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Sandeep	
  Kumar	
  	
   Analysing	
  and	
  Mitigating	
  Risk	
   CID	
  Number:	
  01020501	
  
Page 1 of 8	
  
	
  
What is the rationale behind contingent capital and other hybrid debt instruments?
Can you explain the main trade-offs at play behind their most important design
features?
In this report, I will begin by defining hybrid securities and contingent capital notes, then
discuss the design features (language and structure) of the two securities. I will also look
at recent hybrid issues, their structures and how they have evolved. Then, I will look at
reasons why corporates and financial institutions issue such securities. Given, that tax
regimes differ by region and a uniform treatment is still pending, analyses on tax will be
limited. This report will focus on issuers, regulation facing CCNs, rating agencies and
investors.
Hybrid Corporate Debt: What is it?
Hybrid debt is essentially a fixed-coupon paying note with no set maturity (perpetual) that
is junior or sub-ordinated to other debt in the capital structure. Figure 1 illustrates the
seniority of claims. In bankruptcy or liquidation scenario, the debt ranks junior to all other
debt and is only paid once all other obligations or claims are satisfied, implying a lower
recovery.
For pricing and recovery analysis, sub-debt carries a recovery rate of 20% versus 40% for
senior debt. The investors are paid a premium for the additional risk they take and the
spread is subject to the credit profile of each issuer.
Typical Corporate Balance Sheet Typical Capital Structure
Current Assets
Senior Secured Debt
Senior Unsecured Debt
+ Subordinated Debt
Fixed Assets
Hybrid
Equity
Figure 1: Example of a corporate balance sheet and capital structure.
Figure 2 below shows a recent hybrid issued by Orange and its structure. The hybrid has
no set maturity and has call dates as well as coupon step-up language, which resets the
coupon.
Sandeep	
  Kumar	
  	
   Analysing	
  and	
  Mitigating	
  Risk	
   CID	
  Number:	
  01020501	
  
Page 2 of 8	
  
	
  
Figure 2
Source: Natixis, Ideas – Fixed Income, June 2014.
Contingent Capital Notes (CCNs)- What are they?
Contingent Capital Notes are hybrid securities issued by financial institutions (FI). These
come in various forms; Enhanced Capital Notes (ECNS), Alternative Tier 1 (AT1),
Contingent Convertible Securities (Cocos), and T2 Cocos but essentially they are all junior
ranking or second lien debt that carry a loss absorbing mechanism. They provide leverage
and an “equity buffer” for the issuer. At times of crisis, these automatically covert into
equity i.e. when the banks capital ratio falls below a set trigger level.
Furthermore, they provide a tax efficient way of raising capital and are complimentary to
the issuers CET (common equity) ratios, which is a focus for all banks following Basel III
requirements. The focus for banks is to issue the right debt; one that meets the required
percentage for risk weighted assets (RWA) in T1 capital and meets the leverage ratio
requirement i.e.T1/Exposure measure, which in laymen terms is total assets plus off
balance sheet items.
CCN’s were introduced in late 2009 following an asset liability management exercise by
Lloyds Treasury to replace existing legacy Lower Tier 2 (LT2), Upper Tier 2 (UT2) and Tier
1 (T1) debt. The new instruments carried a predefined trigger option that allowed the
issuer (in this case, Lloyds) to convert their debt into equity, which essentially allowed that
bank to increase its core capital without the needed to tap equity capital markets. The
investors were paid an attractive coupon to compensate for this risk. Attractive proposition
at the time given over 40% of equity was still owned by the government.
Language and Features:
The common features and their impact for hybrids are shown in figure 3.
The corporates main aim is to get the highest equity treatment from rating agencies at the
lowest cost possible. The obvious cost is paying investors the risk premium i.e. a high
coupon.
Features Impact
Cash Cumulative
Interest Deferral
Issuers right to defer coupon payment but the interest is
cumulative and compounded.
Dividend Pusher
Either forces coupon payment on the hybrid or limit any
coupon or dividend payment on instruments ranking pari
passu or subordinated to the hybrid debt in the event of
coupon cancellation on this debt.
Replacement
Capital Covenant
(RCC)
The obligation or intent to replace the hybrid debt with capital
of similar or better quality.
Mandatory Interest
Deferral
Covenants, if breached, require coupon to be deferred.
Proffered by ratings agencies.
Coupon Step-up
Call options accompanied by a coupon step-up associated
with the call dates.
Change of Control
(Coca)
Protects investors in the event of takeover of the parent
company, with a 500bps coupon step-up in most cases.
Alternative Coupon
Satisfaction
Mechanism (ACSM)
Option offering compensation (most often in shares) for
investors at the time of coupon cancellation.
Figure 3
Sandeep	
  Kumar	
  	
