1. 1
Essay
The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: analysis of the argumentation
and the International Court of Justice's decision
Timur Akhmetov1
Introduction
The end of the Cold War was marked with hopes of many nations on the final
elimination of nuclear weapon (NW) that had bred fear of the total elimination of
humanity. First decade after the end of competition between USA und Soviet Union
witnessed multiple attempts to outlaw nuclear weapons as contrary to the principles
of humanity and international peace. The World Health Organization’s (WHO)
request in 1993 was rejected by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the
grounds that the motion was out of the competence of this UN body. On the other
hand, ICJ accepted the General Assembly’s request of 1994 to review the legality of
the threat or use of NW.
In the essay we will try to analyze major lines of argumentation of both sides:
the ones who propose that NW is not banned by the international law and that ones
that state the illegality of NW resulting from its inherent characteristics. The
following analysis will provide a chance to look at the correlations between three
major sources of the international law applicable to NW: international conventional,
customary and humanitarian law.
The paper consists of three major parts. First part is dedicated to the analysis of
the argumentation of the sides. It is based on but not limited with the written
statements of the representatives of USA, UK and Solomon Islands. Second part of the
work deals with the examination of the advisory opinion of the ICJ. Final and
concluding part provides views of the author on the argumentation in general, the
Court’s decision and perspectives of the initiative to eliminate the threat of NW.
I
1. Argumentation for legality of nuclear weapon
Generally speaking states advocating the legality of NW adopted several
standpoints of argumentation, one of them is the importance of Lotus principle in the
international law, especially in issues of the national security:
1
The author is thankful to Prof. Norman Finkelstein for having given an opportunity to explore the universe
of the international law and politics with all their peculiarities and paradoxes;

2. 2
―Does international law prohibit the use, or threat of use, of
nuclear weapons? We do not search for a permissive rule.
International law is premised on the freedom of action of
sovereign States, above all in matters affecting their security and
their independence‖2
.
But the weight of the defence was placed on the proving that there is no general
prohibition of NW in the conventional law and deployment of NW may be done
without violation of the international humanitarian law, regulating the conduct of war.
1.1. International conventional law
It was argued in particular that world community had not yet worked out general
convention outlawing NW ad modum Biological and Chemical Weapon
Conventions. Despite the fact that UN General Assembly has produced multiple
resolutions calling for the conference on the general prohibition of NW no practical
measure followed3
. Of course, it is stated further, there is a number of treaties dealing
directly with NW’s aspects (possession (Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968), deployment
(Treaty of Antarctica, Treaty of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga) and testing (Partial Test Ban
Treaty 1963, Sea Bed Treaty), they in no way ban NW. Moreover, seen from another
angle, treaties establish the fact of existence of NW.
Proponents of NW refer inter alia to long established right of states to self-
defence recognized in the UN Charter’s article 51 presupposes a right to use nuclear
weapon if resort to it is of necessity and deployed proportionally to the military
objective. The right to deploy NW was, moreover, mentioned in Security Council
resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to
non-nuclear-weapon States that are Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons4
. NW is thus tightly connected with the fundamental character of
the right to self-defence:
―That is the most fundamental right of all, Mr. President, and it is
preserved in terms which are general, not restrictive. It is
impossible to argue that this fundamental, inherent right has been
limited or abandoned on the basis of mere inferences drawn from
other rules, whether conventional or customary‖5
.
2
Oral statements of the UK, CR 95/34
3
Written Statement of the UK, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, June 1995, p.25
4
Security Council resolution 984 (1995) http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/106/06/PDF/N9510606.pdf?OpenElement
5
Oral statements of the UK, CR 95/34, p.33

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Finally, argumentation goes on to mention the fact that all attempts to outlaw
nuclear war are undertaken through the medium of practical measures of disarmament
and nonproliferation rather than through an attempt to outlaw nuclear weapon or their
use6
. The Anti-Ballistic Missile and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties include
provisions sanctioning the need for nuclear forces in the framework of the nuclear
deterrence7
.
1.2. International customary law
While evaluating the provisions of the customary law pro-nuclear weapon states
conclude that world community doesn’t have single uniform practice of rejecting NW
and opinio juris on this matter, the two general prerequisites for establishing an
international legal custom.
It is said that on the one hand many states have been committed to the policy of
the nuclear deterrence to secure stability in the Cold War world divided between two
camps. Even now, countries facing serious security challenges prefer relying on their
nuclear arsenals (directly or via nuclear umbrella) thus signaling the existence of
acceptance of NW8
. On the other hand, there is no single opinio juris of the states on
the nuclear issue. Among all, UN General Assembly resolutions 1643 and 2936 can in
no way be regarded as an expression of this opinio juris: they have no clear majority,
most affected states voted against the resolutions and they can not be seen as lege lata
per se because of their pure advisory nature9
.
1.3. International humanitarian law
The line of argumentation regarding the IHL goes through thesis that, first of all,
treaties regulating the warfare don’t apply to nuclear weapon. Further it is stated that
traditional humanitarian principles under careful reading foresee the legality of NW’s
use in a number of cases.
1.3.1. Conventions and treaties regulating the conduct of war
To being with, proponents of NW point out that Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) doesn’t regulate NW’s use in the armed
conflicts. USA, for example, drew attention to the notion of Preparatory Committee to
6
Written Statement of the UK, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, June 1995, p.30
7
Written Statement of the USA, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, June 1995, p.13
8
Oral statements of the UK, CR 95/34, p.22
9
Written Statement of the UK, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, June 1995, p.34

