Russia and Europe: Somewhat Different, Somewhat the Same?

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Russia and Europe:
Somewhat Different,
Somewhat the Same?
POLICY BRIEF
ROMANOVA TATIANA
Associate Professor, School of International Relations, St. Petersburg University, Jean Monnet Chair
No. 5, July 2016

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Tatiana Romanova. Russia and Europe: Somewhat Diﬀerent, Somewhat the Same?
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Sergey Lavrov – Chairman
of the Board of Trustees
Herman Gref
Aleksandr Dzasokhov
Leonid Drachevsky
Aleksandr Dynkin
Mikhail Komissar
Konstantin Kosachev
Mikhail Margelov
Yury Osipov
Sergey Prikhodko
Anatoly Torkunov
Andrey Fursenko
Aleksandr Shokhin
Igor Yurgens
PRESIDIUM
Petr Aven
Igor Ivanov – President
Andrey Kortunov – Director General
Fyodor Lukyanov
Aleksey Meshkov
Dmitry Peskov
Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) is a membership-based non-profit Russian organization.
RIAC’sactivitiesareaimedatstrengtheningpeace,friendshipandsolidaritybetweenpeoples,preventing
international conflicts and promoting crisis resolution. The Council was founded in accordance with
Russian Presidential Order No. 59-rp ”On the Creation of the Russian International Affairs Council non-
profit partnership,” dated February 2, 2010.
FOUNDERS
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation
Russian Academy of Sciences
Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs
Interfax News Agency
RIAC MISSION
The mission of RIAC is to promote Russia’s prosperity by integrating it into the global world. RIAC operates as a
link between the state, scholarly community, business and civil society in an effort to find solutions to foreign
policy issues.
The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of RIAC.
Editors:
Ivan Timofeev, Ph.D. in Political Science
Timur Makhmutov, Ph.D. in Political Science
Alekseenkova E.S., Ph.D. in Political Science
THE RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL

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Russian International Aﬀairs Council
Russia and Europe:
Somewhat Different, Somewhat the Same?
There are more issues that divide Russia and the EU than that unite them. Although both sides support
the fundamentals of the current world-order (especially when confronted with a challenge like IS), Russia
believes that the current arrangement does not grant equality and is asymmetrically patterned after the
West.Whilecivilsocietiesonbothsidesbelievethatsanctionsshouldbeendedandrelationsstrengthened,
and while both have incurred losses as a result of restrictive measures, they diverge on the conditions of
relaunching economic relations, on the feasibility of technical cooperation in the absence of political con-
vergence, and on what EU – Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) cooperation could look like. While the EU and
Russia feel the need to cooperate on a settlement in Ukraine, on stabilisation in the Middle East, on the
fight against terrorism, they diverge over what should be done, over whether human rights / democracy
or security / stability should prevail, and over how international organisations should be used.
In this context two parallel tracks should be promoted. The first one is ad hoc cooperation on burning
common threats (the settlement in Ukraine and the fight against IS and terrorism), or economic issues
of immediate mutual benefit (aviation, the space, medicine, and gas). Various international fora as well
as bilateral EU-Russia arrangements should be open for this cooperation. At the same time, sustainable
long-termcooperationdependsonconceptualdiscussionsoverthefutureset-up,whichwouldguarantee
thatthepreferencesofbothsidesaretakenintoconsiderationandneitherfeelsdiscriminatedorbetrayed.
Mutual understanding is essential for these discussions, it can be cultivated through wider civil society
dialogue, more balanced media coverage, the preservation of existing economic links and expert discus-
sions. Only this conceptual settlement will reverse the current ‘divide-unite’ split in favour of more unity.
Russia and Europe: Origins of Crisis
The EU believes that Russia challenged the
cornerstones of the world order and its
aggressive behaviour (particularly in Ukraine)
caused crisis. The position of the Russian
leadership is fundamentally different. It believes
that the current crisis originates in the 1990s
when the West (understood as the USA and
the EU) did not recognise the end of the Cold
War as a common victory, and treated Russia
as a defeated party, an unequal partner to the
EU / US. The resulting system was patterned
after the West‘without due regard for the global
context’.1
Russia accused theWest of interference
in the domestic affairs of various countries to
fosterpoliticaltransformationsandrevolutionary
changes without respect for internal political
dynamics or international law.
