Mais conteúdo relacionado Semelhante a Spectrum assignment mechanisms v001 270716 sz (20) Mais de Coleago Consulting (8) Spectrum assignment mechanisms v001 270716 sz2. Agenda
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1 The evolution of mobile operator and spectrum licencing
2 Policy goals in assigning spectrum
3 The rationale for assigning spectrum by means of auctions
4 Spectrum auctions in mature markets
5 Best practice spectrum assignment by means of an auction
6 Best practice in spectrum assignment by means of comparative tender
7 Auction failure in some African markets
8 Solutions to overcome market specific problems
3. Coleago Consulting – A specialist consulting firm serving the needs
of the telecoms, media, technology sectors
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Strategy & Business Planning
Strategy development, marketing strategy
MVNO and multi-brand wholesale strategy
Business planning and business modelling
Telecoms Regulation & Interconnect
Accounting separation, price control
Interconnect cost modelling, RIO
Regulatory consultations
Spectrum Valuations and Auctions
Spectrum strategy and spectrum valuation
Spectrum auctions & bid strategy
Spectrum auction design & reserve prices
Transaction Services
Commercial due diligence
Tower due diligence
Preparation of Information Memorandum
Mobile Network Sharing
Mobile Network Sharing
Managed Services and Outsourcing
Network Audit
Training & Management Development
Telecoms Mini-MBA
Regulatory capacity building
Mobile operator business simulation game
4. 20 years of spectrum related work delivered by a team of experienced
consultants
Spectrum valuation and projects
completed in 2015/16
During 2015/16 Coleago conducted
spectrum valuation and auction
projects in Indonesia, Bangladesh,
Denmark, South Africa, the Ukraine,
Nigeria, Ghana, Russia, and
Myanmar.
Spectrum auction capacity building
workshops
Coleago delivers per year 5 to 6
capacity building workshops on
spectrum related matters. Much of
this capacity building work is carried
out in conjunction with the GSMA.
In 2015/16 Coleago delivered Best
Practice Spectrum Management and
Auction workshops in India,
Cambodia, China, South Africa,
Benin, Tanzania, Gabon, and
Mozambique.
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5. The evolution of mobile operator and
spectrum licencing
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6. Spectrum assignment mechanisms in use
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First come first
served
Used in markets with low demand for spectrum, e.g.
Mauritius, but otherwise does not constitute best practice
Comparative tender
(beauty contest)
The price for spectrum is fixed and licences assigned to
operators using a scoring system; criticised for lack of
transparency
Auction
Spectrum assigned to highest bidders subject to a
reserve price; usually constrained by spectrum caps and
other limitations; unfettered auctions are rare
Administered
assignment
Used where auctions are unlikely to deliver policy
objectives; an option for licence renewal; price may be
determined by administered incentive pricing
7. Mobile operator licencing and spectrum licencing evolved with the
mobile industry life cycle
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1985 2015
The era of telecoms
liberalisation:
Licencing of competing
mobile networks
The growth of
mobile: GSM and
1800/1900MHz
spectrum allows for
additional licences
to be issued
The evolution of
mobile for data:
Focus shifts to
assigning additional
spectrum to existing
operators
1995 2005
8. The focus of policy objectives evolves with the mobile industry life
cycle
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1985 2015
Focus on infrastructure
based competition,
coverage roll-out
Introduce 3rd and 4th
operators and
ensure they are
successful, focus on
consumer benefits
Direct additional
spectrum for 3G and
4G to existing
operators
1995 2005
9. Comparative tenders were enormously successful in creating
competitive mobile markets and delivered huge societal benefits
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1985 2015
Comparative tenders
and infrastructure based
competition delivered
rapid coverage roll-out
Comparative tenders for
3rd and 4th operators,
passive infrastructure
sharing is encouraged and
even mandated to ensure
success of new entrants The advent of
auctions to assign
additional spectrum
to existing operators
1995 2005
Maintain sufficient
competition as operators
need wider band
assignments for LTE
10. While spectrum auctions are the dominant method of spectrum
assignment, their usefulness is questionable in a maturing market
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1985 2015
Comparative tenders
(beauty contests)
Auctions dominate
1995 2005
In some cases regulators
move away from auctions
11. Governments are increasingly adding complex conditions and
restrictions to auctions to deliver policy goals
France’s assignment of 700MHz in 2015
was an auction but with extensive
conditions attached to spectrum. The
focus was on managing competition and
rural mobile broadband coverage.
