Paper covering the subject of FW Maritime Patrol Aircraft for my degree in Applied Aviaiton.

1. Is there a strategic requirement for a fixed-wing, long range, maritime
patrol aircraft?
i

2. Synopsis
The purpose of this document is to ascertain whether or not there is scope for further research into
the subject: “Is there a strategic requirement for a fixed-wing, long range, maritime patrol aircraft?”
In 2010, the British Ministry of Defence elected to cancel the contract for the Nimrod MR2
replacement, and as such ended a project that had been in production for over 10 years. £3.6 billion
had already been spent on the project, and none of that money would have been returned to the
Treasury upon the project cancellation.
This report will lay down some arguments for and against the cancellation of the Nimrod
MRA 4, discussing whether or not the Ministry of Defence will be able to conduct its elected tasks
without such a maritime presence. The Strategic Defence Review’s of 1998 and 2010 will be
compared to try and ascertain what has changed over this period. The UK’s abilities to defend its
interests at home and overseas will be researched, with particular interest to those roles the Nimrod
force covered and could have developed in the future.
The content contained in this document will be weighted towards roles in which the MR2
fleet operated, and the expected abilities of the MRA 4. Other maritime patrol aircraft are available
for purchase, such as the P-3C Orion, however these capabilities will not be discussed, so as to keep
this report subjective and as detailed as possible due to the long standing argument and stream of
“experts” offering their viewpoints over the cancellation of the Nimrod MRA 4.
ii

3. Contents
Is there a strategic requirement for a fixed-wing, long range, maritime patrol aircraft? ....................... i
Synopsis .............................................................................................................................................. ii
Nimrod MRA 4 Timeline ...................................................................................................................... 1
1998 SDR – Modern Forces for the Modern World ............................................................................ 2
2010 SDSR – Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty ...................................................................... 3
Roles and Required Equipment .......................................................................................................... 5
Anti-Submarine Warfare ................................................................................................................. 5
Anti-Surface Unit Warfare .............................................................................................................. 7
Overland Operations ....................................................................................................................... 7
Search and Rescue .......................................................................................................................... 8
Communications ............................................................................................................................. 9
Post 2010 SDSR – Select Committee on Defence ............................................................................... 9
Costs of a Maritime Patrol Aircraft vs Other Options ....................................................................... 12
Type 26 Frigate.............................................................................................................................. 12
Merlin ............................................................................................................................................ 12
SOSUS ............................................................................................................................................ 13
What is the threat? ........................................................................................................................... 13
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 14
References ........................................................................................................................................ 16
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 18
Table of Figures ..................................................................................................................................... 19
iii

4. Nimrod MRA 4 Timeline
In the November of 1992, the requirement for a replacement maritime patrol aircraft, one to
supersede the Nimrod MR2, was endorsed, and a data gathering phase was authorised. In the
January of 1995, 4 companies submitted proposals for this replacement aircraft, BAE Systems being
the winning bidder on the 25th July 1996. The initial plan was for 21 Nimrod MRA4 aircraft, along
with all the training and support, which would be delivered between 2001 and 2006. “Technical and
resourcing difficulties” (Nimrod MRA4 Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft) meant that during
1998 the project was delayed, by approximately 3 years.
In February 2003, BAE and the MoD came to an agreement over the contract to the effect
that the initial requirement was changed so that the 3 development aircraft would be built, and
upon the proven maturity through flight trials, the contract for production would be awarded.
(Nimrod MRA4 Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft)
December 2003, the Defence White Paper reduced the Nimrod MR2 fleet from 21 to 16 and
the MRA 4 fleet was reduced to “about 12”. Production slowed as the development aircraft went
through the flight testing phase. 5 further delays pushed the in service date further and further back
until, in 2009, an announcement was made which brought forward the MR2 out of service date.
Finally, under the SDSR of 2010, the Nimrod MRA4 program was cancelled. No direct
replacement was planned, the “slack” left by the MRA 4, instead the plan is to “...depend on other
maritime assets to contribute to the tasks previously planned for them [MRA4]” (GOVERNMENT,
HM, 2010).
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5. Figure 1 - Nimrod MRA4 - £3.6 billion
1998 SDR – Modern Forces for the Modern World
In the July of 1998, while the Nimrod MRA 4 programme was approaching another delay, the
Secretary of State for Defence released the latest Strategic Defence and Security Review. This
document was to lay down how the MoD was to align itself to the perceived threats developing in
the 21st Century and onwards to around 2015. The report laid down the Military Tasks in which the
UK Forces could be expected to be employed, of interest are the following: (GOVERNMENT, HM,
1998)
Peacetime Security
Security of the Overseas Territories
Support to Wider British Interests
Regional Conflict outside the NATO area
Strategic Attack on NATO
This list covers 5 of the 8 broad missions set down by the Government. But these 5 are roles
which maritime patrol aircraft have been employed on, and could have been expected to in the
future. Whereas some elements of the military are directed to specific tasks and have singular roles,
the maritime forces have always been flexible and deployable to a wide range of theatres and
operations. Nimrod crews over the past 30 years have fought in conflicts from the Falkland Islands,
2