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limit the scope of the Conference 1977 to the conventional weapons, ―noting in
particular the important function of nuclear weapon in deterring the outbreak of armed
conflict‖10
.
Next, it is claimed that Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating. Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
(1925) doesn’t regulate NW as such. Supporters of NW note that it should be
distinguished between primary and secondary effects of the used weapon, therefore,
bearing in mind that, according to some states, radiation is not the primary effect of
NW, it thus can not be outlawed by the above mentioned Convention.
Furthermore, the Hague Regulations 1907 stating that parties to the document
don’t have an unlimited choice of the methods and means of warfare. However,
according to the NW proponents, the treaty can’t regulate new weapons and the
prohibition on poison weapons does not extend to conventional explosives or
incendiaries (military utility of which is very high – notes by the author) even though
they may produce dangerous fumes11
.
Finally there is the St.Petersburg Declaration, 1868 which according to NW
states can’t regulate NW application, because the document itself is very specific:
even though, document bans weapons which render death inevitable, it prohibits only
the use of projectiles of a weight below 400 grams which were explosive or were
charged with fulminating or inflammable substances. Moreover, regulations of the
treaty do not mean that ―it is unlawful to use a weapon that has a high probability of
killing persons in its immediate vicinity if that design feature is required to fulfill a
legitimate military mission‖12
.
1.3.2. The traditional principles of the IHL
It is stated that NW doesn’t necessarily violate the principle of unnecessary
suffering. Proponents of NW highlight the importance a balance must be struck
―between the military advantage which may be derived from the use of a particular
weapon and the degree of suffering which the use of that weapon may cause‖13
:
―The prohibition against unnecessary suffering was intended to
preclude weapons designed to increase the injury or suffering of
the persons attacked beyond that necessary to accomplish the
military objective. It does not prohibit weapons that may cause
great injury or suffering if the use of the weapon is necessary to
accomplish the military mission. For example, it does not
10
Written Statement of the USA, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, June 1995, p.25
11
Ibid,p.24
12
Ibid,p.33
13
Written Statement of the UK, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, June 1995, p.50

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prohibit the use of anti-tank munitions which must penetrate
armor by kinetic-energy or incendiary effects, even though this
may well cause severe and painful burn injuries to the tank crew.
By the same token, it does not prohibit the use of nuclear
weapons, even though such weapons can produce severe and
painful injuries‖ 14
.
Further, supporters of NW claim that this weapon is able to be in line with the
principle of distinction saying that the civilian population and individual civilians are
not a legitimate target in their own right.
―Modem nuclear weapons are capable of far more precise
targeting and can therefore be directed against specific military
objectives without the indiscriminate effect on the civilian
population which the older literature assumed to be inevitable. In
some cases, such as the use of a low yield nuclear weapon
against warships on the High Seas or troops in sparsely populated
areas. it is possible to envisage a nuclear arrack which caused
comparatively few civilian casualties‖15
.
Next, it is claimed that NW can be used in a way to follow the principle of
proportionality. It requires that even a military objective should not be attacked if to
do so would cause collateral civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects which
should be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated from the attack. NW States emphasize the importance to look at the
military objective being perused:
―It cannot, however, be right to assume, as an abstract
proposition, that those losses would always outweigh that
advantage especially sphere the destruction of a particular
military objective was essential to the survival of a State which
was under attack (and, perhaps, to the lives of millions of
members of that State's civilian population) and the use of a
nuclear weapon offered the only means of destroying that
objective‖16
.
In sum, main arguments of the NW States for compliance of NW to the IHL deal
with issues of limited deployment of low-yield NW in tactical warfare orand in cases
14
Written Statement of the USA, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, June 1995, pp.28-29
15
Written Statement of the UK, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, June 1995, p.53
16
Ibid, p.54