The 700MHz in Chile auction focussed
on broadband access with nominal
prices being paid by operators for
spectrum.
New Zealand had a two stage 700MHz
auction with caps to ensure that all three
operators would acquire spectrum.
The UK has moved to indefinite licences,
i.e. spectrum will not be re-auctioned.
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The measures are
market specific
and appear to
deliver successful
outcomes for
these specific
markets.
12. When including special measures in auctions, care must be taken so
as not distort the market based approach to spectrum assignment
The cost of spectrum auction
distortions
a Coleago report for the GSMA to
highlight how flawed spectrum auction
rules result in inefficient outcomes and
adverse consequences for a country’s
economy.
You can download this report from the
GSMA website.
www.gsma.com/spectrum/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/The-Cost-of-
Spectrum-Auction-Distortions.-GSMA-
Coleago-report.-Nov14.pdf
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13. Policy goals in assigning spectrum
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14. Policy objectives for the assignment of mobile spectrum are wider
than maximising revenue from the sale of spectrum
Immediate revenue generation by
maximising auction proceeds
Other policy objectives
Promote the highest value use of
spectrum
Ensure spectrum is deployed rapidly
and widely and the maximum spectral
efficiency is extracted
Promote investment and innovation
Promote rural broadband access and
increase digital participation rates
Promote competition
Promote customer convenience
Provide a high net economic return to
the public
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15. The societal value of assigning spectrum to operators
The return to the community from
spectrum auctions goes well beyond
any direct payment made to
government for spectrum.
Implicitly all governments recognise
the trade-off between spectrum fees
and wider goals.
Otherwise they would simply auction
off monopolies which would
undoubtedly bring the highest direct
receipts.
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16. Setting high prices for spectrum is problematic
“[T]he ratio of social gains [is of] the order
of 240-to-1 in favour of services over
licence revenues…Delicate adjustments
that seek to juice auction receipts but
which also alter competitive forces in
wireless operating markets are inherently
risky. A policy that has an enormous
impact in increasing licence revenues
need impose only tiny proportional costs
in output markets to undermine its social
utility.
In short, to maximise consumer welfare,
spectrum auctions should avoid being
distracted by side issues like government
licence revenues.”
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Hazlett and Munoz, “What Really Matters
in Spectrum Auction Design”, 2010
17. The rationale for assigning spectrum
by means of auctions
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18. Using auctions to deliver “efficient” use of spectrum
What do policy makers mean
when they talk about “efficiency”
in spectrum assignments?
An efficient assignment of spectrum
means assigning spectrum to those
who generate the greatest economic
value to society from the use of the
spectrum.