   Analysing	
  and	
  Mitigating	
  Risk	
   CID	
  Number:	
  01020501	
  
Page 3 of 8	
  
	
  
Source: www.hughyieldbonds.com/covenants
Issuance: The re-emergence
The issuance of subordinated bonds by corporates re-emerged in mid 2010 where utilities
and telecoms dominated this space. The rationale was simple for the two sectors: high
capital expenditure and stretched balance sheets. The corporate hybrids allow issuers to
issue debt and earn partial equity treatment by the credit rating agencies (please note: the
treatment language by credit agencies has changed hence the partial equity treatment).
Furthermore, tax breaks also provide an incentive to issue hybrid as one can treat interest
as an expense and still get favorable equity treatment. However, I believe a combination of
low interests rates, central bank action (namely QE) and inflow of money made hybrids
and cocos compelling for investor that lead to record hybrid issuance (figure 4b) – in 2014,
we saw 46bnEur Corporate Hybrid (figure 4) and 50bnEur Cocos (Bloomberg, 2015).
Figure 4 a Figure 4 b
Source: Dealogic and FT Source: Markit, BNP Paribas, Bloomberg
Credit Rating Agencies: Rating a Hybrid and Cocos
i) Corporate Hybrids
Ratings agencies rate the hybrid debt a few notches below the senior debt but this differs
from issuer to issuer and by methodologies. One can assume, as a rule of thumb, that
hybrids are rated two to three notches below senior debt. The lower the rating, the higher
the risk and the closer it is to equity treatment.
Key features analyzed by agencies for a corporate hybrid are: subordination, coupon
deferral language and maturity. A summary of these (required by the top three ratings
agencies) is shown in figure 5. So, naturally issuers’ structure their hybrid to their issue
qualifies for the 50% equity treatment.
Sandeep	
  Kumar	
  	
   Analysing	
  and	
  Mitigating	
  Risk	
   CID	
  Number:	
  01020501	
  
Page 4 of 8	
  
	
  
Figure 5
Source: Western Asset Management Monthly Report, 2013
Figure 6 shows a RNS issued by Moody’s following their assessment of Telefonica’s
hybrid issue from 2013. Moody provides its credit rationale and rating.
Figure 6
Source: www.telefonica.com/investors
Sandeep	
  Kumar	
  	
   Analysing	
  and	
  Mitigating	
  Risk	
   CID	
  Number:	
  01020501	
  
Page 5 of 8	
  
	
  
ii) CCN’s
The approach by agencies on Contingent Capital Notes differs to that of corporate hybrids.
Historically, the key elements for T1 Perps (legacy CCNS) were the following:
a) "Going concern"?
b) "Gone-concern"?
c) Is the loss-absorbing hybrid there when needed?
The considerations above are self-explanatory. However, as the regulatory framework
evolved under Basel III, issuers and their treasury departments were innovative (funkier) in
their structures to satisfy: a) the regulators, b) rating agencies but more importantly, c) the
investor base.
The funkier structures and regulatory developments have led to agencies scrutinising the
CCNS further and looking at them on a case-to-case basis to fully understand the special
features.
The most interesting one (for me) is the recent Societe General 8.75% 49 AT1 that, in
addition to being a “going concern”, carries write down and write up language. So, at times
of distress the issue is written down as a “going concern” but as the bank recovers, the
investors have write-up language the kicks in – increasing the likely hood of getting their
principle investment back. The issue also has multiple triggers including regulatory calls to
protect the issuer from the evolving regulatory framework i.e. if it ceases to qualify the
issue as AT1.
Figure 7 (below) shows a summary of recent CCNs issued and their structures and
features.
Figure 7 (also see appendix)
Source: BNP Research: Cocos – European Credit Strategy Sep 2013.
The above table shows the complexity of the recent CCNs and how they have evolved
over the last decade. Banks are essentially looking at innovative ways to comply with the
regulators while reducing their cost of capital and engaging the investors. The rational for
the bank is clear: to get favourable treatment for CET calculation from the CCN.
Sandeep	
  Kumar	
  	