6. through the Cold War, and on to more recent conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and many
more still covered by the official secrets acts.
The 1998 SDR, however, was a turning point for the future of the Nimrod force. “The risks
and challenges we face are not simply those of the Cold War...” (GOVERNMENT, HM, 1998), this
forward thinking showed that the Government wasn’t expecting large scale battles such as had been
thought throughout the Cold War period. “In part, it was because the scale of the risks involved in
the Cold War obscured the potential importance of the newer style of security risks that were
emerging.” (GOVERNMENT, HM, 1998). This gave the first official signs that we were expecting the
Middle East and such states to be of military interest, no longer would be solely plan on fighting
another major world power.
Furthermore, and more specifically, “At sea, the emphasis is continuing to move away from
large scale maritime warfare...” (GOVERNMENT, HM, 1998). This view showed that the battleground
was no longer going to be the Atlantic Ocean, or areas such as this. But instead, the maritime
battlefield would be within the littoral areas, probably within in 10 miles of the coastline.
In relation directly to the subject of this report, there is a single mention of the Nimrod MRA
4 in the 1998 SDR: “The RAF’s modernised Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft... will provide a powerful
extension of our anti-submarine (ASW) capability, including in shallower waters...” (GOVERNMENT,
HM, 1998). Although there was little mention of the Nimrod fleets in this sizeable doctrine for the
Armed Forces, there was little sign that the force could be expected to be removed completely. Was
there a doctrinal change over the next 12 years that meant Nimrod was no longer required? Or was
the removal of the capability purely down to cost and politics?
2010 SDSR – Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty
By the time this document was published, the MRA 4 project was around 10 years late on its original
in service date, and the MR2 had not flown for 7 months. The MoD had managed without a long
3

7. range maritime patrol aircraft for a significant period, and as such it is unsurprising that the MRA 4
project was cancelled in this way.
As is usual with a strategic document, the new Military Tasks were laid down, all 7 are listed
here: (GOVERNMENT, HM, 2010)
Defending the UK and its Overseas Territories
Providing Strategic Intelligence
Providing a Nuclear Deterrence
Supporting Civil Emergency Organisations in times of crisis
Defending our Interests by Projecting Power Strategically and through Expeditionary
Interventions
Providing a Defence Contribution to UK Influence
Providing security for Stabilisation
Again, looking over the past 30 years, it is possible to directly cross-reference Nimrod Operations
with these 7 Military Tasks. In Nimrod, the UK Government had an asset that was flexible enough to
fulfil all of these roles, to some extent at least. The 2010 SDSR describes how the maritime Future
Force 2020 (i.e., force disposition in the year 2020), can be expected to operate.
“Future Force 2020 will be able to provide:
Nuclear Continuous at Sea Deterrence;
Maritime defence of the UK and its South Atlantic Overseas Territories;
An enduring presence within priority regions of the world to contribute conventional
deterrence” (GOVERNMENT, HM, 2010)
The list continues, however the three roles above were roles in which Nimrod was employed
daily and also held on standby in case it was required. Crews regularly flew through the Christmas
and New Year holidays whilst supporting the tasks listed above.
4