“The key goal of any auction is to
guide goods to those who value
them the most. Spectrum auctions
help identify the highest value use
and users”
New Zealand Ministry of Business,
Innovation and Enterprise - May 2013
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19. Based on the theoretical efficiency argument, auctions became the
norm is assigning spectrum
Benefits of an auction
Transparent and objective
May lead to an efficient assignment of
spectrum
Does not require regulators to “pick the
winners”
Generates revenue for society
Generates a sunk cost and so is less
distortionary
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20. Bidders will not pay more than their valuation
Valuations
In preparing for an auction, bidders
will value the blocks they intend to
acquire
This establishes how much a block is
worth to the bidder
Value created is the difference
between the amount bid and the
valuation
The bid amount
It would be irrational to bid more than
the valuation
Bidding less than the valuation does
make sense because the bidder
could acquire the lot for less than it is
worth to the bidder
However, if a bidder bids much less
than it is worth to the bidder, the risk
of a competing bidder winning the lot
increases
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22. Policy objectives have to be considered in the light of maturing
mobile markets
Mobile markets have reached the
maturity phase of the industry life
cycle
Many markets show flat (at least in real
terms) or declining revenues, EBITDA
and free cash flow
This maturity industry life cycle stage
suggests that:
– Encouraging new network based
competition is not appropriate
– Taking cash out of the industry is not
sustainable
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23. Given the existing spectrum, new entrants will have too little
spectrum to compete
In an LTE world, large contiguous
spectrum holdings confer particular
competitive advantage
The exit of some operators in Europe
and the insolvency of Mobilicity in
Canada demonstrates that it is
impossible to succeed in the market
with small spectrum holdings.
When industry logic has driven
consolidation, trying to reverse the
process by regulation is unlikely to
produce societal benefits.
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24. Allocating spectrum on the basis of private valuations may lead to a
reduction in competition, higher prices and less consumer choice
In a mobile broadband world the
value of preventing a rival from
acquiring their “fair share” of
spectrum is large
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“The private value for incumbents
includes benefits gained by preventing
rivals from improving their services.
The value of keeping spectrum out of
competitors’ hands could be very
high. However, this ‘foreclosure value’
does not reflect consumer value.”
US Department of Justice, Ex Parte
Submission before the FCC - April 2013
25. Options for spectrum auctions in mature markets
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New market entry unlikely
Each incumbent gets a “fair
share”, but auction proceeds are
low because there is no real
bidding
Set high
reserve prices
Unfettered auction among
incumbents
Auction proceeds may be high,
but increased industry
consolidation and reduced
competition results
Spectrum caps to preserve
existing competition with 3
operators (small market) to 4
operators (large market)
Focus on
other policy
goals
What then is
the point of an
auction?
26. High reserve prices are prone to distort auction
outcomes and harm the public interest
Spectrum is unsold and hence unused.
This represents a productivity loss to
society and reduced auction receipts.
National imbalances in spectrum
holdings may be exacerbated.
An unnecessarily high cost-burden
may be imposed on the industry,
leading to adverse downstream
consequences in terms of roll-out,
competition and consumer choice.
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Spectrum remains unsold and hence
economic value is lost to the
country
India 850, 900, 1800, 2100 MHz
Australia 700MHz (2013)
Bangladesh 2100MHz
Ghana 800MHz (2015)
Mozambique (2013)
Higher costs are imposed on
operators than necessary and
deployment slows down
India 2100 & 2300MHz (2010)
Australia 700MHz (2013)
Belgium 800MHz (2013)
Set high
reserve
prices
27. The reserve price for the 700MHz auction in Chile was
set to deliver rural development policy objectives
The 700MHz spectrum award process
in 2014 focussed on connectivity and
competition policy objectives …
connect 1,281 rural towns and 500
schools
obligation to build fibre
mandated MVNO access and roaming
… rather than extracting money from
the mobile industry.
The reserve price was small.
Auction proceeds amounted to only
0.017 $/MHz/pop.
