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Tharindu Edirisinghe
https://www.meetup.com/Melbourne-Identity-and-Security-Meetup/events/269830019/
Securing
SAML SSO
from XSW
Attacks
Security Internal.com
Tharindu Edirisinghe
Graduate Researcher/ PhD Student
Open Source Contributor
RaiderJava Encoder
@thariyarox
What is Single Sign On
(SSO) ?
Identity Provider
(Office 365)
Zoom
Example for SSO
Email
Moodle (LMS)
Timetable
Service Providers
(Replying Party Applications)
Authentication Request
Authentication Response
Use Account
Identity Provider
Zoom
SAML in SSO
Email
Moodle (LMS)
Timetable
Service Providers
(Replying Party Applications)
SAML Authentication Request
SAML Authentication Response
Use Account
DEMO
SAML
Authentication
Request and Response
Identity Provider
SAML Authentication Attack
Client
Service Provider
(Replying Party Application)
SAML Authentication Request
SAML Authentication Response
Use Account
JoanneResponse
Assertion
JoanneAdmin
DEMO
SAML
Authentication
Attack
Digital Signatures
Digital Signatures and Signature Verification
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_signature#/media/File:Digital_Signature_diagram.svg
Identity
Provider
needs
to sign the
responses
Relying Party
needs to verify
the signature
Identity Provider
Digitally Signed SAML Responses/Assertions
Client
Service Provider
(Replying Party Application)
SAML Authentication Request
SAML Authentication Response
Use Account
JoanneResponse
Assertion
Sign the
Response/Assertion
Verify the signature of
Response/Assertion
Assertion
Signature
Response
Signature
DEMO
SAML Authentication
Attack Prevention with
Digital Signatures
Structure of XML Signature
Source: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity12/sec12-final91.pdf
XML Signature Wrapping
(XSW)
Attacks on SAML
Apache Tomcat Server
(Port 8080)
WSO2 Identity Server
(Port 9443)
Web Browser
(Uses Proxy Port 9090)
BurpSuite
(Port 9090)
Travelocity.com
Sample SAML Client
Application
SAML
Identity Provider
SAML Raider
XSW DEMO Setup
Modified SAML Raider : https://github.com/thariyarox/SAMLRaider/blob/NewAttacks/target/saml-raider-1.2.0-SNAPSHOT-jar-with-dependencies.jar
XSW DEMO
Source: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity12/sec12-final91.pdf
WSO2 Security Advisory: https://docs.wso2.com/display/Security/Security+Advisory+WSO2-2016-0104
Office 365
SAML Client App Salesforce
Where it’s fixed?
SAML Request
SAML Response
SAML Request
SAML Response
Fix for SAML Signature Validation
Fix ???
XSW Prevention ?
● If the SAML client is implemented using a 3rd party library, check if it supports XSW
prevention. (Eg: OpenSAML client library)
● If SAML assertion/response parsing is done with your implementation, add extra
validations. (Eg: prevent multiple responses/assertions in the XML message)
● Conduct penetration testing for SAML authentication flows. Use standard tools or
make your own one ! (https://github.com/thariyarox/SAMLRaider/tree/NewAttacks/target)
XML Comments
in
SAML Signatures
XML Comments
Source: https://duo.com/blog/duo-finds-saml-vulnerabilities-affecting-multiple-implementations
<A X="1" Y="2">some text<!-- and a comment --></A>
< A Y="2" X="1" >some text</ A >
Both are logically equal
XML Comments in Signature?
Source: https://duo.com/blog/duo-finds-saml-vulnerabilities-affecting-multiple-implementations
<A X="1" Y="2">some text<!-- and a comment --></A>
< A Y="2" X="1" >some text</ A > XML Transformation
(Canonicalization)
Transformed XML
Generate XML Signature
exc-c14n#WithComments canonicalization
Source: https://duo.com/blog/duo-finds-saml-vulnerabilities-affecting-multiple-implementations
<A X="1" Y="2">some text<!-- and a comment --></A>
< A Y="2" X="1" >some text</ A >
XML Transformation
(Canonicalization)
Transformed XML
Generate XML Signature
<A X="1" Y="2">some text<!-- and a comment --></A>
Two inputs will end up with different
signatures
XML Transformation
(Canonicalization)
Transformed XML
<A X="1" Y="2">some text</A>
Generate XML Signature
exc-c14n canonicalization
Source: https://duo.com/blog/duo-finds-saml-vulnerabilities-affecting-multiple-implementations
<A X="1" Y="2">some text<!-- and a comment --></A>
< A Y="2" X="1" >some text</ A > XML Transformation
(Canonicalization)
Transformed XML
Generate XML Signature
< A Y="2" X="1" >some text</ A >
Both inputs will end up with the
same signature
XML Parser issues with processing
comments (exc-c14n)
Source: https://duo.com/blog/duo-finds-saml-vulnerabilities-affecting-multiple-implementations
<A>first text<!-- comment -->second text</A>
first text
<!-- comment -->
second text
node_A.getText()
What gets returned??
XML Parser issues with processing
comments (exc-c14n)
Source: https://duo.com/blog/duo-finds-saml-vulnerabilities-affecting-multiple-implementations
<Username> phil <!-- comment --> lip </Username>
phil
<!-- comment -->
lip
node_A.getText()
Returns first part of the text
Victim
Attacker’s username is phillip
XML Parser issues with processing
comments (exc-c14n)
Source: https://duo.com/blog/duo-finds-saml-vulnerabilities-affecting-multiple-implementations
<Username> jo <!-- comment --> anne </Username>
jo
<!-- comment -->
anne
node_A.getText()
Returns last part of the text
Victim
Attacker’s username is joanne
DEMO
SAML Attack
with
XML Comments
XML Comments Attack Prevention
● Use exc-c14n#WithComments canonicalization algorithm.
● If exc-c14n is used, process the text of the XML node separately and remove the
comment before extracting the node value.
● Use an XML processing library which is not vulnerable to the string tokenization issue
when comments are present. (Eg: DOM parser, SAX parser)
Summary
● Single Sign On (SSO)
● SAML for SSO
● Digital Signatures
● XSW attacks on SAML
● Penetration testing SAML flows
● XML comments in signatures
● SAML attack prevention
Thank You !
@thariyarox
https://au.linkedin.com/in/ediri

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