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Secure Development
Life Cycle (SDLC)
Sigal Russin, CISO
Senior Analyst at STKI
sigalr@stki.info
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph
What are you getting:
2
1 2 3 4
5 6
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
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OSI Model
3
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
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4
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph
Development Problems
• Buffer Overflow
Buffer which crosses the volume of information allocated to it in
a timely manner. It allows attackers to travel outside the buffer
and overwrite important information to continue running the
program.
In many, utilizing this weakness allows running code injected by
the attacker.
5
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph
Development Problems
• DOS- Denial Of Service
Ping of death- Due to increased bandwidth browsing, this attack
does not pose a risk.
Local Denial of Service:
"Stealing" all possible memory from the operating system, as
well as prevention service by blocking the regular work with your
computer.
6
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph
Development Problems
Distributed Denial of Service:
Many different points make one or more requests for a
particular service any network and is usually carried out through
many computers controlled by a single operator.
• Code Injection
Cross Site Scripting
HTML/Javascript/ SQL injection
The user can enter any code to run it through the software, and
do whatever the spirit through the code they injected.
7
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph
Development Problems
• Race Condition- Resource Condition
Resource conflicts in software refers to the fact that the resource
is used by more than one code divides the software (memory
disposed).
8
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph
Myths
 If no one knows about a problem, you can not take
advantage of - security by obscurity.
 Safe programming language - many high languages ​​provide
the feeling that they are clean and devoid of problems but it
can contain more security issues and bugs that exist in the
world.
 Passwords mashed in one way - files containing passwords
scrambled. The attackers can not retrieve the password so
they will read the information unidirectional scrambled and
use the password itself.
 Nothing can break the software
 You can fix and solve problems "on the go"
9
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
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Assumptions
 QA staff able to locate problems and fix them
 The user would not hurt to information or Software
Foundation
 The program will only be used for its original target
appropriate
 Compiled code into machine language can not be
interpreted
 Coding of symbols machine language is a form of protection
10
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph
Programming Principles correct software security
11
Check out all the input you receive, including those from the
command line, environment variables, and other data
Do not mark only "bad“ input. Know also check what input
"good."
Prevent Buffer Overflow everywhere. Pay particular attention to
long inputs and give them the opportunity to take over the
functionality of your system.
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph
Programming Principles correct software security
12
Remember to build your program correctly - Prevent high privileges,
reboot the system with parameters correct and safe, plan what you will do
when there is a system failure prevented Race Conditions and Use Safe
channels only.
Use caution system calls to external libraries.
Rebate information system carefully, only what is needed and
nothing more. Do not expose data internal.
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
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Customers round table insights
13
(1‫פרויקטים‬‫גוף‬ ‫לידיעת‬ ‫מגיעים‬ ‫תמיד‬ ‫לא‬ ‫אשר‬ ‫מתוכננים‬ ‫לא‬
‫המידע‬ ‫אבטחת‬.
(2‫כדי‬ ‫תוך‬ ‫ואחרים‬ ‫כאלה‬ ‫נתונים‬ ‫לראות‬ ‫רשאים‬ ‫המפתחים‬ ‫האם‬
‫הפיתוח‬ ‫תהליך‬?‫בערבול‬ ‫שימוש‬/‫נתונים‬ ‫מיסוך‬.
(3‫הפיתוח‬ ‫אנשי‬ ‫לטענת‬,‫חוסמים‬ ‫המידע‬ ‫אבטחת‬ ‫אנשי‬‫לעתים‬
‫שימוש‬‫בטכנולוגיות‬‫מסוימות‬‫חוסר‬ ‫בגלל‬ ‫או‬ ‫מוגזם‬ ‫חשש‬ ‫בגלל‬
‫ידע‬‫מספק‬.
(4‫צד‬ ‫מגורמי‬ ‫שמתקבל‬ ‫קוד‬‫שלישי‬.‫עושים‬ ‫מה‬?‫לא‬ ‫מקרה‬ ‫בשום‬
‫מהאוויר‬ ‫ירדה‬‫מערכת‬‫שנמצאו‬ ‫אבטחה‬ ‫ליקויי‬ ‫בשל‬‫בה‬.
(5‫סביבת‬ ‫לבין‬ ‫והפיתוח‬ ‫הבדיקות‬ ‫סביבת‬ ‫בין‬ ‫ההבדלים‬‫הייצור‬.
