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SSID: FYRM                    URL: http://172.16.254.1




             STEALING GUESTS...
                  THE VMWARE WAY
                        Justin Morehouse & Tony Flick
                                    ShmooCon 2010
SSID: FYRM                                    URL: http://172.16.254.1




                   DISCLAIMER
  Standard disclaimer verbiage...

     •Everything said, showed, implied, etc. is not the
      opinion of our employers, friends, dogs, VMware,
      ShmooCon, etc.

     •This disclaimer is not endorsed by our lawyers.
SSID: FYRM                                                 URL: http://172.16.254.1




                        ABOUT US
  Justin Morehouse

     • Assessment Lead @ Large Retailer in Southeast USA
     • Controls 58.2% of the MacBook Pro flipping market on Craigslist

  Tony Flick

     • Principal @ FYRM Associates
     • Has never mistaken Hunts ketchup for Heinz ketchup...EVER!
SSID: FYRM                                                    URL: http://172.16.254.1




                           WARNING
  What this presentation IS NOT:

     • 0 day release - worked w/ VMware
     • A demonstration of rocket science

  What this presentation IS:

     • A reminder of the security implications of virtualization
     • The culmination of ‘sanity’ projects
SSID: FYRM                                      URL: http://172.16.254.1




                              TIMELINE
  • Vulnerability identified on 5/14/09
  • Reported to VMware on 5/15/09
  • VMware responded on 5/21/09
  • CVE-2009-3733 reserved on 10/20/09
  • VMSA-2009-0015 released on 10/27/09
     • ‘b. Directory Traversal vulnerability’
SSID: FYRM                                              URL: http://172.16.254.1




                  IDENTIFICATION
• Originally identified on VMware Server 2.0.1 build 156745
  (on Ubuntu 8.04)

• Thought to be localized to inside of NAT interface of Host (8307/tcp)
• Can steal VMs from within other VMs... if NAT’d
     • Kinda cool, not really practical
• What we originally reported to VMware & submitted to ShmooCon

                                                                       but......
SSID: FYRM           URL: http://172.16.254.1




   DOES THIS LOOK FAMILIAR?
SSID: FYRM                URL: http://172.16.254.1




             HOW ABOUT THIS?
SSID: FYRM                                         URL: http://172.16.254.1




                 VULNERABILITY
  •Web Access web servers also vulnerable
     •Server (default ports 8222/8333) - ../ x 6
     •ESX/ESXi (default ports 80/443) - %2E%2E/ x 6
  •No longer requires NAT mode / Remotely exploitable
  •Not as straightforward as originally thought
     •Still trivial to exploit because...
SSID: FYRM                                  URL: http://172.16.254.1




        IT’S GOOD TO BE ROOT
  •Web servers are running as root = complete access
  •ESX/ESXi


  •Server
SSID: FYRM                                   URL: http://172.16.254.1




  HOW IT WORKS ON SERVER
  •Proxy used to redirect requests based on URL
  •/etc/vmware/hostd/proxy.xml (includes mappings)
     •/sdk = 8307/tcp
     •/ui = 8308/tcp
SSID: FYRM                                       URL: http://172.16.254.1




  HOW IT WORKS ON SERVER
  •Web server on 8308/tcp is vulnerable, but will only serve
    certain filetypes (xml, html, images, etc.)

  •Web server on 8307/tcp is also vulnerable, but serves ALL
    filetypes

  •Simply append /sdk to our URL request and we’ve got
    complete access to Host filesystem (including other Virtual
    Machines)

  •ESX/ESXi - ALL web servers return ALL filetypes (no /sdk)
SSID: FYRM                                      URL: http://172.16.254.1




        VULNERABLE VERSIONS
  Server
  • VMware Server 2.x < 2.0.2 build 203138 (Linux)
  • VMware Server 1.x < 1.0.10 build 203137 (Linux)

  ESX/ESXi
  • ESX 3.5 w/o ESX350-200901401-SG
  • ESX 3.0.3 w/o ESX303-200812406-BG
  • ESXi 3.5 w/o ESXe350-200901401-I-SG
SSID: FYRM                                       URL: http://172.16.254.1




                GUESTSTEALER
  •Perl script remotely ‘steals’ virtual machines from vulnerable
    hosts

  •Supports Server, ESX, ESXi
  •Allows attacker to select which Guest to ‘steal’
  •Utilizes VMware configuration files to identify available
    Guests and determine associated files
SSID: FYRM                                    URL: http://172.16.254.1




             VMINVENTORY.XML
  •/etc/vmware/hostd/vmInventory.xml (default location)
  •Gives us Guest inventory & location information
SSID: FYRM                                        URL: http://172.16.254.1




             GUEST .VMX & .VMDK
  • .vmx gives us Guest config and file locations



  •.vmdk (disk image) can point to other .vmdk images
SSID: FYRM               URL: http://172.16.254.1




             LIVE DEMO
SSID: FYRM                                                      URL: http://172.16.254.1




       MITIGATION STRATEGIES
  • Patch, patch, patch
     • Hosts are an attractive target (compromise one = access many)

  • Better yet...Segment, segment, segment
     • Segment management interfaces
     • Segment systems of different security levels
     • Don’t share physical NICs between different security levels

  • Virtualization is not always the ‘best answer’
SSID: FYRM                                   URL: http://172.16.254.1




                 QUESTIONS?