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Note: Per capita GDP in Chile: US$ 15,700
Focus on
other policy
goals
28. Best practice in spectrum
assignment by means of an auction
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29. Policy objectives should guide the design of spectrum auctions,
rules and reserve prices
Policy objectives are the starting point
Set feasible policy objectives
Competition
Promoting new entry is not efficient at this stage of
the industry life cycle
Create conditions where economies of scale can
materialise while maintaining competition
Coverage obligations
Coverage obligations can be an important element
in delivering policy objectives
Coverage requirements should not be linked to
specific bands
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30. Technical and economic efficiency in spectrum auctions
Technical efficiency considerations
Maximise the amount of available spectrum
Assign available spectrum together rather than
artificially ration
Ensure a minimum channel size of 10MHz for LTE
Avoid fragmentation of spectrum
Make spectrum technology neutral
Ensure an efficient assignment of spectrum
Adopt proportional measure to promote
downstream competition
Allocate spectrum to those that value it most highly
Prevent speculators
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31. Spectrum auctions can and do deliver efficient outcomes, but
different auction formats have different challenges
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Single round sealed
bid auction
No opportunity for price discovery, can lead to lower bids and
hence auction revenue or may result in regret for the winner
Single round sealed
bid auction with 2nd
price rule
Winner pays the price of the second highest bidder and
therefore eliminates the risk of “regret”. No opportunity for price
discovery which can lead to price discrepancies.
Simultaneous Multi-
Round Ascending
(SMRA) auction
Simple ascending auction gives opportunity for price discovery
but aggregation risk* is present as there is no package bidding
SMRA auction with
augmented switching
More complex form of SMRA where bidders can in certain
circumstances alter bids to reduce aggregation risk*
Combinatorial Clock
Auction (CCA) with
2nd price rule
In theory, economically efficient and avoids aggregation risk*
but extremely complex and not very transparent with clock and
supplementary rounds. Can lead to major price discrepancies.
* If blocks are complementary, the risk that a bidder is stuck with an unprofitable subset of its desired package.
Spectrum Workshop
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32. Key characteristics of the two main multi-round auction formats
Design Principle SMRA CCA
Supports simultaneous award of spectrum in multi-bands ✔✔✔ ✔✔✔
Exposure and fragmentation risks (can be overcome) ✘ ✔✔✔
Flexibility over the use of specific or generic lots ✔✔ ✔
Transparency of bidders and bids ✔✔✔ ✔✔
Certainty over lots awarded ✔✔✔ ✘
Certainty over prices paid ✔✔✔ ✘
Avoids ‘regret’ ✔ ✔✔
Avoids adverse price asymmetries ✔✔✔ ✘
Simplicity and ease of presentation and transparency of results ✔✔ ✘
Promotes all spectrum being sold ✔✔ ✘
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33. Implications for best practice
Best Practice
Single round auctions should be avoided in favour of multi-round formats
Sequential auctions should be avoided to reduce substitution and exposure risk
Generic lots should be preferred to avoid aggregation risk
Regulators should prefer greater transparency rather than less
The auction design and rules should be as simple as possible
The design should seek to minimise the scope for strategic bidding
When placing a bid there should be a high certainty regarding the lots, price
and expenditure of the bidder
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34. Avoiding unsold blocks
Ending an auction with unsold spectrum is
inefficient and reflects badly on the
auctioneer
The economic and societal value of spectrum
is only realised if traffic passes through
Spectrum that is unsold at auction does not
generate any revenue for the state
Running a separate auction for unsold lots
increases uncertainty for bidders and imposes
an additional administrative burden
The solution
If an auction has a risk of unsold lots, specify in
the auction rules how these unsold lots will be
sold in a second phase of the same auction
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35. Best practice in spectrum
assignment by means of a
comparative tender
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36. Spectrum assignment by comparative tender, the principles
A comparative tender is also known as a
“beauty contest”. Beauty is subjective, but a
well run comparative tender can be objective.
A comparative tender for the assignment of
spectrum to one or several operators should
have the following characteristics:
– It must be a transparent process using a
predefined set of selection criteria.
– The selection criteria should be translated
into scores which lead to an objective
selection of the winning tenders.
– A spectrum fee, if any, should be stated in
the tender document. The spectrum fee is
not a selection criteria.