8. What is the mitigation against such an apparent loss of capability? “Maritime intelligence,
surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities based on network enabled
warships submarines and aircraft.” (GOVERNMENT, HM, 2010) This would leave the UK’s maritime
force with 1 or 2 helicopter landing ships, 19 frigates and destroyers, 7 attack submarines, 4 ballistic
missile submarines, and their fleet Merlin helicopters. The smallest navy ever to be fielded by the
Royal Navy. (KIRKUP, Thomas Harding and James, 2010)
Roles and Required Equipment
Although the Nimrod MR2 fleet of aircraft conducting a wide selection of roles and responsibilities,
they can be summed up into a small list of over-arching headings:
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)
Anti-Surface Unit Warfare (ASuW)
Overland
Search and Rescue (SAR)
These 4 roles cover essentially all the operations and tasks that the Nimrod fleet could be expected
to participate in. We will look at each role and equipment required to conduct these roles.
Anti-Submarine Warfare
ASW was one of the first roles in which maritime air-assets were tasked. The advent of submarines
in WW1 became such that ships were not able to sufficiently defend themselves against any kind of
capable submarine threat. However submarines of this era “could stay underwater for 12 hours”
(British Submarines 1900 to 1918). A submarine would only manage this if its batteries were
completely charged and it stayed submerged until its batteries were depleted. Modern submarines
will aim to surface when their batteries around 50-60% full, ensuring they’re always in a position to
be tactically effective.
5

9. With an apparent duration of 6 hours submerged, early submarines would regularly be
found sailing on the surface, with this information it didn’t take long for Navy’s to start to employ
long-range fixed-wing aircraft to give surface vessels warning of approaching submarines, or even to
destroy those vessels before they became a threat.
There are several sensors which can be employed to detect surfaced and submerged
submarines:
Radar can detect surfaced submarines by transmitting radio energy and receiving
back an echo if a contact is within range, (Exactly how does radar work?)
Electronic Support Measures (ESM) can detect an enemy transmitting on his radar,
Passive Acoustic systems can hear noise being made by the submarines equipment
and the noise of water on its hull,
Active Acoustic systems work in a similar way to radar, except using wavelengths of
noise energy rather than radio energy,
Magnetic Anomaly Detectors are used to sense a disturbance in the earth’s
magnetic field, a submarine will make a noticeable change to the level of magnetism
which an aircraft can detect
There are many more pieces of equipment that could assist in locating and tracking a submarine, but
the 5 above are the most commonly used across all MPA fleets worldwide.
6

10. Figure 2 - Various ASW MPA Sensors
Anti-Surface Unit Warfare
ASuW goes hand in hand with ASW. Submarines, in modern times, would usually operate with a
friendly fleet of surface vessels, or against a fleet of enemy surface vessels. This means MPA are
usually employed on both ASW and ASuW simultaneously. The main reason this can be
accomplished is because the equipment used is very similar, and in ASuW it is a little simpler.
Only radar and ESM tend to be used to conduct ASuW. Radar can detect contacts, and
depending on the model of radar, provide some basic information such as target length and rough
outline (warship, merchant, fishing boat etc). ESM would then be used to further identify contacts
from the transmissions received by their radars.
Overland Operations
Overland operations are generally covered by the term ISTAR, (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target
Acquisition and Reconnaissance), although ASW and ASuW are both ISTAR roles as well. Overland
operations are generally those in support of conventional (Army/Marines etc) or special (SAS/SBS)
forces. For the Nimrod MR2, overland operations in Iraq and Afghanistan involved the use of the
Wescam MX-15 (Wescam MX-15) multi-spectral imaging sensor. This camera was fitted under one of
the aircrafts wings and could be used to detect and track targets of interest. The ground
commanders also had the capability to see Full Motion Video (FMV) by means of a downlink; this
ensured that vital information wasn’t missed in translation from aircrew to group operatives.
7

11. Figure 3 - Wescam Operators on the Nimrod MR2
Search and Rescue
SAR was, in some ways, the most important part of the Nimrod MR2’s capability. It is difficult to
quantify how many lives were saved by the Nimrod fleet in this role. On July 6th 1988, 61 people
were saved when the oil platform “Piper Alpha” exploded, several Nimrod MR2 sorties were
conducted as a SAR command platform providing control for the various rescue assets involved.
Figure 4 - Piper Alpha 6th July 1988
One of the most important pieces of equipment carried by MPA in their SAR roles is the apparatus
that they can deploy to those in need. Known in the UK inventory as the ASR (Air-Sea Rescue),
various different styles of deployable dingy and supplies can be dropped from aircraft allowing
survivors of an incident a much better chance of being rescued. The average human could survive for
up to 90 minutes in the North Sea if provided with a standard survival suit (Hypothermia Prevention:
8

