a curfew, restrict the movement of citizens,
and ban political parties. It is impossible to dismiss the
Prime Minister with Cabinet and dissolve the Parliament16
.
So, after six months there was a significant reduction in
those who held a peaceful position, and the number of
Ukrainians who perceive the coup as an acceptable way
out of the situation dramatically increased. This is another
proof that the revolutionary situation, i.e. request for a rad-
ical renewal of the state system and changing of social re-
lations has not disappeared, but got deeper and is
smoldering in the depths of society, ready to explode at
any moment.
Let’s consider, under what circumstances the military sce-
nario can be implemented in Ukraine, by what forces, and
if it’s possible in 2017.
In our opinion it is important to note that today in Ukraine
there are no preconditions for the Egyptian revolution sce-
nario for 2013 or the coup in Chile in 1973. This requires the
existence of the army as an institution that reproduces it-
self, but this condition in today’s Ukraine is missing. The
Ukrainian army increases its subjectivity, i.e. the military is
beginning to realize its specified mission and role in the
functioning of the state, but the process will still require at
least several years. Thus the Armed Forces have one of the
highest levels of trust from the Ukrainian people. As shown
by the November survey of the Ukrainian Institute of Fu-
ture, the Ukrainian army is trusted by 39.9% of respondents,
trust as much as don’t trust – 35.1%. 20.1% of respondents
do not trust the AFU. For comparison, the President of
Ukraine is trusted by only 9.7% of Ukrainians and 56.7% of
them do not trust him. For Parliament trust is only 5.2%.
58.1% of respondents do not trust to the Cabinet of Minis-
ters of Ukraine, while 6.6% of them do trust it.
However the army remains under the political supervision
of the President of Ukraine, and today there is no reason to
say that he may lose it. Poroshenko has direct contact with
many military commanders. First of all, with the most com-
bat-ready, so to maintain their loyalty. And it is not a secret
that on the forefront there is certain tiredness from the
16. Rada adopted a new law on the martial law regime
http://www.unian.net/politics/1077004-vr-prinyala-zakon-o-
pravovom-rejime-voennogo-polojeniya.html
32

1. Effective control over the force unit, which fulfill the or-
ders. Loyalty of the army.
2. Quickly establishing control over the regions, including
through involvement of regional elites.
3. Quick imprisonment of the odious members of the
Yanukovych regime or post-Maidan administration.
4. Strengthening internal legitimacy from the masses who
perceive punishment as an act of justice.
5. Acceptance and support of such actions by external play-
ers. In this situation the crucial factor is the position of the
United States. Without legitimacy from the external players
it would be extremely difficult for the political regime to
get the aid which is urgently needed.
Conducting a military coup in tandem with Russia and with
the tacit approval of the USA would lead to a split of Ukraine
and will transfer the situation into an uncontrolled desta-
bilization scenario, which we’ll discuss further.
Success of this option for the incumbent president is in-
creased in case of a threat of confrontation with Russia
within scenario G3. In the absence of confrontation, the in-
cumbent president has a limited period of time to imple-
ment this option because as support from society and
elites decreases, it will be difficult to ensure the legitimacy
of such action. It is logical that the likelihood of this option
will be higher by the end of 2017, when formats A1-A2-B are
exhausted. Or if there won’t be any “black swan” as in the
case of Maidan or destruction of the Malaysian Boeing by
Russian troops in the summer of 2014.
But there is one option when the military coup attempt
makes sense already in February-March 2017. This option
may be acceptable to the Russians at the moment when
Donald Trump just becomes president officially. At this
point it is quite logical to quickly try to overthrow the po-
litical regime of Petro Poroshenko using variant B tools
(mass protests) followed by street clashes. This variant is
possible if it is quick and without Washington interfering,
It means that the President gets real levers of holding
power in case of a threat to his removal from office. Here
we should mention that the introduction of martial law by
the President should be approved by the Parliament within
two days. That means that the Head of State should have
a majority in Parliament, which would agree to support
such a radical measure. Otherwise, such a step may be
considered as usurpation of power and rapidly lead to fail-
ure with the low legitimacy of the President and limited re-
source base.
2. Military coup within a scenario of controlled destabiliza-
tion can be started by a player or coalition of players able
to: a) concentrate sufficient number of security forces for
taking control of key state institutions in low legitimacy; b)
find resources to retain power at the first stage; c) confi-
dent of external support.
Now let’s consider two possible versions for a military coup
in Ukraine in 2017:
Version С1: Successful coup
Version С2: Unsuccessful coup
С1. Successful coup
The President introduces martial law in terms of either a
threat of losing power because of protests or loss of con-
trol over processes in the country in the situations de-
scribed in the variants A1-A2-B. This may be preceded by
an escalation in Donbas, real or provoked within scenarios
G2-G3.
In contrast, a subject competing with the current govern-
ment may attempt to take power by force.
The President or any other subject that will go for a coup
can successfully implement his plans, if there is a coinci-
dence of several basic conditions:
33