             GuestStealer available for download @

                   www.fyrmassociates.com

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Guest Stealing...The VMware Way

  • 1. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 STEALING GUESTS... THE VMWARE WAY Justin Morehouse & Tony Flick ShmooCon 2010
  • 2. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 DISCLAIMER Standard disclaimer verbiage... •Everything said, showed, implied, etc. is not the opinion of our employers, friends, dogs, VMware, ShmooCon, etc. •This disclaimer is not endorsed by our lawyers.
  • 3. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 ABOUT US Justin Morehouse • Assessment Lead @ Large Retailer in Southeast USA • Controls 58.2% of the MacBook Pro flipping market on Craigslist Tony Flick • Principal @ FYRM Associates • Has never mistaken Hunts ketchup for Heinz ketchup...EVER!
  • 4. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 WARNING What this presentation IS NOT: • 0 day release - worked w/ VMware • A demonstration of rocket science What this presentation IS: • A reminder of the security implications of virtualization • The culmination of ‘sanity’ projects
  • 5. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 TIMELINE • Vulnerability identified on 5/14/09 • Reported to VMware on 5/15/09 • VMware responded on 5/21/09 • CVE-2009-3733 reserved on 10/20/09 • VMSA-2009-0015 released on 10/27/09 • ‘b. Directory Traversal vulnerability’
  • 6. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 IDENTIFICATION • Originally identified on VMware Server 2.0.1 build 156745 (on Ubuntu 8.04) • Thought to be localized to inside of NAT interface of Host (8307/tcp) • Can steal VMs from within other VMs... if NAT’d • Kinda cool, not really practical • What we originally reported to VMware & submitted to ShmooCon but......
  • 7. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 DOES THIS LOOK FAMILIAR?
  • 8. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 HOW ABOUT THIS?
  • 9. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 VULNERABILITY •Web Access web servers also vulnerable •Server (default ports 8222/8333) - ../ x 6 •ESX/ESXi (default ports 80/443) - %2E%2E/ x 6 •No longer requires NAT mode / Remotely exploitable •Not as straightforward as originally thought •Still trivial to exploit because...
  • 10. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 IT’S GOOD TO BE ROOT •Web servers are running as root = complete access •ESX/ESXi •Server
  • 11. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 HOW IT WORKS ON SERVER •Proxy used to redirect requests based on URL •/etc/vmware/hostd/proxy.xml (includes mappings) •/sdk = 8307/tcp •/ui = 8308/tcp
  • 12. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 HOW IT WORKS ON SERVER •Web server on 8308/tcp is vulnerable, but will only serve certain filetypes (xml, html, images, etc.) •Web server on 8307/tcp is also vulnerable, but serves ALL filetypes •Simply append /sdk to our URL request and we’ve got complete access to Host filesystem (including other Virtual Machines) •ESX/ESXi - ALL web servers return ALL filetypes (no /sdk)
  • 13. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 VULNERABLE VERSIONS Server • VMware Server 2.x < 2.0.2 build 203138 (Linux) • VMware Server 1.x < 1.0.10 build 203137 (Linux) ESX/ESXi • ESX 3.5 w/o ESX350-200901401-SG • ESX 3.0.3 w/o ESX303-200812406-BG • ESXi 3.5 w/o ESXe350-200901401-I-SG
  • 14. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 GUESTSTEALER •Perl script remotely ‘steals’ virtual machines from vulnerable hosts •Supports Server, ESX, ESXi •Allows attacker to select which Guest to ‘steal’ •Utilizes VMware configuration files to identify available Guests and determine associated files
  • 15. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 VMINVENTORY.XML •/etc/vmware/hostd/vmInventory.xml (default location) •Gives us Guest inventory & location information
  • 16. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 GUEST .VMX & .VMDK • .vmx gives us Guest config and file locations •.vmdk (disk image) can point to other .vmdk images
  • 17. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 LIVE DEMO
  • 18. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 MITIGATION STRATEGIES • Patch, patch, patch • Hosts are an attractive target (compromise one = access many) • Better yet...Segment, segment, segment • Segment management interfaces • Segment systems of different security levels • Don’t share physical NICs between different security levels • Virtualization is not always the ‘best answer’
  • 19. SSID: FYRM URL: http://172.16.254.1 QUESTIONS? GuestStealer available for download @ www.fyrmassociates.com