Golden rule the most important rule in the iOS and legal studys

1. Golden Rule

2. • If the plain meaning of the word
– is ambiguous, vague or misleading or
– if a strict literal interpretation would result in
absurd results
• then the court may deviate from the literal
meaning to avoid such an absurdity.
• This is also known as the golden rule of
interpretation.

3. In Grey v Pearson (1857) 6 HL Cas 61, Lord
Wensleydale said:
• “… the grammatical and ordinary sense of
the words is to be adhered to, unless that
would lead to some absurdity, or some
repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of
the instrument, in which case the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words
may be modified, so as to avoid that
absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.”

4. In Becke v Smith (1836) 2 M&W 195, Justice
Parke stated:
• “It is a very useful rule in the construction of
a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning
of the words used, and to the grammatical
construction, unless that is at variance with
the intention of the legislature to be collected
from the statute itself, or leads to any
manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which
case the language may be varied or modified
so as to avoid such inconvenience but no
further.”

5. • E.g. imagine there may be a sign saying:
"Do not use lifts in case of fire."

6. • Under the literal interpretation of this sign,
people must never use the lifts, in case there
is a fire.
• However, this would be an absurd result, as
the intention of the person who made the sign
is obviously to prevent people from using the
lifts only if there is currently a fire nearby.

7. Lee v. Knapp (1967) 2 QB 442 aka
Hit-Stop-Run case

8. Provision
• Under Sec.77(1) of Road Transport Act, 1960 a
driver causing an accident shall stop after the
accident.
Facts
• In this case the driver stopped for a moment
after causing an accident and then moved
away.

9. • Applying the golden rule the court held that
requirement of the section had not been
followed by the driver as he had not stopped
for a reasonable period requiring interested
persons to make necessary inquires from him
about the accident.

10. Adler v George (1964) aka RAF case

11. Provision
• You cannot obstruct a member of HM forces
engaged in security duty in the vicinity of a
prohibited place.
Facts
• Adler gained access to a RAF station (a prohibited
place within the meaning of the Official Secrets
Act 1920) and was actually within its boundaries.
He obstructed a member of Her Majesty's forces
engaged in security duty in relation to the station.

12. Literal rule: would mean that Adler is not guilty
because ‘in the VICINITY of a prohibited place’
suggests NOT ON the premises but nearby.
Held:
• The courts felt that this was not the Parliament’s
intention, and therefore the literal rule led to an
absurd literal meaning.
• Therefore the GOLDEN rule was applied whereby
the it was held that the defendant was guilty of
the offence because "in the vicinity of" should be
interpreted to mean ON OR NEAR the prohibited
place.

13. R v Sigsworth [1935]aka MFP case

14. Facts
• In this case someone had murdered their
mother, she had not made a will, which would
mean her estate would be inherited by her
next of kin, according to the rules set out in
the Administration Of Justice Act 1925.

15. Held
• In this case her son, the murderer, would have
inherited her estate, making him the
beneficial party of the crime, there were no
ambiguous words in the act, but the court
were not prepared to let a murderer benefit
from his crime, so it was held that the literal
rule should not apply and the golden rule was
used to prevent the repugnant situation.

16. R v Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367 aka
Second Marriage Case

17. • The defendant was charged with the offence
of bigamy under s.57 of the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861.
• The statute states 'whosoever being married
shall marry any other person during the
lifetime of the former husband or wife is guilty
of an offence'.

18. Literal Rule
• Under a literal interpretation of this section
the offence would be impossible to commit
since civil law will not recognise a second
marriage any attempt to marry in such
circumstances would not be recognised as a
valid marriage.

19. Held:
The court applied the golden rule and held
that the word 'marry' should be interpreted as
'to go through a marriage ceremony'. The
defendant's conviction was upheld.

20. Keene v. Muncaster 1980

21. • In order to park, permission must be granted
from police in uniform. M was a policeman in
uniform but off duty and parked his car.

22. • Courts found him guilty and added "from
some one else'

23. U.P.Bhoodan Yagna Samiti,U.P vs Braj
Kishore & Ors (AIR 1988 SC 2239) aka
Bhoodan Case

24. • The Respondents, in 1968, obtained grant from Bhoodan
Yagna Samiti under section 14 of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna
Act, of various plots of land situated in a village in Kanpur.
• It was cancelled On following grounds:
(i) As the Respondent did not reside in the village where the plots
were situated they had obtained the grant fraudulently and by
misrepresenting facts.
(ii) As the Respondent did not fall in the category of land-less
persons it was not proper to make the grant in their favour.
(iii) The grants had not been approved by the Government of U.P."
• It is not disputed that these allotments were made in
accordance with Sec. 14 but had not been approved by the
Government and the Collector took notice of the complaint
and issued notice to the respondents and on the basis of
his enquiry he cancelled the allotments made in their
favour by the Order in 1976 which has been quashed by the
High Court.