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when collateral civilian casualties are minimal (the High Seas or military base in a
desert). Finally, NW States invent the category of the threat to the survival of a State,
when practically all methods of warfare can be justified.
2. Argumentation against legality of nuclear weapon
Interestingly enough, but the bulk of the argumentation of NW opponents was
concentrated around the incompatibility of NW with the international humanitarian
law thus somehow leaving international customary and conventional law without
much attention.
2.1. Nuclear weapon’s nature
The line of the argument starts with the thesis that NW falls under the operation
of the IHL unconditionally and fully. ―The development of new forms of behaviour,
including methods and means of armed conflict, does not bring into question the law
applicable to it. The arrival of a new modus operandi does not modify the application
or effect of the rule of law‖17
. In other words, new weaponry should adapt to the
existing rules of warfare conduct.
Next, the illegality position describes the nature of NW that makes this weapon
inherently contrary to the IHL. Quantitative characteristics of NW make any
deployment of it dangerous for civilians, since it can be calculated in advance what
collateral damage is to expect. By the same token, use of NW in a limited way risks
escalating into the nuclear exchange (backbone of the nuclear deterrence strategy of
mass assured destruction) what is acknowledged by the military manuals and
strategic papers. Qualitative effects such as long-term radiations bring NW within the
operation of international rules outlawing the use of weapons which have poisonous
and analogous characteristics18
. Moreover, the uncontrollability of the effects of NW
means it is contrary to the major principles of the IHL
2.2. The traditional principles of the IHL
The opposition side to the legality of NW refers to the rule of
distinctiondiscrimination of the IHL that shows incompatibility of NW with the laws
of war: collateral damage to civilians and objects must be unintended and accidental,
however if the weapon or its effects were not susceptible of being controlled and
directed against a military target in the first place, the resultant damage to civilian
persons and objects would not be considered unintended, collateral or incidental—and
the use would be prohibited. It is not allowed to employ a method or means of
17
Written Statement of the Solomon Islands, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, June 1995, p.27
18
Ibid,p.60

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combat, the (very) effects of which cannot be limited as required by the law of armed
conflict.
Rule of proportionality prohibits the use of a weapon if its probable effects upon
non-combatant persons or objects would likely be disproportionate to the value of the
anticipated military objective and obligates the sides to evaluate the proportionality of
collateral damage among civilians to the military objective. The NW opponents, in
this regard, claim that any evaluation is practically impossible due to the
uncontrollability of results andor potential risk of escalation into the nuclear
exchange.
Finally, NW violates the principle of necessity that provides that, in conducting a
military operation, a State, even as against its adversary’s forces and property, may
use only such a level of force as is ―necessary‖ or ―imperatively necessary‖ to achieve
its military objective, and that any additional level of force is prohibited as unlawful.
As stated by the opponents of NW:
―Military necessity does not authorize all acts in war that are not
expressly prohibited. Codification of the law of war into specific
prohibitions to anticipate every situation is neither possible nor
desirable. As a result, commanders and others responsible for
making decisions must make those decisions in a manner
consistent with the spirit and intent of the law of war‖19
.
Taking these arguments into account, one can conclude that NW violates the IHL
due to its inherent characteristics: potential disastrous consequences of its deployment
and uncontrollability of all its effects.
II
It is now important to provide decision of the International Court of Justice and
its views on the main arguments delivered above20
.
After the ICJ declared that General Assembly acted in the limits of its mandate
when applied for the advisory opinion on the legality of use and threat of NW, the
Court emphasized that the purpose of the advisory function is not to settle (at least
directly) disputes between States, but to offer legal advice to the organs and
institutions requesting the opinion21
. The fact that the question put to the Court does
not relate to a specific dispute should consequently not lead the Court to decline to
give the opinion requested.
19
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customer of War and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23, para. (g) 18 Oct. 1907.
20
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996) ICJ Rep 226–67, available
at< http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf>
21
Interpretation of Peace Treaties I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 71