Moreover, the NATO and the EU have moved
closer to Russia. NATO enlargements provoked
particular concerns due to both the advance
of its military machine and the negative image,
dating back to the Cold War. EU enlargements
were conceptualised as the disruption of some
economic ties but also people to people contacts
because visas were imposed where they had not
previously existed for the Russians. Similarly,
Russia viewed EU association agreements with
Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine as discriminating
against Russian companies. It felt that the EU did
not respect its various sensitivities when it came
to the shared neighbourhood region.
Hence, the Russian official view is that the
2014 Ukrainian crisis resulted from ‘systemic
problems’. Therefore, Moscow’s answer to
the EU’s mantra ‘there is no return to the
business as usual for Russia’ is: we do not
want business as usual.
A brief look at the opinion polls reveals that
Russian society broadly supports this official
view. About 60% of the Russian population
have a negative attitude towards the EU (this
figure has only slightly improved recently).2
12%
believe that relations with the West are hostile,
according to 42% these relations are tense
whereas 32% classify them as cold.3
75% agree
that the repatriation of Crimea was just a pretext
for the sanctions.4
(Polls in the EU also reveal that
Russia is viewed as a non-European country by
1
Sergey Lavrov’s article “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background” for “Russia in Global Affairs” magazine, March 3, 2016.
URL: http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2124391
2
Relations towards the countries / Levada-Center. URL: http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/otnoshenie-k-stranam
3
Foreign Policy Orientations / Levada-Center. URL: http://www.levada.ru/2015/10/13/vneshnepoliticheskie-orientatsii
4
Press-Edition #3059 // Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM). URL: http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115622

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half of the population because of the values’gap,
and 48% of the Germans believe that Russia is a
threat.5
Hence, the societies are rather negative
to each other.)
48% of Russian big industrial producers
recognised the effect of sanctions but 40%
deniedit.6
64%ofSMEhavenotnoticedanydirect
effect of sanctions on their business. 57% of SME
declared that demand for their goods decreased
as a result of sanctions.7
There are also reports on
the negative effect of sanctions on EU business.8
However, on neither of the sides do these results
constitute a substantial demand for a change
in Russia-EU relations. At the same time 79% of
the Russians argue for the lifting of sanctions
(the same position is supported by 69% of the
Germans).9
95% of Germans and 84% of Russians
believe that it is important that Russia and the
EU develop better political relations.10
However,
66% of Russians are against closer ties with the
EU whereas 60% of Germans are for them.11
This
difference most likely reflects the difference in
how the sides treat interdependence (positive in
the German case and negative in Russia, given
sanction experience and sentiment that Russian
sensitivities, including economic ones, are not
respected).
Russian and European Approaches
to Global Issues
The first pillar of Russian foreign policy is
equality with key global powers.
It presupposes multipolarity (or policentricity,
according to the 2013 foreign policy concept)
and implies the weakening of the US relative
power, a more independent EU and the more
active role of non-Western powers (China, India,
Brazil). In the words of Sergei Lavrov, ‘there has
been a relative reduction in the influence of
the so-called “historical West” that was used to
seeing itself as the master of the human race’s
destinies’.12
However it is yet to be reflected in
how the world is governed. Russia sees itself
as a voice of non-Western world. The EU, for its
part, does not question equality but believes
that all players have to converge along the same
(Western) values, reserving for itself the role of
the norm-setter and ultimate authority.
ThesecondpillarofRussianvisionis‘an equal
and indivisible security environment’.13
Russia is against NATO enlargement. It believes
that a different – indivisible and inclusive –
security system has to be put in place (and have
come with various proposals on that). Russia
sees itself as an important guarantor of security,
in terms of both traditional and new challenges.
The EU does not see itself as a prominent actor
in hard security but is ready to cooperate on soft
security. It does not reject Russian ideas, but has
no appetite to change the security architecture
dominated by the NATO. New EU members, due
to historical traumas, remain particularly wary of
Russia and supportive of a more assertive NATO.
Thirdly, Russia insists on the central role
of international law (and the UN Security
Council). Changes and modalities of
interpretations, which the West develops,
rarely meet Russia’s understanding.
