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CNIT 121:
Computer
Forensics
12 Investigating Windows Systems
NTFS and File System
Analysis
NTFS and FAT
• FAT was the old file system used by MS-DOS,
Windows 95, Windows 98
• NTFS was the replacement
Master File Table
(MFT)
• Defines how disk space is allocated and
utilized
• How files are created and deleted
• How metadata is stored and updates
MFT Contents
• Primary source of metadata in NTFS
• Contains or references everything about a file
• Timestamps
• Size
• Attributes (such as permissions)
• Parent directory
• Contents
The Evidence
• Each NTFS volume has its own MFT
• Stored in the volume root as a file named $MFT
• You need raw disk access to acquire $MFT
• It's not accessible through Windows Explorer
or standard API calls
MFT Structure
• On a standard hard drive with 512-byte
sectors
• A series of 1024-byte records or "entries"
• One for each file and directory on a volume
• First 16 entries are reserved for essential
NTFS artifacts
• $MFT itself, $LogFile, and more
MFT in WinHex
MFT Entry Contents
• Record type (file or directory)
• Record # (integer)
• Parent record #
• Active/Inactive flag
• Deleted files are inactive
• Attributes (metadata)
Attributes
• $STANDARD_INFORMATION
• $FILE_NAME
• $DATA
Deleted Files
• Deleting a file causes its MFT record to be marked
"inactive"
• Nothing else is changed, until this record is re-used
• The file's contents and its metadata can be
recovered
• But NTFS will always re-use an existing MFT entry
before creating a new one
• So inactive entries only last for seconds or minutes
on the operating system volume
Timestamps
• MACE timestamps
• Modified, Accessed, Created, Entry Modified
• An MFT entry will always have at least two sets
of attributes containing MACE timestamps
• STANDARD_INFORMATION (also known as
$SIA or $SI)
• FileName (also known as FNA, FILE_NAME,
or $FN)
•These are Standard
Information ($SI)
timestamps
•Created
•Accessed
•Modified
•Entry Modified
timestamp not
visible in Windows
Explorer
•Forensic tools like
SleuthKit, EnCase,
and FTK show it
MACE Timestamps
Accessed Timestamp
• Versions of Windows after Windows XP no
longer update the Accessed timestamp by
default
• It can be enabled with a registry change, but
even when it's enabled, NTFS may delay
updates by up to an hour
• Link Ch 12a
$FN Timestamps
• Refer to the MFT entry for the filename itself
• NTFS actually maintains multiple sets of file
name attributes
• Full, case-sensitive long filename
• MS-DOS 8.3 short file name
Time-Stomping
• Only the $SI timestamps are available to user
applications through the Windows API
• Programs can only alter those timestamps
• A processes called "time-stomping"
• Setmace can alter all the timestamps (link Ch 12b)
• Malware droppers and installers often automate
this process, inserting timestamps from system
files to hide in the timeline
$SI and $FN Timestamps
• $SI timestamps are easily altered
• $FN timestamps require a complex and indirect
process to modify
• Inconsistencies may remain between the $SI
and $FN timestamps
• Link Ch 12c
Data Runs
• $DATA attribute lists all clusters with the file's
contents
• May not be contiguous (fragmented file)
• Lists "data runs" that must be assembled
together to get the complete file
Resident Data
• MFT entry contains 1024 bytes
• That's enough room to store complete data for
small files (up to 700 or 800 bytes) in the MFT
• These are called "Resident files"
• Set the Resident flag in the MFT entry
MFT Slack Space
• MFT may contain leftovers from previously
resident data
• This happens if a file was small enough to be
resident and then expanded to be too large to
remain resident
Alternate Data Streams
• Additional named $DATA attributes in a file's
MFT entry
• Each can point to an unique set of cluster runs
• All the data streams share the same Standard
Information and Filename attributes
• So they all share the same timestamps
Known Alternate Stream
Names
• Browsers append a stream to downloaded files
• Named Zone.Identifier
• Windows Explorer uses this data to determine
the origin of a file and enforce security controls
on it
• Link Ch 12c
MFT Analysis Tools
INDX Attributes