8. 8
The Court accepted potentially disastrous effects of NW and its effects on all
humanity:
―By its very nature, that process, in nuclear weapons as they exist
today, releases not only immense quantities of heat and energy,
but also powerful and prolonged radiation. According to the
material before the Court, the first two causes of damage are
vastly more powerful than the damage caused by other weapons,
while the phenomenon of radiation is said to be peculiar to
nuclear weapons. These characteristics render the nuclear
weapon potentially catastrophic. The destructive power of
nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time.
They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire
ecosystem of the planet‖.
It further acknowledged the absence of the general prohibition of NW in the
conventional law while at the same time stating the emerging movement to outlaw
this weapon:
―The Court notes that the treaties dealing exclusively with
acquisition, manufacture, possession, deployment and testing of
nuclear weapons, without specifically addressing their threat or
use, certainly point to an increasing concern in the international
community with these weapons; the Court concludes from this
that these treaties could therefore be seen as foreshadowing a
future general prohibition of the use of such weapons, but they
do not constitute such a prohibition by themselves‖.
The Court drew attention to the fact that there is no uniform international custom
that can lead us to say that NW is forbidden under the international customary law:
―The Court points out that the adoption each year by the General
Assembly, by a large majority, of resolutions recalling the
content of resolution 1653 (XVI), and requesting the member
States to conclude a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear
weapons in any circumstance, reveals the desire of a very large
section of the international community to take, by a specific and
express prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a significant
step forward along the road to complete nuclear disarmament.
The emergence, as lex lata, of a customary rule specifically
prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as such is hampered by

9. 9
the continuing tensions between the nascent opinio juris on the
one hand, and the still strong adherence to the practice of
deterrence on the other‖.
Evaluating the conventions regulating the warfare the ICJ stated that due to their
imperfections they do not embrace NW:
―The Second Hague Declaration of 29 July 1899, Hague
Convention IV of 18 October 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 17
June 1925: The Court will observe that the Regulations annexed
to the Hague Convention IV do not define what is to be
understood by "poison or poisoned weapons" and that different
interpretations exist on the issue. Nor does the 1925 Protocol
specify the meaning to be given to the term "analogous materials
or devices". The terms have been understood, in the practice of
States, in their ordinary sense as covering weapons whose prime,
or even exclusive, effect is to poison or asphyxiate. This practice
is clear, and the parties to those instruments have not treated
them as referring to nuclear weapons‖.
Then the Court decides that NW and its use are regulated by the international
humanitarian law:
―Indeed, nuclear weapons were invented after most of the
principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed
conflict had already come into existence; the Conferences of
1949 and 1974-1977 left these weapons aside, and there is a
qualitative as well as quantitative difference between nuclear
weapons and all conventional arms. However, it cannot be
concluded from this that the established principles and rules of
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict did not apply to
nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion would be incompatible with
the intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal principles in
question which permeates the entire law of armed conflict and
applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those
of the past, those of the present and those of the future. In this
respect it seems significant that the thesis that the rules of
humanitarian law do not apply to the new weaponry, because of
the newness of the latter, has not been advocated in the present
proceedings. On the contrary, the newness of nuclear weapons

10. 10
has been expressly rejected as an argument against the
application to them of international humanitarian law‖.
The Court doesn’t accept the thesis of limited use of nuclear low-yield tactical
weapons in light of absence of any conceivable argumentation that its use would not
turn into the nuclear war:
―The Court would observe that none of the States advocating the
legality of the use of nuclear weapons under certain
circumstances, including the "clean" use of smaller, low yield,
tactical nuclear weapons, has indicated what, supposing such
limited use were feasible, would be the precise circumstances
justifying such use; nor whether such limited use would not tend
to escalate into the all-out use of high yield nuclear weapons.
This being so, the Court does not consider that it has a sufficient
basis for a determination on the validity of this view‖.
Most important decision was made in reference to the ―Survival of a State‖
thesis. The ICJ concluded it can not reach a definitive conclusion about legality of
NW’s use in this case:
―The Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every
State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at
stake. Nor can it ignore the practice referred to as "policy of
deterrence", to which an appreciable section of the international
community adhered for many years. The Court also notes the
reservations which certain nuclear-weapon States have appended
to the undertakings they have given, notably under the Protocols
to the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga, and also under the
declarations made by them in connection with the extension of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, not to
resort to such weapons. Accordingly, in view of the present state
of international law viewed as a whole, as examined above by the
Court, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court is led
to observe that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the
legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in
an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very
survival would be at stake‖.