‫והבדיקות‬ ‫הפיתוח‬ ‫מאשר‬ ‫הייצור‬ ‫שרתי‬ ‫הקשחת‬.
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph
Vendors
The Web Application
Vulnerability Scanners
Benchmark, 2012
http://sectooladdict.blogspot
.co.il/2012/07/2012-web-
application-scanner-
benchmark.html
14
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph
Recommendations
1) Mixing of information security in all phases of the project - from the initial
stages (sometimes stop project at this stage because of applicability or
security risk) continued analysis phase, encoding to various stages of testing.
2) Automated testing tools during encoding. Ideally the code is tested all the
time  every day.
3) Dedicated Source survey depth testing phase the issue of information
security.
4) Penetration code tests.
5) Procedures for developing information security "do and do not" on any
technology.
6) Basic training of all developers and more advanced training for developers
who are "Security trustees."
15
Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014
Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph
Thank You!
Sigalr@stki.info

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Secure develpment 2014

  • 1. Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC) Sigal Russin, CISO Senior Analyst at STKI sigalr@stki.info
  • 2. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph What are you getting: 2 1 2 3 4 5 6
  • 3. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph OSI Model 3
  • 4. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph 4
  • 5. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph Development Problems • Buffer Overflow Buffer which crosses the volume of information allocated to it in a timely manner. It allows attackers to travel outside the buffer and overwrite important information to continue running the program. In many, utilizing this weakness allows running code injected by the attacker. 5
  • 6. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph Development Problems • DOS- Denial Of Service Ping of death- Due to increased bandwidth browsing, this attack does not pose a risk. Local Denial of Service: "Stealing" all possible memory from the operating system, as well as prevention service by blocking the regular work with your computer. 6
  • 7. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph Development Problems Distributed Denial of Service: Many different points make one or more requests for a particular service any network and is usually carried out through many computers controlled by a single operator. • Code Injection Cross Site Scripting HTML/Javascript/ SQL injection The user can enter any code to run it through the software, and do whatever the spirit through the code they injected. 7
  • 8. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph Development Problems • Race Condition- Resource Condition Resource conflicts in software refers to the fact that the resource is used by more than one code divides the software (memory disposed). 8
  • 9. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph Myths  If no one knows about a problem, you can not take advantage of - security by obscurity.  Safe programming language - many high languages ​​provide the feeling that they are clean and devoid of problems but it can contain more security issues and bugs that exist in the world.  Passwords mashed in one way - files containing passwords scrambled. The attackers can not retrieve the password so they will read the information unidirectional scrambled and use the password itself.  Nothing can break the software  You can fix and solve problems "on the go" 9
  • 10. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph Assumptions  QA staff able to locate problems and fix them  The user would not hurt to information or Software Foundation  The program will only be used for its original target appropriate  Compiled code into machine language can not be interpreted  Coding of symbols machine language is a form of protection 10
  • 11. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph Programming Principles correct software security 11 Check out all the input you receive, including those from the command line, environment variables, and other data Do not mark only "bad“ input. Know also check what input "good." Prevent Buffer Overflow everywhere. Pay particular attention to long inputs and give them the opportunity to take over the functionality of your system.
  • 12. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph Programming Principles correct software security 12 Remember to build your program correctly - Prevent high privileges, reboot the system with parameters correct and safe, plan what you will do when there is a system failure prevented Race Conditions and Use Safe channels only. Use caution system calls to external libraries. Rebate information system carefully, only what is needed and nothing more. Do not expose data internal.