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37. Advantages of spectrum assignment by comparative tender
Advantages
Allows non-financial aspects to be
taken into account
Can focus on efficient use of
spectrum
Administrative costs usually lower
than an auction
Quick and easy to execute
If a price is applied, this generates
revenue for government
Considerations
For example competition related
aspects
Efficient use of spectrum can be built
into scoring
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38. Potential disadvantages of spectrum assignment by comparative
tender and measures to overcome these
Potential disadvantages
Opaque if award is based on
judgement concerning quality of the
bid.
Spectrum will be assigned to
operators who promise the most with
no assurance of delivery.
Price may be set too high so no bids
are forthcoming
Measures to be taken
Set objective scoring criteria in line
with policy objectives and ensure
transparency of the process.
Strong enforcement of measurable
non-price criteria required with
substantial fines and forfeiture threat.
Set a conservative price which
minimises this risk.
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39. Setting the price for spectrum in a comparative tender
Assignment of spectrum by comparative tender
requires a price to be set for the spectrum.
Benchmarking may be used, but with caution:
– Adjust benchmark prices for population and
GDP per capita
– Compare spectrum in similar bands, for
example 2100MHz and 2600MHz spectrum is
different
– Ignore outliers, such as 2100MHz auction in
India
Do not only use simple prices paid benchmarks
– Benchmark the overall cost of spectrum to the
industry as a percentage of free cash flow
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40. Transparency and objectivity must be an overriding design criteria
for spectrum assignment by comparative tender
The challenge
Lack of transparency and lack of
objectivity in selecting the winner are
rightly the main criticism of spectrum
assignment by comparative tender.
The solution
Take steps to ensure:
– Utmost transparency
– Objective selection criteria and a
clear scoring system
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41. Policy objectives, selection criteria and scoring
Best practice
There should be a clear link between
the policy objectives and the selection
criteria.
It must be possible to quantify the
selection criteria.
It is likely that some policy objectives
will be more important than others.
This should determine the relative
weighting in the scoring system.
Common mistakes
A long list of criteria that do not relate
to the policy objectives.
Non-quantifiable criteria.
The tender document requests a long
list of detail which is not relevant to the
selection.
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An unnecessarily long list of criteria and detail does not translate into
a more objective process. In fact it tends to obscure the process.
A comparative tender can be done on the basis of numerical
information in table format on three to five pages
43. Mozambique: The reserve price for each block was
too high and all of the spectrum remained unsold
800MHz spectrum auction in 2013,
none of the spectrum was sold
There were 3 potential bidders for six
2x5 MHz blocks.
To restrict supply, one of six blocks
was withheld from the auction.
The reserve price per 2x5 MHz block
was US$ 30 million, equivalent to
0.115 US$ / MHz / pop.
Benchmarking the reserve price
In a fiercely contested auction in
Germany in 2010 (4 operators bidding
for 6 blocks) the price paid was 0.91
US$ / MHz / pop.
In Mozambique the GDP per capita is
US$ 610.
The GDP per capita in Germany is
US$ 47,250
Adjusting the Mozambique reserve
price for GDP per capita relative to
Germany produces a reserve price of
8.94 US$ / MHz / pop (US$ 0.115 /
610 x 47,250 = US$ 8.94)
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On a GDP adjusted basis, the
reserve in Mozambique was around
10 times higher than prices paid
elsewhere for digital dividend
spectrum
44. Ghana: The 800MHz auction in Ghana in December
2015 resulted in only one LTE operator
Ghana 2015 800MHz auction
2 lots of 2x10MHz of 800MHz
offered via auction
Reserve price of US$ 67.5 million
per lot
Existing spectrum is not technology
neutral
MTN became the sole LTE operator
MTN acquired 2x10MHz for
US$67.5 million (US$ 0.13 / MHz /
pop)
Failure to achieve policy goals
Unsold spectrum means spectrum
lies fallow instead of contributing to
GDP growth
Competition issues arise
Future policy challenges in
assigning the remaining spectrum
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45. Senegal: Spectrum auction boycott in January 2016
forced negotiations that led to a sale in June 2016
Spectrum on offer
800MHz 2x30MHz in 3 blocks
700MHz 2x20MHz in 4 blocks
1800MHz 2x30MHz in 3 blocks
Reserve price
Reserve price XOF 30 billion (US$
49.86 million) for each of the 20-year
licences
January 2016 headline
“Senegal’s incumbent cellcos ‘boycott’
4G licence tender; ARTP invites bids
from new entrants”
In June 2016, the assignment
progressed
The ARTP restarted the 4G licensing
process and in June 2016 concluded
the assignment of 2x10MHz of
800MHz and 2x10MHz 1800MHz for
Sonatel for XOF 32 bn (US$ 53.8
million)
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47. Market based spectrum assignment constitutes best practice
Spectrum assignment by auction has
delivered excellent outcomes for
consumers, investment and revenue
generation in the majority of markets.