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Finally, Court once again underlines the obligation undertaken by the NW States
to eliminate NW:
―The Court appreciates the full importance of the recognition by
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of an obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear
disarmament. The legal import of that obligation goes beyond
that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here
is an obligation to achieve a precise result ‹ nuclear disarmament
in all its aspects ‹ by adopting a particular course of conduct,
namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith‖.
III
In this part the argumentation and the Court’s decision will be analyzed. The
evaluation will begin with the state of the conventional international law regulating
the nuclear weapon. Then we will look at the sources of the customary law: the
practice of the Sates and the existing legal views on the issue of NW. Finally, we will
scrutinize the status of the nuclear weapon and the compatibility of its nature with
IHL.
1.1. International conventional law
As we know the first decade after the end of Cold war was marked with end of
threat of confrontation between USA and USSR, powers with greatest number of NW.
The same period was therefore a time of active reduction in deployed tactical nuclear
weapons what raised hope in the world that the final elimination of NW is very near.
It is evident that main NW countries were reluctant for the last 70 years to limit
their right to use NW as a powerful tool in their national security. For the reason of
international pressure andor for the wish to limit the number of NW states, they tried
to establish the system of treaties that would make proliferation of nuclear weapon
difficult.
Major NW states envisioned that elimination of NW should take place only in
the framework of disarmament negotiations due to high reliance of their national
security strategies on NW. ―Complete Disarmament was defined by the United
Nations General Assembly as the elimination of all WMD, coupled with the
―balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, based on the
principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or
enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States

12. 12
to protect their security‖22
. Therefore, it is understandable why there is no general
prohibition of NW.
1.2. International customary law
As was demonstrated by the sides of the legal case there is no clear uniform
custom banning the NW as such. First of all, there has been formed a uniform opinion
juris ob the legality of NW. The reason lies to our mind in the logic of Cold War with
clear vision of utility of nuclear arms. By the same token, no uniform practice of the
States has been formed either: many states relied in the past and rely today on the
nuclear arsenals directly, as in the case of the recognized members of the Security
Council (+India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea), or indirectly, as in the case of
countries that enjoy positive security guarantees of the nuclear weapon states.
1.3. International humanitarian law
The relation between NW and the IHL inevitably touches upon the nature of the
weapon and the methods of its deployment envisaged in the national military
strategies. As was seen above the argumentation of the NW opponents and decision of
the ICJ outlined the inherent characteristics of the weapon. NW’s uniqueness is its
immense power to destroy and ability to expose short-term and long-term radiation.
On the other hand, NW is designed to be used in a way to fully realize its destructive
potential: massive attacks on the enemy. Moreover, it is worth noting that effects of
NW is hard to predict at the moment of use and impossible to calculate in the long
run. As referenced in the statement by Judge Shahabuddeen in the Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Decision the United States, in ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco, subscribed
to the statement that the ―terrible effects‖ of nuclear weapons ―are suffered,
indiscriminately and inexorably, by military forces and civilian population alike; and
―through the persistence of the radioactivity they release, an attack on the integrity of
the human species and ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable‖23
.
These features make NW’s nature violate traditional principles of the IHL. Long-
term radiation and potential destructive forces are impossible to control thus making
NW be contrary to the principle of distinction. Furthermore, impossibility to calculate
the scope of effects make NW contradict the principle of unnecessary suffering that
requires control over the after effects of the deployed weapon. Finally, the way NW is
designed to be used and NW’s nature make it doubtful that proportionality of losses
among civilians can be precisely estimated thus suggesting that NW violate the
principle of proportionality.
22
UN General Assembly, Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament, para. 22.
(http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/SSOD/A-S-10-4.pdf)
23
Dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen at 5–6, 35 I.L.M. at 863–864

13. 13
1.4. Importance of the ICJ’s decision
It is evident that the Court’s decision was delivered with consideration of the
existing state of the international law and without exceeding its own authority.
Though it was acknowledged that there is no general prohibition of the nuclear
weapon, the Court decided that nuclear States bear responsibility to eliminate NW
within the regulations of NPT. ―Since some NWS continue to oppose nuclear
disarmament negotiations in any of the main international fora including the
Conference on Disarmament, the UN General Assembly and the NPT review process,
it is useful to make a possible request to the ICJ to render an advisory opinion would
be perhaps whether NWS fulfill their obligation and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to comprehensive and effective abolition of nuclear weapons‖24
.
Moreover, the attention is to be paid to the survival thesis. Survival of a State
thesis and using of this thesis to withdraw from the IHL (i.e. limit its applicability to
NW) show the importance of the national security of a state per se. On the other hand,
national security of the nuclear states is being compromised primarily by the existence
of nuclear weapons in the hands of other nuclear states. This paradox is to be resolved
by the international community and the Security Council, responsible for the
international security.
Finally, a debate around the nuclear weapon and more generally deployment of
radioactive materials in the warfare can gain impetus by reviewing the status of the
arms based in the depleted uranium. If a general opinion (with possible prohibition) is
reached on the incompatibility of such weapon with the IHL due to uncontrollability
of its effects (long lasting radiation), the opponents of NW can gain an upper hand in
the future.
24
Anguel Anastassov, Are Nuclear Weapons Illegal? The Role of Public International Law and the
International Court of Justice, Journal of Conflict Security Law (2010) 15 (1): 65-87