   Analysing	
  and	
  Mitigating	
  Risk	
   CID	
  Number:	
  01020501	
  
Page 6 of 8	
  
	
  
Assessing Hybrids
For investors, the most important features when assessing hybrids are: ratings, language
in the offering memorandum, reputational risk of the issuer, rationale for issuance i.e. use
of proceeds and LBO risk. These are explained further in figure 8.
Figure 8
Source: Western Asset Management, Publication June 2013.
Conclusion
In summary, for corporates the incentive to issue hybrids is to diversify funding, tax breaks
and equity credit from rating agencies. For banks, it is to boost investor confidence and
have an equity cushion in case of a credit crisis.
In the current climate, hybrid issuance via CCNs and corporate hybrid is led by purely by
technicals. Investors are chasing yield and hybrids provide an attractive coupon but the
risks (in my view) are not fully compensated for (figure x).
Investors are attracted by the lower trigger levels on CCNs (in some cases as low as 5%)
and there is widespread belief that the sovereigns or the ECB will step-in at times of crisis
but they should remember that this is second tier debt that, like that case of Irish Banks,
can have haircuts. More importantly, most securities are a “going concern” that
automatically converts into equity before any form of government intervention comes into
play.
In my view, investors should avoid issuance with covenant lights features and should focus
their efforts into national champions (for corporates) and banks with a higher parent rating
that provide a hold-co guarantee. Issuers’ rationale for these is compelling in the current
climate but they need to keep in mind that these instruments can become costly if
regulation or methodologies change. Furthermore, there could be a contagion effect if
investor confidence fades away.
Word Count Inc. Headings and Subheadings: 1189.
Ratings:	
  This	
  is	
  more	
  important	
  for	
  investors.	
  One	
  should	
  pay	
  close	
  attention	
  to	
  the	
  full	
  capital	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  issuer	
  and	
  
where	
  the	
  debt	
  fits.	
  While	
  holding	
  company	
  (HoldCo)	
  ratings	
  are	
  important,	
  one	
  should	
  pay	
  attention	
  to	
  where	
  the	
  debt	
  lies	
  
in	
  case	
  of	
  default,	
  leverage	
  buy-­‐outs	
  and	
  how	
  interest	
  and	
  principal	
  payment	
  are	
  treated	
  following	
  ratings	
  action	
  (HoldCo	
  vs.	
  
Opco).	
  
	
  
Document	
  Language:	
  Terms	
  and	
  structures	
  vary	
  from	
  issuer	
  to	
  issuer	
  and	
  industry	
  to	
  industry	
  and	
  one	
  should	
  pay	
  close	
  
attention	
  of	
  the	
  offering	
  memorandum/circular	
  to	
  fully	
  understand	
  what	
  happens	
  in	
  case	
  of	
  default	
  and	
  what	
  is	
  the	
  interest	
  
deferral	
  language	
  i.e.	
  non-­‐dividend	
  payment,	
  must-­‐pay	
  or	
  deferred/cumulative	
  interest	
  payments.	
  
	
  
Reputational	
  Risk:	
  One	
  should	
  assess	
  the	
  size	
  of	
  hybrid	
  relative	
  to	
  the	
  issuers	
  total	
  enterprise	
  value	
  and	
  the	
  coupon	
  vs.	
  the	
  
dividend.	
  Issuers	
  are	
  concerned	
  about	
  their	
  reputation	
  and	
  more	
  importantly,	
  their	
  ability	
  to	
  raise	
  debt	
  via	
  debt	
  capital	
  
markets	
  so	
  the	
  smaller	
  the	
  hybrid	
  issue	
  the	
  better	
  as	
  deferring	
  and	
  non-­‐payment	
  of	
  coupons	
  can	
  dent	
  investor	
  confidence.	
  	
  
	
  
Rationale	
  for	
  issuance:	
  Historically,	
  hybrids	
  have	
  been	
  an	
  expensive	
  method	
  to	
  raise	
  funding	
  but	
  in	
  the	
  current	
  low	
  rates	
  
environment	
  we	
  are	
  in	
  these	
  provide	
  an	
  incentive	
  for	
  issuers	
  to	
  raise	
  funding	
  at	
  a	
  lower	
  cost	
  of	
  capital.	
  
	
  
LBO:	
  The	
  option	
  to	
  defer	
  interest	
  could	
  raise	
  serious	
  issues	
  for	
  investors.	
  In	
  case	
  of	
  a	
  LBO,	
  the	
  hybrid	
  can	
  essentially	
  turn	
  in	
  a	
  
zero	
  coupon	
  perp	
  bond.	
  