Moscow labels these attempts as double
standards. «You shouldn’t play with words
and manipulate them», — famously argued
President Putin.14
In line with this vision, Russia
rejects accusations of destroying the world
order since it was not the one ‘who bombed
Yugoslavia in 1999 in violation of the UN Charter
and the Helsinki Final Act … [or] that ignored
international law by invading Iraq in 2003 and
distorted UN Security Council resolutions by
overthrowing Muammar Gaddafi’s regime by
5
Russia and Europe: Rapprochement or Isolation. The results of a representative survey conducted by TNS Infratest Politikforschung in Germany and Russia.
URL: https://www.koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/internationale-verstaendigung/fokus_russland-in-europa/pdf/2016/Survey_Russia-in-Europe.pdf
6
Results of the research “Consequences of Sanctions for Russian Business” / Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.
URL: http://www.rspp.ru/library/view/104?s=
7
Small and medium-sized businesses in Russia have not noticed the effect of the sanctions. URL: http://www.interfax.ru/business/485756
8
European losses from anti-Russian sanctions. URL: http://ria.ru/infografika/20150915/1253446590.html; Economic impact on the EU of sanctions over Ukraine
conflict. URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569020/EPRS_BRI(2015)569020_EN.pdf
9
Russia and Europe: Rapprochement or Isolation. The results of a representative survey conducted by TNS Infratest Politikforschung in Germany and Russia.
URL: https://www.koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/internationale-verstaendigung/fokus_russland-in-europa/pdf/2016/Survey_Russia-in-Europe.pdf
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
13
70th session of the UN General Assembly. URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50385
14
Ibid.

5
force in Libya in 2011.’15
The EU insists that
norms have to be adopted to the present
situation, mostly reserving for itself the rights of
norm-setter. Russian attempts to challenge the
centrality of the West in this domain have not
been very successful so far.
There are numerous nuances in these
interpretations that make cooperation difficult.
Russia prioritizes the rights of the group
over the rights of individual. Linked to this
are juxtapositions of Russian patriotism and
invincibility (symbolised by the victory in the
SecondWorldWar)vs.anEUcriticalreassessment
of history. Russia insists on traditional values as
oppose to more liberal approaches practiced by
the EU. Frequently caricatured as family values
vs. same sex marriages, this distinction is also
about Russians believing that they are more
spiritual. Security trumps everything in Russia
(when compared to market economy or human
rights), which is drastically different from the EU
position.
The fourth pillar of the Russian external
vision is sovereignty understood as non-
interference in domestic affairs for the sake
of fostering any political change.
This does not mean ignoring violation of human
rights or democracy. However, it is not seen as
a legitimate reason for any intervention. Rather
Russia argues for a constructive dialogue of all
the parties involved (possibly with the assistance
of the international community).The EU believes
that human rights are of utmost value and justify
intervention in certain cases. However, in many
cases the EU and its members have privileged
stability over changes until the situation erupted
(i.e. in southern Mediterranean and Syria).
Finally, Russian leadership believes that
the West is wary of Russia’s power and has
always tried to contain it.
In the words of Sergei Lavrov, ‘the European
countries had apprehensions about the
nascent giant in the East and tried to isolate it
whenever possible and prevent it from taking
part in Europe’s most important affairs.’16
The
EU is concerned, however, not so much with the
growth of Russian power but with its intention
to be on a par with the West when it comes to
interpreting various rules and norms.
In sum, although the two sides talk about the
same issues, they frequently talk past each
other rather than sharing the same argu-
ment. It does not mean that any cooperation
is precluded. However, to be acceptable for
Moscow this cooperation should be based on
three principles. These are pragmatism and
result-oriented cooperation where there are
shared interests, respect for sovereignty and
equal involvement of Russia in all stages of
international decision-making.
This cooperation has regional specificities
as well. Moscow insists on the respect of its
sensitivities and interests in the region of ‘near
abroad’while making clear that it does not have
any plans to restore the Soviet Union. It would
like its integration projects (the EEU being their
core) to be recognised. It grants its integration
partners access to its market, low energy
prices and visa free access (including for labour
migration). Moscow is also central to resolving
various conflicts in this region. It positions itself
as the defender of Russian-speaking population.
Finally,itproposesvarioussecurityarrangements
in the area.