12. Survival in Cold Water). This could be extended to several weeks with the equipment available in an
ASR package.
Communications
Due to the long ranges MPA work at, and the amount of information they are likely to process, the
most vital part of the aircraft is the communications suite. Upon detection of enemy submarine,
enemy forces on the ground or survivor in the sea, it is vital that other parties are informed as
quickly as possible. Modern MPA can be expected to have around 10 radios covering different
frequency bands and agencies, as well as automatic data links which provide near real-time data
transmission, cutting down on ambiguities of voice-communications and improving situational
awareness.
Post 2010 SDSR – Select Committee on Defence
The 2010 SDSR brought out a lot of points for argument, not only the MRA 4 decision. Experts
argued over the basis for keeping Tornado over Harrier, the requirement for the future carriers was
in question, closure of bases was also unexpected. However in some ways, not keeping the MRA 4
appears to have been the most interesting, what is the point in having 2 carriers if you can’t protect
them from enemy submarines and ships?
In July 1988 the oil facility “Piper Alpha” caught fire and subsequently 167 people died.
However much of this disaster was averted due to repeated Nimrod sorties which operated as on-
scene commander for the rescue operation. The Nimrod crews organised helicopters and ships such
that many people were saved.
The Nimrod MR2 was also employed on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of
Multi-National brigades. Its sensor suite was upgraded so that crews were able to locate, monitor
and track targets of interest throughout deserts and built up areas. This provided commanders at
9

13. various levels with detailed information on enemy movements and threats to friendly forces without
having to send troops into an area.
“The MRA4 was not just a submarine-hunter; it was capable of a variety of roles from ship
surveillance to search and rescue. It could act as a communications and disaster co-ordination
platform and perhaps its most important role would have been as an ISTAR (Intelligence,
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) platform in support of operations in
Afghanistan.” (ROBERTSON, Dr Sue, 2011).
Indeed, the potential of the MRA 4 as a platform was unmatched. The aircraft was built upon
modular technologies allowing any current NATO weapon system to be employed from it, as well as
future proofing it for future systems. As such the aircraft would have been able to be refitted for a
specific task within a very short period, maintaining the flexibility shown by its predecessor the MR2.
Dr Robertson, in her report, continues: "Loss of the capability offered by the Nimrod
Maritime Reconnaissance and Attack Mk4 would have an adverse effect on the protection of the
strategic nuclear deterrent, the provision of which is one of the Ministry of Defence's Standing
Strategic Tasks.” (ROBERTSON, Dr Sue, 2011). The lack of a long range anti-submarine aircraft would
mean that the UK nuclear deterrent, aboard Vanguard submarines, would have to operate by
themselves in areas also patrolled by many nations’ submarines. It would be very difficult for the
Vanguard class boats to be able to detect another submarine if it was being followed, and near
impossible for them to do anything about it. There seems to be little point of having a nuclear
deterrent if the enemy can neutralize it easily.
In regard to the roles of the MRA 4 and the Governments plans to mitigate the capability
gap, Dr Robertson produced the table below: (ROBERTSON, Dr Sue, 2011)
10

14. THE ROLES OF THE NIMROD
Asset Nimrod MRA4 Merlin Mk1 Type 23 C130
Task
Submarine Detection Yes—6000nm range with 15 Yes—200 nm range with 90 Yes No
(ASW) hour mission time minute mission time
Shipping Surveillance Yes—to 260nm at 40,000 ft Limited Sensors No Limited—no adequate sensors
Fleet Protection Yes Yes Limited Limited—no adequate sensors
range
ISTAR (Support of Troops in Yes No No No
Afghanistan)
ELINT data gathering Yes No No No
Counter-terrorism Yes No No Perhaps
Weapons deployment Yes Yes Yes Yes?
Search & Rescue Yes—2400nm range for three Limited—300 nm range with No Limited—600 nm range with
hours search one hour search two hours search
Emergency Communications Yes No No Yes
Overseas Maritime Patrol Yes No No No
Counter-pirate operations Yes No No No
Protection of Trident Yes Limited range Limited No
Submarines range
Protection of Future Carriers? Yes Limited range Limited No
range
Although the report is undoubtedly biased, its remarks on the capabilities area accurate and ring
true. The Mk1 Merlin is the easiest platform to compare to the Nimrod when it comes to anti-
submarine and surface ship warfare. Although the Merlin has a small fraction of the capability from
its equipment, not to mention a vastly reduced range and endurance. This is mitigated somewhat by
deploying Merlin onto the ships at sea so they can be refuelled and deployed several times, whereas
a fixed-wing aircraft requires a large support network at a well established base.
The Type 23 frigate is the UK’s anti-submarine ship. There are around 13 in operation in the
Royal Navy. Although it has an excellent suite of ASW sensors, it cannot do a vast range of other
tasks to which Nimrod was suited. The Royal Navy could not operate as it does without its fleet of
T23’s, however they are equipped for a specific role and can do little else. Finally, the C-130. Some
Government officials thought that since the Hercules transport aircraft could open its cargo doors in
flight it would be able to deploy some Search and Rescue apparatus to those requiring them.
However, the C-130 has neither the communications suite nor sensors to co-ordinate a rescue or
indeed find those in need of rescue. Its poor range when compared to the MRA 4 shows how it is a
11