Sandeep	
  Kumar	
  	
   Analysing	
  and	
  Mitigating	
  Risk	
   CID	
  Number:	
  01020501	
  
Page 7 of 8	
  
	
  
REFERENCE LIST
• BNP Paribas: European Credit Research: Valuing the Coco collection, September
2013.
• Natixis Asset Management: Ideas Fixed Income, June 2014.
• Moody’s Investor Services: Ratings Action, September 2013. Deutsche Bank
• Financial Times (2014), Telefonica SA. [Online] Available from:
http://markets.ft.com/research/Markets/Tearsheets/Summary?s=TEF:MCE
[Accessed: April 3rd
2015]
• Practical Law: Hybrid Securities: an Overview. Available from:
www.gobal.practicallaw.com/1-517-1581
[Accessed: April 3rd
2015]
• Western Asset Management, Corporate Hybrids, May 2013.

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Final Report. Hybrids and CCNs.SK

  • 1. Sandeep  Kumar     Analysing  and  Mitigating  Risk   CID  Number:  01020501   Page 1 of 8     What is the rationale behind contingent capital and other hybrid debt instruments? Can you explain the main trade-offs at play behind their most important design features? In this report, I will begin by defining hybrid securities and contingent capital notes, then discuss the design features (language and structure) of the two securities. I will also look at recent hybrid issues, their structures and how they have evolved. Then, I will look at reasons why corporates and financial institutions issue such securities. Given, that tax regimes differ by region and a uniform treatment is still pending, analyses on tax will be limited. This report will focus on issuers, regulation facing CCNs, rating agencies and investors. Hybrid Corporate Debt: What is it? Hybrid debt is essentially a fixed-coupon paying note with no set maturity (perpetual) that is junior or sub-ordinated to other debt in the capital structure. Figure 1 illustrates the seniority of claims. In bankruptcy or liquidation scenario, the debt ranks junior to all other debt and is only paid once all other obligations or claims are satisfied, implying a lower recovery. For pricing and recovery analysis, sub-debt carries a recovery rate of 20% versus 40% for senior debt. The investors are paid a premium for the additional risk they take and the spread is subject to the credit profile of each issuer. Typical Corporate Balance Sheet Typical Capital Structure Current Assets Senior Secured Debt Senior Unsecured Debt + Subordinated Debt Fixed Assets Hybrid Equity Figure 1: Example of a corporate balance sheet and capital structure. Figure 2 below shows a recent hybrid issued by Orange and its structure. The hybrid has no set maturity and has call dates as well as coupon step-up language, which resets the coupon.
  • 2. Sandeep  Kumar     Analysing  and  Mitigating  Risk   CID  Number:  01020501   Page 2 of 8     Figure 2 Source: Natixis, Ideas – Fixed Income, June 2014. Contingent Capital Notes (CCNs)- What are they? Contingent Capital Notes are hybrid securities issued by financial institutions (FI). These come in various forms; Enhanced Capital Notes (ECNS), Alternative Tier 1 (AT1), Contingent Convertible Securities (Cocos), and T2 Cocos but essentially they are all junior ranking or second lien debt that carry a loss absorbing mechanism. They provide leverage and an “equity buffer” for the issuer. At times of crisis, these automatically covert into equity i.e. when the banks capital ratio falls below a set trigger level. Furthermore, they provide a tax efficient way of raising capital and are complimentary to the issuers CET (common equity) ratios, which is a focus for all banks following Basel III requirements. The focus for banks is to issue the right debt; one that meets the required percentage for risk weighted assets (RWA) in T1 capital and meets the leverage ratio requirement i.e.T1/Exposure measure, which in laymen terms is total assets plus off balance sheet items. CCN’s were introduced in late 2009 following an asset liability management exercise by Lloyds Treasury to replace existing legacy Lower Tier 2 (LT2), Upper Tier 2 (UT2) and Tier 1 (T1) debt. The new instruments carried a predefined trigger option that allowed the issuer (in this case, Lloyds) to convert their debt into equity, which essentially allowed that bank to increase its core capital without the needed to tap equity capital markets. The investors were paid an attractive coupon to compensate for this risk. Attractive proposition at the time given over 40% of equity was still owned by the government. Language and Features: The common features and their impact for hybrids are shown in figure 3. The corporates main aim is to get the highest equity treatment from rating agencies at the lowest cost possible. The obvious cost is paying investors