• Used to make file searches faster
• Often contains metadata from deleted files
• Links Ch 12h, 12i
Change Logs
• $LogFile tracks all transactions that change the
structure of a volume
• File or directory creation/copy/delete
• Changes to file metadata or INDX records
• $UsnJrnl (Update Sequence Number) journal
• Tracks less data but has a longer history
Volume Shadow Copies
• Automatically created backup of Windows files
• Manage with the vssadmin and mklink
command-line tools (link Ch 12k)
Shadow Copy
• A mirror of the volume's entire file system at the
time of the snapshot
• Available within the linked directory
• Other tools:
File System Redirector
• Windows 32-bit on Windows 64-bit (WoW64)
• Redirects some folders elsewhere when 32-bit
programs run on 64-bit Windows, like
• %SYSTEMROOT%system32 redirects to 

C:WindowsSysWOW64
• 32-bit tools may not see the whole file system
Windows Prefetch
C:WindowsPrefetch
Contains
• NTOSBOOT-BooDFAAD.pf (system boot
prefetch) -- only file existing on Windows Server
by default
• Layout.ini (for disk defragmenter)
• Appname-########.pf (up to 128 application-
specific prefetch files)
Value
• A record of programs executed on a system
• Even if the executable has been deleted
• Shows when application was first run, when it
most recently ran, and how many times it was
run
• Also shows each component loaded
WinPrefetchView
• Link Ch 12l
Event Logs
Event Logs Enable these
Tasks
Types of Logs
• Core event logs in all Windows versions
• Application
• Errors and info from apps; antivirus and host-
based IPS logs
• System
• Events from core Windows services; changes in
time, driver loads, network configuration issues
• Security
• Login and logoff attempts, changes to audit
policy
Acquiring Logs
• Log file locations are specified in this Registry
key: HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetServices
Eventlog
• For Vista and later, the logs are in these XML
files:
Applications and Services
Logs
• EVTX files in %SYSTEMROOT%
System32WinevtLogs
• Logs for Task scheduler, Windows Firewall,
AppLocker, Terminal Services, User Access
Control
Event ID
• Each event is labelled with its Source and Event
ID number
• Good resource: eventid.net
• Vista and later often have EventIDs that are 4096
larger than the EventID from Windows XP
Logon Events
Fields
Lateral Movement
• Attackers use stolen credentials to move from
system to system
• Often use a common administrator account
• Or a domain or domain administrator account
Example
In Command Shell as ACMEEve
Events Logged
Changes to Accounts and
Security Settings: Security Logs
Process Auditing
• Not on by default
• Turn it on in local audit policy or Group Policy
• Puts an event in the Security log every time a
process is executed or terminated
• Generates a lot of log events
Service Events
• System logs record every time a service starts
or stops
• A common persistence mechanism for malware
Logs for PsExec
Suspicious Things
• Abnormal usernames using PsExec
• Known-bad service names
• Errors from malicious binaries that were
deleted, but still referenced by a service
Log Analysis Tips
• Check Application log for AV alert during period
of interest
• Increase log file sizes to retain a longer history
• If log files in the old binary format are corrupt,
use FixEVT (link Ch 12m)
Tools
Scheduled Tasks
The "at" Command
• Requires administrator privileges
• Uses local time
• Run as SYSTEM
The "schtasks" Command
• More complex format
• Rarely used by attackers
.job Files
• Configuration data for scheduled tasks
• One file per task
• In %SYSTEMROOT%Tasks
• Files persist until shutdown or reboot of system
Task Scheduler Logs
• %SYSTEMROOT%TasksSchedLgU.txt
• Records start time and completion of tasks
• Also Event Logs, including
• Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler
%4Operational.evtx
• Security log
Analyzing .job Files
• A binary file
• Strings will show user information and file path
Job File Parser
• Link Ch
12n
Scheduled Tasks Log
Windows
Task
Scheduler
Operational
Log in Event
Viewer

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CNIT 121: 12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 1 of 3)

  • 2.