The EU’s strategy is to encourage neighbours
to change in accordance with its norms; their
prosperity and democratic credentials are
viewed in Brussels as a guarantee of the EU’s own
security. It can also become an attractive market
for the EU in future. To influence its neighbours,
the EU uses three instruments: technical
assistance, access to its market, and visa-free
travel.However,thetwolatteronesremainrather
promises on the horizon. Russia has refused
to participate in EU neighbourhood policies
(looking instead for a special arrangement) and
has always stressed that the EU creates problems
by making neighbourhood countries choose
whether they want to be with Russia or the
EU. The EU, in turn, has always been sceptical
and apprehensive about Russia-led integration
projects. As a result the region became an area
of strategic competition. Georgia and Ukraine
acquired territorial problems as a result.
15
16
Ibid.

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Russia views itself as a global power. The EU’s
rising global ambitions mean that Russia and the
EU increasingly frequently deal with each other
throughout the world.
The further a region away from Europe the
easier for Russia and the EU to cooperate
(dialogue on the Middle East, crisis manage-
ment in Africa, countering proliferation are
examples of positive relations).
However, the conceptual divergence between
the parties, described above, resurface as well,
particularly when it comes to equality, norms
interpretation or primacy of state sovereignty vs.
human rights.
Russia and the EU:
views on common neighbours
The Russian vision of the future of Eastern Europe
is linked first and foremost to Ukraine, and the
implementation of the Minsk agreements, in
accordance with the sequence of points there
(immediate and full ceasefire and pull-out of all
heavy weapon first, followed by local elections in
Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts and adoption of the
lawontheirspecialstatus;anumberofothersteps
by Kiev before eventual restoration of the control
over external borders to Ukrainian authorities and
finally decentralization of the country).
In Moscow’s view, Kyiv’s insufficient imple-
mentation slows down progress.
Long-term settlement in Eastern Europe
requires neutral status of the region. Russia
interprets it as ‘no’ to the NATO membership or
its military basis. Long-term security guarantees
for Eastern Europe states have to be collectively
developed by them, Russia and the West and
should reflect the principle of equal security
for all. Long-term settlement also presupposes
an agreement on the economic regime for the
region, which is compatible with both the EU’s
and Russian / EEU norms. It will ideally reflect
‘a common economic and humanitarian space
from the Atlantic to the Pacific, so that the
newly formed Eurasian Economic Union could
be an integrating link between Europe and Asia
Pacific’.17
What Russia expects from the West is the logical
result of how Moscow sees the future of the
shared neighbourhood. Full implementation of
the Minsk agreements comes first (with more
and consistent pressure on Kiev authorities over
decentralisation as well as economic and social
aspects in Eastern Ukraine).
Moscow also expects the EU and the NATO to
cooperate on defining trade / economic and
security regimes for common neighbours
(with the involvement of the countries of
the region). The new regimes should, in
Moscow’sview,beinclusiveandleadtoequal
security for all and to a common economic
and humanitarian space from Lisbon to
Vladivostok.
Moscow clearly demonstrates, however, that it
will not allow the problem to be deconstructed
into technical issues until there is a global
consensus. This goes against EU efforts to
agree on standards and some other solutions
for Ukraine, for example, in the context of past
negotiations on EU-Ukraine association agree-
ment. However, a more constructive attitude
along those lines on the part of Moscow could
help to depoliticise some issues.
In parallel, rebuilding relations with new EU
members is of utmost importance to create
a better climate for both settlements in the
neighbourhood and the improvement of overall
EU–Russian relations. Several initiatives can be
considered.
• Dialogue on contradictory historical issues,
involving historians, journalists, NGOs (Mutual
reproachesshouldbefollowedbyself-criticism
on both sides.);
• Various interpretations of contested historical
events to be allowed on both sides, also
reflected in the work of the mass media (One
way is to oblige them to present alternative
visions, along the logic of that used during
electorate campaigns.);
• Non-political issues that create cross-border
civil society dialogue and engagement (like
environmental or educational projects, self-
governance and various cultural activities,
studies of respective, as in neighbours’,
languages and culture);
17
Ibid.

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• Sharedbusinessinitiatives,encouragedthrough
cutting red-tape and possibly providing some
credit programmes;
• Refusal of a zero-sum game (Two examples
from Russian – Polish relations can be cited.