the risk premium i.e. a high coupon. Features Impact Cash Cumulative Interest Deferral Issuers right to defer coupon payment but the interest is cumulative and compounded. Dividend Pusher Either forces coupon payment on the hybrid or limit any coupon or dividend payment on instruments ranking pari passu or subordinated to the hybrid debt in the event of coupon cancellation on this debt. Replacement Capital Covenant (RCC) The obligation or intent to replace the hybrid debt with capital of similar or better quality. Mandatory Interest Deferral Covenants, if breached, require coupon to be deferred. Proffered by ratings agencies. Coupon Step-up Call options accompanied by a coupon step-up associated with the call dates. Change of Control (Coca) Protects investors in the event of takeover of the parent company, with a 500bps coupon step-up in most cases. Alternative Coupon Satisfaction Mechanism (ACSM) Option offering compensation (most often in shares) for investors at the time of coupon cancellation. Figure 3
  • 3. Sandeep  Kumar     Analysing  and  Mitigating  Risk   CID  Number:  01020501   Page 3 of 8     Source: www.hughyieldbonds.com/covenants Issuance: The re-emergence The issuance of subordinated bonds by corporates re-emerged in mid 2010 where utilities and telecoms dominated this space. The rationale was simple for the two sectors: high capital expenditure and stretched balance sheets. The corporate hybrids allow issuers to issue debt and earn partial equity treatment by the credit rating agencies (please note: the treatment language by credit agencies has changed hence the partial equity treatment). Furthermore, tax breaks also provide an incentive to issue hybrid as one can treat interest as an expense and still get favorable equity treatment. However, I believe a combination of low interests rates, central bank action (namely QE) and inflow of money made hybrids and cocos compelling for investor that lead to record hybrid issuance (figure 4b) – in 2014, we saw 46bnEur Corporate Hybrid (figure 4) and 50bnEur Cocos (Bloomberg, 2015). Figure 4 a Figure 4 b Source: Dealogic and FT Source: Markit, BNP Paribas, Bloomberg Credit Rating Agencies: Rating a Hybrid and Cocos i) Corporate Hybrids Ratings agencies rate the hybrid debt a few notches below the senior debt but this differs from issuer to issuer and by methodologies. One can assume, as a rule of thumb, that hybrids are rated two to three notches below senior debt. The lower the rating, the higher the risk and the closer it is to equity treatment. Key features analyzed by agencies for a corporate hybrid are: subordination, coupon deferral language and maturity. A summary of these (required by the top three ratings agencies) is shown in figure 5. So, naturally issuers’ structure their hybrid to their issue qualifies for the 50% equity treatment.
  • 4. Sandeep  Kumar     Analysing  and  Mitigating  Risk   CID  Number:  01020501   Page 4 of 8     Figure 5 Source: Western Asset Management Monthly Report, 2013 Figure 6 shows a RNS issued by Moody’s following their assessment of Telefonica’s hybrid issue from 2013. Moody provides its credit rationale and rating. Figure 6 Source: www.telefonica.com/investors
  • 5. Sandeep  Kumar     Analysing  and  Mitigating  Risk   CID  Number:  01020501   Page 5 of 8     ii) CCN’s The approach by agencies on Contingent Capital Notes differs to that of corporate hybrids. Historically, the key elements for T1 Perps (legacy CCNS) were the following: a) "Going concern"? b) "Gone-concern"? c) Is the loss-absorbing hybrid there when needed? The considerations above are self-explanatory. However, as the regulatory framework evolved under Basel III, issuers and their treasury departments were innovative (funkier) in their structures to satisfy: a) the regulators, b) rating agencies but more importantly, c) the investor base. The funkier structures and regulatory developments have led to agencies scrutinising the CCNS further and looking at them on a case-to-case basis to fully understand the special features. The most interesting one (for me) is the recent Societe General 8.75% 49 AT1 that, in addition to being a “going concern”, carries write down and write up language. So, at times of distress the issue is written down as a “going concern” but as the bank recovers, the investors have write-up language the kicks in – increasing the likely hood of getting their principle investment back. The issue also has multiple triggers including regulatory calls to protect the issuer from the evolving regulatory framework i.e. if it ceases to qualify the issue as AT1. Figure 7 (below) shows a summary of recent CCNs issued and their structures and features. Figure 7 (also see appendix) Source: BNP Research: Cocos – European Credit Strategy Sep 2013. The above table shows the complexity of the recent CCNs and how they have evolved over the last decade. Banks are essentially looking at innovative ways to comply with the regulators while reducing their cost of capital and engaging the investors. The rational for the bank is clear: to get favourable treatment for CET calculation from the CCN.