  • 3. NTFS and File System Analysis
  • 4. NTFS and FAT • FAT was the old file system used by MS-DOS, Windows 95, Windows 98 • NTFS was the replacement
  • 5. Master File Table (MFT) • Defines how disk space is allocated and utilized • How files are created and deleted • How metadata is stored and updates
  • 6. MFT Contents • Primary source of metadata in NTFS • Contains or references everything about a file • Timestamps • Size • Attributes (such as permissions) • Parent directory • Contents
  • 7. The Evidence • Each NTFS volume has its own MFT • Stored in the volume root as a file named $MFT • You need raw disk access to acquire $MFT • It's not accessible through Windows Explorer or standard API calls
  • 8. MFT Structure • On a standard hard drive with 512-byte sectors • A series of 1024-byte records or "entries" • One for each file and directory on a volume • First 16 entries are reserved for essential NTFS artifacts • $MFT itself, $LogFile, and more
  • 10. MFT Entry Contents • Record type (file or directory) • Record # (integer) • Parent record # • Active/Inactive flag • Deleted files are inactive • Attributes (metadata)
  • 12. Deleted Files • Deleting a file causes its MFT record to be marked "inactive" • Nothing else is changed, until this record is re-used • The file's contents and its metadata can be recovered • But NTFS will always re-use an existing MFT entry before creating a new one • So inactive entries only last for seconds or minutes on the operating system volume
  • 13. Timestamps • MACE timestamps • Modified, Accessed, Created, Entry Modified • An MFT entry will always have at least two sets of attributes containing MACE timestamps • STANDARD_INFORMATION (also known as $SIA or $SI) • FileName (also known as FNA, FILE_NAME, or $FN)
  • 14. •These are Standard Information ($SI) timestamps •Created •Accessed •Modified •Entry Modified timestamp not visible in Windows Explorer •Forensic tools like SleuthKit, EnCase, and FTK show it
  • 16. Accessed Timestamp • Versions of Windows after Windows XP no longer update the Accessed timestamp by default • It can be enabled with a registry change, but even when it's enabled, NTFS may delay updates by up to an hour • Link Ch 12a
  • 17. $FN Timestamps • Refer to the MFT entry for the filename itself • NTFS actually maintains multiple sets of file name attributes • Full, case-sensitive long filename • MS-DOS 8.3 short file name
  • 18. Time-Stomping • Only the $SI timestamps are available to user applications through the Windows API • Programs can only alter those timestamps • A processes called "time-stomping" • Setmace can alter all the timestamps (link Ch 12b) • Malware droppers and installers often automate this process, inserting timestamps from system files to hide in the timeline
  • 19. $SI and $FN Timestamps • $SI timestamps are easily altered • $FN timestamps require a complex and indirect process to modify • Inconsistencies may remain between the $SI and $FN timestamps
  • 20.
  • 21. • Link Ch 12c
  • 22. Data Runs • $DATA attribute lists all clusters with the file's contents • May not be contiguous (fragmented file) • Lists "data runs" that must be assembled together to get the complete file
  • 23. Resident Data • MFT entry contains 1024 bytes • That's enough room to store complete data for small files (up to 700 or 800 bytes) in the MFT • These are called "Resident files" • Set the Resident flag in the MFT entry
  • 24. MFT Slack Space • MFT may contain leftovers from previously resident data • This happens if a file was small enough to be resident and then expanded to be too large to remain resident
  • 25. Alternate Data Streams • Additional named $DATA attributes in a file's MFT entry • Each can point to an unique set of cluster runs • All the data streams share the same Standard Information and Filename attributes • So they all share the same timestamps
  • 26.