Russia could abandon immediate reciprocity
when talking about a monument to the Poles,
who died in the airplane crush near Smolensk.
Poland, for its part, should not forbid opening
museums if they do not neatly match its
versions of historical events.);
• Reduced military manoeuvring to encourage
confidence on both sides.
At present when the perception of a threat
coming from Russia is high, member states
more friendly to Russia are unlikely to help
Moscow improve its relations with new
members (and overall the EU).
The harsh German position on Russia is a
condition of new members’ support of Berlin
leadership. France and Italy, although courting
Russia verbally, do not have the power to
change the EU’s policy (especially when Russian
actions remain hawkish). Smaller member states
(like Greece or Hungary) use Russia policy as a
means of internal EU bargaining (to extract more
benefits for their‘yes’to sanctions’extension).
Hence,amoreproactivelineofRussia,taking
the path of small steps in the direction of
new members, is required to improve overall
relations with the EU.
Politization of Economy:
Future of Economic Cooperation
The effect of the sanctions remains difficult to
assess. It is hard to separate it from the slow-
down of the Russian economy, which started
before the sanctions. The fall in EU-Russian trade
after 2012 is due to the decrease of oil (and
thus, gas) prices. Finally, Moscow rhetorically
diminished the significance of sanctions before
making them one of the reasons for Russian
recession in 2015.
However, overall trade between the EU and
Russia decreased from the 2012 record of
€338.5 bln to €284.6 bln in 2014 and further
by €70 bln between January and November
2015.18
According to Russian data, Russia lost
about USD 40 bln in 2014 and another USD
50 bln in 2015 due to sanctions (or about 1,5%
of its GDP), the EU also lost about 90 bln in 2014-
2015.19
According to EU sources, Russia lost
€23blnand€75blnin2014and2015respectively,
whereas the EU lost €49 bln and €50 bln.20
The most recent study estimates that in April
2014 through September 2015 Russian economy
lostabout11%ofitspotentialgrowthrate,mostly
due to sanctions whereas the EU’s economic
growth was supported by the fall in oil and gas
prices.21
Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands
and Poland are most affected.22
The effect of sanctions goes well beyond that.
Many deals were postponed because of the
direct or indirect effect of the sanctions.
Direct effects result from blacklisted people
and companies as well as sectoral sanctions
(financial sphere; military, dual use and
energy goods and services). Indirect effects
are caused by uncertainty of future relations
and how it will limit deals with Russians.
Russia is mostly affected by EU financial sanc-
tions. As a result big business competes for
scarce domestic resources.
Priority in banking finance is given to giant
(energy) companies. The Russian financial
sector naturally suffered because EU sanctions
cover more than 70% of its banks, preventing
them from access to global financial resources.
Western energy sanctions will manifest their
effectinthemedium-tolong-termbecausesome
exploration and development activities were
18
Russia–EU Trade Relations. Article by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Union Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov, 20 February
2016. URL: http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/russia-eu-trade-relations
19
Siluanov praised Russia’s losses from the sanctions and falling oil prices in the $ 140 billion. URL: http://top.rbc.ru/finances/24/11/2014/5472ededcbb20f5
0f1970522 ; The Deputy Head of Ministry of Economic Development: the Losses for the EU on anti-Russian Sanctions in 2014-2015 amounted to € 90 billion.
URL: http://tass.ru/ekonomika/2583530, Kudrin: the Sanctions Have a Negative Impact on the Russian Economy/ RIA-Novosti.
URL: http://ria.ru/economy/20151121/1325569509.html
20
Multi-billion losses expected from Russia sanctions. URL:https://euobserver.com/economic/125118
21
Sanctions Fall: From the second quarter of 2014, the Russian economy could lose up to 11% growth.
URL:http://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2016/05/12/57322fb99a794753913fc68b; The Russian economy has lost 8.4% growth / Vedomosti.
URL: http://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2016/02/05/626922-ekonomika-lishilas
22
Kudrin: the Sanctions Have a Negative Impact on the Russian Economy / RIA-Novosti. URL: http://ria.ru/economy/20151121/1325569509.html

8
postponed. However, given current oil prices, it is
not certain whether these exploration activities
would take place anyways. Some aeronautics
business were also affected as a result of limited
access to technologies (including those with
assembly factories in Ukraine) whereas some
military goods were reported suffering from the
lack of access to Western electronics.23
On the EU’s side agricultural production and
transportation as well as tourist companies
suffered the most. The overall losses of EU’s
farmers due to Russian embargo are estimated
as €6-10 bln in 2014 only.24
The tourist sector
is mainly affected by dwindling incomes,
which limit Russians travelling. Russian import-
substitution strategy and fall in income of the
Russians also led to losses of European high-
technology companies.