25. HC Decision
• Against the order of the Additional Collector,
the respondents filed writ petitions in the
High Court. The High Court held that the
respondents were covered by the definition
landless persons as they had no land in that
village and the district, though they may be
traders and paying income-tax and may have
properties in the city of Kanpur, and quashed
the order passed by the Additional Collector
and maintained the grants in favour of the
respondents.

26. Sec. 14
• Grant of land to landless persons--The Committee or
such other authority or person as the Committee may,
with the approval of the State Government specify
either generally or in respect of any area, may in the
manner prescribed, grant lands which have vested in it
to the landless persons, and the grantee of the land
shall--
(i) where the land is situate in any estate which has vested in
the State Government under and in accordance with
Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Land Abolition and Reforms
Act, 1950, enquire in such land the rights and the liabilities
of a sirdar, and
(ii) where it is situate in any other area, acquire therein such
rights and liabilities and subject to such conditions,
restrictions and limitations as may be prescribed and the
same shall have effect, any law to the contrary notwith-
standing.

27. Held
• The Supreme Court held that the expression “landless
person” used in section 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act,
1953 which made provision for grant of land to
landless persons, was limited to “landless laborers”. A
landless labour is he who is engaged in agriculture but
having no agricultural land.
• The Court further said that “any landless person” did
not include a landless businessman residing in a city.
The object of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan
movement, which aimed at distribution of land to
landless labourers who were verged in agriculture. A
businessman, though landless cannot claim the benefit
of the Act.

28. G.Narayanaswami v. G.
Pannerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 717 aka
Graduation Case

29. Facts
• The appellant’s election, held on April 11,
1970, to the Madras Legislative Council from
the Madras District Graduates’ Constituency
was set aside by a learned Judge of the
Madras High Court.

30. Grounds in HC
• The Appellant Narayana-swami, who had only
passed the High School Leaving Examination and
was not a Graduate, could not be elected at all to
the Legislative Council from the Graduates’
Constituency.
• secondly, it would be absurd and destructive of
the very concept of representation of especially
qualified persons that an individual who does not
possess the essential or basic qualification of the
electors should be a representative of those who
are to be represented because of this special
qualification of theirs.

31. • “171 (1) The total number of members in the
Legislative Council of a State having such a
Council shall not exceed one-third of the total
number of members in the Legislative Assembly
of that State: Provided that the total number of
members in the Legislative Council of a State shall
in no case be less than forty.
(2) Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the
composition of the Legislative Council of a State
shall be as provided in clause (3).

32. (3) Of the total number of members of the Legislative Council of a State—
(a) as nearly as may be, one-third shall be elected by electorates consisting of
members of municipalities, district boards and such other local authorities
in the State as Parliament may by law specify;
(b) as nearly as may be, one-twelfth shall be elected by electorates consisting
of persons residing in the State who have been for at least three years
graduates of any university in the territory of India or have been for at
‘least three years in possession of qualifications prescribed by or under
any law made by Parliament as equivalent to that of a graduate of any
such university;
(c) as nearly as may be, one-twelfth shall be elected by electorates consisting
of persons who have been for at least three years engaged in teaching in
such educational institutions within the State, not lower in standard than
that of a secondary school, as may be prescribed by or under any law
made by Parliament;
(d) as nearly as may be, one-third shall be elected by the members of the
Legislative Assembly of the State from amongst persons who are not
members of the Assembly;
(e) the remainder shall be nominated by the Governor in accordance with the
provisions of clause (5).

33. • The term “electorate”, used in Article 171(3), (a),
(b) and (c) has neither been defined by the
Constitution nor in any enactment by Parliament.
• Section 2(1) (a) of the Representation of People
Act 43 of 1951, however, says:
“ ‘elector’, in relation to a constituency means a
person whose name is entered in the electoral
roll of that constituency for the time being in
force and who is not subject to any of the
disqualifications mentioned in Section 16 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1950.”

34. • Section 16 of the Representation of People Act,
43 of 1951, lays down the qualifications of an
elector negatively by prescribing who shall be
disqualified for registration in an electoral roll. A
disqualified person is one who:
“(a) is not a citizen of India; or
(b) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a
competent court; or
(c) is for the time being disqualified from voting
under the provisions of any law relating to
corrupt practices and other offences in
connection with elections.”