  • 27. Known Alternate Stream Names • Browsers append a stream to downloaded files • Named Zone.Identifier • Windows Explorer uses this data to determine the origin of a file and enforce security controls on it • Link Ch 12c
  • 28.
  • 29.
  • 31. INDX Attributes • Used to make file searches faster • Often contains metadata from deleted files • Links Ch 12h, 12i
  • 32.
  • 33. Change Logs • $LogFile tracks all transactions that change the structure of a volume • File or directory creation/copy/delete • Changes to file metadata or INDX records • $UsnJrnl (Update Sequence Number) journal • Tracks less data but has a longer history
  • 34. Volume Shadow Copies • Automatically created backup of Windows files • Manage with the vssadmin and mklink command-line tools (link Ch 12k)
  • 35.
  • 36. Shadow Copy • A mirror of the volume's entire file system at the time of the snapshot • Available within the linked directory • Other tools:
  • 37. File System Redirector • Windows 32-bit on Windows 64-bit (WoW64) • Redirects some folders elsewhere when 32-bit programs run on 64-bit Windows, like • %SYSTEMROOT%system32 redirects to 
 C:WindowsSysWOW64 • 32-bit tools may not see the whole file system
  • 39. C:WindowsPrefetch Contains • NTOSBOOT-BooDFAAD.pf (system boot prefetch) -- only file existing on Windows Server by default • Layout.ini (for disk defragmenter) • Appname-########.pf (up to 128 application- specific prefetch files)
  • 40. Value • A record of programs executed on a system • Even if the executable has been deleted • Shows when application was first run, when it most recently ran, and how many times it was run • Also shows each component loaded
  • 43. Event Logs Enable these Tasks
  • 44. Types of Logs • Core event logs in all Windows versions • Application • Errors and info from apps; antivirus and host- based IPS logs • System • Events from core Windows services; changes in time, driver loads, network configuration issues • Security • Login and logoff attempts, changes to audit policy
  • 45. Acquiring Logs • Log file locations are specified in this Registry key: HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetServices Eventlog • For Vista and later, the logs are in these XML files:
  • 46. Applications and Services Logs • EVTX files in %SYSTEMROOT% System32WinevtLogs • Logs for Task scheduler, Windows Firewall, AppLocker, Terminal Services, User Access Control
  • 47. Event ID • Each event is labelled with its Source and Event ID number • Good resource: eventid.net • Vista and later often have EventIDs that are 4096 larger than the EventID from Windows XP
  • 49.
  • 51. Lateral Movement • Attackers use stolen credentials to move from system to system • Often use a common administrator account • Or a domain or domain administrator account
  • 53. In Command Shell as ACMEEve
  • 55. Changes to Accounts and Security Settings: Security Logs
  • 56. Process Auditing • Not on by default • Turn it on in local audit policy or Group Policy • Puts an event in the Security log every time a process is executed or terminated • Generates a lot of log events
  • 57. Service Events • System logs record every time a service starts or stops • A common persistence mechanism for malware
  • 59. Suspicious Things • Abnormal usernames using PsExec • Known-bad service names • Errors from malicious binaries that were deleted, but still referenced by a service
  • 60. Log Analysis Tips • Check Application log for AV alert during period of interest • Increase log file sizes to retain a longer history • If log files in the old binary format are corrupt, use FixEVT (link Ch 12m)
  • 61. Tools
  • 63. The "at" Command • Requires administrator privileges • Uses local time • Run as SYSTEM
  • 64. The "schtasks" Command • More complex format • Rarely used by attackers
  • 65. .job Files • Configuration data for scheduled tasks • One file per task • In %SYSTEMROOT%Tasks • Files persist until shutdown or reboot of system
  • 66. Task Scheduler Logs • %SYSTEMROOT%TasksSchedLgU.txt • Records start time and completion of tasks • Also Event Logs, including • Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler %4Operational.evtx • Security log
  • 67. Analyzing .job Files • A binary file • Strings will show user information and file path
  • 68. Job File Parser • Link Ch 12n