The spheres that suffered the least are those
of mutual interdependence and need of
immediate cooperation.
One illustration is space cooperation where the
EU needs Russian expertise. Another example
is medicine where problems with the supply of
pharmaceuticals to Russia led to the relaunch of
the dialogue. Scientific cooperation continued
as well. Finally, trade in oil and gas is not affected
although both sides are also looking for ways to
minimise mutual dependence.
On the other hand, rouble devaluation coupled
with Russian counter-sanctions led to some
growth of local agricultural production (notably
meat, milk products and poultry). Some import
substitution in consumer goods (like beauty
products) has also been successful. Russia also
initiated large-scale import-substitution in
energy, military and dual-use technologies. In
the longer-run if successful, it will make the
Russian economy more immune to any repeat of
sanctions’pressure and will also create additional
jobs. However, to date the net result of import
substitution is limited due to the constrained
access to financial markets and top Western
technologies, the absence of free production
capacities and insufficient global competition.
Moreover, scarce resources are diverted to
duplicate technologies that already exist in the
West.
Could the economy then serve to relaunch
EU–Russian relations?
One idea that has been floated is to revive the
2010 EU-Russian Partnership for Modernisation
(PfM)? The problem is that the PfM has
never been a success because it has suffered
from the difference in the EU’s and Russian
approaches. Russia has seen it limited to the
economic field, and technical recipes. For the
EU modernisation was first and foremost about
political changes (strengthening the rule of law,
fight against corruption). Brussels saw economic
transformations as a result of political reforms.
While short-term and small-scale oriented nature
of the PfM (as implemented in 2010-2014) could
fit today’s relations, the question of the nature of
the PfM is more burning than in 2010. Russian
leadership is even more sure that no change in
the political field is needed.
The EU is much more irreconcilable in its criti-
queofthecurrentRussianpoliticalleadership.
Moreover,economicrelationsareconstrained
by EU sanctions. EU reengagement with
Russia is a politically sensitive subject.
Finally,thepresentRussianrefusaltocompromise
on technical issues while conceptual problems
are open works against the second edition of the
PfM. Hence, any possibility of the second edition
of the PfM is doomed at present.
At the same time, the idea of integration of
integration entities is promoted by Russia, which
has persisted in its efforts to set up a credible and
sustainable integration entity. Economically the
EurasianEconomicUnionmaximisesthepowerof
its members in the global economy and vis-à-vis
the EU. Politically it is the way to emulate the EU
(with its complicated structure of competences’
division). It also brings closer the idea of a single
economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok.
While the EU has never been enthusiastic about
the EEU, its attitude has evolved since 2014. The
EEU is viewed (especially in Germany) as a way
to maintain contacts with Russia and to sustain
positive economic dynamics in the continent.
Formally the EU does not recognise the EEU
because some of its members have not joined
the WTO. Contacts are, however, maintained at
the technical level.
23
Russian IT market for defense industry. URL: http://www.tadviser.ru/index.php/Статья:ИТ_для_оборонно-промышленного_комплекса_(рынок_России)
24
The EU has listed the industry’s most affected by Russia prodembargo. URL: http://rg.ru/2015/07/14/embargo-site-anons.html

9
The short-term prospects of EU-EEU coopera-
tion remain bleak. Both sides politicise EU-EEU
contacts.
For Russia the problem is again conceptual.
Hence, overall conceptual settlement becomes
an issue again. While agreeing on the need to
converge norms, Moscow finds it unjustified that
it will mostly be EU norms. The EU, for its part,
believes that the EEU is a political project.
In the medium-term, cooperation between
the EU and the EEU will depend primarily
on how seriously Eurasian states treat their
integration and on whether they develop a
credible legal order.
A face-saving solution, which will allow the EU
and EEU to converge their standards without just
a one-way transfer of the EU’s rules also has to be
developed. One way to do this is to discuss rules
in the context of international organisations
(like the WTO or UN Economic Commission for
Europe).