15. poor asset for such a role, upon talking to some C-130 crewmen, it is doubtful that they could drop
SAR equipment accurately enough to be of any use.
Costs of a Maritime Patrol Aircraft vs. Other Options
The estimated cost of the MRA4 fleet was £200 million per year, this figure is reached from a plan to
“save over £2 billion over the next ten years” (COMMITTEE, House of Commons Defence, 2011). If
we transpose these costs onto the other 2 main ASW units, then we can see how much value 9
Nimrod MRA4 Maritime Patrol Aircraft were likely to be.
Type 26 Frigate
The Type 26 Frigate (Now possibly named the Global Combat Ship) is the future replacement for the
current Type 23. It is expected to start coming into service in 2020, and will replace the Type 23 on a
one-for-one basis. As they have not yet been built, any savings on the MRA4 could easily be used to
keep more frigates operating. Currently, the Royal Navy has 13 Type 23 Frigates, their costs for FY
08/09 were £340.3 million, and for FY 09/10 £313.8 million, (Type 23 Frigate). With these costs in
mind, and ignoring build costs, the RN could operate an extra 8 Type 26 Frigates purely within the
costs saved by not introducing the MRA4 into service.
Merlin
Due to the complexity of a modern helicopter, and the requirement to strip the mechanical
elements frequently for servicing, it is unlikely that more Merlin ASW helicopters would be an option
to replace the MRA4. According to thinkdefence.co.uk, the operating cost of a Merlin helicopter is
£28,000 per hour (The future of the RAF - Page 18), comparing this to an answer to a parliamentary
question, Nimrod MR2 cost £30,000 per hour (WINTERTON, Richard). Even with some padding
added to cover extra costs we could expect to incur for a more modern MRA4, It is doubtful that
more than 12-15 Merlins could be employed within the Nimrod cost saving.
12

16. SOSUS
SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System) has been employed for many decades as a permanent under-
water acoustic detection system. Fields of sensors are deployed at strategically important
chokepoints, which are monitored by a UK/US partnership. The system is used as an early warning
system, and can queue other assets into an area so that more accurate tracking of a potentially
hostile submarine can be achieved. The SOSUS system was classified until 1991, and is now also used
by civilian agencies.
Figure 5 - Example of Theoretical SOSUS placements
SOSUS is being phased out as an option for ASW, and as such is being replaced by surface vessels,
meaning the MRA4 problem has been heightened.
What is the threat?
There are many countries procuring submarines in various different roles, from coastal insertion of
Special Forces, through open ocean maritime warfare and even nuclear deterrence.
The Russian Navy has around 50 operational submarines, although it is unlikely that they
could all deploy simultaneously, the weapons on some of them have world-wide reach.
13

17. Figure 6 - 33 Russian Submarines in Port
At last count the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy had 63 active submarines, including at least
10 home-built nuclear subs. Argentina is in the process of purchasing several of the latest generation
diesel electric submarines from France, and is investigation converting some to be nuclear powered.
Submarines are no longer the machine of the modern military either; drug gangs of South
America have been seen to employ semi and fully submersible vessels for the purposes of
transporting drugs to mainland USA. (BBC NEWS, 2011).
Perhaps more worrying than the military potential of submarines, is their ability to locate
and hack into communication cables. Several systems connect Europe and the United States which
utilise transatlantic fibre-optic connections (Transatlantic Telecommunications Cables). SDSR 2010
identified that Cyber Warfare is one of the greatest threats that we are facing within the UK theatre.
Conclusion
The arguments appear to be weighted; many agree that there is a requirement for a long-range
maritime patrol aircraft. However, there is more research needed into whether or not those assets
assigned to the roles traditionally covered by the Nimrod force can cover those roles sufficiently.
Without considering the financial aspect, assuming the defence of the nation and its
dependencies are more important than international aid etc, perhaps the role of maritime patrol is
now suited to platforms fitted for specific roles, rather than a single platform which can do lots of
tasks. Nimrod could have been a victim of its own fame, by appearing to not be a vital unit in any
one area; it appears to have watered down its skill base by covering many roles.
14