35. • whether the representative of the Graduates
should also be a graduate to stand in the
elections?

36. • The plain and ordinary meaning of the term
“electorate” is confined to the body of persons who
elect.
• It does not contain, within its ambit, the extended
notion of a body of persons electing representatives
“from amongst themselves”.
• Thus, the use of the term “electorate”, in Article 171(3)
of our Constitution, could not, by itself, impose a limit
upon the field of choice of members of the electorate
by requiring that the person to be chosen must also be
a member of the electorate.

37. Held
• We think that the language as well as the legislative history
of Articles 171 and 173 of the Constitution and Section 6 of
the Representation of People Act, 1951, enable us to
presume a deliberate omission of the qualification that the
representative of the Graduates should also be a graduate.
• In our opinion, no absurdity results if we presume such an
intention. We cannot infer as the learned Judge of the
Madras High Court had done, from the mere fact of such an
omission and opinions underlying Article 171 of our
Constitution, that the omission was either unintentional or
that it led to absurd results.
• We think that, by adding a condition to be necessary or
implied qualifications of a representative of the Graduates
which the Judge had really invaded the legislative sphere.
The defect, if any, in the law could be removed only by law
made by Parliament.
• We conclude that the appellant possesses all the
qualifications laid down for such a candidate. Therefore, we
allow this appeal, set aside the Judgment of Madras High
Court.

38. Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated
Collieries
(1940) AC 1014

39. Facts
• The appellant is a coalminer, and between January, 1937, and June 4,
1937, there existed between him and the Hickleton Main Colliery
Company, Ld., a contract under which he worked at the colliery and
received wages from that company.
• On June 4, 1937, an order was made by the Chancery Division of His
Majesty's High Court of Justice under s. 154, which transferred to the
respondent company all the property, rights, powers, liabilities and duties
of a number of colliery companies, including the Hickleton Main Colliery
Company, and which provided that these transferor companies should be
dissolved without winding up.
• The appellant continued to work at the Hickleton Main Colliery until
October 7, 1937, and received wages from the respondents for his labour,
but he throughout believed himself to be working under his contract with
the Hickleton Main Colliery Company, Ld., which contract had never been
terminated by notice.
• The company, however, as the result of the order made by the Chancery
Division, had ceased to exist. On October 7, 1937, the appellant absented
himself from work, in circumstances which would have made him liable
under s. 4 of the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, if he could be
regarded as under a contract of service with the respondents.

40. • Whether transfer u/s. 154 includes transfer of
contract service under transfer of all the
property, rights, powers, liabilities and
duties?

41. Section 154 of the Companies Act 1929
"Where an application is made to the court... for the
sanctioning of a compromise or arrangement... and it is
shown to the court that the compromise or arrangement
has been proposed for the purposes of or in connection
with a scheme for the reconstruction of any
company or companies or the amalgamation of any two or
more companies, and that under the scheme the whole or
any part of the undertaking or the property of
any company concerned in the scheme (in
this Section referred to as 'a transferor company") is to be
transferred to another company (in this Section referred to
as 'the transferee company"), the court may... by... order,
make provision for all or any of the following matters: -
(a) The transfer to the transferee company of the whole or
any part of the undertaking and of the property or liabilities
of any transferor company..."

42. • We can come to no other conclusion than that an order
made under Sec.154 does not automatically transfer
contracts of personal service.
• The word "contract“ does not appear in the section at all,
and I do not agree with the view expressed in the Court of
Appeal that a right to the service of an employee is the
property of the transferor company. Such a right cannot be
the subject of gift or bequest; it cannot be bought or sold;
it forms no part of the assets of the employer for the
purpose of administering his estate.
• Sec. 154 when it provides for "transfer" is providing in my
opinion for the transfer of those rights which are not
incapable of transfer and is not contemplating the transfer
of rights which are in their nature incapable of being
transferred.
• Current contracts for the supply and purchase of goods are
subject to statutory novation except contracts for the
supply of "your requirements" or the like which, like
contracts to obey "your orders," do not seem to me
capable of automatic transfer.

43. ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
The golden rule can prevent the problems
of the literal rule, e.g. injustice.
An absurdity may mean different things to
different judges.
The rule can put into practice what
Parliament intended.
May give judge too much discretion –
how?
Golden rule provides a check on the
strictness of the literal rule.
Professor Zander’s criticisms of the golden
rule – ‘an unpredictable safety valve’
It respects the parliamentary supremacy
as it does not give judges complete
freedom to interpret.

44. • Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of
Vedem Vasco De Gama, AIR 1980 SC 981 :
(1990) 1 SCC 277 (case presentation)