The overall conceptual agreement on long-
termrelationswillfacilitatethedevelopment
of EU-EEU relations.
Russia and Europe in the Middle
East: a Chance for Cooperation?
The EU and Russia share numerous threats
originating in the Middle East. Among them
are radical Islam and mass terrorism; massive
immigration, bringing numerous internal
problems;mercenariestravellingtohotspotsand
back and recruiting successors; proliferation of
weapon of mass destruction, which complicates
its control and dilutes relative power of major
players; and destabilization of energy markets.
Both the EU and Russia are interested in reducing
volatility as much as possible.
The Russian vision of its role in the Middle East
is complex. Firstly, it presupposes participation
in the overall settlement of the Middle East,
which includes the elimination of the IS
(including through military means); a political
settlement in Syria on the basis of the Geneva
format and preserving it as a single and secular
state; the end of conflicts in Libya and Yemen;
overcoming the consequences of the Arab
spring, in particular in Tunisia and Egypt; the
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict; and the
prevention of civil war in Lebanon. Secondly,
any measure in Moscow’s views should be
based on non-intervention in domestic affairs,
including for any forced democratisation, on
the respect for international law and for the
rights of various Christian groups as well as
ethnic minorities (like Kurdish population). This
is again the case where conceptual principles
condition and complicate any cooperation on
a specific issue. Thirdly, Russia would like to
limit the spread of radical Islam to Russia or
its vicinity. Fourthly, it would like to preserve
its Khmeimim airbase in Syria and naval
facility in Tartus and at the same time to keep
the Middle East as a zone free of the weapon
of mass destruction and chemical weapon.
Finally, close cooperation with major oil and
gas producers in the region through the OPEC
and Forum of Gas Exporters but also bilaterally
is of major importance for Moscow.
Several formats of EU-Russian cooperation
seem to Moscow feasible and desirable in
this region. The specificity of the EU means
thatcooperationwithBrusselsshouldmostly
concentrate on laying the basis for varying
political dialogue.
MiddleEasternquartetforArab-Israelsettlement,
P5 + 1 for non-proliferation and nuclear control
in Iran as well as regular EU-Russian political
consultations at various levels should be
explored for that. In military terms, ideally
Russian side would like to see ad hoc military
cooperation on peacekeeping in Syria, which
ensures transparency and non-surprise policy
(through the Russia–NATO Council as well as
dialogues between Russia and states, involved in
the operation) as well as a more general dialogue
between Russia and the NATO. Syrian internal
settlement should ideally be done through the
International Syria Support Group, and on the
basis of the discussions in the Geneva format
between all Syrian parties.
Finally, various formats can help the EU
and Russia to fight soft security threats (like
migration dialogue or dialogue between
law enforcement authorities). In most cases,
these latter formats have remained dormant
since early 2014.

10
The views of EU member states on various
Middle Eastern problems have substantially
converged over the last years. Strengthening
EU competences through treaty reforms played
the role. Convergence is facilitated by European
External Action Service (EEAS) coordination
and by reliance on economic and humanitarian
instruments. The strength of the EU’s position
itself depends on the coherence among member
states.
In the oldest, Arab-Israeli conflict has caused
the initial divergence between former colonial
powers. Although member states still have
problems agreeing a common position on
Palestine, notably in various UN bodies, the
general line is common: establishing a more
independent Palestine state and criticizing
certain activities of Israel (like settlements).
Similarly, EU member states diverged in the
promptness and depth of reaction to Iraq
situation in 2002 or the Arab spring in 2011
(in particular, on intervention). However, they
managed to craft a common post-conflict
position.
In Syria, EU members agree on the need to fight
IS, to preserve Syria as a secular state but also to
support moderate opposition.Yet, the difference
resurfaces in relation to how much they would
like to contribute to military solution. Moreover,
member states diverge on how to manage
inflows of asylum seekers. While southern EU
members carry the disproportionate burden,
there is little consensus on how to share the
burden; some member states are reinstalling
internal Schengen barriers. While Germany calls
for solidarity, most member states refuse to host
newcomers. The strength of refugees challenge
threatens the EU’s internal stability.
Common Security in Europe:
Myth or Reality?