The best illustration for this option is the fall of Hetman
Pavlo Skoropadsky in Ukraine in November-December 1918:
As we know, Pavlo Skoropadsky came to power after a mil-
itary coup supported by the Germans in late April 1918. Sko-
ropadsky bet on moderates and big bourgeoisie, trying to
create a Ukrainian state almost from scratch under the
protectorate of the German Empire in terms of Brest-
Litovsk in early March 1918. Skoropadsky’s bet on big busi-
ness pushed him away from the masses, where leftist
sentiments dominated. Although Hetman managed to
achieve some success in the establishment of the state
apparatus, once the external support from the Germans
fell after defeat in the First World War, Skoropadsky was
left alone with the angry masses, raised to revolt by the Di-
rectorate led by Symon Petliura and Volodymyr Vin-
nichenko. During a month Hetman Skoropadsky lost his
authority and escaped to Germany. However the Direc-
torate triumphantly entered Kyiv on December 14, 1918, in
little more than a month they lost control over the situation.
The external aggression of the Bolsheviks and the Volun-
teer Army led by Lieutenant General Anton Denikin brought
the collapse of Ukrainian statehood in 1919, as it had no re-
sources, internal and external legitimacy, as well as no ex-
ternal support.
The scenario of controlled destabilization with certain vari-
ations, in our opinion, is the most likely in 2017. The highest
likelihood are options A1 and A2, and by the end of the sec-
ond half of the year there are increased prospects for op-
tion B with exit to the specified bifurcation. Variant B with
transition to C1-C2 is possible in February – March 2017,
when Putin will try to enter forced blitzkrieg: package deal
with the US to solve key problems in one strike under G1
scenario.
Overall probability of controlled destabilization scenario is
80%.
thus Putin is able to immediately begin negotiating a pack-
age deal with the United States, giving Trump the opportu-
nity to start his presidency with victory cutting the “Gordian
knot” of the Middle East and the Ukrainian crisis entering
format “Reset 2.0”.
In case of successful implementation of this option the po-
litical regime is becoming more authoritarian, obtaining
several years of carte blanche for radical policies (reform
or counter reforms, depending on the purposes of new in-
cumbents).
This was an option of Recep Erdogan in Turkey this summer,
when in counteracting the military coup attempt he man-
aged to strengthen his position.
С2. Unsuccessful coup
This option essentially is the opposite to the previous one.
Accordingly, the incumbent president or another person
attempts a military coup in circumstances when there are
no factors of success:
There is no control over the security forces, and as a result
the other players receive the opportunity to resist which
means a rapid loss of the time factor, which is critical at
the beginning, so the struggle begins to linger, and the sce-
nario turns into uncontrollable destabilization.
Following this, there is a loss of control over the regions
because regional elites begin to see the threat for them-
selves in such situation, so begin to insulate themselves
against the risks. It is likely that this situation will be used
by an external interested party, e.g. Russia.
The result is a rapid loss of residual legitimacy of the state,
which quickly collapses.
External support is over because there is no one to sup-
port.
In fact, the situation quickly turns into either variant B (at
best) or uncontrolled destabilization.
34

In this case, Ukraine faces two sub-variants, which we call
“Poland 1939”: - 3A1 and “South Korea 1953” - 3A2:
3A1 or “Poland 1939”: Rapid collapse of the state under ex-
ternal strikes of Russia. Ukrainian state is divided by ex-
ternal actors into spheres of influence. Russia at this turn
of events will try to cut Ukraine off from the sea, taking
control of the southeast and providing a way to the border
with Moldova and Romania. The Kremlin is unlikely to try to
take control of all of Ukraine; it is rather advantageous to
push European neighbors into the division of Ukraine so to
legitimize its actions by humanitarian crisis that requires
immediate attention. If Hungary, Romania or Poland would
agree to this policy, then it will start a strong crisis within
the EU, as old historical insults among European countries
arise. Ukraine in this case may be preserved as tiny area
with limited resources and population, and cut off from the
sea. However, in our opinion, such actions are such a pow-
erful challenge to the United States that Washington would
not be able to ignore such developments because there
are grounds for the following sub-variant.
3A2 or “South Korea 1953”: Conflict escalation in the east
may lead Ukraine to lose territory, as happened to South
Korea in 1950, when North Korea almost pushed South
Korea into the sea. This causes mobilization of the Ukrain-
ian state either led by the incumbent president in the C1
format described in Scenario 2, or by a more adequate and
tough administration resulting from a military coup.
Trump’s Administration would provide support with
weapons and finances, as described in the global scenario
G3, together with the introduction of tough sanctions
against Russia. For some time the situation is stabilized
and the new status quo is secured. Ukraine joins the orbit
of the West, perhaps losing some territories to the east.
However, total reformatting of the state under confronta-
tional scenario G3 allows to create a more adaptive model
allowing to start the modernization governance and the
economy.
Scenario 3. Uncontrolled Destabilization
This scenario implies losing control over processes in the
country, which increases the impact of marginal and re-
gional political players, guided by motivation to destruction
of the existing status quo. This scenario also includes the
option of large-scale aggression from outside, which de-
stroys the old state.
In our opinion, there are three possible options in this sce-
nario:
Option 1. Geopolitical, or external aggression.
Option 2. Regionalization.
Option 3. Mass revolt.
Option 1. Geopolitical, or External Aggression
This is an extreme version of the global confrontational
scenario G3, when Russia starts large-scale escalation in
the Donbas with parallel strikes in the Baltic states or the
Middle East. The Kremlin will go for this option if it fails to
reach agreements with the US and Europe, and if the ex-
haustion of internal resources imposes the threat of eco-
nomic collapse. Then escalation will become a way to
switch attention of the masses and elites to external sites.
In this case, Russia will raise the issue of rapid collapse in
Ukraine using boost loosening; combining a range of mili-
tary actions in the Donbas with destabilization in the coun-
try through its agents of influence.
This option can also be derived from a second scenario in
the variant C2 when an unsuccessful attempt at a military
coup from Russia leads to the situation when rebels are
not be able to retain control over the entire country what
will de facto start a civil war with elements of outside in-
tervention, as it was in Libya in 2011.
35

2017: Challenges and opportunites

2017: Challenges and opportunites

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