  • 6. Sandeep  Kumar     Analysing  and  Mitigating  Risk   CID  Number:  01020501   Page 6 of 8     Assessing Hybrids For investors, the most important features when assessing hybrids are: ratings, language in the offering memorandum, reputational risk of the issuer, rationale for issuance i.e. use of proceeds and LBO risk. These are explained further in figure 8. Figure 8 Source: Western Asset Management, Publication June 2013. Conclusion In summary, for corporates the incentive to issue hybrids is to diversify funding, tax breaks and equity credit from rating agencies. For banks, it is to boost investor confidence and have an equity cushion in case of a credit crisis. In the current climate, hybrid issuance via CCNs and corporate hybrid is led by purely by technicals. Investors are chasing yield and hybrids provide an attractive coupon but the risks (in my view) are not fully compensated for (figure x). Investors are attracted by the lower trigger levels on CCNs (in some cases as low as 5%) and there is widespread belief that the sovereigns or the ECB will step-in at times of crisis but they should remember that this is second tier debt that, like that case of Irish Banks, can have haircuts. More importantly, most securities are a “going concern” that automatically converts into equity before any form of government intervention comes into play. In my view, investors should avoid issuance with covenant lights features and should focus their efforts into national champions (for corporates) and banks with a higher parent rating that provide a hold-co guarantee. Issuers’ rationale for these is compelling in the current climate but they need to keep in mind that these instruments can become costly if regulation or methodologies change. Furthermore, there could be a contagion effect if investor confidence fades away. Word Count Inc. Headings and Subheadings: 1189. Ratings:  This  is  more  important  for  investors.  One  should  pay  close  attention  to  the  full  capital  structure  of  the  issuer  and   where  the  debt  fits.  While  holding  company  (HoldCo)  ratings  are  important,  one  should  pay  attention  to  where  the  debt  lies   in  case  of  default,  leverage  buy-­‐outs  and  how  interest  and  principal  payment  are  treated  following  ratings  action  (HoldCo  vs.   Opco).     Document  Language:  Terms  and  structures  vary  from  issuer  to  issuer  and  industry  to  industry  and  one  should  pay  close   attention  of  the  offering  memorandum/circular  to  fully  understand  what  happens  in  case  of  default  and  what  is  the  interest   deferral  language  i.e.  non-­‐dividend  payment,  must-­‐pay  or  deferred/cumulative  interest  payments.     Reputational  Risk:  One  should  assess  the  size  of  hybrid  relative  to  the  issuers  total  enterprise  value  and  the  coupon  vs.  the   dividend.  Issuers  are  concerned  about  their  reputation  and  more  importantly,  their  ability  to  raise  debt  via  debt  capital   markets  so  the  smaller  the  hybrid  issue  the  better  as  deferring  and  non-­‐payment  of  coupons  can  dent  investor  confidence.       Rationale  for  issuance:  Historically,  hybrids  have  been  an  expensive  method  to  raise  funding  but  in  the  current  low  rates   environment  we  are  in  these  provide  an  incentive  for  issuers  to  raise  funding  at  a  lower  cost  of  capital.     LBO:  The  option  to  defer  interest  could  raise  serious  issues  for  investors.  In  case  of  a  LBO,  the  hybrid  can  essentially  turn  in  a   zero  coupon  perp  bond.  
  • 7. Sandeep  Kumar     Analysing  and  Mitigating  Risk   CID  Number:  01020501   Page 7 of 8     REFERENCE LIST • BNP Paribas: European Credit Research: Valuing the Coco collection, September 2013. • Natixis Asset Management: Ideas Fixed Income, June 2014. • Moody’s Investor Services: Ratings Action, September 2013. Deutsche Bank • Financial Times (2014), Telefonica SA. [Online] Available from: http://markets.ft.com/research/Markets/Tearsheets/Summary?s=TEF:MCE [Accessed: April 3rd 2015] • Practical Law: Hybrid Securities: an Overview. Available from: www.gobal.practicallaw.com/1-517-1581 [Accessed: April 3rd 2015] • Western Asset Management, Corporate Hybrids, May 2013.