Russia and the EU share general concerns about
security (proliferation, terrorism and Islamic
radicalism as well as climate change and cyber
crimes, trafficking in drugs and human beings).
Yet Russia is more concerned with hard security
(nuclearweaponcontrolandanti-missiledefence
systems, and conventional arms control). These
are the fields where the EU is a policy-taker. The
culture of hard security cooperation talks has
never emerged in Russia–EU relations (unlike
Russia–US relations). The EU is more interested
in soft security issues, especially climate change.
Moscow uses this cooperation to reengage with
the West but is not a significant player in climate
change. In fighting terrorism, the EU and Russia
diverge on what to prioritise (human rights are
of utmost importance for Brussels whereas in
Russia security trumps everything).
The increased role of hard security issues
in Europe (following the events in Ukraine)
diminished the soft security agenda.
However, Russia is portrayed as the main
challengeinEurope,whichlimitscooperation
with it, amplifies US influence in Europe
and provides the NATO with a new modus
vivendi. Military drills and manoeuvring on
both sides further deteriorate the situation.
This situation prevents any meaningful
long-term strategic cooperation on security
between the EU and Russia.
The interaction is mostly limited to tactical
aspects and ad hoc deals.
The OSCE is seen as one platform of security
cooperation between the EU and Russia
even under current circumstances. However,
the vision of the partners diverges, which
complicates cooperation. The EU emphasises
the human rights’ component but believes that
Russia is blocking the OSCE effectiveness. Russia,
for its part, praises this organisation as the only
currently available discussion forum25
but links
its strategic value to the concept of indivisible
security in Europe, believing that the EU and
NATO have marginalised the OSCE and thus
block the idea of equal security for all. In sum,
the concept of cooperation in the OSCE and its
technicalities remain unclear.
The OSCE, however, can be of particular use
for monitoring ceasefire, human rights and
elections in Ukraine. This is the area were the
consensus is emerging between the EU and
Russia, once again proving that at present
partiescanonlyagreeoncooperation,which
is essential and cannot be postponed.
25
Major foreign policy events of 2015 / Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
URL: http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2003505

11
Russia–NATO dialogue remains central for
security cooperation in Europe. According to
the Russian view, the Russia–NATO Council is
to be revived at all levels, with both political
and military components, and on the basis of
mutual respect and pragmatism. In the short-
term, both parties need the Council for political
and military coordination in the Middle East,
on tactical manoeuvring and military drills, on
the implementation of the Minsk agreements,
on Afghanistan, and regional terrorist threats.
These discussions will guarantee minimum
predictability. In the long-term, the Council is
useful for restarting talks on arms reduction
and on antimissile defence system in Europe,
the latter causing particular Russian irritation.26
A return to joint military drills as well as the
exchange of students in military institutions
should take place in due time for the wider
socialisation at lower levels.
To ensure the efficiency of discussions, talks
on who is more guilty in the current crisis
should be avoided (or at least postponed for
some time).
However, the lack of mutual trust will remain the
key barrier for the effective work of the Council.
Finally, the EU and Russia diverge on the modes
of the fight against terrorism. The EU, which
still has mostly national reply to terrorism,
engages with the countries of origin or transit
of terrorists (like North African states or Turkey)
than with Russia, which fights terrorists. In doing
so, the EU relies on soft instruments. EU anti-
terrorist authorities seem to lack a strategy of
cooperation with Russia. EU military and human
resources contribution to fight is limited. Of EU
member states only France looks to set up some
operational cooperation with Russia in Syria.
Russia for its part, has always stressed that
there is no alternative to international
cooperation against the terrorist threat; it
insists on operational cooperation and the
development of anti-terrorist conventions.
Moscow is also ready to share its experience. But
similar goals are again challenged by divergence
in conceptual vision.
Despite this divergence, several formats seem
appropriate for EU-Russian cooperation. These
are permanent exchange of information on
potential terrorists, and their finance, operational
cooperation (especially among police bodies),
exchange of experience in managing inflows of
migrants, and asylum seekers, and cooperation
in various conflict-management formats (as
described above). These initiatives will allow
dealing with most burning challenges while
preserving some minimum cooperation
between the EU and Russia.
26
Comment by Russian MFA in connection with the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Permanent Representatives.
URL: http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2245344

12
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