18. In answer to the question posed, I would say there is a massive gap in requirement and
capability when it comes to Maritime Warfare. The area covered by 13 Frigates and their associated
Merlins is minute when compared to the whole area of operations (North Sea/North Atlantic). There
can be little doubt that the effectiveness of the RN to be able to defend against National maritime
threats has been severely reduced by the removal of the Nimrod MRA4 from introduction.
However, there is an argument that the MRA4 was too costly and the wrong asset for the
requirement. A smaller aircraft such as the Casa C-295M would have much lower running costs, but
with modern equipment would give similar capability in the maritime environment to the MRA4. An
airframe such as this is also modular so could be refitted for different tasks such as transport or
medivac.
15

19. References
BBC NEWS. 2011. Drug submarine seized by Colombian navy. London.
British Submarines 1900 to 1918. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:
<http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/british_submarines_1900_to_.htm>
COMMITTEE, House of Commons Defence. 2011. The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the
National Security Strategy. London.
Exactly how does radar work? [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:
<http://www.srh.noaa.gov/jetstream/doppler/how.htm>
FOX, Dr Liam. 2010. The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy -
Defence Committee - SDSR.
GOVERNMENT, HM. 1998. Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for the Modern World.
GOVERNMENT, HM. 2010. Securing Britian in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and
Security Review.
GUSTIN, Emmanuel. UK Radars. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:
<http://www.uboat.net/allies/technical/uk_radars.htm>
HOON, Rt Hon Geoff. 2003. Delivery Security in a Changing World - Defence White Paper.
Hypothermia Prevention: Survival in Cold Water. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from
World Wide Web: <http://www.seagrant.umn.edu/coastal_communities/hypothermia>
KIRKUP, Thomas Harding and James. 2010. Navy to reduce to smallest size ever to save carriers.
[online]. [Accessed 22 Aug 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8049674/Navy-to-reduce-to-smallest-size-
ever-to-save-carriers.html>
Nimrod MRA4 Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft. [online]. [Accessed 22 Aug 2011]. Available
from World Wide Web: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/nimrod_mra4.htm>
ROBERTSON, Dr Sue. 2011. The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security
Strategy - Defence Committee - Written Evidence from Dr Sue Robertson.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE. 2002. Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence on Major
Procurement Project Survey (March 2002).
The future of the RAF - Page 18. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:
<http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/04/the-future-of-the-raf-18-%E2%80%93-vertical-lift-03-a-
sensible-future/>
Transatlantic Telecommunications Cables. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from World
Wide Web: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transatlantic_telecommunications_cable>
16

20. Type 23 Frigate. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_23_frigate#Running_costs>
Wescam MX-15. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from World Wide Web: <http://www2.l-
3com.com/wescam/products/products_services_1g.asp>
WINTERTON, Richard. Money down the Drain. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from
World Wide Web: <http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2007/11/money-down-drain.html>
17

21. Bibliography
FOX, Dr Liam. 2010. The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy -
Defence Committee - SDSR.
GOVERNMENT, HM. 1998. Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for the Modern World.
GOVERNMENT, HM. 2010. Securing Britian in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and
Security Review.
HOON, Rt Hon Geoff. 2003. Delivery Security in a Changing World - Defence White Paper.
KIRKUP, Thomas Harding and James. 2010. Navy to reduce to smallest size ever to save carriers.
[online]. [Accessed 22 Aug 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8049674/Navy-to-reduce-to-smallest-size-
ever-to-save-carriers.html>
Nimrod MRA4 Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft. [online]. [Accessed 22 Aug 2011]. Available
from World Wide Web: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/nimrod_mra4.htm>
ROBERTSON, Dr Sue. 2011. The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security
Strategy - Defence Committee - Written Evidence from Dr Sue Robertson.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE. 2002. Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence on Major
Procurement Project Survey (March 2002).
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22. Table of Figures
Figure 1 - Nimrod MRA4 - £3.6 billion .................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2 - Various ASW MPA Sensors ..................................................................................................... 7
Figure 3 - Wescam Operators on the Nimrod MR2 ................................................................................ 8
Figure 4 - Piper Alpha 6th July 1988 ....................................................................................................... 8
Figure 5 - Example of Theoretical SOSUS placements .......................................................................... 13
Figure 6 - 33 Rusian Submarines in Port ............................................................................................... 14
19