  • 13. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph Customers round table insights 13 (1‫פרויקטים‬‫גוף‬ ‫לידיעת‬ ‫מגיעים‬ ‫תמיד‬ ‫לא‬ ‫אשר‬ ‫מתוכננים‬ ‫לא‬ ‫המידע‬ ‫אבטחת‬. (2‫כדי‬ ‫תוך‬ ‫ואחרים‬ ‫כאלה‬ ‫נתונים‬ ‫לראות‬ ‫רשאים‬ ‫המפתחים‬ ‫האם‬ ‫הפיתוח‬ ‫תהליך‬?‫בערבול‬ ‫שימוש‬/‫נתונים‬ ‫מיסוך‬. (3‫הפיתוח‬ ‫אנשי‬ ‫לטענת‬,‫חוסמים‬ ‫המידע‬ ‫אבטחת‬ ‫אנשי‬‫לעתים‬ ‫שימוש‬‫בטכנולוגיות‬‫מסוימות‬‫חוסר‬ ‫בגלל‬ ‫או‬ ‫מוגזם‬ ‫חשש‬ ‫בגלל‬ ‫ידע‬‫מספק‬. (4‫צד‬ ‫מגורמי‬ ‫שמתקבל‬ ‫קוד‬‫שלישי‬.‫עושים‬ ‫מה‬?‫לא‬ ‫מקרה‬ ‫בשום‬ ‫מהאוויר‬ ‫ירדה‬‫מערכת‬‫שנמצאו‬ ‫אבטחה‬ ‫ליקויי‬ ‫בשל‬‫בה‬. (5‫סביבת‬ ‫לבין‬ ‫והפיתוח‬ ‫הבדיקות‬ ‫סביבת‬ ‫בין‬ ‫ההבדלים‬‫הייצור‬. ‫והבדיקות‬ ‫הפיתוח‬ ‫מאשר‬ ‫הייצור‬ ‫שרתי‬ ‫הקשחת‬.
  • 14. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph Vendors The Web Application Vulnerability Scanners Benchmark, 2012 http://sectooladdict.blogspot .co.il/2012/07/2012-web- application-scanner- benchmark.html 14
  • 15. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph Recommendations 1) Mixing of information security in all phases of the project - from the initial stages (sometimes stop project at this stage because of applicability or security risk) continued analysis phase, encoding to various stages of testing. 2) Automated testing tools during encoding. Ideally the code is tested all the time every day. 3) Dedicated Source survey depth testing phase the issue of information security. 4) Penetration code tests. 5) Procedures for developing information security "do and do not" on any technology. 6) Basic training of all developers and more advanced training for developers who are "Security trustees." 15
  • 16. Sigal Russin’s work/ Copyright@2014 Do not remove source or attribution from any slide, graph or portion of graph Thank You! Sigalr@stki.info

Notas do Editor

  1. software
  2. לחוצץ אשר חוצה את נפח המידע שהוקצה לו מבעוד מועד. חריגה זו מאפשרת לתוקפים לצאת מגבולות החוצץ וכך לשכתב מידע חשוב להמשך ריצת התוכנית. במקרים רבים, ניצול חולשה זו מאפשר הרצת קוד המוזרק על ידי התוקף
  3. רקורסיה ללא תנאי עצירה אשר בצורה אין סופית יוצרת עוד רקורסיה עד ”אין סוף“, כאשר ה"אין הסוף" הזה הוא המשאבים של מערכת ההפעלה הפנויים במערכת. למרות שזו דוגמה סטטית, עדיין קיימת מניעת שירות לכל דבר בשל "גניבת" כל זיכרון אפשרי ממערכת ההפעלה, וכן מניעת שירות על ידי חסימת עבודה סדירה עם המחשב.
  4. מניעת שירות שכזו גורמת לנקודות שונות ורבות לבצע בקשה אחת או יותר כלפי שירות מסויים .(Service ברשת כלשהי והיא בדרך כלל מתבצעת באמצעות מחשבים רבים בשליטתו של מפעיל בודד, כאשר התקפה זו מצליחה ברוב המקרים משום שיש הרבה מאוד בקשות בו .zombies מחשבים אלו נקראים זמנית והשירות לא מסוגל לענות לכל הבקשות. במקרה הטוב השירות רק נחסם לעוד בקשות ובמקרה הרע גורם למערכת לקרוס מחוסר במשאבים פנויים להתמודד עם הבקשות השונות, גם לאחר שהמתקפה מסתיימת.
  5. בעיית התנגשות המשאבים בתוך תוכנה מתייחסת לכך שאותו משאב נמצא בשימוש של יותר מחלק קוד אחד בתוכנה (גריעת זיכרון)
  6. לא מעט מבעיות האבטחה והבאגים הנמצאים בתוכנה נוצרים עקב חוסר מעקב או התעלמות של המתכנתים מהודעות המהדר או המפרשים. מעבר לכך, מתכנתים רבים חושבים שאם הקוד שלהם מפורש או מהודר, אז הוא לא מכיל בעיות כלשהן או שלפחות את חלקן ניתן לנצל נגד התכנה או המחשב המריץ אותם.
  7. קריאה זהירה לספריות חיצוניות או "בטוחות" שהמערכת כבר עושה שימשו בהם קריאה עם פרמטרים מאומתים פלט תקין הגבלת הפורמט של נתוני הקלט