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48. Implicitly all policy makers recognise that unrestricted auctions do
not deliver policy objectives
All regulators introduce limitations on
bidding such as caps and impose a
number of criteria such as coverage.
Why is this necessary when an auction
in theory delivers an efficient
assignment?
The answer is that assignment by a
pure auction will not deliver policy
objectives …
… and the more limitations are
imposed on an auction the further one
moves away from the raison d’être of
an auction.
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49. Kenya: An administered solution to assigning
800MHz spectrum to preserve competition
Market concentration made an
auction impossible
In a three operator market Safaricom
has a rather large market share.
An auction would have cemented the
current situation because smaller
players - Airtel and Telecom Kenya
(Helios) - are unlikely to have had a
business case to pay significant
amounts for the 800MHz spectrum.
The Communications Authority of
Kenya rightly concluded that an
auction would not deliver policy
objectives.
Administered assignment at a price
which the weakest operator could
justify
The regulator assigned 2x10MHz to
each of the three operators for US$
25 million each.
The price amounts to a mere US$
0.025 / MHz / pop.
Policy goals were delivered
All spectrum assigned
A chance to maintain competition
US$ 75 million raised for the state
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50. An innovative solution for 700MHz spectrum
assignment in Zealand delivered policy objectives
The 700MHz auction presented a risk
of going from a 3 player to a 2 player
market
700MHz APT band plan consists of 9
blocks of 2x5 MHz.
The economic minimum an operator
would want to acquire is 2 blocks.
The two large operators, Telecom New
Zealand (Spark) and Vodafone would
easily outbid 2degrees, a weak late 3rd
entrant and acquire 4 blocks each.
One block would have been left unsold
and 2degrees’ ability to compete would
have been severely hampered.
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5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
APT 700MHz (Band 28)
703 748
758 803
51. An innovative solution for 700MHz spectrum
assignment in Zealand delivered policy objectives
The solution: A two stage auction with
caps in the first stage
In stage 1, the cap on bidding was 3
blocks.
2degrees bid for two blocks and the
other for 3 blocks each.
All operators acquired the blocks at the
reserve price of NZ$ 22 million per 2x5
MHz block.
In stage 2 the caps were removed and
the unsold block put to auction. It was
bought by Telecom New Zealand for
NZ$ 83 million.
The auction design delivered
and an excellent outcome
Competition maintained with
a 3 player market.
2nd stage auction was market
based and delivered demand
driven auction revenue for
the state.
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52. Best practice in selecting and auction format and rules requires a
formal and transparent consultation with stakeholders
Do not use the cookie cutter approach and copy from
another country. The auction format and rules should
be developed in a market context.
Auction theory is complex: Obtain advice from
spectrum auction experts.
Use restrictions on bidding such as caps with great
care in order to avoid distortions.
Develop a proposal, including a discussion of
alternatives and rationale for the preferred auction
format and rules.
Publish and consult with stakeholders, notably
the mobile operators.
Publish the final document, including discussion on
rationale and respond to points raised in submissions
from stakeholders.
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